Files
home-network-k3s-impl/conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 fdf5c69adc test(conformance): add L3 node-loss test for R-STATE-02 (Longhorn node-loss resilience)
R-STATE-02 was the last safety-critical requirement with no verifying test,
exempted via DOCUMENTED_GAPS. Author the L3 fault-injection test that proves the
guarantee and remove the exemption.

tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss/chainsaw-test.yaml:
  GIVEN a 3-replica Longhorn volume with written data attached on node N,
  WHEN  N is removed from service (cordon + evict the attached workload, forcing
        the volume to detach from N),
  THEN  a fresh workload on a SURVIVING node re-attaches the same volume and reads
        the canary intact — volume stays available, cluster reconverges.

Safe-by-construction for the 3-node embedded-etcd dev cluster:
  - Disruption scoped to EXACTLY ONE node, at the scheduling layer only (cordon +
    evict our own pod). kubelet/etcd stay up — etcd quorum is never touched.
  - Never `kubectl drain`; only our own writer pod is deleted, so no unrelated or
    system pod is disturbed.
  - Victim node labelled conformance.home.k3s/cordoned-by=<test-ns>; `finally`
    ALWAYS uncordons every node with THAT label and removes it — restored even on
    failure/timeout, and never touches an operator-cordoned node.
  - Self-skips green until a longhorn StorageClass AND >= 3 Ready nodes exist.

Bookkeeping:
  - run.sh: remove R-STATE-02 from DOCUMENTED_GAPS; add node-loss to CONF_HEAVY_TESTS
    (serial pass, matches the other Longhorn/KubeVirt L3 tests).
  - incluster/rbac.yaml: enable the scoped nodes get/list/patch rule the test needs
    (cordon/uncordon/label); no eviction rights (no drain).
  - README.md / coverage.py docstring: refresh the documented-gap example.

Coverage: 36/51 -> 37/51 (70.6% -> 72.5%); safety-critical gaps 1 -> 0. Only
R-STATE-02 changed ([] -> node-loss); no other requirement or golden touched.

NOTE: LIVE execution is DEFERRED to an operator-chosen maintenance window. This
change AUTHORS + statically validates the test (renders, chainsaw-lints, harness
selects it, coverage updates). The static gate runs L2/L3 as SKIP without a
cluster (expected). The node-disruption test was NOT run live.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-08-27 18:12:33 -05:00

135 lines
6.2 KiB
YAML

# =============================================================================
# Scoped test ServiceAccount + RBAC for the in-cluster Chainsaw conformance Job
# (ADR-0011; docs/14 "Where each layer runs"; R-SEC-02 least-privilege).
#
# SKELETON / PLACEHOLDER — RBAC is deliberately LEFT EMPTY here and authored
# least-privilege as each fault-injection capability actually lands (T-3.0+). The
# rule is: grant nothing until a committed test needs it, then grant exactly that
# verb/resource, with a comment naming the test that requires it. This SA is a
# PRIVILEGED TEST IDENTITY — it is its own audit item (R-SEC-02): it MUST NOT be
# reused by workloads, and every widening is reviewed.
#
# CI holds NO cluster credentials. CI only triggers the Job (T-6.1b via Gitea
# Actions); the Job runs under THIS ServiceAccount, so cluster access stays
# in-cluster and scoped (docs/14, R-SEC-02).
#
# Deployment: reconciled by Flux into the `conformance` namespace once the cluster
# exists (Phase 1+). Not applied in Phase 0 (no cluster).
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: conformance
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
# The test namespace itself is exempt from nothing: the platform default-deny
# baseline still applies; the Job opens only the egress it declares.
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: conformance-runner
namespace: conformance
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
annotations:
conformance.home.k3s/audit: >-
PRIVILEGED TEST IDENTITY. Scoped least-privilege for fault-injection only.
Never reuse for workloads. Widen only alongside the test that needs it.
---
# ClusterRole — the union of what BEHAVIOR + FAULT tests need. Every rule is
# commented with the test/requirement that justifies it. Start empty; uncomment /
# add rules as the corresponding L2/L3 tests are delivered (do NOT pre-grant).
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: conformance-runner
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
rules:
# ---- Hermetic fixtures (all L2/L3): create/delete throwaway test namespaces + fixtures
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [namespaces]
# `patch` is required by R-NET-06 (vpn-killswitch): the test relabels its own
# ephemeral namespace to PodSecurity enforce=privileged so it can launch the
# node-pinned privileged fault Job. Scoped to the per-test namespace only.
verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch, patch]
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [pods, services, configmaps, secrets, persistentvolumeclaims]
verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch, patch]
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [pods/exec]
verbs: [create] # probe exec for behavior assertions
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [pods/log]
verbs: [get] # read fault/probe Job logs on failure
# ---- Probe / fault Jobs (R-TLS-01/03 tls-probe; R-NET-06 tunnel stop/start)
# `create` cannot be constrained by resourceNames, and the fault Job names are
# fixed per-test (tunnel-stop/tunnel-start/tunnel-start-finally); scoped by the
# in-namespace blast radius of the ephemeral test namespace.
- apiGroups: [batch]
resources: [jobs]
verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch, patch]
#
# ---- R-NET-01/02 (default-deny, deny-undeclared): apply/patch/delete allow policies
# - apiGroups: [cilium.io]
# resources: [ciliumnetworkpolicies]
# verbs: [create, delete, get, list, patch]
#
# ---- R-NET-06 (VPN kill-switch, ADR-0015): the fault is a HOST systemd action
# (stop/start `vpn-egress-tunnel` on the egress-gateway node), NOT scaling an
# in-cluster gluetun Deployment (superseded design). It is driven by a privileged,
# hostPID, node-pinned Job (nsenter -t 1 -- systemctl ...). That power comes from
# PodSecurity (the test namespace relabeled to enforce=privileged) + the pod's
# securityContext, NOT from RBAC — the fault Job pod needs NO Kubernetes API
# rights. The runner only needs `jobs` create/delete + `namespaces` patch above.
# PREREQUISITE: if a cluster-wide Kyverno disallow-privileged / disallow-host-
# namespaces policy is enforced, the `chainsaw-conf-*` test namespaces MUST be in
# its exclusion set (documented, audited exception — R-SEC-02).
#
# ---- R-STATE-02 (node loss, tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss): the fault is
# `kubectl cordon` + label of ONE node, reverted by `kubectl uncordon` + label removal
# in the test's `finally`. All three (cordon/uncordon/label) are a `patch` on the node
# object; `get`/`list` locate the victim + the finally cleanup selector. The test evicts
# only its OWN writer pod via `delete pod` (already granted above) — it deliberately does
# NOT `kubectl drain`, so no eviction rights and no reach over unrelated pods are needed.
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [nodes]
verbs: [get, list, patch] # cordon/uncordon/label = patch spec.unschedulable + metadata.labels
#
# ---- R-UPD-02 (bad-update auto-rollback): inject a bad image tag via automation
# - apiGroups: [image.toolkit.fluxcd.io]
# resources: [imagepolicies, imagerepositories]
# verbs: [get, patch]
#
# ---- R-STATE-03 (DR restore): trigger a Velero restore
# - apiGroups: [velero.io]
# resources: [restores, backups]
# verbs: [create, get, list, watch]
#
# ---- R-GITOPS-03 (drift): mutate a reconciled resource + observe Flux revert
# - apiGroups: [kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io]
# resources: [kustomizations]
# verbs: [get, list, watch] # observe only; do NOT grant reconcile suspension
#
# ---- R-PLAT-03 (VM lifecycle): create/start/stop/destroy VMs
# - apiGroups: [kubevirt.io]
# resources: [virtualmachines, virtualmachineinstances]
# verbs: [create, delete, get, list, patch]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: conformance-runner
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: conformance-runner
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-runner
namespace: conformance