Files
home-network-k3s-impl/runbooks/pvc-capacity.md
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 44983095e1 feat(runbooks): make the 42 alert runbook_url annotations resolve
Every platform-health alert rule carries
`runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34
distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml,
platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and
platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute
serving that path: an in-cluster probe of
https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that
reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read,
and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism
class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets.

No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is
made to resolve instead.

WHAT LANDS
- runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and,
  where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O
  starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four
  mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of
  concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface
  cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG
  38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the
  2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12
  clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero
  R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap
  re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator.
  Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely
  causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop.
- Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the
  kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so
  `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and
  27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss.
- Every page states that kubectl only works via
  `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`,
  because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev.
- Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no
  Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules
  evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health.

SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml
A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at
the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier
(dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file.
- The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound
  to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is
  no path field.
- Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is
  broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these
  runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier,
  so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules.
- configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md),
  so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as
  text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not
  load anyway.
- The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over
  the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01
  emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the
  https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting.

AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately
auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make
runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and
runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode.
An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational
procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute
so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth
enforcement lands.

PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod
  /runbooks/node-down        HTTP 200   8613 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/keycloak-down    HTTP 200   9378 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/cnpg-archiving   HTTP 200  11729 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200   9135 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/vpn-down         HTTP 200  11092 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
  /runbooks/backup-failure   HTTP 200   9604 bytes  text/plain; charset=utf-8
HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the
`/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence.

GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04)
363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both
directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook
committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still
404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look
fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations.
Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the
generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 23:49:58 -05:00

8.3 KiB

pvc-capacity — A PersistentVolumeClaim is filling up, nearly full, or predicted to fill

Alerts: PersistentVolumeFillingUp (warning, 15m), PersistentVolumeAlmostFull (critical, 15m), PersistentVolumeFillingUpPredicted (warning, 1h) File: platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, group platform-health.pvc-capacity Expressions: < 0.15 free / < 0.05 free / < 0.50 free and predict_linear(kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes[24h], 7*24*3600) < 0, each and kubelet_volume_stats_inodes{job="kubelet"} > 0

What this means here

These are the PVC fill alerts for everything outside the monitoring namespace (/runbooks/monitoring-capacity owns that half). Before this file existed, no PVC outside monitoring had any fill alert at all. Unlike the Longhorn rule group, these work: they are built on kubelet_volume_stats_*, which is live (56 series on prod).

Three design facts you need in order to read the labels correctly:

  • Every rule pins job="kubelet". kubelet_volume_stats_* is published by two jobs with different label shapes: job="kubelet" carries the PVC's real namespace, while job="apiserver" reports namespace="default" with the real one in exported_namespace. Without the pin, namespace!="monitoring" double-fires on monitoring's own PVCs and names the wrong namespace.
  • Every rule carries and kubelet_volume_stats_inodes > 0. Block-mode PVCs — KubeVirt VM disks on longhorn-vm — report available=0, used=0, inodes=0 against a real capacity. Without the guard, unifi/unifi-rootdisk (40 GiB Block) would fire both warning and critical permanently. If you are ever tempted to remove that clause, this is why it is there.
  • The predicted rule is the point of the exercise. A level threshold is useless for a slow leak on a mostly-empty volume: prod's keycloak-db sat at 93% free while leaking ~6.8 MiB/h of unrecyclable WAL, so <15% was ~29 days away and would have arrived as a surprise. The < 0.50 gate keeps it quiet on volumes that are not plausibly about to fill, and the 24h fit / 7d horizon is chosen so a daily backup or log rotation does not make it flap.

If the PVC name matches *-db-N, read /runbooks/cnpg-archiving before doing anything else. That is by far the most likely cause on this cluster and the one where the obvious action is fatal.

Running the commands in this runbook

kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires — that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'

Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.) Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.

USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup: longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as "the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io, settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.

Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy). Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.

First commands

Which PVC, how full, on which node:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
   curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=topk(10, 1 - kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes{job=\"kubelet\"} / kubelet_volume_stats_capacity_bytes{job=\"kubelet\"})" localhost:19090/api/v1/query | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "persistentvolumeclaim|namespace|\"1\"" '
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pvc -A -o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,SIZE:.spec.resources.requests.storage,SC:.spec.storageClassName,STATUS:.status.phase'

Is it a CNPG data volume? (Fully-qualified clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io — the short name cluster is ambiguous on clusters carrying more than one Cluster kind.)

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A'

If yes, the one question that decides everything — is WAL archiving working?

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A \
     -o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,ARCHIVING:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"ContinuousArchiving\"\)].status,LASTBACKUP:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"LastBackupSucceeded\"\)].status,FIRSTPITR:.status.firstRecoverabilityPoint'

What is actually consuming the space, from inside the pod:

infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
  'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-db-2 -c postgres -- bash -c "df -h /var/lib/postgresql/data; du -sh /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal; ls /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal/archive_status | wc -l"'

Likely causes, most likely first

1. A CNPG database is not recycling WAL

The dominant cause. With archive_mode=on and a failing archive_command, Postgres refuses to recycle unarchived WAL segments, so pg_wal grows until the data PVC is full and the postmaster PANICs — taking the database, and for keycloak-db all of SSO, down. pg_wal shares the data PVC on every Cluster here (no walStorage: is configured), which is why a backup fault presents as a capacity alert. This actually happened: prod ran from bootstrap to 2026-09-07 with endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT, all three Clusters at ContinuousArchiving=False with barman-cloud-wal-archive: exit status 4, unnoticed for 38+ hours. Remediation: fix archiving (/runbooks/cnpg-archiving). Do NOT delete WAL by hand — that destroys the database. Do NOT expand the PVC and call it done; that buys days.

2. Log or cache growth in an app-tier workload

Nextcloud, the *arr apps, Gitea. Prune inside the app, or expand the PVC in git (every Longhorn class has allowVolumeExpansion: true).

3. Media on the wrong storage class

Media is meant to be static NFS PVs from 192.168.2.102:/mnt/Storage/plex (8.32 TiB measured), not Longhorn. A media volume on longhorn is a misconfiguration; fix the class, do not grow the disk.

4. A Velero or CDI staging write

Transient. CDI uses longhorn-scratch deliberately (single replica) because the 3-replica default failed the UniFi 60Gi import on insufficient storage.

5. The predicted rule caught a genuine slow leak

This is the rule working as designed and giving you a week. Find what is growing before the level thresholds arrive.

When to escalate or stop

  • PersistentVolumeAlmostFull on a *-db-N volume is an imminent database outage. Get the operator. A Postgres data volume at under 5% free will PANIC the postmaster.
  • Never delete WAL segments, and never delete anything under a Postgres data directory.
  • Do not delete the PVC to reclaim space.
  • If unifi-rootdisk or another Block-mode volume appears in these alerts, the inodes guard has been removed or broken — that is a monitoring bug, not a storage incident.
  • Escalate for PVC expansion beyond what the node can hold (see /runbooks/longhorn-capacity).

Source of truth: runbooks/pvc-capacity.md. Index: /runbooks/ Records: platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml (the two-job and inodes findings); platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml header (the 2026-09-06 archiving incident and the measured fill rate).