Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
9.5 KiB
cnpg-exporter — The CNPG metrics collector is erroring (a database is invisible)
Alert: CNPGMetricsCollectorErroring (warning, 6h)
File: platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.cnpg
Expression: max by (namespace, pod) (cnpg_last_error) == 1
What this means here
This is the monitor's own blind spot, for databases — a failure that looks exactly like health.
CloudNativePG publishes two independent metric families and only one of them depends on SQL:
cnpg_collector_*comes from the instance manager and is always present.cnpg_pg_stat_*(archiver, database, replication) comes from the exporter logging in to the application database as thecnpg_metrics_exporterrole.
When that login fails, cnpg_last_error goes to 1 and the entire cnpg_pg_stat_* family blanks for
that instance — while up stays 1 and cnpg_collector_up stays 1. Nothing looks broken. The scrape
target is green. The dashboards have gaps that read as "no data" rather than "broken".
This is not hypothetical, and it shaped the whole alert file. Measured live on 2026-09-06 on both
clusters, cnpg_errors_total carried:
pg_stat_archiver on db nextcloud: failed to connect to `user=cnpg_metrics_exporter database=nextcloud`:
FATAL: permission denied for database "nextcloud" (SQLSTATE 42501)
nextcloud-db had been publishing no pg_stat_archiver / pg_stat_database metrics at all. The
consequence recorded verbatim: an archiving alert built on pg_stat_archiver — the obvious choice —
would have been silently blind to one of three prod databases. That is why every DR rule in
platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml keys on cnpg_collector_* instead, and why this rule exists to alert on the
blind spot itself.
Scope: pod is kept here, deliberately and unchanged. cnpg_last_error is genuinely per-instance —
each instance's own exporter reports its own SQL-collection health — and prod proved the metric
discriminates rather than tracking role: all three nextcloud-db pods (including primary -2)
reported 1 while all six keycloak/semaphore pods reported 0. There is no primary-only defect to fix,
and per-pod is the right granularity because the remedy is a GRANT applied per database and you want
to see it clear on every instance.
for: 6h keeps a pod restart or a brief connection blip quiet. Severity stays warning so it never
becomes the permanently-firing critical this repo has been burned by.
Live state, measured 2026-09-13: max by (namespace,pod) (cnpg_last_error) == 1 returned empty
across the 9 instances that publish cnpg_last_error — so the nextcloud grant appears to have been
addressed. Re-measure rather than assuming either way.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers
about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.)
Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
First commands
Which instances are erroring:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=max by (namespace,pod) (cnpg_last_error)" localhost:19090/api/v1/query | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "pod|\"1\""'
The message itself — cnpg_errors_total carries it in an errorUserQueries label. This is the one
command that tells you the cause outright:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=cnpg_errors_total" localhost:19090/api/v1/query | python3 -m json.tool | head -60'
Or straight from the instance's metrics endpoint:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n nextcloud-db exec nextcloud-db-2 -c postgres -- \
curl -s localhost:9187/metrics | grep -E "^cnpg_last_error|^cnpg_errors_total|^cnpg_collector_up" | head -20'
Confirm which family is actually missing — this is what makes the blind spot visible:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
for q in "count(cnpg_collector_up)" "count(cnpg_last_error)" "count(cnpg_pg_stat_archiver_archived_count)" "count(cnpg_pg_stat_database_xact_commit)"; do \
printf "%-50s " "$q"; curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=$q" localhost:19090/api/v1/query \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;print([x[\"value\"][1] for x in json.load(sys.stdin)[\"data\"][\"result\"]] or \"ABSENT\")"; done'
The exporter role's actual grants:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n nextcloud-db exec nextcloud-db-2 -c postgres -- \
psql -tAc "select rolname, rolcanlogin from pg_roles where rolname = \"cnpg_metrics_exporter\";" \
-c "select datname, has_database_privilege(\"cnpg_metrics_exporter\", datname, \"CONNECT\") from pg_database where datistemplate = false;"'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. The exporter role lacks CONNECT on the application database
The recorded cause. Signature: SQLSTATE 42501, permission denied for database "<name>" in
cnpg_errors_total. Remedy: grant the cnpg_metrics_exporter role CONNECT on the application
database. Do it declaratively — CNPG can manage roles and the managed.roles / bootstrap surface in the
Cluster spec is where this belongs, so the grant survives a re-seed. A psql GRANT by hand fixes the
symptom on one instance and vanishes on the next bootstrap.
2. Custom monitoring queries reference something that does not exist
CNPG lets a Cluster attach extra collector queries via a ConfigMap. A query against a missing table,
extension or column fails the whole collection pass for that instance. cnpg_errors_total's label names
the failing query.
3. The database is not accepting connections
A read-only/recovery state, max_connections exhausted, or the instance mid-restart. Cross-read
/runbooks/keycloak-db if the instance is keycloak-db-*. Note the deliberate setting
dataDurability: preferred (never required) exists so a degraded standby cannot block writes here.
4. An upgrade changed the exporter's expectations
CNPG 1.30.0 is the verified operator version on both clusters. A major operator or Postgres bump can
change the collector's queries; if this started at an upgrade, read /runbooks/update-rollback.
5. The instance is fine and the whole scrape is gone
Then up for that job would be 0 and this is the wrong runbook — /runbooks/targets-down. The precise
value of this alert is the case where up is 1 and the data is still missing.
When to escalate or stop
- Understand what you are currently blind to. While this fires,
cnpg_pg_stat_archiver,cnpg_pg_stat_databaseandcnpg_pg_stat_replicationare missing for that instance. The DR alerts inplatform/cnpg/alerts.yamlare deliberately built oncnpg_collector_*so they still work — but do not build any new alert or dashboard onpg_stat_*without checking this first. That is the trap this alert exists to mark. - Do not silence it. It is a warning with a 6h
forprecisely so it can be left visible without becoming noise, and it was a true positive for months. - Do not grant the exporter role broad privileges to make it go away. CONNECT on the application database is the whole requirement; anything more widens the blast radius of a metrics credential.
- Do not restart the database to clear it — the error is a grant, not a state.
- Escalate to the operator if the fix requires changing the Cluster's managed roles or bootstrap, since that touches the database's declarative definition and its DR path.
Source of truth: runbooks/cnpg-exporter.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml (the 2026-09-06 SQLSTATE 42501 measurement on nextcloud-db, the
two-metric-families finding, and the 2026-09-12 scope audit that deliberately kept pod).