Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
8.3 KiB
pvc-capacity — A PersistentVolumeClaim is filling up, nearly full, or predicted to fill
Alerts: PersistentVolumeFillingUp (warning, 15m), PersistentVolumeAlmostFull (critical, 15m),
PersistentVolumeFillingUpPredicted (warning, 1h)
File: platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, group platform-health.pvc-capacity
Expressions: < 0.15 free / < 0.05 free / < 0.50 free and
predict_linear(kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes[24h], 7*24*3600) < 0, each and kubelet_volume_stats_inodes{job="kubelet"} > 0
What this means here
These are the PVC fill alerts for everything outside the monitoring namespace
(/runbooks/monitoring-capacity owns that half). Before this file existed, no PVC outside
monitoring had any fill alert at all. Unlike the Longhorn rule group, these work: they are built
on kubelet_volume_stats_*, which is live (56 series on prod).
Three design facts you need in order to read the labels correctly:
- Every rule pins
job="kubelet".kubelet_volume_stats_*is published by two jobs with different label shapes:job="kubelet"carries the PVC's real namespace, whilejob="apiserver"reportsnamespace="default"with the real one inexported_namespace. Without the pin,namespace!="monitoring"double-fires on monitoring's own PVCs and names the wrong namespace. - Every rule carries
and kubelet_volume_stats_inodes > 0. Block-mode PVCs — KubeVirt VM disks onlonghorn-vm— report available=0, used=0, inodes=0 against a real capacity. Without the guard,unifi/unifi-rootdisk(40 GiB Block) would fire both warning and critical permanently. If you are ever tempted to remove that clause, this is why it is there. - The predicted rule is the point of the exercise. A level threshold is useless for a slow leak on
a mostly-empty volume: prod's
keycloak-dbsat at 93% free while leaking ~6.8 MiB/h of unrecyclable WAL, so<15%was ~29 days away and would have arrived as a surprise. The< 0.50gate keeps it quiet on volumes that are not plausibly about to fill, and the 24h fit / 7d horizon is chosen so a daily backup or log rotation does not make it flap.
If the PVC name matches *-db-N, read /runbooks/cnpg-archiving before doing anything else.
That is by far the most likely cause on this cluster and the one where the obvious action is fatal.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges both clusters into one kubeconfig and
defaults its current-context to k3s-dev, so a command without --context silently answers
about the wrong cluster. (CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... is equivalent.)
Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once — they share one container and interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
First commands
Which PVC, how full, on which node:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n monitoring port-forward svc/kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus 19090:9090 & sleep 5; \
curl -s -G --data-urlencode "query=topk(10, 1 - kubelet_volume_stats_available_bytes{job=\"kubelet\"} / kubelet_volume_stats_capacity_bytes{job=\"kubelet\"})" localhost:19090/api/v1/query | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E "persistentvolumeclaim|namespace|\"1\"" '
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pvc -A -o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,SIZE:.spec.resources.requests.storage,SC:.spec.storageClassName,STATUS:.status.phase'
Is it a CNPG data volume? (Fully-qualified clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io — the short name cluster is
ambiguous on clusters carrying more than one Cluster kind.)
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A'
If yes, the one question that decides everything — is WAL archiving working?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A \
-o custom-columns=NS:.metadata.namespace,NAME:.metadata.name,ARCHIVING:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"ContinuousArchiving\"\)].status,LASTBACKUP:.status.conditions[?\(@.type==\"LastBackupSucceeded\"\)].status,FIRSTPITR:.status.firstRecoverabilityPoint'
What is actually consuming the space, from inside the pod:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak exec keycloak-db-2 -c postgres -- bash -c "df -h /var/lib/postgresql/data; du -sh /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal; ls /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata/pg_wal/archive_status | wc -l"'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. A CNPG database is not recycling WAL
The dominant cause. With archive_mode=on and a failing archive_command, Postgres refuses to
recycle unarchived WAL segments, so pg_wal grows until the data PVC is full and the postmaster
PANICs — taking the database, and for keycloak-db all of SSO, down. pg_wal shares the data
PVC on every Cluster here (no walStorage: is configured), which is why a backup fault presents as
a capacity alert. This actually happened: prod ran from bootstrap to 2026-09-07 with
endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT, all three Clusters at ContinuousArchiving=False with
barman-cloud-wal-archive: exit status 4, unnoticed for 38+ hours.
Remediation: fix archiving (/runbooks/cnpg-archiving). Do NOT delete WAL by hand — that destroys
the database. Do NOT expand the PVC and call it done; that buys days.
2. Log or cache growth in an app-tier workload
Nextcloud, the *arr apps, Gitea. Prune inside the app, or expand the PVC in git (every Longhorn class
has allowVolumeExpansion: true).
3. Media on the wrong storage class
Media is meant to be static NFS PVs from 192.168.2.102:/mnt/Storage/plex (8.32 TiB measured), not
Longhorn. A media volume on longhorn is a misconfiguration; fix the class, do not grow the disk.
4. A Velero or CDI staging write
Transient. CDI uses longhorn-scratch deliberately (single replica) because the 3-replica default
failed the UniFi 60Gi import on insufficient storage.
5. The predicted rule caught a genuine slow leak
This is the rule working as designed and giving you a week. Find what is growing before the level thresholds arrive.
When to escalate or stop
PersistentVolumeAlmostFullon a*-db-Nvolume is an imminent database outage. Get the operator. A Postgres data volume at under 5% free will PANIC the postmaster.- Never delete WAL segments, and never delete anything under a Postgres data directory.
- Do not delete the PVC to reclaim space.
- If
unifi-rootdiskor another Block-mode volume appears in these alerts, the inodes guard has been removed or broken — that is a monitoring bug, not a storage incident. - Escalate for PVC expansion beyond what the node can hold (see
/runbooks/longhorn-capacity).
Source of truth: runbooks/pvc-capacity.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml (the two-job and inodes findings);
platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml header (the 2026-09-06 archiving incident and the measured fill rate).