Files
home-network-k3s-impl/conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore/chainsaw-test.yaml
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 59ffbaf11a feat(conformance): L2 tests derive their environment from the cluster, not a literal
Six L2 behavioural tests embedded `home.keithjackson.dev`. They are test INPUTS,
not reconciled manifests, so postBuild substitution never touched them — correct
while dev held the apex, wrong the moment prod came up on
prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and blocking §9's "suite passes green against prod".

Each test now asks the cluster what it is, via a test-level chainsaw binding over
flux-system/cluster-vars — the SAME ConfigMap Flux renders the platform from, so
a test cannot disagree with the cluster it runs on:

  bindings:
    - name: baseDomain
      value: (x_k8s_get($client,'v1','ConfigMap','flux-system','cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)

Chosen over a flag or env var because there is nothing to forget at run time, and
test-level scope covers every step (step outputs/bindings are step-scoped).

THE APEX WAS NOT THE ONLY LEAK. dns-exposure and dns-internal-resolution also
hardcoded DEV'S Cilium LB range 192.168.1.53-.60; prod's is 192.168.2.20-.30, so
both were wrong for prod regardless of hostname. Replaced with assertions on the
OBSERVED value — the DNS answer must equal that cluster's GATEWAY_VIP, and the
public record must equal the LB IP the Service was actually assigned — which is
strictly STRONGER than the old range check as well as environment-independent.
sso-forward-auth held the literal only in prose (it talks over Service DNS).

PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED — and the positive control is the important half:
  * expressions extracted verbatim from the tracked files resolve to the correct,
    DIFFERENT values per cluster (dev home.keithjackson.dev / 192.168.1.53,
    prod prod.home.keithjackson.dev / 192.168.2.20);
  * the same assert with the HARDCODED apex passes on dev and FAILS on prod
    ("Invalid value: *.prod.home... Expected: *.home..."), so the harness is
    provably not blind — that is exactly the drift removed;
  * chainsaw lint VALID on all six; run.sh --lint clean over the whole tree.

END-TO-END L2 RUN AGAINST LIVE DEV: `dns-exposure` PASSED (42.6s) — the binding
produced conformance-dns.home.keithjackson.dev, external-dns published it, and the
probe Job asserted the record against the assigned LB IP. This is the first time
one of these tests has been executed since parameterization, and it exercises the
full path rather than just the binding.

FINDING FROM THAT RUN, worth recording: the test's teardown is ASYNCHRONOUS. It
reports PASS as soon as chainsaw deletes the namespace, but the Cloudflare record
is reaped later by external-dns's own --interval=1m sync. A zone query immediately
after PASS still showed conformance-dns.home.keithjackson.dev plus its owner=default
TXT registry entry. Harmless here, but it means a green dns-exposure does NOT prove
cleanup happened, and if external-dns were suspended the record would persist
silently. Verified separately that it clears.

conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml: its cluster-wide `get configmaps` is now
LOAD-BEARING for these bindings — narrowing it to the test namespace breaks five
tests. Commented so it is not "tidied" later.

l3-fault-injection/dr-restore: its KNOWN-GAPS block said off-host is unproven
because the MinIO shares a Proxmox host with dev's VMs. Still true as run, so the
text now says both — that the R2 move (32d6766) is what closes it, that this test's
pass is against MinIO, and that the ledger row proving R-STATE-03 PREDATES the move,
so off-host DR cannot be claimed until the drill is re-run against R2.

NOT VERIFIED, plainly: no full L2 suite run against prod, so "green against prod"
remains unproven — what is proven is that the tests now derive the CORRECT
expectation for whichever cluster they are pointed at. Whether prod SATISFIES them
(split-horizon, LE wildcard, Grafana's issuer) is untested.

VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. flux-postbuild-substitution 260 assertions,
render-golden 10/10.

Refs R-TEST-01, R-TEST-02, R-TEST-03, R-TEST-04, R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01/02/03.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-05 12:05:05 -05:00

691 lines
39 KiB
YAML

# =============================================================================
# L3 FAULT-INJECTION — DR restore from an OFF-CLUSTER backup (R-STATE-03)
# *SAFETY-CRITICAL* [RUNNABLE / self-skips]
# Catalog: docs/14-testing-and-conformance.md "DR restore (R-STATE-03, L3)"
# DoD: agents/definition-of-done.md — "DR-critical data restores from an
# **off-cluster** backup (drill for at least one service/phase)."
# Spec: docs/04-storage-and-state.md; ADR-0003 (Longhorn + Velero).
# Impl: platform/velero/** (Velero + kopia File System Backup -> the versitygw S3
# endpoint on the Proxmox HOST), reconciled by clusters/base/backup.yaml.
#
# GIVEN a DR-critical stateful workload with known data on the replicated `longhorn`
# tier, and a Velero BackupStorageLocation whose object-store endpoint is
# PROVABLY OUTSIDE this cluster,
# WHEN a backup of that namespace + its volume data is written to that off-cluster
# store, and then EVERY in-cluster copy of the data is DESTROYED (namespace,
# PVC and the underlying PersistentVolume/Longhorn replicas all deleted),
# THEN a Velero restore into a CLEAN, previously-nonexistent namespace brings the
# workload back and the known data reads back byte-identical.
#
# R-TEST-05 (fault injection, not happy-path): the restore is only meaningful because
# the source is annihilated first. After the destroy step there is no PVC, no PV and
# no Longhorn volume left in the cluster holding this data — so the bytes that come
# back can ONLY have come from the off-cluster object store. A restore that silently
# rebound a surviving in-cluster PV is explicitly excluded: the test captures the
# original PV name, asserts it is GONE, and asserts the restored PVC is bound to a
# DIFFERENT, newly provisioned PV.
#
# HOW "OFF-CLUSTER" IS PROVEN (not assumed) — step `assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster`:
# 1. The BackupStorageLocation reports phase `Available` — Velero itself has
# successfully reached and validated that object store.
# 2. Its endpoint host is resolved to an IPv4 address and asserted to be NONE of:
# loopback; any Node InternalIP/ExternalIP; any Service ClusterIP; any Pod IP;
# inside any node's `spec.podCIDR(s)`; inside any `ServiceCIDR` (best-effort).
# It is also asserted not to be a cluster-internal DNS name (*.svc,
# *.cluster.local, localhost). => the bytes leave the cluster's address space.
# 3. The backup's PodVolumeBackup carries a non-empty `status.snapshotID` — the
# kopia snapshot really landed in the remote repository, i.e. VOLUME DATA (not
# merely Kubernetes resource JSON) was uploaded off-cluster.
# 4. Plus the destroy-then-restore sequence above, which removes every in-cluster
# alternative source for the data.
#
# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (asserted nowhere — do not read this test as claiming them):
# * OFF-HOST is NOT proven, only OFF-CLUSTER — TRUE AS RUN, and being fixed. On the
# dev estate the k3s nodes are VMs on the same Proxmox host that runs the
# versitygw/MinIO S3 target (192.168.1.9), so this drill does not survive loss of
# that hypervisor: one machine takes the cluster AND its backups.
# That is exactly why the operator moved off-cluster DR to Cloudflare R2 on
# 2026-09-05 (commit 32d6766 — S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is now an R2 endpoint). Once that
# merges and this drill is RE-RUN against R2, off-host stops being a gap and becomes
# proven, because the target no longer shares a failure domain with the cluster.
# UNTIL THEN THIS TEST'S PASS IS AGAINST MinIO. R-STATE-03 is currently proven only
# for the same-host target; re-proving it against R2 is a prerequisite for claiming
# off-host DR, and the ledger row that proves R-STATE-03 predates the move.
# * The test does NOT read the backup objects out of the bucket with an S3 client.
# Doing so would require handing the conformance runner the backup credential,
# widening a privileged test identity for weaker evidence than (1)-(4) above.
# * The test restores its OWN scratch workload, never a real service's data. A
# per-service drill (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG) stays an operator exercise.
# * Bare-metal DR (rebuild the cluster itself, then restore) is NOT exercised; this
# asserts namespace+volume restore into a live cluster, which is what the catalog
# entry and the DoD line ask for.
# * Backup ENCRYPTION at rest and retention/GC behaviour are not asserted.
#
# RUNNABLE / SELF-SKIPPING (a skip is honest; a fake pass is a defect). Skips CLEANLY
# (green) when a precondition is absent: no `longhorn` StorageClass; no Velero API
# (CRDs absent); no BackupStorageLocation configured at all; Velero server or its
# node-agent DaemonSet not ready. It runs the full drill the moment those exist — no
# edit needed. RBAC denial is NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect.
#
# DESTRUCTIVE BY DESIGN, SCOPED BY CONSTRUCTION: every object it destroys is one it
# created itself, in two namespaces it names after its own Chainsaw namespace
# (`<ns>-dr-src`, `<ns>-dr-dst`) and labels `conformance.home.k3s/created-by=<ns>`.
# It never touches a real service's namespace, PVC or PV, and it never deletes a
# Backup it did not create.
#
# TEARDOWN ALWAYS RUNS (`finally`, even on failure/timeout/panic): both scratch
# namespaces, any leftover PV, the Restore CR, and the Backup — the latter via a
# Velero DeleteBackupRequest so the objects are removed from the bucket too, with a
# short `ttl` on the Backup as a belt-and-braces backstop if that request is lost.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
metadata:
name: dr-restore
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/R-STATE-03: "true"
annotations:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-STATE-03"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L3"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "true"
# executable => runs against a cluster; self-skips (green) until Velero + a
# BackupStorageLocation + the longhorn tier exist.
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
Seed known data on longhorn, back the namespace + volume data up to the Velero
object store whose endpoint is proven to be outside this cluster, destroy every
in-cluster copy (namespace, PVC and PV), restore into a clean namespace, and read
the known data back from a newly provisioned volume. Skips cleanly until Velero,
a BackupStorageLocation and a longhorn StorageClass exist.
conformance.home.k3s/never-executed: >-
AUTHORED, NOT YET EXECUTED. No workstation in this repo has cluster access, and
the drill is destructive, so it must first be run by the operator against the dev
cluster in a maintenance window before R-STATE-03 may be called proven. Repo-derived
status deliberately reports proof as not-derivable (conformance/lib/status.py).
spec:
# A full backup -> destroy -> restore cycle over kopia File System Backup, plus
# Longhorn provisioning on HDD, is far slower than any other test here. Bound it
# generously but explicitly (no sleep-and-hope; every wait below is a bounded poll).
# Worst-case bound of the drill step, summing every poll below (seed ~5m + stale-target
# clean ~5m + backup 15m + namespace destroy 12m + PV destroy 5m + restore 15m + restored
# workload Ready 10m ~= 67m). Declared at 75m so the step's own bounded polls, not this
# timeout, are what fail first and report WHICH phase stalled. Nothing here sleeps blindly.
timeouts:
exec: 75m
delete: 10m
cleanup: 15m
steps:
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Preconditions + the OFF-CLUSTER property of the backup target. This step makes
# no changes to the cluster; it either skips cleanly or proves the target is
# genuinely outside the cluster's address space.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster
try:
- script:
content: |
set -eu
# ---- helpers -------------------------------------------------------
# Classify a kubectl failure: an RBAC denial is a HARNESS DEFECT and must
# fail loudly; an absent API is a genuine precondition gap and may skip.
die_or_skip() {
case "$2" in
*orbidden*|*Unauthorized*|*cannot\ list*|*cannot\ get*)
echo "FAIL: conformance runner lacks RBAC for $1 -- fix conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml" >&2
echo "$2" >&2
exit 1 ;;
*)
echo "SKIP: $1 not available on this cluster -- $2"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0 ;;
esac
}
ip2int() {
_q="$(echo "$1" | tr '.' ' ')"
set -- $_q
[ $# -eq 4 ] || { echo -1; return 0; }
echo $(( ($1 * 16777216) + ($2 * 65536) + ($3 * 256) + $4 ))
}
# in_cidr <ip> <a.b.c.d/len> -> 0 when the ip is inside the prefix
in_cidr() {
case "$2" in *"/"*) ;; *) return 1 ;; esac
_net="${2%/*}"; _len="${2#*/}"
case "$_len" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 1 ;; esac
[ "$_len" -ge 0 ] && [ "$_len" -le 32 ] || return 1
_i="$(ip2int "$1")"; _n="$(ip2int "$_net")"
[ "$_i" -ge 0 ] && [ "$_n" -ge 0 ] || return 1
[ "$_len" -eq 0 ] && return 0
_d=1; _s=0
while [ "$_s" -lt $((32 - _len)) ]; do _d=$((_d * 2)); _s=$((_s + 1)); done
[ $(( _i / _d )) -eq $(( _n / _d )) ]
}
# ---- Gate 1: the replicated storage tier the DR-critical data lives on --
if ! kubectl get storageclass longhorn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "SKIP: 'longhorn' StorageClass absent -- no DR-critical data tier on this cluster yet"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
# ---- Gate 2: the Velero API + a configured BackupStorageLocation --------
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.provider}{" "}{.spec.default}{" "}{.spec.config.s3Url}{" "}{.spec.objectStorage.bucket}{"\n"}{end}' \
2>&1)" || die_or_skip "velero.io/backupstoragelocations" "$BSL_LINES"
if [ -z "$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero API present but NO BackupStorageLocation is configured -- no off-cluster backup target yet"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "backup storage locations:"
echo "$BSL_LINES"
VNS="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1)"
# ---- Gate 3: Velero server + node-agent (kopia FSB) actually ready -------
# File System Backup is the volume-DATA path (platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml:
# deployNodeAgent=true, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). Without a
# ready node-agent no volume data can be captured, so the drill is not runnable.
VREADY=0; NAREADY=0
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
VREADY="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get deploy velero -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
NAREADY="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get daemonset node-agent -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: velero readyReplicas=${VREADY:-0} node-agent numberReady=${NAREADY:-0}"
if [ "${VREADY:-0}" -ge 1 ] && [ "${NAREADY:-0}" -ge 1 ]; then break; fi
sleep 10
done
if [ "${VREADY:-0}" -lt 1 ] || [ "${NAREADY:-0}" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero server and/or its node-agent DaemonSet are not ready in ns '$VNS' -- backup/restore path not available"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
# ---- Pick the BSL this drill will use: prefer the default, and it MUST be
# Available. A CONFIGURED-BUT-UNAVAILABLE target is NOT a precondition
# gap -- it is a live R-STATE-03 defect, so it FAILS (after a bounded
# wait for first-validation on a cold start), it does not skip. --------
BSL_NS=""; BSL_NAME=""; BSL_URL=""; BSL_BUCKET=""
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.provider}{" "}{.spec.default}{" "}{.spec.config.s3Url}{" "}{.spec.objectStorage.bucket}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | grep ' true ' | head -1 || true)"
[ -n "$CAND" ] || CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | head -1 || true)"
if [ -n "$CAND" ]; then
BSL_NS="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
BSL_NAME="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f2)"
BSL_URL="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f6)"
BSL_BUCKET="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f7)"
break
fi
echo "poll $i: no Available BackupStorageLocation yet"
sleep 10
done
if [ -z "$BSL_NAME" ]; then
echo "FAIL: a BackupStorageLocation is configured but NONE reached phase 'Available'." >&2
echo " The off-cluster backup target is unreachable -- R-STATE-03 is BROKEN, not merely untested." >&2
echo "$BSL_LINES" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "using BSL ${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} bucket=${BSL_BUCKET} endpoint=${BSL_URL}"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (1): an endpoint we can evaluate ------------------
if [ -z "$BSL_URL" ]; then
echo "FAIL: BackupStorageLocation ${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} exposes no spec.config.s3Url;" >&2
echo " the OFF-CLUSTER property of the backup target cannot be established, so this" >&2
echo " test refuses to claim it. (Extend this check for a non-S3 provider.)" >&2
exit 1
fi
HOST="${BSL_URL#*://}" # strip scheme
HOST="${HOST%%/*}" # strip path
HOST="${HOST%%:*}" # strip port
echo "backup endpoint host: $HOST"
case "$HOST" in
localhost|*.svc|*.svc.cluster.local|*.cluster.local)
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint '$HOST' is a CLUSTER-INTERNAL name -- the backup target is IN the cluster." >&2
echo " An in-cluster backup store cannot satisfy R-STATE-03 (off-cluster backup)." >&2
exit 1 ;;
esac
# Resolve to an IPv4 address. If it cannot be resolved we CANNOT establish the
# off-cluster property -- that is a failure, never a silent pass.
case "$HOST" in
*[!0-9.]*)
# Endpoint given as a name. Try the resolvers that may exist in the
# runner image, in order; if none is available or none resolves, the
# test FAILS below rather than guessing.
EPIP="$(getent ahostsv4 "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)"
[ -n "$EPIP" ] || EPIP="$(getent hosts "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)"
[ -n "$EPIP" ] || EPIP="$(nslookup "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | grep -A2 '^Name:' | grep '^Address' | head -1 | sed 's/.*: *//' || true)" ;;
*) EPIP="$HOST" ;;
esac
if [ -z "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: could not resolve backup endpoint host '$HOST' to an IPv4 address;" >&2
echo " the OFF-CLUSTER property cannot be asserted, so this test does not pass." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "backup endpoint resolves to: $EPIP"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (2): the endpoint is outside every cluster address --
case "$EPIP" in 127.*|0.0.0.0) echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is loopback -- not off-cluster" >&2; exit 1 ;; esac
NODE_IPS="$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .status.addresses[*]}{.address}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $NODE_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a NODE address of this cluster -- the backup is not off-cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any node address (checked $(echo "$NODE_IPS" | grep -c . || true) node addresses)"
SVC_IPS="$(kubectl get svc -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.clusterIP}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $SVC_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a Service ClusterIP -- the backup target lives INSIDE the cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any Service ClusterIP (checked $(echo "$SVC_IPS" | grep -c . || true))"
POD_IPS="$(kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.podIP}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $POD_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a POD IP -- the backup target is an in-cluster pod." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any Pod IP (checked $(echo "$POD_IPS" | grep -c . || true))"
POD_CIDRS="$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.podCIDR}{"\n"}{range .spec.podCIDRs[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for c in $POD_CIDRS; do
case "$c" in *:*) continue ;; esac # IPv6 prefixes are out of scope here
if in_cidr "$EPIP" "$c"; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP falls inside node podCIDR $c -- it is in the cluster pod network." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is outside every node podCIDR (checked: $(echo "$POD_CIDRS" | tr '\n' ' '))"
# Best-effort (needs networking.k8s.io/ServiceCIDR, which the least-privilege
# runner may not read): the checks above are the authoritative ones.
SVC_CIDRS="$(kubectl get servicecidrs.networking.k8s.io -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .spec.cidrs[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$SVC_CIDRS" ]; then
for c in $SVC_CIDRS; do
case "$c" in *:*) continue ;; esac
if in_cidr "$EPIP" "$c"; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP falls inside the Service CIDR $c -- it is in the cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is outside every ServiceCIDR ($(echo "$SVC_CIDRS" | tr '\n' ' '))"
else
echo "(ServiceCIDR objects unreadable -- skipping that best-effort check; ClusterIP/PodIP/podCIDR checks stand)"
fi
echo "OFF_CLUSTER_TARGET_OK bsl=${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} endpoint=${EPIP} bucket=${BSL_BUCKET}"
check:
# green on either a clean precondition skip or a proven off-cluster target.
(contains($stdout, 'OFF_CLUSTER_TARGET_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# R-STATE-03's "scheduled" half: the backup is not a one-off human action.
# Non-destructive, and skipped in lock-step with the step above.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: assert-backups-are-scheduled
try:
- script:
content: |
set -eu
SCHED="$(kubectl get schedules.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"/"}{.metadata.name}{" phase="}{.status.phase}{" cron="}{.spec.schedule}{" lastBackup="}{.status.lastBackup}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$(echo "$SCHED" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
# Distinguish "Velero absent" (skip, in lock-step with step 1) from
# "Velero present but nothing scheduled" (a real R-STATE-03 defect).
if kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ -z "$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A -o name 2>/dev/null || true)" ]; then
echo "SKIP: no BackupStorageLocation configured -- scheduling not applicable yet"
echo DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "FAIL: Velero is configured with a backup target but declares NO Schedule --" >&2
echo " R-STATE-03 requires SCHEDULED off-cluster backups, not manual ones." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "SKIP: Velero API absent -- backup scheduling not applicable on this cluster yet"
echo DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "velero schedules:"
echo "$SCHED"
# A Schedule that exists but is paused/disabled backs nothing up.
if echo "$SCHED" | grep -q 'phase=Enabled'; then
echo BACKUPS_ARE_SCHEDULED_OK
else
echo "FAIL: no Velero Schedule is in phase 'Enabled' -- scheduled off-cluster backups are not running." >&2
exit 1
fi
check:
(contains($stdout, 'BACKUPS_ARE_SCHEDULED_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The drill itself: seed -> back up off-cluster -> ANNIHILATE -> restore -> read.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: data-restores-from-the-off-cluster-backup
try:
- script:
content: |
set -eu
NS="$NAMESPACE"
SRC="${NS}-dr-src" # scratch source namespace (destroyed by design)
DST="${NS}-dr-dst" # clean restore target (must not pre-exist)
BK="${NS}-dr-backup"
RS="${NS}-dr-restore"
OWNER_LABEL="conformance.home.k3s/created-by=${NS}"
# ---- Re-derive the preconditions (steps do not share shell state). Every
# skip below mirrors step 1 exactly, so the whole test skips or runs
# as a unit -- it can never half-run. -----------------------------
if ! kubectl get storageclass longhorn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "SKIP: 'longhorn' StorageClass absent"; echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.default}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | grep ' true$' | head -1 || true)"
[ -n "$CAND" ] || CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | head -1 || true)"
if [ -z "$CAND" ]; then
echo "SKIP: no Available BackupStorageLocation (see the off-cluster step for the authoritative verdict)"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
VNS="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
BSL_NAME="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f2)"
if [ "$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get daemonset node-agent -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero node-agent (kopia FSB) not ready -- volume data cannot be backed up"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
echo "velero ns=$VNS bsl=$BSL_NAME src=$SRC dst=$DST"
# A clean restore target means PREVIOUSLY NONEXISTENT, and the source name must
# be free. If either is lying around from an aborted run, remove it before we
# claim "clean" -- and fail loudly if it will not go, because a half-deleted
# namespace would silently invalidate the destroy proof below.
kubectl delete namespace "$DST" "$SRC" --ignore-not-found --wait=true --timeout=300s
# ============================ GIVEN ==============================
# A DR-critical stateful workload with known data on the replicated tier.
CANARY="dr-canary-$(date +%s%N)"
kubectl create namespace "$SRC"
kubectl label namespace "$SRC" "$OWNER_LABEL" --overwrite
kubectl -n "$SRC" apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: dr-data
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
storageClassName: longhorn
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
EOF
kubectl -n "$SRC" apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: dr-workload
labels:
app: dr-workload
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: app
image: busybox:1.36.1
command: ["sh", "-c", "sleep 7200"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: dr-data
EOF
kubectl -n "$SRC" wait --for=condition=Ready pod/dr-workload --timeout=300s
printf '%s' "$CANARY" | kubectl -n "$SRC" exec -i dr-workload -- sh -c 'cat > /data/canary && sync'
echo "seeded canary: $(kubectl -n "$SRC" exec dr-workload -- cat /data/canary)"
ORIG_PV="$(kubectl -n "$SRC" get pvc dr-data -o jsonpath='{.spec.volumeName}')"
[ -n "$ORIG_PV" ] || { echo "FAIL: source PVC never bound to a PV" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "original in-cluster PersistentVolume: $ORIG_PV"
# ======================= WHEN (part 1): back up off-cluster =======
# Created as a Velero Backup CR -- exactly what `velero backup create` does.
# defaultVolumesToFsBackup:true selects the kopia File System Backup path, so
# the VOLUME DATA (not just the resource JSON) is uploaded to the object store.
# ttl is short: if the finally-step DeleteBackupRequest is ever lost, Velero's
# own GC still removes this drill's objects from the bucket.
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Backup
metadata:
name: ${BK}
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
includedNamespaces: [${SRC}]
storageLocation: ${BSL_NAME}
snapshotVolumes: false
defaultVolumesToFsBackup: true
ttl: 2h0m0s
EOF
BPHASE=""
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
BPHASE="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: backup phase=${BPHASE:-<pending>}"
case "${BPHASE:-}" in
Completed|Failed|PartiallyFailed|FailedValidation) break ;;
esac
sleep 10
done
if [ "${BPHASE:-}" != "Completed" ]; then
echo "FAIL: off-cluster backup did not complete (phase=${BPHASE:-<timeout>})" >&2
kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" -o yaml >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
echo "backup $BK Completed to ${BSL_NAME}"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (3): the VOLUME DATA really landed in the remote
# kopia repository -- a PodVolumeBackup Completed with a snapshot ID.
PVB="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumebackups.velero.io \
-l velero.io/backup-name="$BK" \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.status.snapshotID}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "pod volume backups:"
echo "$PVB"
if [ -z "$(echo "$PVB" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
echo "FAIL: the backup captured NO pod volume data (no PodVolumeBackup)." >&2
echo " Resource-only backups cannot restore DR-critical DATA." >&2
exit 1
fi
# A line is "<name> <phase> <snapshotID>"; require Completed AND a
# non-empty snapshot ID (an empty ID means nothing reached the repository).
GOOD_PVB="$(echo "$PVB" | grep -cE ' Completed [^[:space:]]+$' || true)"
if [ "${GOOD_PVB:-0}" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "FAIL: no PodVolumeBackup reached phase Completed with a snapshot ID --" >&2
echo " the volume data did not reach the off-cluster repository." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "volume data uploaded off-cluster (PodVolumeBackup Completed with a kopia snapshotID)"
# ============ WHEN (part 2): FAULT INJECTION -- annihilate the source ====
# Destroy EVERY in-cluster copy: the pod, the PVC, the namespace, and the
# underlying PersistentVolume (and with it the Longhorn replicas). After this
# there is no in-cluster source the restore could quietly read from.
kubectl delete namespace "$SRC" --wait=true --timeout=420s
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if ! kubectl get namespace "$SRC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
echo "poll $i: waiting for namespace $SRC to disappear"
sleep 10
done
if kubectl get namespace "$SRC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: source namespace $SRC did not terminate; the destroy step is not convincing" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "source namespace destroyed"
# The longhorn StorageClass reclaims Delete, so the PV should already be gone;
# force it if a Retain policy (or a stuck finalizer) left it behind, because a
# surviving PV would make the restore prove nothing about off-cluster recovery.
kubectl delete pv "$ORIG_PV" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if ! kubectl get pv "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
echo "poll $i: waiting for PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV to disappear"
sleep 10
done
if kubectl get pv "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: the original PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV SURVIVED the destroy step." >&2
echo " An in-cluster copy of the data still exists, so a successful restore" >&2
echo " would NOT prove recovery from the off-cluster backup. Refusing to pass." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "original PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV is GONE -- no in-cluster copy of the data remains"
# Best-effort corroboration (the least-privilege runner may not read longhorn.io):
# the Longhorn Volume CR and its replicas should be gone too.
if kubectl -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: Longhorn Volume $ORIG_PV still exists after PV deletion -- replicas survive in-cluster" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "(longhorn Volume CR $ORIG_PV not present -- either deleted or not readable by this identity)"
# ============================ RESTORE ============================
# Into a CLEAN, previously-nonexistent namespace (Velero creates it), which is
# the catalog's "restored into a clean state".
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Restore
metadata:
name: ${RS}
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
backupName: ${BK}
includedNamespaces: [${SRC}]
namespaceMapping:
${SRC}: ${DST}
existingResourcePolicy: none
EOF
RPHASE=""
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
RPHASE="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get restores.velero.io "$RS" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: restore phase=${RPHASE:-<pending>}"
case "${RPHASE:-}" in
Completed|Failed|PartiallyFailed|FailedValidation) break ;;
esac
sleep 10
done
if [ "${RPHASE:-}" != "Completed" ]; then
echo "FAIL: restore did not complete (phase=${RPHASE:-<timeout>})" >&2
kubectl -n "$VNS" get restores.velero.io "$RS" -o yaml >&2 || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumerestores.velero.io -l velero.io/restore-name="$RS" -o wide >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
echo "restore $RS Completed into $DST"
# ============================= THEN ==============================
# The service returns WITH ITS DATA. With kopia FSB the restored pod carries a
# `restore-wait` init container that blocks until the node-agent has written the
# volume contents back, so Ready here already implies the data landed.
if ! kubectl -n "$DST" wait --for=condition=Ready pod/dr-workload --timeout=600s; then
echo "FAIL: restored workload never became Ready in the clean namespace $DST" >&2
kubectl -n "$DST" describe pod dr-workload >&2 || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumerestores.velero.io -l velero.io/restore-name="$RS" -o wide >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
NEW_PV="$(kubectl -n "$DST" get pvc dr-data -o jsonpath='{.spec.volumeName}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "restored PVC bound to PersistentVolume: ${NEW_PV:-<none>}"
[ -n "$NEW_PV" ] || { echo "FAIL: restored PVC did not bind a PV" >&2; exit 1; }
if [ "$NEW_PV" = "$ORIG_PV" ]; then
echo "FAIL: the restored PVC rebound the ORIGINAL PersistentVolume ($ORIG_PV)." >&2
echo " That is an in-cluster survival, not an off-cluster restore." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "restored onto a NEW volume ($NEW_PV != $ORIG_PV) -- the data came from outside the cluster"
GOT="$(kubectl -n "$DST" exec dr-workload -- cat /data/canary)"
echo "recovered='$GOT' expected='$CANARY'"
if [ "$GOT" != "$CANARY" ]; then
echo "FAIL: restored data does not match what was backed up -- DR restore lost/corrupted data" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK
check:
# green on either a clean precondition skip or a proven off-cluster restore.
(contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
finally:
# ALWAYS RUNS -- on pass, fail, timeout or panic. This test creates namespaces
# and Velero objects OUTSIDE its Chainsaw namespace, so Chainsaw's own namespace
# teardown cannot reclaim them; everything below is keyed to names/labels derived
# from THIS test's namespace, so it can never touch anything it did not create.
- script:
content: |
set -u
NS="$NAMESPACE"
SRC="${NS}-dr-src"; DST="${NS}-dr-dst"; BK="${NS}-dr-backup"; RS="${NS}-dr-restore"
VNS="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.namespace}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
# Velero objects first: a DeleteBackupRequest makes Velero remove the backup
# DATA from the off-cluster bucket, not just the CR (self-cleaning contract).
if [ -n "$VNS" ]; then
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete restores.velero.io "$RS" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
if kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF || true
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: DeleteBackupRequest
metadata:
name: ${BK}-delete
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
backupName: ${BK}
EOF
for i in $(seq 1 18); do
kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
sleep 10
done
# Backstop if Velero could not process the request (the 2h ttl also GCs it).
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete backups.velero.io "$BK" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete deletebackuprequests.velero.io "${BK}-delete" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
fi
echo "velero objects for $NS cleaned up (ns $VNS)"
fi
# Scratch namespaces (both, in case the run aborted at any point).
for n in "$DST" "$SRC"; do
kubectl delete namespace "$n" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
done
# Anything left labelled as ours (defensive; the two names above are the only
# namespaces this test ever creates).
kubectl delete namespace -l "conformance.home.k3s/created-by=${NS}" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
# Released PVs from either namespace's PVCs would otherwise leak storage.
for pv in $(kubectl get pv -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.spec.claimRef.namespace}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null | grep -E " (${SRC}|${DST})$" | cut -d' ' -f1 || true); do
kubectl delete pv "$pv" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
echo "released leftover PersistentVolume: $pv"
done
echo "dr-restore teardown complete (best-effort; every object was created by this test)"