jakman85andClaude Opus 5
8ccfdab180
`required_approvals: 1` on `main` was a lock-out, not a protection. Gitea
refuses to let a PR's author approve their own PR, and `jakman85` is the only
collaborator — so no account in existence could approve a PR the operator
opened, including the PR that would fix that. Measured 2026-10-01 on PR #35:
gate green in 1m41s, reviews `[]`, `required_approvals: 1`, unmergeable.
It was never the documented design either: `ci/approval-policy.sh`'s header and
`ci/gate.sh:194` both already describe the model as "required_approvals drops
to 0 and the GATE decides", and `require-gate.sh`'s own closing note named this
failure and prescribed this remedy. 2026-09-30's entry flagged the 1-vs-0
disagreement as unresolved; this settles it at 0.
Layer 1 — branch protection. required_approvals 1 -> 0 in the declaration, plus
infra/gitea/allow-admin-self-merge.sh to apply it live (target read FROM the
declaration, so the script cannot drift from what the gate checks).
require-gate.sh moves to 0 too; left at 1 it would re-impose the lock-out on its
next run. The narrow choice is deliberate: the other way to unblock an owner is
block_admin_merge_override: false, which would re-open what
block-admin-override.sh was written to close (PRs #5-#9, zero approvals). This
drops the approval COUNT only — block_admin_merge_override and
enable_status_check stay true and are asserted after the PATCH, so a red gate
stays unmergeable by everyone, administrators included.
Layer 2 — ci/approval-policy.sh. Sensitive paths still need a non-author
approval the sole admin cannot get, so an administrator may waive it with an
`/approve-override <reason>` comment: directive must start a line, reason
mandatory, permission re-checked LIVE, invalidated by a new commit, and the
overrider + reason printed in the gate log and job summary. Candidate selection
is the pure, offline ci/approval-override.py (23 unit assertions, all passing);
authorisation stays in the fail-closed stage. Every new failure mode blocks.
The cost, stated not buried: for an administrator, "a change to the gate cannot
be gated by the gate" is now advisory rather than structural. Unavoidable with
one human; what is bought back is an attributed, commit-scoped record instead of
a silent bypass. And the uncomfortable part, accepted as an operator decision:
authorisation is by live permission alone, and the AGENT account `gitea-admin`
also holds `owner` — so an agent can clear its own PR this way. Documented in
approval-policy.json, the stage header, and CLAUDE.md (which tells agents not
to). Narrowing needs no code change: add `override_admins` and the stage already
requires membership.
Adjacent fix, in scope because `make -C ci test` is the only runner for the
suite added here: ci/tests/gate-decision.test.sh hand-maintained a stub list
that "must name EVERY stage gate.sh runs" and omitted `approval-policy` (added
to gate.sh by PR #17), so run_stage hit exit 127 and 15 of 50 assertions failed.
Verified pre-existing on pristine origin/main @ 0c7e8dd. The list is now derived
from gate.sh's own run_stage lines, so the omission cannot recur; the suite goes
15-failed -> 50 passing and `make -C ci test` goes FAILED -> all suites passed.
Toolbox gate: rc 3 UNDETERMINED — every stage green except `gitea-settings`
(no SETTINGS_API_TOKEN locally) and `conformance` (no cluster). NOT a green run.
The live rule is UNCHANGED and still reads 1 — mutating it is an operator
action. Until allow-admin-self-merge.sh is run, ci/gitea-settings.sh will
correctly report DRIFT and this PR will be red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
249 lines
14 KiB
Bash
Executable File
249 lines
14 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# ci/approval-policy.sh — the CI/CD pipeline is the approver, EXCEPT for changes that alter
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# what the pipeline verifies or the security posture it rests on.
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#
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# THE POLICY, and why it is shaped this way.
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#
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# Operator intent (2026-09-29): "CI/CD pipeline is the end-all-be-all for approval. If the CI
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# pipeline is not good enough to be trusted for this, then it is not good enough to do its
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# intended job and needs to be improved. Manual approvers should only be for architecturally or
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# security relevant changes -- which is essentially the CI pipeline itself and kyverno policies."
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#
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# So `required_approvals` on the branch drops to 0 and the GATE decides. That is a real transfer
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# of authority, and it has exactly one hole: **a change to the gate cannot be gated by the gate.**
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# A PR that weakens a check would be approved by the weakened check. The same applies to the
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# admission policies, the Flux wiring that decides what reconciles, the SOPS recipients, and the
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# RBAC. Those are the "architecturally or security relevant" set, and this stage is what still
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# requires a human for them.
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#
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# The list is data, not code: infra/gitea/approval-policy.json, with a stated reason per entry so
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# it stays reviewable. Changing that list is itself a sensitive change (infra/gitea/**), so the
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# policy cannot be widened without a human.
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#
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# FAIL-CLOSED, DELIBERATELY DIFFERENT FROM gitea-settings.sh. That stage skips when its token is
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# missing, because an unwired credential blocking every PR is a lock-out. Here the reverse is
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# true: if this cannot evaluate, an unreviewed change to the gate itself could merge. A skip is a
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# BYPASS, not a gap. So: cannot determine -> BLOCK.
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#
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# THE ADMIN OVERRIDE (added 2026-10-01), and the lock-out it clears.
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#
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# The rule above was UNSATISFIABLE for the one human who runs this repo. Gitea refuses to let a
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# pull request's author approve their own PR, and `jakman85` is the only collaborator — so "an
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# APPROVED review from someone who is not its author" is a condition the sole administrator can
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# never meet. Every sensitive-path PR they opened was permanently unmergeable, INCLUDING the PR
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# that would fix it. Measured 2026-10-01: PR #35, gate green in 1m41s, zero reviews, blocked.
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#
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# So an administrator may waive the review by COMMENTING on the PR:
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#
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# /approve-override <reason>
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#
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# Authority comes from the LIVE Gitea permission API, never from the comment — the commenter must
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# hold a permission listed in `.override.authorized_permissions` (admin/owner) at the moment the
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# gate runs, so an old comment from a since-demoted account is worth nothing. The directive must
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# start a line, a reason is mandatory, and the comment must POST-DATE the head commit: an override
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# earned at commit A does not cover commit B. Choosing the candidate comment is the job of the
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# pure, offline, unit-tested ci/approval-override.py; AUTHORISING it is the job of this stage,
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# which fails closed.
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#
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# WHAT THIS COSTS, STATED PLAINLY. For an administrator, "a change to the gate cannot be gated by
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# the gate" stops being structural and becomes advisory. That is the unavoidable consequence of
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# there being one human; the alternative is a repository its owner cannot change. What is bought
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# back is a RECORD — the waiver is an explicit act, attributed to an account, carrying a stated
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# reason, in the PR history and in this stage's output. A silent bypass keyed on "is the author an
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# admin?" would have been less code and is exactly the fail-open shape this repo keeps finding.
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#
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# AND THE PART THAT IS NOT COMFORTABLE. Authorisation is by permission ALONE, with no allowlist of
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# human accounts (operator decision, 2026-10-01, taken with this consequence on the table). The
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# AGENT account `gitea-admin` also reports permission `owner` here, so an agent can clear the
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# sensitive-path review on its own PR by posting the directive — and agents author most PRs in
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# this repo, so that is the common case, not an edge case. To narrow it without touching this
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# logic, add an `override_admins` list to infra/gitea/approval-policy.json: the check below
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# already requires membership whenever that key is present.
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#
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# EXIT CODES
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# 0 no sensitive paths touched (gate alone is sufficient), OR sensitive paths touched and
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# either a non-author APPROVED review or a valid admin override is present
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# 1 sensitive paths touched with neither, OR the policy could not be evaluated
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set -euo pipefail
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CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${CI_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
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# shellcheck disable=SC1091
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source "${CI_DIR}/lib.sh"
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log "Stage: approval policy (CI approves; humans approve changes to CI)"
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DECL="${REPO_ROOT}/infra/gitea/approval-policy.json"
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[ -f "$DECL" ] || die "approval policy declaration missing: ${DECL}"
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require_tool jq
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require_tool python3
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# Not a PR -> nothing to gate. A push to main is already merged, and direct pushes are refused
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# by branch protection, so this is genuinely not-applicable rather than a skipped check.
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EVENT="${GITHUB_EVENT_NAME:-${EVENT_NAME:-}}"
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PR="${PR_NUMBER:-}"
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if [ "$EVENT" != "pull_request" ] || [ -z "$PR" ] || [ "$PR" = "null" ]; then
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ok "not a pull_request event (event='${EVENT:-none}') — approval policy N/A"
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exit 0
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fi
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GITEA_URL="${GITEA_URL:-https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev}"
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GITEA_REPO="${GITEA_REPO:-Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl}"
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TOKEN="${SETTINGS_API_TOKEN:-${GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN:-}}"
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if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
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err "no SETTINGS_API_TOKEN — cannot read this PR's changed files or its reviews."
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err " BLOCKING. A skip here would let an unreviewed change to the gate itself merge."
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — cannot evaluate** (no token; a skip here is a bypass)"
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exit 1
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fi
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api() { curl -sS --max-time 20 -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" "$@"; }
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FILES_JSON="$(api "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_REPO}/pulls/${PR}/files?limit=1000" || true)"
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PR_JSON="$(api "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_REPO}/pulls/${PR}" || true)"
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REVIEWS_JSON="$(api "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_REPO}/pulls/${PR}/reviews" || true)"
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# PR conversation comments live under the ISSUES endpoint. `/pulls/{n}/comments` returns review
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# (diff) comments ONLY, so an override posted in the normal comment box would never appear in it.
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# Verified against this Gitea (1.24.3) rather than assumed.
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COMMENTS_JSON="$(api "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments?limit=1000" || true)"
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for v in FILES_JSON PR_JSON REVIEWS_JSON COMMENTS_JSON; do
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jq -e . >/dev/null 2>&1 <<<"${!v}" || {
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err "could not read ${v} from Gitea for PR #${PR} — BLOCKING rather than assuming."
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — Gitea unreadable**"
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exit 1; }
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done
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AUTHOR="$(jq -r '.user.login // empty' <<<"$PR_JSON")"
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[ -n "$AUTHOR" ] || { err "could not determine PR author — BLOCKING"; exit 1; }
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# NOTE: the PR file list goes in via an ENV VAR, not a second stdin redirect. `python3 - <<EOF`
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# already consumes stdin for the script; adding `<<<"$json"` silently wins and the script body is
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# never read. Caught before shipping, by running it.
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SENSITIVE="$(FILES_JSON="$FILES_JSON" DECL="$DECL" python3 -c '
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import json, os, fnmatch
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decl = json.load(open(os.environ["DECL"]))
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files = [f.get("filename", "") for f in json.loads(os.environ["FILES_JSON"])]
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pats = decl["sensitive_paths"]
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hits = sorted({f for f in files for p in pats
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if fnmatch.fnmatch(f, p) or (p.endswith("/**") and f.startswith(p[:-2]))})
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print("\n".join(hits))
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')"
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if [ -z "$SENSITIVE" ]; then
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ok "no architecturally/security-relevant paths touched — the GATE is the approver."
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summary "- approval-policy: **green** (CI approves; no sensitive paths touched)"
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exit 0
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fi
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echo " sensitive paths touched:" >&2
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printf ' %s\n' $SENSITIVE >&2
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APPROVER="$(jq -r --arg a "$AUTHOR" \
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'[.[] | select(.state == "APPROVED") | select(.user.login != $a) | .user.login] | first // empty' \
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<<<"$REVIEWS_JSON")"
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if [ -n "$APPROVER" ]; then
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ok "approved by '${APPROVER}' (author '${AUTHOR}') — sensitive change is human-reviewed."
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summary "- approval-policy: **green** (sensitive paths approved by \`${APPROVER}\`)"
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exit 0
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fi
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# No non-author approval exists. Before refusing, look for an administrator's explicit
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# override. See the header for why this hatch exists and what it costs.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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OVERRIDE_ENABLED="$(jq -r '.override.enabled // false' "$DECL")"
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DIRECTIVE="$(jq -r '.override.comment_directive // "/approve-override"' "$DECL")"
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HEAD_SHA="$(jq -r '.head.sha // empty' <<<"$PR_JSON")"
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if [ "$OVERRIDE_ENABLED" = "true" ]; then
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# The head commit's timestamp anchors staleness. Read it from GITEA, not from the local
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# tree: CI checks out a merge commit, whose date is not the head commit's date.
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HEAD_TIME=""
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if [ -n "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then
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HEAD_COMMIT_JSON="$(api "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_REPO}/git/commits/${HEAD_SHA}" || true)"
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HEAD_TIME="$(jq -r '.commit.committer.date // .created // empty' <<<"${HEAD_COMMIT_JSON:-null}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
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fi
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if [ -z "$HEAD_TIME" ]; then
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err "could not read the head commit's timestamp for PR #${PR} — BLOCKING."
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err " Without it an override cannot be aged, and an unaged override is one that silently"
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err " covers commits nobody waived review on."
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — head commit timestamp unreadable** (cannot age an override)"
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exit 1
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fi
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# Pure, offline, unit-tested selection: which comment, if any, is a live override?
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OVERRIDE_TSV="$(COMMENTS_JSON="$COMMENTS_JSON" HEAD_TIME="$HEAD_TIME" DIRECTIVE="$DIRECTIVE" \
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python3 "${CI_DIR}/approval-override.py")" || {
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err "ci/approval-override.py failed — BLOCKING rather than assuming there is no override."
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — override parser failed**"
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exit 1; }
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if [ -n "$OVERRIDE_TSV" ]; then
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OV_USER="$(cut -f1 <<<"$OVERRIDE_TSV")"
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OV_WHEN="$(cut -f2 <<<"$OVERRIDE_TSV")"
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OV_WHY="$(cut -f3- <<<"$OVERRIDE_TSV")"
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# AUTHORITY IS MEASURED LIVE, never inferred from the comment or from a name in git.
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PERM_JSON="$(api "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_REPO}/collaborators/${OV_USER}/permission" || true)"
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OV_PERM="$(jq -r '.permission // empty' <<<"${PERM_JSON:-null}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
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if [ -z "$OV_PERM" ]; then
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err "'${OV_USER}' posted ${DIRECTIVE}, but their permission on ${GITEA_REPO} could not be"
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err " read — BLOCKING. An override whose authority is unverified is not an override."
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — cannot verify \`${OV_USER}\`'s permission**"
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exit 1
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fi
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# Authorised when the LIVE permission is one of the declared ones and — only if an
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# `override_admins` allowlist exists at all — the account is on it. No allowlist means
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# permission alone, which is the operator's standing decision; adding the key narrows
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# this with no change to any code.
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AUTHORISED="$(DECL="$DECL" OV_PERM="$OV_PERM" OV_USER="$OV_USER" python3 -c '
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import json, os
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d = json.load(open(os.environ["DECL"])).get("override", {})
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perms = d.get("authorized_permissions") or ["admin", "owner"]
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allow = d.get("override_admins")
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ok_perm = os.environ["OV_PERM"] in perms
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ok_list = True if allow is None else os.environ["OV_USER"] in allow
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print("yes" if (ok_perm and ok_list) else "no")
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')"
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if [ "$AUTHORISED" = "yes" ]; then
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if [ "$OV_USER" = "$AUTHOR" ]; then
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warn "ADMIN OVERRIDE — SELF-WAIVED. '${OV_USER}' authored this PR and waived the"
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warn " non-author review requirement on their own change. Permitted (permission"
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warn " '${OV_PERM}'), deliberate, and shouted about here precisely because it is not free."
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else
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warn "ADMIN OVERRIDE by '${OV_USER}' (permission '${OV_PERM}'); author is '${AUTHOR}'."
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fi
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warn " when: ${OV_WHEN} (head commit ${HEAD_SHA:0:8}, ${HEAD_TIME})"
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warn " reason: ${OV_WHY}"
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warn " review waived on: $(printf '%s ' $SENSITIVE)"
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ok "sensitive paths cleared by administrator override — this stage does not block."
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SELFNOTE=""; [ "$OV_USER" = "$AUTHOR" ] && SELFNOTE=", **self-waived as author**"
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summary "- approval-policy: **OVERRIDDEN by \`${OV_USER}\`** (permission \`${OV_PERM}\`${SELFNOTE})"
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summary " - reason: ${OV_WHY}"
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summary " - review waived on: $(printf '\`%s\` ' $SENSITIVE)"
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exit 0
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fi
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err "'${OV_USER}' posted ${DIRECTIVE} but is NOT authorised to override: live permission is"
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err " '${OV_PERM}'. The authorised set is declared in infra/gitea/approval-policy.json."
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — \`${OV_USER}\` may not override** (permission \`${OV_PERM}\`)"
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exit 1
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fi
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fi
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err "This PR changes the pipeline or the security posture it rests on, and has NO approving"
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err " review from anyone other than its author ('${AUTHOR}')."
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err " A change to the gate cannot be gated by the gate — that is the one thing CI cannot"
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err " honestly approve for itself. Get a human review, or move the change out of:"
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printf ' %s\n' $SENSITIVE >&2
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err " The list lives in infra/gitea/approval-policy.json, with a reason per entry."
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if [ "$OVERRIDE_ENABLED" = "true" ]; then
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err " Or, if you hold admin/owner on this repository, comment on the PR:"
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err " ${DIRECTIVE} <reason>"
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err " The reason is mandatory, the directive must START a line, and the comment must be"
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err " NEWER than head commit ${HEAD_SHA:0:8} — push again and you must override again."
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fi
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summary "- approval-policy: **BLOCKED — needs a non-author approval, or an admin \`${DIRECTIVE}\` comment**"
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exit 1
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