Files
home-network-k3s-impl/platform
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 6a8953e288 feat(prod): observability for the two failure modes that went unseen, plus OIDC self-healing
Minimal prod delivery, authored directly on main (= prod's live revision d1a6628)
rather than by merging work/prod-standup-campaign. That branch carries the DNS apex
inversion, which would have set prod's BASE_DOMAIN to home.keithjackson.dev; prod
runs external-dns with policy: sync and txtOwnerId: prod, so it would have begun
rewriting apex records dev owns while the non-k3s prod still serves 443 there.
Operator sequencing is "dev migrates first". Nothing under clusters/ is touched
here at all, which is what makes this safe to land now.

Also deliberately EXCLUDED, because prod's live cluster-vars has no CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
key and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions would fail the whole tier: the R2 rework of
platform/velero/ and the CNPG destinationPath changes. Those land as
feat/r2-backup-prod together with the endpoint and bucket knobs.

WHAT THIS FIXES

1. Nothing was watching CNPG. All three prod databases have run since bootstrap with
   ContinuousArchiving=False and firstRecoverabilityPoint=null, and no alert existed
   anywhere. Because archive_mode=on and the archive command fails, Postgres refuses
   to recycle WAL: keycloak-db holds every segment ever written (257 MiB on a 5 GiB
   volume, ~6.8 MiB/h) — roughly 29 days to a disk-full PANIC on the cluster's SSO
   database. Found by hand, 38h late. CNPGWALArchiveBacklog would have fired within
   the hour, and evaluates to 3 firing series on prod today.
   Rules key on cnpg_collector_* rather than cnpg_pg_stat_archiver_*, because
   nextcloud-db's exporter cannot log in to its own database (permission denied for
   database "nextcloud", both clusters) so the pg_stat_archiver family does not exist
   for it — the obvious metric would have been blind to one database in three.

2. No PVC outside namespace=monitoring had any fill alert. New rules are partitioned
   by namespace so they cannot double-fire with MonitoringVolumeFillingUp, pinned to
   job="kubelet" (the apiserver copy of the same series reports namespace=default),
   and guarded by inodes > 0 — block-mode PVCs such as unifi-rootdisk report
   available=0 forever and would otherwise have fired critical permanently.

3. VPNTunnelDown could never clear on a cluster with no gateway node; it has been
   firing critical on prod since 2026-09-05. Now guarded so prod self-arms the moment
   a node carries the egress-gateway label, with dev's behaviour unchanged today.

4. The Keycloak realm import fails OPEN: an unresolved placeholder is stored
   LITERALLY and the import still reports success, then sits at Done=True and never
   re-runs. On 2026-09-06 all 12 prod OIDC clients held the literal
   $(env:..._CLIENT_SECRET) string and every SSO login failed, while every signal was
   green. The CronJob is the level-triggered correction; two alerts make its silence
   observable. Repaired live already — this stops it recurring.

Also: the R-NET-04 conformance scan descended into nested agent worktrees under
.claude/, counting 4 egress policies where 1 is authored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-07 00:59:22 -05:00
..

platform/

Cluster-wide platform services, Flux-managed (R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01/02/03). Reconciled by the platform Flux Kustomization defined in clusters/base/platform.yaml, before apps/.

Governing spec: docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md, docs/01-architecture-overview.md.

Phase 0 scaffolding only. Every component here is a structurally-correct stub — a Flux HelmRelease and/or Kustomization with a values placeholder, a README citing the governing ADR/spec, and TODOs for the phase that fills it in. No cluster exists; nothing reconciles yet. Do not add working config, secrets, or provisioning under Phase 0 (spec AGENTS.md §1/§5/§6, roadmap/phases.md).

Reconciliation flow (how a change lands)

git (source of truth)
   │  operator PR → CI (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · Chainsaw) → merge to tracked branch
   ▼
Flux GitRepository (clusters/base/flux-system.yaml)
   ▼
Flux Kustomization "platform"  → ./platform  (this dir)     ── substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┐
   │  prune=true (drift correction, R-GITOPS-03) · wait=true                                  │ R-ENV-02
   ▼                                                                                          │
Flux Kustomization "apps"      → ./apps  (dependsOn platform) ─ substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┘

Git is authoritative; the cluster conforms to git and drift is auto-corrected (R-GITOPS-01/03). Manual kubectl apply of platform state is prohibited (spec AGENTS.md §5).

The dev ↔ prod overlay model (R-ENV-02)

Platform manifests are authored once. Every value that legitimately differs between environments is a ${TOKEN} resolved from the cluster-vars ConfigMap via Flux postBuild.substituteFrom. The clusters/dev and clusters/prod overlays differ only by the values they patch into cluster-vars (issuer, replica counts, storage sizes, retention). See clusters/README.md. Base manifests are never forked per environment.

Components (one directory each)

Dir Component Governing ADR / spec Serves
cilium/ CNI + kube-proxy replacement + Gateway API + Egress Gateway + Hubble ADR-0002, docs/03 R-NET-*
longhorn/ Replicated block storage; 3-replica default StorageClass + bulk tier ADR-0003, docs/04 R-STATE-*
cert-manager/ TLS via Let's Encrypt DNS-01 (Cloudflare); staging + prod ClusterIssuers ADR-0006, docs/08 R-TLS-*
externaldns/ Automatic DNS records for public services (Cloudflare) docs/09 R-DNS-*
gateway/ Gateway API GatewayClass + shared HTTPS Gateway + wildcard cert ADR-0002/ADR-0006, docs/09 R-DNS-01, R-TLS-01
monitoring/ kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Grafana Alloy + Alertmanager docs/10 R-OBS-*
velero/ Off-cluster backup/DR of volumes + resource state ADR-0003, docs/04 R-STATE-03
kubevirt/ KubeVirt + CDI (IaaS: application VMs on the same K8s surface) ADR-0005, docs/06 R-PLAT-03
image-automation/ Flux image-update-automation (hands-off image tag advance) ADR-0009, docs/11 R-UPD-02
keycloak/ Platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn ADR-0014, docs/15 R-IDP-*
oauth2-proxy/ Forward-auth at the Gateway for non-OIDC apps → Keycloak ADR-0014, docs/15 R-IDP-*
kyverno/ L0 policy-as-code gate — OWNED BY THE POLICY ENGINEER (WS-TEST). ADR-0011, docs/14 R-TEST-*

⚠️ INTEGRATION TODO(PM): wire kyverno into the platform kustomization

platform/kyverno/ is authored by a different agent (the policy engineer, WS-TEST). This workstream did not create any files under platform/kyverno/ and must not.

platform/kustomization.yaml intentionally omits - kyverno. Once the policy engineer's files land, the PM must add - kyverno to that list (recommended first, so policies are present before other components reconcile). The line is present as a commented TODO in the kustomization.

Secrets

Every secret referenced below (Cloudflare API token, Velero backup-target creds, Keycloak admin/DB, oauth2-proxy cookie/client secrets) is referenced by name only and will be committed SOPS-encrypted (WS-SEC, ADR-0007). No plaintext secret appears anywhere in this tree.

Cross-workstream contracts surfaced by these stubs

  • cilium (WS-NET ↔ WS-INFRA): Cilium's initial CNI install is done by Ansible at cluster bootstrap (docs/02, Phase 1). The HelmRelease here manages Cilium config thereafter; its Helm values MUST match the Ansible bootstrap values (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port, API server host) or reconciliation will fight the bootstrap. Contract owner: WS-NET + WS-INFRA.
  • gateway + cert-manager + externaldns (WS-NET + WS-SEC): the shared Gateway listener, the wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert, and the ExternalDNS source all reference each other; they form the "Issuer + Gateway TLS" interface in roadmap/workstreams.md.
  • image-automation (WS-UPDATE): this dir holds only the cluster-wide ImageUpdateAutomation + git write-back. Per-service ImageRepository/ImagePolicy are rendered from each ServiceDefinition's update block (WS-GITOPS/WS-UPDATE), living with apps/.
  • keycloak/oauth2-proxy (WS-SEC): the SSO/auth contract (auth block → Keycloak client / oauth2-proxy protection) is owned by WS-SEC; these are placeholders pending that contract.