jakman85andClaude Opus 5
1a67fc1b3c
Lets the operator's Android / Linux / Windows / macOS devices dial in from anywhere and behave like LAN machines: full reach to 192.168.2.0/24 plus internet egress out the house WAN. Opposite direction to platform/vpn-egress, which sends pods OUT through PIA; the two share nothing but the word "VPN". WireGuard because it is the only option with a first-party client on all four named platforms, and because its handshake MAC is keyed with the responder's own public key: an unauthenticated packet gets NO reply, so udp/51820 is indistinguishable from a closed port. That, not "it is encrypted", is what makes an unfiltered WAN port defensible, and why there is no source allowlist. hostNetwork: true is REQUIRED, not convenient. A pod-networked server must SNAT clients to its own pod IP, so every remote client would carry that pod's Cilium identity -- and a pod-sourced request to the shared Gateway VIP returns 403 from Envoy for ALL 16 hostnames (measured 2026-10-04), because Cilium's Gateway preserves the original source identity and enforces the destination's ingress policy. The obvious build would have shipped a healthy-looking tunnel on which every cluster web UI was 403 and *.home.keithjackson.dev did not even resolve. In the host netns traffic is SNATed to the node and arrives as host/remote-node, exactly like a LAN client. It also sidesteps the unsafe ip_forward sysctl, the L2-announcement lease lottery, and double encapsulation (hence MTU 1420). Permitted by restrict-host-namespaces' own carve-out for platform namespaces. The cost is stated in networkpolicy.yaml rather than papered over: no NetworkPolicy constrains a hostNetwork pod. A DaemonSet so the hand-made WAN forward cannot be invalidated by a reschedule; all three nodes answer the same keys, so failover is a one-line router change. Peer PUBLIC keys are plaintext in peers.yaml, which makes "who can get into my house" a reviewable PR diff. The only secret -- the server's private key -- is an out-of-band Secret: an agent must not mint a long-lived private key, and the two halves are joined only at pod start into a tmpfs that dies with the pod. Ships INERT-BUT-HEALTHY with zero peers. THREE off-repo manual steps remain (kernel module, server key, WAN forward) -- runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md. Touches clusters/** , so ci/approval-policy.sh will block pending the operator's /approve-override. Deliberately not posted by me (CLAUDE.md §1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
292 lines
18 KiB
YAML
292 lines
18 KiB
YAML
---
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# =================================================================================================
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# WireGuard remote-access listener — udp/51820 in the HOST network namespace, on every node.
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# =================================================================================================
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# WHY WireGuard AND NOT OpenVPN/IPsec. The requirement is "Android, Linux, Windows and other
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# computing clients", from anywhere on the internet, securely. WireGuard is the only option here
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# with a first-party client on all four platforms (official apps for Android/iOS/Windows/macOS, and
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# in-kernel on Linux since 5.6 — so Linux clients need no userspace daemon at all). It is also the
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# smallest attack surface of the three: one UDP port, ~4k lines of kernel code, no cipher
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# negotiation, no PKI, no user database, and — the property that actually matters for a port
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# exposed to the whole internet — it NEVER REPLIES to an unauthenticated packet. See README.
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#
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# hostNetwork: true — REQUIRED, not convenient. This is THE decision in this file.
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A VPN client must behave like a machine plugged into the LAN. In Cilium, what a packet is ALLOWED
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# to reach is decided by the SECURITY IDENTITY of its source, and after any in-pod SNAT that
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# identity is the VPN pod's — not `world`. That distinction is not academic; it was MEASURED on
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# this cluster on 2026-10-04 (decisions/2026-10-04-plex-advertise-plexdirect.md): a curl of the
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# shared Gateway VIP from inside a pod returns `403 Access denied` from Envoy for **all 16**
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# Gateway hostnames, because Cilium's Gateway preserves the original source identity and enforces
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# the DESTINATION's ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy, and every app admits `reserved:ingress` plus named
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# peers — never an arbitrary pod. LAN browsers are allowed only because they arrive as
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# `reserved:world` / `reserved:host`.
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#
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# So a pod-networked WireGuard server would have handed remote clients a tunnel on which every
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# single cluster web UI returned 403 — plex, gitea, keycloak, nextcloud, grafana, headlamp, the
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# apex, all of them — while `wg show` reported a perfectly healthy tunnel. PiHole would have failed
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# the same way and worse: apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml's ingress policy deliberately OMITS the
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# `cluster` entity, so VPN clients would not have been able to resolve `*.${BASE_DOMAIN}` either.
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# The VPN would have looked up and been useless, which is the worst failure shape available.
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#
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# In the host netns there is no pod identity to carry: forwarded client traffic is SNATed to the
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# NODE's address, so it reaches the Gateway, PiHole and every LAN host as `host`/`remote-node` —
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# exactly what a LAN client looks like. Three further problems disappear with it:
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# * net.ipv4.ip_forward is ALREADY 1 on these nodes (node_baseline writes it to
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# /etc/sysctl.d/99-k3s-cilium.conf), so no pod sysctl is needed — and `net.ipv4.ip_forward`
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# is NOT in the kubelet's safe-sysctl allowlist, so a pod-netns version of this would have
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# required `--allowed-unsafe-sysctls` on all three kubelets (a node-restart change).
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# * no LoadBalancer VIP, so no CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy lease lottery (the defect that cost
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# this LAN an 8-day Minecraft outage) and no `externalTrafficPolicy` trade-off at all.
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# * no double encapsulation. WireGuard's UDP lands on the node's own NIC, so the underlay is a
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# flat 1500-byte LAN path, not Cilium's 1450-byte VXLAN.
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#
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# hostNetwork is PERMITTED here, and not by accident: platform/kyverno/policies/
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# restrict-host-namespaces.yaml matches `namespaceSelector: app-namespace=true` only, and names
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# this exact carve-out in its own comment ("platform components that do -- e.g. Cilium,
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# node-exporter -- live in platform namespaces that do NOT carry the app-namespace label").
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# namespace.yaml is deliberately unlabelled. THE COST IS REAL AND IS STATED: a hostNetwork pod
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# bypasses the Cilium datapath, so NO NetworkPolicy constrains this workload (see
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# networkpolicy.yaml, which says so rather than pretending otherwise). The boundary protecting
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# this port is WireGuard's own cryptographic peer authentication, not the CNI.
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#
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# A DaemonSet, not a single-replica Deployment.
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The WAN port-forward on the SOHO router points at ONE node address, by hand, off-repo (same shape
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# as the plex tcp/32400 forward — runbooks/plex-remote-access.md). A Deployment would float to
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# whichever node the scheduler picked and silently invalidate that forward on every reschedule. A
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# DaemonSet instead puts an identical warm listener on ALL THREE nodes: the forward names one of
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# them, and if that node is lost, FAILOVER IS A ONE-LINE ROUTER CHANGE with no cluster work and no
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# new client profiles — every node answers the same keys. Each node binds udp/51820 in its own
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# netns, so there is no conflict, and the two idle listeners cost ~15 MiB each.
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#
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# All three nodes carry no taints (measured 2026-10-05), so no tolerations are needed for the
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# DaemonSet to cover the cluster; add them if a node is ever tainted.
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apiVersion: apps/v1
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kind: DaemonSet
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metadata:
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name: wireguard
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namespace: vpn-ingress
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: vpn-ingress
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spec:
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selector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: vpn-ingress
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# One node at a time, so a rollout never takes every listener down at once. The node named by the
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# router's forward does drop for a few seconds during its own replacement; clients re-handshake
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# automatically (WireGuard retries every 5s, and rekeys every 2 minutes regardless).
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updateStrategy:
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type: RollingUpdate
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rollingUpdate:
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maxUnavailable: 1
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template:
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metadata:
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: vpn-ingress
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# Declared for documentation and for symmetry with the app tier. It MUST be `internet`, and
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# the value is load-bearing rather than cosmetic: platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml's
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# CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy selects `egress-class: vpn` pods CLUSTER-WIDE, with no namespace
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# scope. Setting `vpn` here would steer every remote client's internet traffic out the PIA
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# tunnel instead of the house WAN — the opposite of the requirement, and it would look like
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# a working VPN with a mysterious foreign exit IP. (The selector matches on the pod label,
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# so hostNetwork does not exempt this pod from being selected.)
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: internet
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# WireGuard authenticates its own peers by public key; there is no UI and no IdP hop.
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: native
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spec:
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# See the long rationale at the head of this file. ClusterFirstWithHostNet keeps in-cluster
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# DNS working for the pod itself despite hostNetwork (without it the pod inherits the NODE's
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# resolv.conf, which points at public resolvers).
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hostNetwork: true
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dnsPolicy: ClusterFirstWithHostNet
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automountServiceAccountToken: false
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# ── Assemble the running config: PUBLIC peer register (git) + PRIVATE server key (Secret) ──
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# The two halves are deliberately stored apart (peers.yaml explains why) and are only ever
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# joined here, at pod start, into a tmpfs that is destroyed with the pod. The server's private
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# key is therefore never written to any node's disk, never committed, and never logged.
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initContainers:
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- name: assemble-config
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image: lscr.io/linuxserver/wireguard:1.0.20260223-r0-ls124
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imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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# POSIX sh. Note on $ handling: this script is rendered through Flux's envsubst (the
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# `vpn-ingress` Kustomization declares postBuild.substituteFrom), so `${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}`
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# below IS substituted on purpose — it is a declared cluster-vars knob. Every SHELL
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# variable is written bare (`$net`, `$(cmd)`), which envsubst leaves untouched. There is
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# deliberately NO braced shell-variable form anywhere in here: braces are what envsubst
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# consumes, so a shell variable written that way silently renders to the empty string.
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# (ci: flux-postbuild-substitution enforces this, and caught this very comment when it
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# first spelled the hazard out literally — the check reads comments too, correctly.)
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command:
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- /bin/sh
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- -c
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- |
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set -eu
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umask 077
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mkdir -p /config/wg_confs
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# Derive the server's own tunnel address from the single CIDR knob, so there is no
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# second knob to keep in agreement: 10.90.0.0/24 -> 10.90.0.1/24.
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net=${WG_CLIENT_CIDR}
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mask=$(echo "$net" | cut -d/ -f2)
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base=$(echo "$net" | cut -d/ -f1 | cut -d. -f1-3)
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# The key arrives as a Secret file; strip any trailing newline the operator's shell
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# added, or wg-quick rejects the config with "Key is not the correct length or format".
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key=$(tr -d ' \r\n' < /run/wg-server-key/privatekey)
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if [ -z "$key" ]; then
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echo "FATAL: /run/wg-server-key/privatekey is empty." >&2
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echo " See runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md step 1 (create the server key)." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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{
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echo '[Interface]'
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echo "Address = $base.1/$mask"
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echo 'ListenPort = 51820'
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# 1420 = 1500 (flat LAN/WAN path to the node's own NIC) - 60 bytes of WireGuard
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# encapsulation (20 IPv4 + 8 UDP + 32 WireGuard). This is also what wg-quick would
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# auto-derive, but it is pinned because the symptom of getting it wrong is the
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# nastiest kind: handshakes and SSH work while large packets (HTTPS, file copies)
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# hang. Inner packets stay under Cilium's 1450-byte VXLAN MTU too, so reaching a
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# cluster pod does not fragment either.
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echo 'MTU = 1420'
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printf 'PrivateKey = %s\n' "$key"
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# ── Forwarding + SNAT, applied in the HOST netns when wg0 comes up ──
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# ip_forward is already 1 from node_baseline; re-asserted so this component does not
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# silently depend on another role's sysctl file surviving.
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echo 'PostUp = sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1'
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# SNAT client traffic to the node's address. REQUIRED: without it a LAN host would
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# reply to 10.90.0.x, find no route, hand the packet to the router, and the router
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# would drop it — so every connection would hang rather than fail. Matching on
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# `! -o wg0` rather than a named `-o eth0` keeps this independent of the node's NIC
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# name. Each rule is add-if-absent so a pod killed without PostDown does not
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# accumulate duplicates in the host's tables across restarts.
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echo "PostUp = iptables -t nat -C POSTROUTING -s $net ! -o wg0 -j MASQUERADE 2>/dev/null || iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s $net ! -o wg0 -j MASQUERADE"
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echo 'PostUp = iptables -C FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || iptables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT'
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echo 'PostUp = iptables -C FORWARD -o wg0 -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || iptables -A FORWARD -o wg0 -j ACCEPT'
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echo "PostDown = iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s $net ! -o wg0 -j MASQUERADE 2>/dev/null || true"
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echo 'PostDown = iptables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || true'
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echo 'PostDown = iptables -D FORWARD -o wg0 -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || true'
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echo ''
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} > /config/wg_confs/wg0.conf
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cat /run/wg-peers/peers.conf >> /config/wg_confs/wg0.conf
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chmod 600 /config/wg_confs/wg0.conf
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# Report the SHAPE of the result, never its content — the file now holds the server's
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# private key, and a log line is a transcript (CLAUDE.md §6).
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echo "wg0.conf assembled: $(grep -c '^\[Peer\]' /config/wg_confs/wg0.conf || true) peer(s), server $base.1/$mask, udp/51820."
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securityContext:
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runAsUser: 0
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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capabilities:
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drop:
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- ALL
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 10m
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memory: 16Mi
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limits:
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memory: 64Mi
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volumeMounts:
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- { name: wg-config, mountPath: /config }
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- { name: wg-server-key, mountPath: /run/wg-server-key, readOnly: true }
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- { name: wg-peers, mountPath: /run/wg-peers, readOnly: true }
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containers:
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- name: wireguard
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# linuxserver/wireguard — provides wg, wg-quick and iptables on a maintained, multi-arch
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# base. Pinned to the full upstream+build tag (1.0.20260223, published 2026-10-01) rather
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# than `latest`, per the crafty/oauth2-proxy convention; Renovate maintains it.
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#
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# NO `PEERS` ENV IS SET, DELIBERATELY. With PEERS the image runs in "server mode" and
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# GENERATES keypairs at runtime — which would put the authoritative peer list on a
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# container filesystem instead of in git, and (worse) print client private keys and QR
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# codes into the POD LOG, where they would be readable by anyone with log access and
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# shipped to Loki. Supplying our own /config/wg_confs/wg0.conf selects the image's
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# bring-up-what-you-are-given path instead.
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image: lscr.io/linuxserver/wireguard:1.0.20260223-r0-ls124
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imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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env:
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- name: TZ
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value: "America/Chicago"
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ports:
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# hostNetwork, so containerPort IS the node port. Declared for documentation and so
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# `kubectl get pod -o wide` shows what this listener owns.
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- { name: wireguard, containerPort: 51820, hostPort: 51820, protocol: UDP }
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securityContext:
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# NET_ADMIN is the whole privilege budget: create the wg0 link, set the host sysctl, and
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# write the two netfilter rules above. Everything else is dropped, and the container is
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# NOT privileged — which also keeps it clear of restrict-host-namespaces' second rule.
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# SYS_MODULE is deliberately NOT granted: the `wireguard` module is loaded by the node
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# (infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline, node_baseline_kernel_modules), so this container
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# never needs to load a kernel module. If the module is missing the pod CrashLoops with
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# a clear wg-quick error rather than quietly falling back to slow userspace WireGuard.
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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capabilities:
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drop:
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- ALL
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add:
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- NET_ADMIN
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# readOnlyRootFilesystem intentionally UNSET: the image's s6 init writes under /run and
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# /var during startup. Same deferral as crafty/headlamp.
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 25m
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memory: 32Mi
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limits:
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# Kernel WireGuard does its crypto in the KERNEL, not in this container, so throughput
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# does not consume the container's budget. The limit covers s6 plus the tmpfs holding
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# wg0.conf (a memory-medium emptyDir counts against this).
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memory: 128Mi
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# `wg show wg0` exits non-zero when the interface is absent, which is the one failure that
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# matters and the one that a port probe cannot see: a crashed or never-created wg0 leaves
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# udp/51820 silent, and WireGuard is silent to unauthenticated traffic ANYWAY, so "nothing
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# answers" is indistinguishable from "working" from the outside. This probe is the only
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# thing that tells the difference.
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startupProbe:
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exec:
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command: ["sh", "-c", "wg show wg0 >/dev/null"]
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periodSeconds: 5
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failureThreshold: 24
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livenessProbe:
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exec:
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command: ["sh", "-c", "wg show wg0 >/dev/null"]
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periodSeconds: 30
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failureThreshold: 3
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volumeMounts:
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- { name: wg-config, mountPath: /config }
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# Read-only so the image can SEE whether the kernel module is present and fail with a
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# real message. It cannot load one (no SYS_MODULE) — that is the node's job.
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- { name: lib-modules, mountPath: /lib/modules, readOnly: true }
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volumes:
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# tmpfs. The assembled wg0.conf contains the server's private key, so it must never land on
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# a node's disk — `medium: Memory` guarantees that and guarantees it is gone when the pod is.
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- name: wg-config
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emptyDir:
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medium: Memory
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sizeLimit: 1Mi
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# The ONLY secret in this component. Created OUT OF BAND by the operator and referenced by
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# name (R-IDP-04) — runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md step 1. It is NOT a *.sops.yaml in this
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# tree on purpose: an agent must not mint a long-lived private key (CLAUDE.md §6), and a key
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# that passed through a session transcript would have to be treated as compromised.
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# DR: Velero's `daily` schedule excludes only `monitoring` and `unifi`, so this namespace
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# and this Secret ARE captured off-cluster (platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml). Keep a copy
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# in the operator's password manager as well — restoring it is what makes every already
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# enrolled client work again without re-enrolling.
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- name: wg-server-key
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secret:
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secretName: wg-server-key
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defaultMode: 0400
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items:
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- { key: privatekey, path: privatekey }
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- name: wg-peers
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configMap:
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name: wg-peers
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- name: lib-modules
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hostPath:
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path: /lib/modules
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type: Directory
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