The hostPath mechanism was MEASURED NOT TO WORK. In the live Plex pod on
k3s-prod-2, 2026-10-01: the device node was VISIBLE in the container
(`crw-rw---- root video2 226,128 renderD128`) and could not be opened --
`uid 0 O_RDWR -> EPERM` and `uid 1000 O_RDWR -> EPERM`. EPERM from the DEVICE
CGROUP, not EACCES from file permissions, proven three ways: root on the HOST
opens the same device rc=0; the node is unified cgroup2fs; and the container's
runc config.json read `linux.resources.devices: [{allow: False, access: 'rwm'}]`
with `linux.devices: None` -- one deny-all rule, no allow entry for major 226.
A hostPath is a filesystem operation: it binds the device node in but adds no
cgroup allow rule, because Kubernetes cannot infer one from a volume.
The Intel GPU device plugin produces that allow rule
(`createDeviceSpecsFromDrmFiles` emits `DeviceSpec{..., Permissions: "rw"}`).
It shipped as #36 and is live: all three prod nodes advertise
`gpu.intel.com/i915: 1`, DaemonSet 3/3/3 (measured 2026-10-01).
ZERO ServiceDefinition field changes, which was the entire point of making the
field an enum of capability classes rather than a device path. `catalog/plex.yaml`'s
`hardware:` block comes through byte-identical; only its comment changes, because
it restated the old mechanism. Contract invariant 8 holds, now demonstrated rather
than claimed.
- catalog/render.py: `DRI_VOLUME_NAME`/`DRI_DEVICE_DIR` retired for
`QUICKSYNC_RESOURCE`; the hardware branch now sets
`resources.limits["gpu.intel.com/i915"] = 1` on the APP container only (never a
sidecar) and emits no volume, no mount, no securityContext, no nodeSelector.
`limits` not `requests` is mandatory: Kubernetes mirrors requests from limits,
and a requests-only extended resource is invalid. This is the only app-container
`resources` render path and is deliberately narrow -- no general CPU/memory
feature was invented.
- selftests: resources dict asserted EXACTLY; hostPath/mount asserted ABSENT; the
no-`hardware` negative extended to `resources`; the podSecurityContext
pass-through and the no-synthesised-securityContext assertions kept; one new
assertion that the limit never reaches the oauth2-proxy sidecar. Mutation-tested:
8/8 mutants caught (requests-instead-of-limits, emission dropped, hostPath
re-added, emitted unconditionally, supplementalGroups synthesised, wrong resource
name, quantity as a string, limit leaked onto the sidecar).
- apps/wave-0/plex.yaml: six hostPath lines removed, a three-line resources block
added. Only golden touched; keycloak/vm-demo unchanged.
THE REGRESSION, STATED RATHER THAN SOLD. Before: device missing ->
`DirectoryOrCreate` mounted an empty dir -> Plex ran and SILENTLY
software-transcoded (invisible, harmless to everything else). After: resource
unavailable (plugin broken, removed, or not yet reconciled) -> Plex is
UNSCHEDULABLE, and `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` with `apps-wave-1` dependsOn it,
so that STALLS THE APP TIER. Unavoidable: an extended resource is a hard
scheduling constraint, and it is also the only thing that produces the cgroup
allow rule. There is no graceful-degradation variant. Plex's schedulability is now
coupled to the intel-gpu-plugin DaemonSet. Escape hatch, one field and no code
change: delete the `hardware:` block from catalog/plex.yaml and re-render.
Documented in the contract, the runbook (its own top-of-page section and a
"Plex will not schedule" procedure) and the handoff.
HARDWARE TRANSCODING IS STILL NOT OBSERVED WORKING. The decisive open() test
cannot be re-run until this merges and Flux reconciles, and the Plex-side
`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` toggle is still unset. A green gate proves the
manifest renders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
catalog — ServiceDefinition entries (the onboarding surface)
One YAML file per service. Each file is a ServiceDefinition conforming to
../schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json. Adding or
editing a service here is the only onboarding step — the platform renders compute, storage, network
policy, egress, TLS, DNS, monitoring, and update policy from it (see
../schemas/renderer-contract.md). Serves R-GITOPS-02.
Source of truth for the initial catalog: spec
docs/13-service-catalog.md (14-service table +
SSO/egress/dependency intent).
Current examples
| File | docs/13 row | exposure | egress | auth | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
pihole.yaml |
6 | internal | internet | forward-auth | admin UI behind oauth2-proxy; config on Longhorn (DR-critical); also platform DNS |
keycloak.yaml |
0 | public | internet | native | the IdP itself (own admin login + MFA); PostgreSQL on Longhorn; DR-critical |
The remaining catalog services (plex, sonarr, radarr, jackett, seerr, nextcloud, minecraft, unifi, semaphore, kasm, gitea, qbittorrent) are onboarded in later phases; they follow the same schema and inherit every guarantee automatically.
Authoring rules
- Only
nameandsourceare mandatory; every other field defaults to docs/13's default posture (kind: container,exposure: internal,egress: internet,auth.mode: forward-auth, stable auto-update, DNS-only default-deny). Set a field only to override the default. - Any exposed UI must have an
authblock:forward-auth(default) oroidc, each with a non-emptyauth.groups;native/noneare documented exceptions only. - Irreplaceable state (
class: longhornconfigs/DBs) must setbackup.policyto an off-cluster schedule — neverreacquirable(R-STATE-03). Only bulk media may bereacquirable. - Shell braces must be escaped
$${...}. Anything rendered verbatim onto the workload — alifecyclepostStart script, anenvvalue — lands underapps/wave-<N>/, and everyapps-wave-<N>Flux Kustomization declarespostBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars. Flux runs envsubst over the WHOLE manifest at reconcile time, so an unescaped${VAR:-}meant for the shell is replaced with the empty string before the container ever starts (this silently killed gitea's and nextcloud's OIDC registration for days). Bare$VARand$(cmd)are left alone and need no escaping; a genuine environment knob is declared inclusters/base/cluster-vars.yamland written bare${KNOB}. Full contract:../clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml.render.pyREFUSES to emit a manifest that breaks this rule (Flux's strict substitution mode cannot: it deliberately exempts the${V:-}/${V:=x}/${V:?}default-operator forms).
Validate before commit — single command, no cluster (R-TEST-02)
check-jsonschema --schemafile schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json catalog/*.yaml
See ../schemas/README.md for install/pinning and a pure-Python fallback.
This is the L0/L1 schema gate (spec docs/14); CI (.gitea/) runs it on every change.
Rendering — render.py (the ServiceDefinition renderer, T-0.3)
render.py compiles a ServiceDefinition into the concrete manifest set defined
by ../schemas/renderer-contract.md: a Namespace (with the
app-namespace/gateway-access labels), the default-deny baseline (R-NET-01), a
Deployment+Service or a KubeVirt VirtualMachine + CDI DataVolume (R-PLAT-02/03), PVCs
(R-STATE), one CiliumNetworkPolicy egress-allow per dependency (R-NET-02), the
egress-class steering label (R-NET-05), HTTPRoute(s) on the shared Gateway (R-TLS/R-DNS),
ServiceMonitor + SLI alerts (R-OBS-01), the Flux ImageRepository/ImagePolicy update plumbing
(R-UPD), and the auth-mode / backup wiring hints (R-IDP/R-STATE-03).
python3 catalog/render.py catalog/pihole.yaml # render one SD to stdout
python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o out/ # render every SD to out/<name>.yaml
python3 catalog/render.py --selftest # deterministic self-test (no cluster)
- Deterministic: identical input → byte-identical output (golden-diffable). The L1 render
conformance tests (
conformance/tests/l1-rendering/*) diff the output against committed goldens — run offline byconformance/run.sh --layer l1andci/l1.sh(no cluster). - How CI/Flux consume it: CI invokes
render.pyin the L1 stage; a GitOps flow renders--all catalog -o <rendered-dir>and Flux reconciles the rendered directory. Design choice (renderer-contract is silent on mechanism): a render-then-consume script is the simplest reproducible option — see the header ofrender.py. - Dependency: PyYAML (the renderer's single dependency; the conformance harness stays stdlib-only and only shells out to this script + diffs text).