Three corrections after rebasing onto main. 1. THE GUARD CAUGHT A REAL ONE ON ITS FIRST CONTACT WITH main. main had gained `CNPGPrimariesCoLocated` (platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml) pointing at /runbooks/cnpg-primary-spread, with no runbook. The check failed the rebase exactly as designed — 46 annotations, 35 names, 34 present — naming both the missing file AND the missing configMapGenerator entry. runbooks/cnpg-primary-spread.md now exists: what co-located primaries actually cost here (blast radius, not an outage, because instances: 3 + required anti-affinity), why the drift is uncorrectable-by-declaration (CNPG has no primary-placement field), the readiness gate that keeps the rule quiet during a real node outage, and the ~9s-per-database switchover rebalance, one cluster at a time. The 2026-09-07 outage in which all three primaries sat on one node is the reason the alert exists at all. 2. WHOLE-REPO SCOPE, NOT A HAND-WRITTEN STAGE. main's refactor replaced ci/l0.sh's per-check "UNCONDITIONAL" stages with a declaration: `conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"`, unioned into every gate run by Stage 3b's `--include-scope`. My +38-line Stage 3f is removed (ci/l0.sh is now byte-identical to main) and the annotation is declared instead. Assertion (7) of the check was rewritten to match: it no longer asserts its own path appears in ci/l0.sh — it asserts the test DECLARES the scope and that ci/l0.sh still passes --include-scope, since neither half alone makes the check load-bearing. That matters here because ci/touched-requirements.sh maps platform/monitoring/* to "R-OBS-01 R-OBS-02", not R-OBS-04, and maps platform/kubevirt/* and runbooks/* to nothing at all. 3. A FACTUAL CORRECTION IN ALL 35 RUNBOOKS. Every page claimed `dev.sh` defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. main's `9b4744d fix(devcontainer): dev.sh defaults to prod` made that false, and a runbook that misstates which cluster a command talks to is worse than one that says nothing. The pages now say what is durably true: the default has already changed once, so naming `--context k3s-prod` is what makes a command mean the same thing next month, and the per-invocation banner is there to be read. The check's own failure message was corrected the same way. Re-verified after all three: check green at 374 assertions (46 annotations, 35/35 runbooks present, 35/35 projected), re-applied to prod, and re-probed in-cluster through the Gateway — node-down, keycloak-down, keycloak-client-secrets, cnpg-archiving, longhorn-faulted, vpn-down, node-io and cnpg-primary-spread all HTTP 200 with text/plain; charset=utf-8 and 8.9-12.1 KB of real body; /runbooks/ index 200; an unknown name 404s with a pointer rather than a blank page; and homepage still answers the apex `/`, confirming Gateway API longest-path precedence. Full merge gate: PASS (spec-immutability, lint, l0, render-golden, l1 all green; prom-rules SKIPPED for want of promtool in the image; L2/L3 SKIPPED, no cluster). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
8.7 KiB
kubevirt-crashloop — A VM's virt-launcher pod is restarting repeatedly
Alert: KubeVirtVMCrashLooping (warning, 10m)
File: platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.kubevirt
Expression: increase(kube_pod_container_status_restarts_total{pod=~"virt-launcher-.*"}[15m]) > 3
What this means here
More than three restarts of a virt-launcher pod in 15 minutes. The threshold is chosen to distinguish a
crash-loop from a one-off reboot: a guest that restarts once is not interesting, a guest that restarts
four times in a quarter of an hour is either panicking, being OOM-killed, or crashing qemu.
Note what layer this watches: the pod, not the guest. virt-launcher wraps qemu, so a guest kernel
panic, an OOM kill of the launcher, and a qemu crash all present the same way here. The distinction comes
from the logs and the events, not from the alert.
This is a warning, correctly: the VM tier is deliberately non-gating (apps-vms is wait: false) and a
crash-looping VM does not affect the container platform. The one caveat is that on this network the UniFi
VM is the home network's controller, so that VM crash-looping is user-visible.
Two platform facts that shape the likely causes:
- These are HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Minis with ~22 GiB usable each, running the whole platform. A VM is the largest discretionary memory consumer on a node, so OOM is a live possibility rather than a theoretical one.
useEmulation: falseis set deliberately — on KubeVirt v1.9,truesilently forces TCG. A VM running under TCG burns a whole core per vCPU, and heavy sustained TCG load has been observed to degrade the Cilium datapath into intermittent LB-VIP unreachability (cleared by a restart). So "the VM is unstable and the network is flaky" is usually one cause, not two.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once — it was k3s-dev
until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
to talk to — read it. Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once; they share one container and
interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
First commands
Which launcher, how many restarts, on which node:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get pods -A -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher -o wide; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod get vmi -A -o wide'
Why it died — the previous container's log is the one that matters:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n unifi logs -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher --previous --tail=120 2>&1 | tail -60'
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n unifi describe pod -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher 2>&1 | sed -n "/Last State/,\$p" | head -40'
Was it OOM-killed?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get events -A --field-selector reason=OOMKilling --sort-by=.lastTimestamp | tail -10; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod top pods -A --sort-by=memory | head -10'
ssh k3s-prod-1 'dmesg -T | grep -iE "oom|killed process" | tail -10; free -h; swapon --show'
(An empty swapon --show is what you want. On 2026-09-07 all three prod nodes came back from a reboot with
977 MiB of swap active while the role reported success — SwapTotal == 0 is not evidence swap is off.
See /runbooks/node-memory.)
Is it really TCG rather than KVM?
ssh k3s-prod-1 'ls -l /dev/kvm; grep -c -E "vmx|svm" /proc/cpuinfo; ps -eo pid,pcpu,comm | grep -i qemu'
Is the disk healthy underneath?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUST:.status.robustness,STATE:.status.state | grep -v healthy'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. The guest is panicking or the guest OS is broken
Read the serial console via the previous container's log. A guest that panics at boot after a change is
usually a bad cloud-init or a bad image. Two precise traps here: KubeVirt caps inline userData at 2048
bytes (the shipped payload is a deliberately minimal ~1.1 KB inline blob; userDataSecretRef was tried
and reverted), and apps-vms must NOT carry postBuild.substituteFrom — Flux's envsubst rewrote
${...} inside the cloud-init and corrupted it (commit da1f833). Do not restore substitution there for
consistency with the app waves.
2. The launcher is being OOM-killed
On ~22 GiB nodes running the whole platform, a VM with a generous memory request plus Prometheus (3Gi) and
Grafana (768Mi) is tight. Remediation: lower the VM's memory in git, or address node memory
(/runbooks/node-memory). Check swap is genuinely off first — active swap makes the kubelet's accounting
lie and eviction misbehave.
3. qemu is crashing
The launcher log will carry the qemu error. Most often a device or firmware mismatch: a UEFI image needs
firmware.efi, and containerDisk does not work here at all (it requires the ALPHA ImageVolume gate,
off on k3s — use a CDI DataVolume). See /runbooks/kubevirt-launch-failed.
4. The disk is unavailable or degraded mid-flight
A longhorn-vm volume that went degraded or faulted takes the guest with it. Cross-read
/runbooks/longhorn-degraded and /runbooks/longhorn-faulted. Remember longhorn-vm is Block mode
only and migratable: true; a VM on plain longhorn cannot live-migrate.
5. Node I/O pressure is starving the guest
A guest whose virtual disk cannot complete writes will wedge and be restarted. /runbooks/node-io — and
note the guest's writes land on the same partition as the embedded etcd WAL, so a thrashing VM is a
control-plane risk, not just its own problem.
6. It is running under TCG
useEmulation: true forces it on v1.9. Confirm with /dev/kvm presence and qemu CPU usage. Fix in git.
When to escalate or stop
- Bound the damage first. If the VM is thrashing the disk, its restarts are loading the node that
etcd writes to. If
/runbooks/node-iois also firing, stopping the VM (an operator action on theVMobject,spec.running: falsein git) is the right move — protecting the control plane beats keeping one VM trying. - Do not delete the DataVolume or the PVC. A re-import is hours of I/O on the shared partition.
- Do not
kubectl drainthe node to relocate it. This cluster does not drain, and a VM live-migrates on drain only with per-VMevictionStrategy: LiveMigrate; a blanket setting would wedge drains for RWO-disk VMs. - Escalate if the guest needs in-guest repair — that is console work, and for the UniFi VM it is also home-network-visible.
- If the alert is firing for a
virt-launcherin a leaked test namespace, deleting that namespace is the fix; leaked TCG test namespaces have caused API blips here before.
Source of truth: runbooks/kubevirt-crashloop.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md Session 7 (useEmulation, firmware.efi, containerDisk/ImageVolume);
commit da1f833 (cloud-init corrupted by envsubst); the 2026-09-07 swap-persistence finding.