A service that reads this repository's Gitea issues, decides what to do about each thread as the Program Manager persona, and runs one worker agent per assignment that authors a change, runs the merge gate and opens a pull request. It reacts to issue creation and to comments; the assignment and all correspondence travel through the issue thread and the PR. It authenticates with an Anthropic subscription token. It never pushes to main and never merges. Three choices carry the design, with alternatives recorded in docs/plans/: - it POLLS rather than receiving webhooks (Gitea's webhook SSRF guard, lost deliveries, and no inbound reach needed at all); - it keeps NO state: the trigger is "the newest thing in this thread was not written by me", so the issue thread is the state — no PVC, no backup obligation; - the model holds NO tools: its reply is one JSON object this code validates, so nothing in the path executes text. The boundary is platform/kyverno/admission/pm-agent-job-shape.yaml (Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail), not the RBAC: Kubernetes places no `use` check on serviceAccountName, so "may create Jobs" is "may run arbitrary code as the namespace's most privileged identity". Six rules admit only the committed shape, and the worker identity is bound to nothing with no token mounted, so there is nothing to escalate to. 28/28 offline Kyverno assertions. Nothing has run: the image has never been built or pushed, and both the image digest and the two credentials are deliberate placeholders. See the handoff entry's "What I did NOT verify". Refs CLAUDE.md §1/§3/§6, R-SEC-02, R-GITOPS-02. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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pm-agent — the Program Manager agent service
Operator procedure, not alert-linked. The service reads Gitea issues, decides what to do about each thread as the Program Manager, and runs one worker agent per assignment that authors a change, runs the merge gate and opens a pull request.
- What it is and why it is shaped this way:
platform/pm-agent/README.md - The design and the rejected alternatives:
docs/plans/pm-agent-issue-to-pr.md
Everything below is read-only except where it says otherwise. Mutating kubectl and
flux reconcile are operator actions, not agent actions.
Stop it. Right now.
In order of increasing severity. Each is an operator action.
1. Stop it taking new work, keep it running. Set PM_DRY_RUN: "true" in
platform/pm-agent/configmap.yaml, bump the config-generation annotation in
deployment.yaml, merge. It still reads threads and still posts what it would have done,
and creates no worker Jobs. This is also the right setting for watching it for a day.
2. Stop it immediately, without a merge.
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent scale deploy/pm-agent --replicas=0'
Flux will put it back at the next reconcile (10m). To hold it down, suspend the tier:
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'flux --context k3s-prod suspend kustomization pm-agent'
Running worker Jobs are not stopped by either. They finish, or:
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent delete job -l app.kubernetes.io/name=pm-agent-worker'
3. Revoke its reach. Delete the Gitea token in Gitea (as the pm-agent user: Settings →
Applications → the token → Delete). Every worker and the dispatcher then fail
authentication, nothing can be pushed, and no comment can be posted. This is the one that
does not depend on the cluster behaving.
A branch the agent already pushed is not undone by any of the above. A pull request it opened cannot merge without a green gate, and — if it touched a sensitive path — not without a human review either.
It is not doing anything
Work through these in order; the first three are by far the most likely.
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent get deploy,pod,job'
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent logs deploy/pm-agent --tail=60'
| Symptom in the log | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
GET /user returned no login — is GITEA_TOKEN valid? and a CrashLoop |
the credentials are still the committed placeholders, or the token was revoked | fill them in per platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml.example |
ImagePullBackOff, digest sha256:0000… |
the image has never been pushed; the committed digest is the deliberate placeholder | infra/agent/build-image.sh, operator pushes, then one PR updates the digest in both deployment.yaml and configmap.yaml (PM_WORKER_IMAGE) |
PM_WORKER_IMAGE must be digest-pinned |
someone put a tag in the ConfigMap | use the digest from podman push --digestfile |
scope: ONLY issues labelled 'agent' |
PM_REQUIRE_LABEL is set; unlabelled issues are out of scope by configuration |
label the issue, or clear the knob |
cycle: 2 worker(s) active and nothing new |
at PM_MAX_ACTIVE_WORKERS |
wait, or raise it (RAM is the binding constraint: each worker's limit is 2Gi) |
at the worker cap / worker limit reached |
the per-cycle cap, draining a backlog one issue at a time | expected; it will continue next cycle |
nothing at all, not even cycle: lines |
the process is not running | check the pod, then the events |
It will not answer an issue whose newest comment is its own. That is the trigger, not a bug: it acts only when the newest thing in a thread was written by somebody else. If you want it to look again, comment on the issue.
It will not re-answer an issue within PM_ISSUE_COOLDOWN_SECONDS (15 min) of its last
attempt on that issue. Restarting the pod clears that timer.
A worker failed
Every worker posts its own outcome on the issue, including failures — so read the issue first; it usually names the step. Then:
# which workers ran, and how they ended (Jobs are kept 48h)
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent get jobs -l app.kubernetes.io/name=pm-agent-worker \
-L pm-agent.homelab.keithjackson.dev/issue'
# the full log of one
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent logs job/pm-agent-task-<issue>-<ts> --tail=200'
| What you see | Meaning |
|---|---|
| issue comment: "the merge gate refused it" with a gate log | working as intended. Nothing was pushed. Comment on the issue with guidance and the PM will send a worker back |
unexpected skipped stage '<x>' — rc 3 is NOT acceptable |
the gate could not run a stage that is not one of the two expected skips (spec-immutability, gitea-settings). Treated as a refusal, correctly: a stage that did not run is not green |
branch '<x>' already exists on the remote, but this assignment was 'implement' |
the PM thought this was new work. Nothing was forced. Ask for a revision of the existing branch instead |
is not an allowed git host |
PM_GITEA_URL was changed to something outside the allowlist baked into pm-worker. That allowlist is deliberate — changing it means rebuilding the image |
Error from server (Forbidden) creating a Job, in the dispatcher log |
admission denied the Job. Read the message: it names the rule. Either the image digest is not under the agent-runner path, or the template drifted out of the shape the policy admits |
Job DeadlineExceeded after 90 min |
a wedged session. Nothing was pushed (the push is the last step) |
| nothing on the issue at all and the Job failed | the worker died before it could comment. The pod log is the only record; the Job is kept 48h |
The Anthropic token expires after a year
claude setup-token mints a one-year OAuth token, and nothing warns you: Claude
Code's expiry notice only appears for an interactive login, never for the
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN variable. When it lapses, every session fails at once and the
symptom is workers failing with an authentication error.
Rotate it exactly as it was created — claude setup-token on a machine with a browser, then
sops -e -i platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml, then a pull request. Restart
the dispatcher pod afterwards so it re-reads the Secret (a Secret change does not roll a
Deployment by itself); worker Jobs pick the new value up on their next run with no action.
The date it was minted belongs in the handoff entry. Check it now:
grep -rn 'claude setup-token' decisions/ | head
Checks worth making, and the one you must not
Confirm the bot account is NOT an administrator. This is the control that stops the
service clearing its own sensitive-path review — infra/gitea/approval-policy.json
authorises /approve-override by live repository permission alone, so an admin-permission
bot could waive the human review on its own pull request. It must print write:
curl -s -H "Authorization: token <the pm-agent token>" \
https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl/collaborators/pm-agent/permission \
| python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("permission"))'
Confirm the admission policy is actually applied — a policy that is in git and not in the applied set is the exact failure this repository has already had once:
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusterpolicy pm-agent-job-shape \
-o jsonpath="{.spec.validationFailureAction}{\"\n\"}"'
Enforce, or the boundary is not there.
Never sops -d the credentials file into a terminal, a log or a transcript, and never
print the Secret's .data to check that it exists. Key names only:
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n pm-agent get secret pm-agent-credentials \
-o jsonpath="{.data}" | tr "," "\n" | cut -d\" -f2'
(That prints the keys. A password has been leaked into a transcript in this repository by printing the values.)