main became a protected branch on 2026-09-29, so the direct push that 37 of 39 runbooks instructed is REJECTED. The wording was merely stale before; it is now actively wrong, and it is the line an operator reads mid-incident. Every occurrence now describes the real path: push a branch, open a PR, merge once the gate is green -- that merge is the deploy. 35 files shared one identical block; flux-reconcile.md, README.md and plex-claim.md each said it their own way and were corrected individually. plex-claim.md is rewritten around the delivery loop and records that THE SERVER IS NOW CLAIMED (PlexOnlineToken present in /config), so PLEX_CLAIM is a permanent no-op and the page only applies after a /config wipe. Adds infra/plex/claim-ship.sh, which drives branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate -> merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verdict with a stopwatch. Three steps are easy to lose under time pressure and two are SILENT when skipped: --with-source (without it the Kustomization applies the previously-fetched revision), the mandatory rollout restart (only the ciphertext changes, so the pod template is byte-identical and nothing restarts itself), and the feat/ branch prefix (act_runner capacity is 1, and a prefix inside gate.yml's push trigger fires a redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run). Drops the "~4-minute TTL" the page asserted in four places. It was uncited, and upstream pms-docker documents no expiry at all. The countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority. Measured loop: ~2m45s. DECISIONS-LOG carries the PM handoff: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false, the stale-.runner root cause, the four-deep Flux dependency cascade, and the correction that a skipped Gitea job reports success rather than hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
9.6 KiB
keycloak-down — The Keycloak IdP is down (SSO is unavailable)
Alert: KeycloakDown (critical, 5m)
File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.identity
Expression:
max(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~"keycloak-[0-9]+", condition="true"}) == 0
or absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~"keycloak-[0-9]+"})
What this means here
No ready Keycloak server pod for five minutes. The regex is deliberately scoped to
keycloak-[0-9]+ (the StatefulSet pods keycloak-0, keycloak-1) because the keycloak namespace also
holds the operator (keycloak-operator-*) and the database (keycloak-db-*); an unscoped max() would
be satisfied by those being ready and would never fire for the IdP itself. That scoping was a fix — the
original matched .*postgres.*.
Blast radius — read this before triaging anything else
Keycloak is the root of trust. With SSO down, all of these are down or degraded at once:
- kubectl OIDC login (the public
kubernetesclient with PKCE, groups → RBAC) - Grafana (OIDC), Headlamp (forwards the user's id_token to the apiserver), Gitea
- forward-auth via oauth2-proxy, and the five per-app oauth2-proxy sidecars (pihole, jackett, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr) — these fail closed, 302ing to a Keycloak that is not there
You can still get in. The certificate-based kubeconfig is untouched by the OIDC work and remains a
fully independent break-glass path — that is a deliberate design property, not an accident. From this
workstation the working non-interactive path is the dev-container kubeconfig; the host k3s-oidc
context will hang on a browser prompt, which is not the cluster being down.
And you can still read this page. The runbook route is deliberately public, with no
forward-auth, precisely so that keycloak-down is readable by an operator who cannot log in. If that
ever changes, this runbook becomes unreachable exactly when it is needed.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once — it was k3s-dev
until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
to talk to — read it. Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once; they share one container and
interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git. main is a protected branch — a direct push
is rejected. A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
First commands
Everything in the namespace, in one view — server, operator and database together:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get pods -o wide; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get statefulsets,deployments'
Is the database the real cause? (It usually is. Fully-qualified: clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io.)
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -n keycloak \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,INSTANCES:.status.instances,READY:.status.readyInstances,PRIMARY:.status.currentPrimary,PHASE:.status.phase'
The server's own complaint:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak logs keycloak-0 --tail=120 2>&1 | tail -50; echo ====; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak describe pod keycloak-0 | sed -n "/Events:/,\$p"'
The operator's view of the CR:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get keycloaks.k8s.keycloak.org -o yaml | grep -A20 "status:"'
Is it reachable at all, from outside, with an explicit SNI (in-pod HTTPS tests to these hostnames are misleading here):
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' --resolve keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev:443:192.168.2.20 \
https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
Likely causes, most likely first
1. The CNPG database is not available
Keycloak cannot start without Postgres. This is the highest-probability cause and it has its own runbook:
/runbooks/keycloak-db. Note that keycloak-db is a 3-instance CNPG Cluster with
primaryUpdateMethod: switchover and synchronous replication at dataDurability: preferred —
preferred specifically so that one degraded standby does not block writes, which on this database
would be a total SSO write outage.
2. A node that held the Keycloak pods went away
Both Keycloak pods and all three keycloak-db instances previously ran on one node — all three CNPG
primaries had drifted onto k3s-prod-2 — and on 2026-09-07 that node took SSO, Nextcloud and
Semaphore down together. The fixes were instances: 3 on every Cluster and
podAntiAffinityType: required (CNPG's default preferred is only a scheduler hint and co-locates on
the path that matters — recreating an instance after node loss). Check -o wide above: if everything is
on one node, that is a live re-occurrence of the same defect. Go to /runbooks/node-down.
3. A HelmRelease / operator upgrade went bad
Read /runbooks/update-rollback. Under primaryUpdateMethod: switchover the CNPG operator rejects an
update that changes imageName and a postgresql parameter in the same reconcile — a stuck reconcile
with that message is this.
4. TLS to the issuer is broken
Keycloak's clients validate the issuer's certificate. While the wildcard was LE-staging, in-cluster
clients rejected it with x509: certificate signed by unknown authority. If /runbooks/cert-issuance or
/runbooks/cert-expiry is also firing, fix that first.
5. Logins fail but Keycloak is UP
Then this is the wrong alert and the wrong runbook, and the distinction has cost this cluster dearly.
On 2026-09-06 every OIDC login on prod failed — "Invalid client or Invalid client credentials" — with
all 12 clients holding the literal (env:...) placeholder as their secret, while
KeycloakDown/KeycloakDatabaseDown were quiet, the import Job reported success, the CR read
Done=True, and the conformance test that asserts Done=True passed throughout. The only observable
was a human failing to log in. Go to /runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets.
Similarly, a redirect_uri mismatch after a hostname change is not an outage — same runbook.
And once, MFA broke every platform-admin login on its own: conditional-OTP used a non-existent config
key, giving "Invalid role name: null" → 403, fixed to condUserRole: platform-admin.
When to escalate or stop
- Escalate immediately. SSO down is a platform-wide outage; treat it as such.
- Use the certificate-based kubeconfig (the dev-container path) rather than trying to fix OIDC login
first. Do not burn the outage on getting
kubectlto authenticate through the thing that is down. - Do not edit the realm to "reset" anything. The realm import is a ONE-SHOT that fails open: the
operator logs "Job already executed - not recreating", so a git change to
keycloak-realm-import.yamldoes not re-import. The documented path iskcadm.shinsidekeycloak-0(admin credentials in the Secretkeycloak-admin-credentials;kcadmis present,curl/python3are not) and fixing git for reproducibility. Doing only one of the two is how drift is created. - Do not delete the Keycloak CR or the StatefulSet. Recreating the IdP is a restore operation, not a restart.
- Do not touch
keycloak-dbvolumes. If the database is the cause, read/runbooks/keycloak-dband/runbooks/cnpg-archiving; only the Barman archive is a backup, standbys replicate deletions faithfully. - Break-glass local admins exist for gitea, nextcloud and semaphore. Nextcloud has no native group→admin mapping, so platform-admins there are promoted by hand.
Source of truth: runbooks/keycloak-down.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md (the 2026-09-06 client-secret lockout; the 2026-09-07 single-node SSO
outage); commits f338e91, e8d8601, cac413e (CNPG instances/anti-affinity/switchover/sync).