The last steps of a prod bring-up were living in shell history: resume the tiers in the right order, clear a wedged HelmRelease, fix external-dns without deleting the other cluster's DNS. That is the same failure the Kyverno CRD pre-apply had, so it gets the same treatment. bootstrap/standup.sh — environment-agnostic (R-ENV-02), no dev/prod fork. Six idempotent steps: preflight, crds, unwedge, externaldns, resume, verify. THE GUARD IS THE POINT. --expect-server is MANDATORY and is compared against the live API server before any step runs; there is no override flag. Dev is live and shares the keithjackson.dev Cloudflare zone with prod, and on 2026-09-04 prod deleted every one of dev's public records. Negative control run: prod's kubeconfig with dev's server URL refuses and changes nothing. preflight fails closed if EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID is empty, still the base sentinel, or `default` (dev's owner) — the exact condition that caused the incident. It also surfaces SUSPENDED HelmReleases separately, because a suspended release keeps its last Ready condition and a stale `Ready=True` otherwise hides that Flux is not managing it at all (external-dns today). externaldns is the dangerous step, and the ordering IS the mitigation. A Helm upgrade resets replicas to 1 and applies new args in ONE operation, so there is no window to check the result first; if --txt-owner-id were missing the pod starts as owner `default` and syncs away dev's records. So the step PROVES THE OUTCOME BEFORE CAUSING IT: render the chart with the LIVE HelmRelease values and assert --txt-owner-id=<owner> appears, aborting if not. Rendering is deterministic and touches nothing, which turns a race into a precondition. Then snapshot Cloudflare, upgrade, re-verify live args (scale to 0 and fail if wrong), and diff the zone. resume walks the dependency order and STOPS at the first tier that does not go Ready — a partial understood bring-up beats a forced green. velero is skipped while S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is the TBD placeholder. TWO BUGS CAUGHT WHILE VALIDATING THIS, both by measuring instead of assuming: 1. preflight counted Kyverno CRDs with grep 'kyverno.io' and reported 20 of 22 — the policy-report types are in the wgpolicyk8s.io group. A preflight that under-reports reads as "the pre-apply failed" when it succeeded. Fixed and re-run: 22. 2. The documented node-health invocation used -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod and SILENTLY RAN AGAINST DEV'S THREE NODES. Diagnostic plays deliberately keep their own target var (node_health_hosts, memattr_survey_hosts, vpn_egress_gateway_hosts) so they stay pointable while a bring-up is scoped elsewhere — a good design I did NOT change. The hazard is that the wrong flag does not error, it falls through to the dev default. Caught only by --list-hosts; the doc now leads with that warning and a dry-run command. Verified after fixing: node-health and all six site.yml plays target prod. .claude/settings.local.json — permission rules for the above. Every entry hardcodes prod's kubeconfig AND prod's --expect-server (or prod's ansible groups), so the permission strings are themselves prod-scoped and cannot be turned against dev. Deliberately NO rule for `dev.sh run bash -c *`, which would have been blanket cluster access wearing a narrow-looking mask. Refs R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01, R-SEC-02. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
11 KiB
Prod cluster standup — the complete command sequence
Every command below is copy-pasteable and runs from the repo root, through the pinned dev container. Nothing here needs a command invented on the spot; that is the point. If a step is not in this file it is not part of standup.
State as of 2026-09-05: phases A and B are DONE on the current hardware. The cluster is
live (k3s v1.36.4 HA, 3 etcd members, kube-vip, Cilium 1.20.1, Longhorn) with platform reconciling
and 8/9 HelmReleases Ready, 76/76 pods Running. Outstanding work is phase C, blocked on the
two items in §Blockers.
The one guard that matters. Dev is LIVE and shares the
keithjackson.devCloudflare zone with prod. On 2026-09-04 prod deleted every one of dev's public DNS records.bootstrap/standup.shtherefore requires--expect-serverand compares it against the live API server before running anything. There is no override flag. Do not add one.
Constants
| kube-API (kube-vip VIP) | https://192.168.2.9:6443 |
| Gateway / ingress VIP | 192.168.2.20 |
| Nodes | k3s-prod-1/2/3 — 192.168.2.10 / .11 / .12 |
| Break-glass kubeconfig | infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig (cert-based; survives OIDC/DNS failure) |
| GitOps source (interim) | http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git branch main |
BASE_DOMAIN |
prod.home.keithjackson.dev — not the apex; see §Blockers |
Container paths: the repo is mounted at /work, so kubeconfig paths passed to the script are
repo-relative (infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig).
Phase A — bare metal to a joined cluster (Ansible)
Prerequisites that are not commands: firmware/BIOS (§1), disk layout (§2), OS install (§3),
network (§4), and SSH + the vaulted ansible_become_password in
inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml (§5). Ansible cannot escalate on prod without that vault
file. See infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md.
Install the backports kernel first. All three prod nodes need ≥6.13 because HP's R21 firmware
publishes a corrupt EFI Memory Attributes Table and Linux 6.12's efi_memattr_init() does not
validate it, reserving everything above the table (fixed upstream in 6.13 by 8fbe4c49c0cc, absent
from linux-6.12.y). Prod runs 7.1.8+deb13-amd64 from trixie-backports.
timeout 3600 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run env ANSIBLE_CONFIG=/work/infra/ansible/ansible.cfg \
ansible-playbook /work/infra/ansible/playbooks/node-baseline.yml \
-i /work/infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags kernel
Then the full chain — baseline, k3s HA, Cilium, verify, Flux hand-off. All three -e flags are
required: a play's hosts: is templated before any host exists, so group_vars cannot retarget it.
timeout 3600 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run env ANSIBLE_CONFIG=/work/infra/ansible/ansible.cfg \
ansible-playbook /work/infra/ansible/playbooks/site.yml \
-i /work/infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini \
-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod -e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary
kube-vip is a separate play (not imported by site.yml):
timeout 1800 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run env ANSIBLE_CONFIG=/work/infra/ansible/ansible.cfg \
ansible-playbook /work/infra/ansible/playbooks/kube-vip.yml \
-i /work/infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
Hardware health (read-only; node_health asserts the memattr fix took and that all RAM is addressed).
The flag is
node_health_hosts, NOTk3s_hosts. Diagnostic plays deliberately keep their own target var so they stay independently pointable while a bring-up run is scoped elsewhere (node-health.yml→node_health_hosts,memattr-survey.yml→memattr_survey_hosts,vpn.egress.gateway.yml→vpn_egress_gateway_hosts). The consequence is a silent one: passingk3s_hosts=k3s_prodhere does not error, it falls through to thek3s_serversdefault and runs against DEV's three nodes. Verified — this exact mistake was made while writing this file and caught only by--list-hosts. Always dry-run the target first:timeout 200 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run env ANSIBLE_CONFIG=/work/infra/ansible/ansible.cfg \ ansible-playbook /work/infra/ansible/playbooks/node-health.yml \ -i /work/infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini -e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod --list-hosts
timeout 900 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run env ANSIBLE_CONFIG=/work/infra/ansible/ansible.cfg \
ansible-playbook /work/infra/ansible/playbooks/node-health.yml \
-i /work/infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini -e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod
Phase B — Flux bootstrap
flux-bootstrap.yml (last play of site.yml) shells to bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh, the single
documented entrypoint. That script now runs the CRD pre-apply as step [2/4], so a cold bootstrap
no longer strands platform. The age private key Secret must exist first — bootstrap verifies it
and refuses to continue rather than silently skipping decryption
(bootstrap/sops/age-key-secret.md).
Phase C — bring the reconciliation graph up
One script, six steps, each independently runnable and idempotent. Run them in this order.
K=infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig
S=https://192.168.2.9:6443
C1 — preflight (read-only, changes nothing)
Asserts the guards that prevent a repeat of the DNS incident and reports every tier's state. Fails
closed if EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID is empty, still the base sentinel, or default (dev's owner).
timeout 300 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 preflight
C2 — pre-apply chart CRDs (idempotent)
timeout 600 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 crds
C3 — unwedge stuck Helm releases
A release left in uninstalling / pending-* cannot be advanced by helm-controller: it reports
StateError forever, so platform (wait: true) never goes Ready and all 10 tiers below it stall.
Dry run by default — it prints what it would do and changes nothing:
timeout 600 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 unwedge
To act (this deletes the release's Kubernetes objects and lets Flux install cold). Pre-applied CRDs live outside the Helm release and survive, which is exactly why C2 comes first:
timeout 900 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 \
--confirm-destructive unwedge
C4 — external-dns safe upgrade
The most dangerous step in the repo, and the ordering is the entire mitigation. A Helm upgrade
resets replicas to the chart default (1) and applies the new args in ONE operation — there is no
window in which to check the result first. If --txt-owner-id were missing, the pod starts as owner
default, claims dev's TXT registry entries, and under policy: sync deletes the records behind
them.
So this step proves the outcome before causing it: it renders the chart with the live
HelmRelease values and asserts --txt-owner-id=<owner> appears, aborting if not. Rendering is
deterministic and touches nothing, which converts a race into a precondition. It then snapshots the
Cloudflare zone, upgrades, re-verifies the live args (scaling to 0 and failing if they are wrong),
and diffs the zone.
timeout 900 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 externaldns
Expected diff: additions only, all under prod.home.keithjackson.dev, all TXT entries owner
prod. Any change to a name outside that subtree, or to a TXT entry owned by another cluster, is a
regression — stop and investigate.
C5 — resume the tiers, in dependency order
platform → platform-config → {oauth2-proxy, headlamp, homepage, crafty, apps-wave-0, apps-vms} → apps-wave-1 → apps-wave-2. Waits for each to go Ready and stops at the first that does not — a
partial, understood bring-up beats a forced green. velero is skipped while S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is
a placeholder (see §Blockers). Long-running; expect it to background.
timeout 3600 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 resume
C6 — verify
timeout 900 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 verify
Everything at once
Runs C1→C6 with unwedge in dry-run mode (no --confirm-destructive), so it stops short of the
destructive step by design:
timeout 3600 infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bootstrap/standup.sh \
--kubeconfig infra/ansible/.cache/prod.kubeconfig --expect-server https://192.168.2.9:6443 all
Blockers
1. S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is an intentional placeholder — operator decision required
Prod sets TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT on purpose: base defaults are the dev values, so an
omitted override would make prod silently inherit dev's address (http://192.168.1.9:9000), which
prod cannot reach anyway. A loud placeholder beats a silent wrong answer.
It is consumed by velero and apps-wave-0. velero is skipped by C5. apps-wave-0 still
applies — the token is defined, so strict substitution succeeds — but anything writing to that
endpoint fails at runtime, not at apply time. A green apps-wave-0 does not mean backups
work. Until a real prod endpoint is set, treat prod as having no backup coverage.
2. Prod is on prod.home.keithjackson.dev, not the apex
The operator's target layout is dev under *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev and prod on the apex.
Prod cannot take the apex until dev vacates it, because both clusters would request a
letsencrypt-prod wildcard for the same name set and race each other's _acme-challenge TXT
records, so neither reliably solves DNS-01.
This does not block phase C. Prod on its own subtree with txtOwnerId: prod collides with
nothing, and standing it up first is strictly better: it proves the whole stack before the flip, so
the cutover becomes a DNS/TLS change on a known-good cluster instead of a bring-up and a cutover at
once. The apex move is infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10a, sequence D (dev vacates) then P.
Not covered here
- Dev's migration off the apex — §10a sequence D. Touches Keycloak's issuer, ~12 OIDC client redirect URIs, and a rolling k3s restart that invalidates every OIDC kubeconfig. Operator-present.
- Prod's GitOps cutover (P5) from the workstation bootstrap Gitea to prod's own in-cluster Gitea.
clusters/prod/kustomization.yamlowns that procedure. - Six L2 conformance tests hardcode the apex and must be parameterized per environment before §9's "suite passes green against the prod cluster" can be claimed.