Files
home-network-k3s-impl/runbooks/node-down.md
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 44983095e1 feat(runbooks): make the 42 alert runbook_url annotations resolve
Every platform-health alert rule carries
`runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34
distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml,
platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and
platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute
serving that path: an in-cluster probe of
https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that
reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read,
and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism
class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets.

No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is
made to resolve instead.

WHAT LANDS
- runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and,
  where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O
  starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four
  mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of
  concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface
  cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG
  38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the
  2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12
  clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero
  R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap
  re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator.
  Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely
  causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop.
- Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the
  kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so
  `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and
  27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss.
- Every page states that kubectl only works via
  `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`,
  because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev.
- Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no
  Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules
  evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health.

SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml
A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at
the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier
(dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file.
- The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound
  to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is
  no path field.
- Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is
  broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these
  runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier,
  so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules.
- configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md),
  so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as
  text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not
  load anyway.
- The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over
  the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01
  emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the
  https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting.

AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately
auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make
runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and
runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode.
An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational
procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute
so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth
enforcement lands.

PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod
  /runbooks/node-down        HTTP 200   8613 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/keycloak-down    HTTP 200   9378 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/cnpg-archiving   HTTP 200  11729 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200   9135 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/vpn-down         HTTP 200  11092 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/backup-failure   HTTP 200   9604 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the
`/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence.

GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04)
363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both
directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook
committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still
404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look
fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations.
Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the
generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 23:49:58 -05:00

8.4 KiB

node-down — A node's node-exporter is unscrapable (the node may be gone)

Alert: NodeExporterDown (critical, 5m) File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.nodes Expression: up{job="node-exporter"} == 0

What this means here

Prometheus has not scraped node-exporter on that instance for 5 minutes. The alert is worded carefully — it says the exporter is down — because on this cluster the two cases look identical from Prometheus and have opposite urgency:

  • The node is genuinely gone (powered off, kernel panic, network loss).
  • The node is up and the kubelet stopped posting status. This is what actually happened on 2026-09-07 at 06:05:21Z: k3s-prod-1 went NotReady with "Kubelet stopped posting node status" while the host was up, pingable and SSH-able. Root cause was disk-I/O starvation of the embedded etcd, not a dead machine. If this alert is firing alongside node-io, read /runbooks/node-io first — that is the cause and this is the symptom.

Why it is critical rather than a warning. All three nodes are control-plane + etcd members (k3s-prod-1 .10, k3s-prod-2 .11, k3s-prod-3 .12, kube-vip API VIP 192.168.2.9). Losing one leaves a 2-member etcd with no fault tolerance: the next loss ends quorum and the API server with it. Losing a node also degrades every Longhorn volume that had a replica there, and every degraded volume starts rebuilding — which loads the same disks etcd fsyncs to. One node down is not a routine event on a 3-node cluster; it is one step from an outage.

Two node-specific roles matter when you read which node it is:

  • k3s-prod-3 is the sole VPN egress gateway. Cilium OSS has no egress-gateway failover, so while that node is down, VPN-classed egress is an outage, not a degradation. See /runbooks/vpn-down.
  • k3s-prod-2 is the cluster founder ([k3s_prod_primary] in inventory/hosts.ini). Do not re-provision it from the inventory without reading /runbooks/node-io — re-provisioning a node still listed as primary founds a second cluster.

Running the commands in this runbook

kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires — that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'

Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.) Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.

USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup: longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as "the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io, settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.

Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy). Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.

First commands

Is the node actually NotReady, or is only the exporter unscrapable?

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes -o wide; echo; kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/name=prometheus-node-exporter -o wide'

Is it the API server or the node? (If this hangs, you have a bigger problem than one node.)

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get --raw /readyz?verbose 2>&1 | tail -20'

Is the host alive at all? Prod is directly on 192.168.2.0/24 — no NAT hop:

ping -c3 192.168.2.10 ; ssh k3s-prod-1 'uptime; systemctl is-active k3s; cat /proc/pressure/io'

The three lines that distinguish "etcd starved" from "machine dead":

ssh k3s-prod-1 'journalctl -u k3s --since "30 min ago" | grep -Ei "fdatasync|apply request took|too many requests|Kubelet stopped|leader"'

Etcd membership and leader — do this before touching anything:

ssh k3s-prod-2 'curl -s http://127.0.0.1:2381/metrics | grep -E "etcd_server_is_leader|etcd_server_has_leader"'

What did the node take with it?

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
     -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUST:.status.robustness | grep -v healthy; \
   kubectl --context k3s-prod get pods -A --field-selector spec.nodeName=k3s-prod-1 -o wide | head -30'

Likely causes, most likely first

1. Disk I/O starvation wedged the kubelet (host still up)

The signature is slow fdatasync took=3.56s / apply request took too long took=8.30s / etcdserver: too many requests in journalctl -u k3s, with /proc/pressure/io full avg300 well above 1. On 2026-09-07 node 1 read 11.36 against 0.75 on node 2 and 1.29 on node 3. Remediation: follow /runbooks/node-io. Recovery that day required a manual systemctl restart k3s on the node (operator, on-host), after which 18 Longhorn volumes rebuilt and pressure only fell when the rebuilds finished.

2. The node rebooted (planned or otherwise)

Check uptime. A reboot is not harmless here: every node reboot degrades all ~18 Longhorn volumes and triggers a full rebuild. If a reboot is intentional, roll one node at a time and wait for robustness=healthy on every volume before the next, and freeze rebuilds first (see /runbooks/longhorn-degraded). Note two hardware quirks recorded in infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b: k3s-prod-2 hangs on a warm reboot while staying powered, and all three nodes carry the EFI memattr kernel bug that once presented k3s-prod-1 as having 2.6 GiB usable of 16 GB (needs kernel ≥ 6.13).

3. node-exporter itself is unhealthy, node fine

If kubectl get nodes says Ready and the pod is CrashLoopBackOff or Pending, this is a monitoring fault, not a node fault. Downgrade urgency, but do not ignore it — while that exporter is down you are blind to node-io, node-memory, node-disk and node-cpu on that node, which is exactly the blindness that let 2026-09-07 arrive as a surprise. Related: /runbooks/targets-down.

4. Network loss to the node

ping fails, SSH fails. Check the switch and the node's eno1 (prod-3's /etc/network/interfaces also holds a commented-out wireless stanza — inert, but worth scrubbing). A node reachable by ping but not by the API is usually Cilium, not the network: heavy sustained node load has been observed to degrade the Cilium datapath into intermittent LB-VIP unreachability, cleared by a restart.

5. Hardware

k3s-prod-1's original 2011 SSD had 61,440 reallocated sectors and was replaced 2026-09-07. Check SMART (/runbooks/node-io has the command). Hardware is an operator job.

When to escalate or stop

  • STOP if two nodes are affected. Two of three etcd members down means no quorum, no API server, and no GitOps. Nothing in this runbook applies; get the operator.
  • Do not reboot, drain or cordon a second node while any Longhorn volume is not healthy. This cluster deliberately does not kubectl drain — the auto-drain of system-upgrade-controller was rejected precisely because it fights slow-disk Longhorn.
  • Do not delete the Node object to "clean up". That triggers replica deletion in Longhorn.
  • Escalate to the operator for: a power-cycle, a disk replacement, or re-provisioning a node (the inventory's [k3s_prod_primary] trap above makes re-provisioning a two-person job).
  • If the node returns but volumes stay degraded for more than an hour, go to /runbooks/longhorn-degraded.

Source of truth: runbooks/node-down.md in home-network-k3s-impl. Index: /runbooks/ Incident record: DECISIONS-LOG.md "2026-09-07 — k3s-prod-1 NotReady"; infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b/§0c.