Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
8.4 KiB
kubevirt-crashloop — A VM's virt-launcher pod is restarting repeatedly
Alert: KubeVirtVMCrashLooping (warning, 10m)
File: platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.kubevirt
Expression: increase(kube_pod_container_status_restarts_total{pod=~"virt-launcher-.*"}[15m]) > 3
What this means here
More than three restarts of a virt-launcher pod in 15 minutes. The threshold is chosen to distinguish a
crash-loop from a one-off reboot: a guest that restarts once is not interesting, a guest that restarts
four times in a quarter of an hour is either panicking, being OOM-killed, or crashing qemu.
Note what layer this watches: the pod, not the guest. virt-launcher wraps qemu, so a guest kernel
panic, an OOM kill of the launcher, and a qemu crash all present the same way here. The distinction comes
from the logs and the events, not from the alert.
This is a warning, correctly: the VM tier is deliberately non-gating (apps-vms is wait: false) and a
crash-looping VM does not affect the container platform. The one caveat is that on this network the UniFi
VM is the home network's controller, so that VM crash-looping is user-visible.
Two platform facts that shape the likely causes:
- These are HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Minis with ~22 GiB usable each, running the whole platform. A VM is the largest discretionary memory consumer on a node, so OOM is a live possibility rather than a theoretical one.
useEmulation: falseis set deliberately — on KubeVirt v1.9,truesilently forces TCG. A VM running under TCG burns a whole core per vCPU, and heavy sustained TCG load has been observed to degrade the Cilium datapath into intermittent LB-VIP unreachability (cleared by a restart). So "the VM is unstable and the network is flaky" is usually one cause, not two.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers
about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.)
Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
First commands
Which launcher, how many restarts, on which node:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pods -A -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher -o wide; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod get vmi -A -o wide'
Why it died — the previous container's log is the one that matters:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n unifi logs -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher --previous --tail=120 2>&1 | tail -60'
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n unifi describe pod -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher 2>&1 | sed -n "/Last State/,\$p" | head -40'
Was it OOM-killed?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get events -A --field-selector reason=OOMKilling --sort-by=.lastTimestamp | tail -10; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod top pods -A --sort-by=memory | head -10'
ssh k3s-prod-1 'dmesg -T | grep -iE "oom|killed process" | tail -10; free -h; swapon --show'
(An empty swapon --show is what you want. On 2026-09-07 all three prod nodes came back from a reboot with
977 MiB of swap active while the role reported success — SwapTotal == 0 is not evidence swap is off.
See /runbooks/node-memory.)
Is it really TCG rather than KVM?
ssh k3s-prod-1 'ls -l /dev/kvm; grep -c -E "vmx|svm" /proc/cpuinfo; ps -eo pid,pcpu,comm | grep -i qemu'
Is the disk healthy underneath?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUST:.status.robustness,STATE:.status.state | grep -v healthy'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. The guest is panicking or the guest OS is broken
Read the serial console via the previous container's log. A guest that panics at boot after a change is
usually a bad cloud-init or a bad image. Two precise traps here: KubeVirt caps inline userData at 2048
bytes (the shipped payload is a deliberately minimal ~1.1 KB inline blob; userDataSecretRef was tried
and reverted), and apps-vms must NOT carry postBuild.substituteFrom — Flux's envsubst rewrote
${...} inside the cloud-init and corrupted it (commit da1f833). Do not restore substitution there for
consistency with the app waves.
2. The launcher is being OOM-killed
On ~22 GiB nodes running the whole platform, a VM with a generous memory request plus Prometheus (3Gi) and
Grafana (768Mi) is tight. Remediation: lower the VM's memory in git, or address node memory
(/runbooks/node-memory). Check swap is genuinely off first — active swap makes the kubelet's accounting
lie and eviction misbehave.
3. qemu is crashing
The launcher log will carry the qemu error. Most often a device or firmware mismatch: a UEFI image needs
firmware.efi, and containerDisk does not work here at all (it requires the ALPHA ImageVolume gate,
off on k3s — use a CDI DataVolume). See /runbooks/kubevirt-launch-failed.
4. The disk is unavailable or degraded mid-flight
A longhorn-vm volume that went degraded or faulted takes the guest with it. Cross-read
/runbooks/longhorn-degraded and /runbooks/longhorn-faulted. Remember longhorn-vm is Block mode
only and migratable: true; a VM on plain longhorn cannot live-migrate.
5. Node I/O pressure is starving the guest
A guest whose virtual disk cannot complete writes will wedge and be restarted. /runbooks/node-io — and
note the guest's writes land on the same partition as the embedded etcd WAL, so a thrashing VM is a
control-plane risk, not just its own problem.
6. It is running under TCG
useEmulation: true forces it on v1.9. Confirm with /dev/kvm presence and qemu CPU usage. Fix in git.
When to escalate or stop
- Bound the damage first. If the VM is thrashing the disk, its restarts are loading the node that
etcd writes to. If
/runbooks/node-iois also firing, stopping the VM (an operator action on theVMobject,spec.running: falsein git) is the right move — protecting the control plane beats keeping one VM trying. - Do not delete the DataVolume or the PVC. A re-import is hours of I/O on the shared partition.
- Do not
kubectl drainthe node to relocate it. This cluster does not drain, and a VM live-migrates on drain only with per-VMevictionStrategy: LiveMigrate; a blanket setting would wedge drains for RWO-disk VMs. - Escalate if the guest needs in-guest repair — that is console work, and for the UniFi VM it is also home-network-visible.
- If the alert is firing for a
virt-launcherin a leaked test namespace, deleting that namespace is the fix; leaked TCG test namespaces have caused API blips here before.
Source of truth: runbooks/kubevirt-crashloop.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md Session 7 (useEmulation, firmware.efi, containerDisk/ImageVolume);
commit da1f833 (cloud-init corrupted by envsubst); the 2026-09-07 swap-persistence finding.