Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
8.6 KiB
longhorn-capacity — A Longhorn volume or node is near its storage capacity
Alerts: LonghornVolumeCapacityHigh (warning, 30m) and LonghornNodeStorageHigh (warning, 30m)
File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.longhorn
Expressions:
(longhorn_volume_actual_size_bytes / longhorn_volume_capacity_bytes) > 0.85
(longhorn_node_storage_usage_bytes / longhorn_node_storage_capacity_bytes) > 0.85
What this means here
Either one volume is 85% full, or one node's Longhorn disk is 85% allocated. They are different
problems with different fixes, so read the labels: volume means a workload is filling its own PVC;
node means the cluster is running out of places to put replicas.
The node case is bounded by settings that are already conservative:
storageReservedPercentageForDefaultDisk: 20, storageMinimalAvailablePercentage: 25,
storageOverProvisioningPercentage: 200, defaultDataLocality: disabled, hard node anti-affinity.
Measured headroom on prod is roughly 269 GiB scheduled against an 829 GiB ceiling, so the node
alert firing means something has changed materially, not that the platform has slowly grown.
The severe consequence of running out of node storage is that a degraded volume cannot finish
rebuilding — hard anti-affinity needs three distinct nodes with room, so one full node pins a
volume at 2 replicas indefinitely. Cross-read /runbooks/longhorn-degraded.
Verify the alert can even fire (measured 2026-09-13)
Prometheus on prod scrapes 19 jobs: apiserver, cdi-prometheus-metrics, coredns,
keycloak-discovery, keycloak-service, keycloak/keycloak-db, kube-prometheus-stack-alertmanager,
kube-prometheus-stack-grafana, kube-prometheus-stack-operator, kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus,
kube-state-metrics, kubelet, kubevirt-prometheus-metrics, nextcloud-db/nextcloud-db,
node-exporter, oauth2-proxy, semaphore-db/semaphore-db, velero, velero/node-agent.
There is no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble/Cilium job. Check the series this
rule depends on before you trust its silence:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & \
sleep 5; curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=count by (job) (up)" localhost:19090/api/v1/query'
These alerts are currently INERT. count(longhorn_volume_capacity_bytes) and
count(longhorn_node_storage_capacity_bytes) both returned 0 series on prod on 2026-09-13 —
Longhorn ships no ServiceMonitor here. Volume-fill coverage actually comes from
kubelet_volume_stats_* instead, i.e. /runbooks/pvc-capacity, which is where the working alerts
are. Use this runbook for the Longhorn-side (node allocation) half, and expect to reach it by hand.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers
about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.)
Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
First commands
Node-level allocation (the half that has no substitute alert):
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get nodes.longhorn.io -o yaml | grep -E "name:|storageAvailable|storageMaximum|storageScheduled|allowScheduling"'
Volume sizes versus actual usage:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,SPEC:.spec.size,ACTUAL:.status.actualSize,ROBUST:.status.robustness'
Which PVC each one is, so you know who is filling it:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pv -o custom-columns=PV:.metadata.name,CLAIM:.spec.claimRef.namespace/.spec.claimRef.name,SIZE:.spec.capacity.storage,SC:.spec.storageClassName'
The filesystem view, which is the alert that actually works:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=topk(10, 1 - kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes{job=\"kubelet\"} / kubelet_volume_stats_capacity_bytes{job=\"kubelet\"})" localhost:19090/api/v1/query'
On the node itself:
ssh k3s-prod-1 'df -h /data; du -xh --max-depth=1 /data/longhorn/replicas 2>/dev/null | sort -h | tail'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. A CNPG database is not recycling WAL (check this FIRST)
The only cause here that grows without bound. archive_mode=on plus a failing archive_command means
Postgres will not recycle unarchived WAL; measured on prod keycloak-db at ~6.8 MiB/h with pg_wal
sharing the data PVC (no walStorage: is configured on any Cluster) — about 29 days from 93% free to
disk-full, ending in a postmaster PANIC. Go to /runbooks/cnpg-archiving. Never delete WAL by
hand.
2. Snapshots and orphaned replicas accumulating
Longhorn snapshots are not free, and cleanup here is manual: orphanAutoDeletion: true in
platform/longhorn/helmrelease.yaml has been silently inert since Longhorn 1.12 — it was renamed
orphanResourceAutoDeletion (now a list) and the chart drops unknown defaultSettings keys with no
error. Verify the key's current state in that file before citing it; then prune orphans and stale
snapshots from the Longhorn UI.
3. A workload genuinely grew
Plex/Sonarr/Radarr media does not live on Longhorn — it is static NFS from
192.168.2.102:/mnt/Storage/plex, via the bulk tier. If a media volume is on longhorn, that is a
misconfiguration worth fixing, not a capacity problem: the bulk StorageClass is a stub
(provisioner: nfs.csi.k8s.io, server:/share: REPLACE-ME) and provisions nothing, so real bulk
storage is static NFS PVs. Otherwise expand the PVC — all Longhorn classes have
allowVolumeExpansion: true; change the size in git and push.
4. Replicas piled onto one node
replicaAutoBalance: best-effort should prevent this, and hard anti-affinity bounds it to one replica
per volume per node. If one node is much fuller than the others, check whether a rebuild placed
replicas there while another node was down.
5. The cluster has outgrown its disks
Prod's ceiling is ~829 GiB across three nodes. docs/plans/longhorn-ssd-tiering.md is the planned
answer (a ~51 GB hot tier: Prometheus, CNPG, Loki, Gitea). Operator planning work.
When to escalate or stop
- A node over 85% while any volume is degraded is urgent, because the rebuild cannot complete. Free space or restore the other node before anything else.
- Never delete files under
/data/longhornor inside a Postgrespg_wal. Both are irreversible. - Do not expand a PVC as a reflex if the cause is unrecycled WAL — you are buying days and hiding the real fault.
- Escalate for adding disks, the SSD tiering plan, or anything that needs a node reboot (each reboot degrades all ~18 volumes and triggers a rebuild storm).
Source of truth: runbooks/longhorn-capacity.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: platform/longhorn/helmrelease.yaml (the settings above and the inert orphanAutoDeletion);
platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml header (the WAL disk-full clock); docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md.