Files
home-network-k3s-impl/conformance/tests
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 a984442cae harden: pin node timezone to UTC, and TEST the guard/value coupling that bit us
Two debt items, both about making a latent problem impossible rather than fixed.

=== 1. Node timezone pinned to Etc/UTC (node_baseline, `system` tag) ===

The prod nodes disagreed, measured from k3s's own etcd snapshot annotations:
prod-1/2 at -05:00 (Central), prod-3 at -04:00 (Eastern). Functionally harmless —
Kubernetes and etcd are UTC internally, and in UTC those snapshots are ~4 minutes
apart, which is correct staggering — but it makes cross-node log correlation
actively misleading, and this cluster has had two unplanned reboots in two days.

`Etc/UTC` chosen on repo convention, not just principle: catalog/plex.yaml records
"no other service in the repo sets a timezone ... so use the safe default" with
TZ: Etc/UTC, and apps/wave-0/plex.yaml matches (platform/crafty is America/Chicago
DELIBERATELY — a user-facing game schedule, not a log clock). Decisive extra fact:
THE THREE DEV NODES ARE ALREADY Etc/UTC, so this makes prod match dev rather than
inventing a convention. UTC also removes the class — no DST discontinuity, node
time == platform time.

New knob `node_baseline_timezone`, overridable per environment via group_vars (the
same seam as node_baseline_backports_kernel) but deliberately NOT restated there:
no environment needs to differ, and a second copy is a second thing to disagree.
Guarded by an assert in the role's existing BLOCKED style before the module runs.

`--check --diff --tags system -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMS the
offset evidence, and is the whole verification — the play was never run for real:
  k3s-prod-1: -"America/Chicago"  +"Etc/UTC"  changed
  k3s-prod-2: -"America/Chicago"  +"Etc/UTC"  changed
  k3s-prod-3: -"America/New_York" +"Etc/UTC"  changed
The same --check against DEV reports the task `ok` on all three — idempotence
demonstrated against live hosts, in check mode only. `--list-hosts` confirms
`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` selects the three prod nodes (the diagnostic plays take
their OWN var; the wrong flag silently targets dev).

*** AUTHORED, NOT APPLIED. *** Applying it is a live-cluster action and was
deliberately left for the operator to schedule: prod's Longhorn had only just
finished resyncing after a node reboot, and changing a node's clock config during
storage recovery is not an unattended move.

`ansible-inventory --list` was NOT used anywhere — it prints DECRYPTED vault values
(the passphrase is mounted into the dev container) and has leaked the prod
become-password to a transcript once already.

=== 2. New L0 check `placeholder-guard-coupling` (R-ENV-02, R-STATE-03) ===

On 2026-09-05 the PM changed a placeholder in clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml from
`TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` to `https://TBD-R2-ACCOUNT-ID...`. The guards in
bootstrap/standup.sh matched the glob `TBD-*` — a PREFIX. All three silently died,
and `resume` would have enabled velero on prod against a nonexistent hostname:
installs clean, reports healthy, no backups exist. Found by accident. A guard in
one file keyed on the SHAPE of a value in another file, with nothing tying them.

The check exercises the REAL predicate — it does not reimplement it. standup.sh is
not sourceable (top-level argv parsing hard-exits, cd, export, EXIT trap), so the
check extracts the predicate's own source lines and sources only those. Faithfulness
is pinned by: discovery of every `*_is_placeholder` (not a hardcoded name),
exactly-one-definition, "extracted block is a verbatim substring", a self-containment
gate, a canary (must refuse "", must accept a real URL), and a scan for a divergent
second copy. If the predicate grows a dependency the check FAILS LOUDLY and names
the remedy rather than degrading to testing a copy — the failure mode it exists for.

Both sides derive from real files: guarded knobs from a taint trace in standup.sh
(`x="$(cvar KEY)"` -> alias hop -> `*_is_placeholder "$x"`); values from base
cluster-vars plus each overlay's JSON6902 /data/KEY patches. The independent
detector is deliberately NOT the guard: seed idioms UNION the guard's own words with
glob anchors STRIPPED — so a prefix-anchored guard cannot pass, and deleting an arm
cannot make a value stop being placeholder-shaped.

Real tree: 32 assertions, 18 values through the extracted predicate, PASS.

NON-VACUITY VERIFIED BY ME, twice, on throwaway copies (the real repo and the
read-only spec repo untouched). My first perturbation tripped the self-containment
rail instead of the anchoring property, so I redid it shape-preserving — substring
globs -> prefix globs, nothing else — and it failed on exactly the right property,
naming mid-string and tail acceptances with the diagnosis "This is the 2026-09-05
failure exactly". Control: unperturbed copy exits 0.

=== 3. ci/touched-requirements.sh: bootstrap/ was UNMAPPED (found by the agent) ===

The path->requirement map had no `bootstrap/*` entry, so a change touching
standup.sh ALONGSIDE any already-mapped path scoped the L0 run to that other path's
requirements and silently excluded the new check — the one that exists to catch
exactly the 2026-09-05 class. A safety net with a hole where the incident was.
Mapped to R-STATE-03 R-GITOPS-01; verified the map now resolves bootstrap paths.

VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. `run.sh --layer l0` 8/8 PASS including the new check.
Coverage unchanged at 45/51 (the new check tags existing requirements).

Refs R-ENV-02, R-STATE-03, R-TEST-01, R-PLAT-01.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-06 08:47:08 -05:00
..

Conformance tests — layout & requirement-tagging convention

Every test is a Chainsaw Test in its own directory:

tests/
  l0-static/           L0 — whole-repo invariants over the tracked tree (no cluster)
  l1-rendering/        L1 — ServiceDefinition -> rendered resources match golden
  l2-behavioral/       L2 — real runtime behavior (probes against a cluster)
  l3-fault-injection/  L3 — break something; assert fail-closed / no-data-loss
  meta/                harness self-checks (R-TEST-*), cluster-independent
    <test-name>/chainsaw-test.yaml

The layer a test belongs to is its subtree and its .../layer annotation; the coverage generator cross-checks the two.

L0 static (l0-static/) — what belongs here, and what does not

docs/14's L0 row is "Pre-apply, in CI · manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants". Kyverno (platform/kyverno/) covers the invariants expressible over a single resource. This subtree covers the L0 invariants that are properties of the repository as a whole and that no per-resource policy can state — e.g. no plaintext secret exists anywhere in the tracked tree, no tracked RoleBinding grants a workload identity a privileged role, the spec-immutability gate actually blocks a modified spec.

Each l0-static/<name>/ dir carries a check.sh: a self-contained offline assertion script (git + Python stdlib/PyYAML; no cluster, no network) that exits 0/1. It is executed:

  • by conformance/run.sh --layer l0 (and as the offline leg of a full run), via lib/run_l1_offline.py, producing a REAL pass/fail JUnit entry — never a skip; and
  • by the merge gate's ci/l0.sh stage, so these assertions run on every PR; and
  • by the wrapping Chainsaw Test, which runs the SAME check.sh, so an in-cluster run executes byte-identical assertions.

Two authoring rules specific to this layer:

  1. State the gap. A statically-provable half of a requirement is still only half. Every check.sh header ends with an explicit "what this does NOT prove" list naming the cluster-layer remainder. Covering a requirement at L0 does not finish it.
  2. Exemptions must be self-policing. Where a check must tolerate something (a deliberately-plaintext policy fixture, an .example template), the exemption is conditioned on a property that would break if the exemption were abused — e.g. the plaintext Secret fixture is exempt only while a kyverno-test.yaml asserts the policy rejects it. Never a bare path allowlist.

Requirement-tagging convention (authoritative)

A test declares the requirement(s) it verifies three ways; the label is the source of truth, the annotations must agree with it (the coverage generator fails on drift):

metadata:
  name: default-deny
  labels:
    # ONE label per verified R-* ID. Machine-selectable + coverage source of truth.
    conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-01: "true"
  annotations:
    # Human-readable canonical list — MUST equal the label set.
    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-01"
    # Declared layer (L0|L1|L2|L3|META) — must match the subtree.
    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
    # true => R-TEST-05 requires this to be (or have) an L3 fault-injection test.
    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
    # Given/When/Then intent, for the coverage report and reviewers.
    conformance.home.k3s/intent: "Given ... When ... Then ..."

Why a label per requirement (not a comma list): Kubernetes label values can't hold a comma-separated list, and chainsaw test --selector selects on label keys/values. One conformance.home.k3s/<R-ID>=true label per requirement makes both subset-selection and coverage extraction exact and robust.

How this drives the tooling

  • Subset runs (merge gate): run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-06 resolves the R-IDs to the set of test dirs carrying those labels (union, deduped) and runs each once.
  • Coverage (lib/coverage.py): reads these labels from every chainsaw-test.yaml, maps each registry requirement -> its verifying test(s), and flags gaps + any label/annotation mismatch + tags not in the registry.
  • JUnit: results (real or skipped-scaffold) carry the R-IDs in classname + properties, so the JUnit itself stays traceable (R-TEST-04).

Authoring rules (R-TEST-01/02/06)

  • Behavior, not existence. Assert what the system does (a probe cannot connect), never that an object merely exists (a policy can exist and not enforce).

  • Given/When/Then structure with given-*/when-*/then-* step names.

  • Hermetic & self-cleaning. Rely on Chainsaw's per-test namespace + auto-teardown; put any out-of-namespace fixture cleanup in a finally block. A leaked fixture is a failure.

  • Bounded, deterministic waits. Use assert/error polling within the config timeouts; never sleep-and-hope.

  • Safety-critical => fault-injection. For a safety-critical requirement, actually break the thing and assert fail-closed / no-data-loss, with finally restoring state.

  • Never weaken a test to go green (R-TEST-06). If the spec can't be met, escalate to the PM — do not relax the assertion or the requirement.

  • Never write a per-environment value into a test (R-ENV-02). No hostname suffix, no Gateway VIP, no LB-pool range. One authored suite must run green against dev and prod, so a test asks the cluster it is pointed at what it is. The mechanism is a chainsaw binding over the same ConfigMap Flux substitutes from:

    spec:
      bindings:
        - name: baseDomain
          value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
    

    Declare it at test level (step outputs/bindings are step-scoped), then consume it: ($baseDomain) for a pod env: value, (join('.', ['myhost', $baseDomain])) where a full hostname is needed — including inside a fixtures/*.yaml applied with apply: file:, which chainsaw templates with the same bindings. Prefer reading the actual observed value over restating a range (e.g. assert the DNS answer equals GATEWAY_VIP, or equals the LB IP the Service was assigned) — it is both stricter and environment-independent. Never take the environment from a CLI flag or an exported variable: a flag someone forgets is how a suite ends up silently asserting the other cluster's expectations. L1 goldens are the one exception: they are rendering fixtures and carry the literal ${BASE_DOMAIN} token.

Scaffolds in this tree carry TODO(T-x.y) markers where a fixture/assertion lands as a later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test. lib/status.py treats such a marker — in the chainsaw-test.yaml, in render-check.sh, or in check.sh — as outranking any conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true" annotation, so a placeholder body can never be reported as an executable test.