Files
home-network-k3s-impl/runbooks/longhorn-degraded.md
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 44983095e1 feat(runbooks): make the 42 alert runbook_url annotations resolve
Every platform-health alert rule carries
`runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34
distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml,
platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and
platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute
serving that path: an in-cluster probe of
https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that
reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read,
and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism
class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets.

No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is
made to resolve instead.

WHAT LANDS
- runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and,
  where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O
  starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four
  mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of
  concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface
  cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG
  38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the
  2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12
  clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero
  R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap
  re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator.
  Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely
  causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop.
- Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the
  kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so
  `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and
  27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss.
- Every page states that kubectl only works via
  `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`,
  because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev.
- Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no
  Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules
  evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health.

SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml
A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at
the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier
(dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file.
- The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound
  to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is
  no path field.
- Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is
  broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these
  runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier,
  so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules.
- configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md),
  so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as
  text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not
  load anyway.
- The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over
  the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01
  emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the
  https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting.

AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately
auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make
runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and
runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode.
An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational
procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute
so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth
enforcement lands.

PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod
  /runbooks/node-down        HTTP 200   8613 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/keycloak-down    HTTP 200   9378 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/cnpg-archiving   HTTP 200  11729 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200   9135 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/vpn-down         HTTP 200  11092 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/backup-failure   HTTP 200   9604 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the
`/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence.

GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04)
363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both
directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook
committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still
404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look
fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations.
Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the
generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 23:49:58 -05:00

9.3 KiB

longhorn-degraded — A Longhorn volume has been degraded for 10 minutes

Alert: LonghornVolumeDegraded (warning, 10m) File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.longhorn Expression: longhorn_volume_robustness == 2 (0=unknown 1=healthy 2=degraded 3=faulted)

What this means here

A volume has fewer healthy replicas than it should. It is still serving I/O — that is the difference between degraded and faulted (/runbooks/longhorn-faulted). What you have lost is redundancy, and on a 3-node cluster with hard node anti-affinity (replicaSoftAntiAffinity: false, numberOfReplicas: 3) one degraded volume means one more node loss away from data loss.

Degraded is the NORMAL state after any node reboot on this cluster, and it is expensive. Recorded plainly in the stabilization notes: "Longhorn on the HDD: every node reboot degrades all 18 volumes → full rebuild (slow; 30%+ IO-delay). Roll reboots one node at a time; wait robustness=healthy before the next." The rebuild is the thing that hurts, not the degradation: rebuild writes land on the same partition as the embedded etcd WAL (/data/k3s and /data/longhorn share one device), and that is the mechanism behind the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 NotReady outage. So the question to answer is never just "why is it degraded" but "is the rebuild about to take a node out". Cross-read /runbooks/node-io.

Verify the alert can even fire (measured 2026-09-13)

Prometheus on prod scrapes 19 jobs: apiserver, cdi-prometheus-metrics, coredns, keycloak-discovery, keycloak-service, keycloak/keycloak-db, kube-prometheus-stack-alertmanager, kube-prometheus-stack-grafana, kube-prometheus-stack-operator, kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus, kube-state-metrics, kubelet, kubevirt-prometheus-metrics, nextcloud-db/nextcloud-db, node-exporter, oauth2-proxy, semaphore-db/semaphore-db, velero, velero/node-agent. There is no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble/Cilium job. Check the series this rule depends on before you trust its silence:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & \
   sleep 5; curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=count by (job) (up)" localhost:19090/api/v1/query'

This alert is currently INERT. count(longhorn_volume_robustness) returned 0 series on prod on 2026-09-13: the whole platform-health.longhorn rule group has no data, because Longhorn ships no ServiceMonitor here. That is a separate open defect, and the practical consequence is that you will probably learn about a degraded volume from an application symptom or from volumes.longhorn.io, not from this alert. Do not infer "no alert, so volumes are fine".

Running the commands in this runbook

kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires — that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'

Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.) Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.

USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup: longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as "the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io, settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.

Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy). Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.

First commands

The truth about robustness, straight from the CRs (this works whether or not the metric does):

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
     -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUST:.status.robustness,STATE:.status.state,NODE:.status.currentNodeID,SIZE:.spec.size'

Which replicas are missing, and where:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get replicas.longhorn.io \
     -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,VOL:.spec.volumeName,NODE:.spec.nodeID,RUNNING:.status.currentState | sort -k2'

Which PVC/workload is affected:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pv -o custom-columns=PV:.metadata.name,CLAIM:.spec.claimRef.namespace/.spec.claimRef.name,SC:.spec.storageClassName'

Are the nodes and their disks schedulable, and is a rebuild in flight?

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get nodes.longhorn.io -o wide; echo; \
   kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get settings.longhorn.io concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,VALUE:.value'

And the pressure that rebuild is causing — the reason this alert matters:

ssh k3s-prod-1 'cat /proc/pressure/io'

Likely causes, most likely first

1. A node rebooted or was briefly NotReady (overwhelmingly the most common)

Expected, and it self-heals by rebuilding. Your job is to keep the rebuild from taking a node down. Remediation (operator, mutating) — freeze rebuilds while replicas will reattach (an in-place bounce):

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system patch settings.longhorn.io \
     concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit --type=merge -p "{\"value\":\"0\"}"'

Thaw to "1" — never higher — once every volume reads healthy. Use 1 rather than 0 when the replicas are genuinely gone (an OS re-provision), so replenishment can actually proceed. concurrentReplicaRebuildPerNodeLimit: 1 was already in force during the 2026-09-07 outage and held; do not "fix" this by setting a knob that is already set. replicaRebuildingBandwidthLimit is v2/SPDK-only and does nothing here; rebuildConcurrentSyncLimit is already at its floor of 1. What was actually tightened after that incident was every other Longhorn I/O source: concurrentVolumeBackupRestorePerNodeLimit and snapshotHeavyTaskConcurrentLimit 5 → 1.

2. A node is still down

Then the rebuild cannot complete and this will not clear. Go to /runbooks/node-down first; there is nothing to fix in Longhorn.

3. A disk was replaced and Longhorn refuses it

Signature: DiskFilesystemChanged — "record diskUUID doesn't match the one on the disk". Remediation, in exactly this order (the validating webhook enforces it): disable the disk → remove the disk entry → re-add it. Seen during the 2026-09-07 drive swap.

4. No node can hold the replica (anti-affinity or space)

Hard anti-affinity means a 3-replica volume needs three distinct schedulable nodes. With one node cordoned or its disk over storageMinimalAvailablePercentage: 25, the third replica cannot be placed and the volume stays degraded indefinitely. Check nodes.longhorn.io scheduling and /runbooks/longhorn-capacity.

5. replicaAutoBalance: best-effort is shuffling replicas

Normal background behaviour, transient. If degradation follows a pattern of replicas moving and never settling, that is worth an operator's attention.

When to escalate or stop

  • If more than one volume is degraded and I/O-PSI on any node is climbing, freeze rebuilds first and then get the operator. That combination is the 2026-09-07 failure mode in progress.
  • Never reboot, cordon or re-provision a second node while any volume is degraded. This is the single most important rule in this runbook.
  • Do not kubectl drain. This cluster deliberately does not drain: there is no Longhorn nodeDrainPolicy configured anywhere in the repo, the upgrade plan rejects system-upgrade-controller because "its auto-drain fights this cluster's slow-HDD Longhorn", and the node-loss conformance test evicts only its own writer pod.
  • Do not delete a degraded volume's replicas to "force a clean rebuild" unless the operator agrees — with 3 replicas and one already missing you are one mistake from /runbooks/longhorn-faulted.
  • Escalate for: a node that will not come back, a disk replacement, or a volume degraded for more than a few hours with all three nodes Ready (that is a Longhorn bug, not an operational state).

Source of truth: runbooks/longhorn-degraded.md. Index: /runbooks/ Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md "2026-08-31 — Post-upgrade stabilization" (the reboot tax) and "2026-09-07 — k3s-prod-1 NotReady"; docs/plans/cluster-upgrade-plan.md §6.2/§7 (the freeze/thaw).