218 lines
9.3 KiB
YAML
218 lines
9.3 KiB
YAML
---
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# Gitea Actions runner (act_runner) — Phase 6 CI/CD (WS-GITOSS).
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#
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# WHY A DEDICATED, NON-APP NAMESPACE:
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# The runner's job executor is a Docker-in-Docker (DinD) sidecar that MUST run
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# `privileged: true` (dockerd needs it). The Kyverno `restrict-host-namespaces`
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# policy denies privileged containers, but it (and the egress-class / auth-mode /
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# default-deny-baseline policies) scope ONLY to namespaces labeled
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# homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace: "true". This namespace deliberately does
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# NOT carry that label — it is CI plumbing, not a user-facing app — so the privileged
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# DinD sidecar is admitted WITHOUT a policy exception. (Verified: a privileged Pod in
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# a non-app namespace passes server-side admission; Kyverno test fixture
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# `platform-workload` is likewise Excluded from restrict-host-namespaces.)
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#
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# EXECUTOR MODEL — Docker executor + DinD sidecar (privileged):
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# act_runner runs each job step inside a container it launches via a Docker daemon.
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# That daemon is the co-located `dind` sidecar (shared pod netns → tcp://localhost:2376,
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# TLS via a shared emptyDir of certs). Tradeoff vs the host/self-hosted executor: DinD
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# needs `privileged`, but it gives clean per-job isolation and lets the workflow pick its
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# own job image (the pinned toolchain), which the host executor cannot. Privileged is
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# contained to this CI-only namespace and the runner mounts NO ServiceAccount token
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# (automountServiceAccountToken: false) — CI holds no cluster credentials (R-SEC-02).
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Namespace
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metadata:
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name: gitea-actions
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labels:
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# NOTE: intentionally NO homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace label (see header).
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/ci: act-runner
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---
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# Default-deny ingress; broad egress (a CI runner legitimately needs the internet:
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# ghcr.io / github.com / docker hub / dl.k8s.io / pypi for job images + pinned tools,
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# and the Gitea ingress VIP for registration + repo clone). Nothing connects INTO the
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# runner, so ingress is denied entirely.
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: default-deny-ingress-allow-egress
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namespace: gitea-actions
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labels:
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
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spec:
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podSelector: {}
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policyTypes:
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- Ingress
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- Egress
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ingress: []
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egress:
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# DNS (cluster + split-horizon resolution of gitea.home.keithjackson.dev).
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
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ports:
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- protocol: UDP
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port: 53
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 53
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# Everything else the runner + DinD need: Gitea VIP + internet registries/tool hosts.
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- {}
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---
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# Runner state (config.yaml + the `.runner` registration file) persists here so the
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# runner registers exactly ONCE and reuses its identity across restarts (no duplicate
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# offline rows in Gitea). RWO → Deployment strategy must be Recreate (fix/recreate-strategy-rwo).
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
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metadata:
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name: act-runner-data
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namespace: gitea-actions
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: act-runner
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spec:
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accessModes:
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- ReadWriteOnce
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storageClassName: longhorn
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resources:
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requests:
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storage: 1Gi
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---
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apiVersion: apps/v1
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kind: Deployment
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metadata:
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name: act-runner
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namespace: gitea-actions
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: act-runner
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spec:
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replicas: 1
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strategy:
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type: Recreate
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selector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: act-runner
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template:
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metadata:
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: act-runner
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spec:
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# CI holds no cluster credentials — do not mount a SA token into the runner or
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# (via the shared netns) the job containers (R-SEC-02, docs/14).
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automountServiceAccountToken: false
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# ---- Docker-in-Docker: the job executor daemon (privileged) -------------------
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#
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# NATIVE SIDECAR (k3s v1.36; sidecar containers are GA). It is an initContainer with
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# `restartPolicy: Always`, which means: it starts BEFORE the regular containers, keeps
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# running alongside them, and is terminated after them. kubelet holds `runner` until
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# this container's startupProbe passes, so the ordering is enforced by the kubelet
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# instead of hand-rolled shell in the runner.
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#
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# This REPLACES two bounded wait-loops that used to live in the runner's `command:`.
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# Deleting them also deletes an envsubst hazard: clusters/base/apps-wave-1.yaml runs
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# postBuild substitution over this ENTIRE manifest, comments included, and those loops
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# depended on bare dollar-names surviving it untouched. There is now no shell here at
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# all, so there is nothing to escape or mis-escape.
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#
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# WHY THE PROBE IS `exec docker ... info` AND NOT `tcpSocket`. A tcpSocket probe would
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# re-open the exact gap the old Stage 1 existed to close: dockerd writes the TLS certs
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# and only THEN begins listening, so the port can accept a connection while the certs
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# are absent or incomplete -- and act_runner hard-exits on a missing
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# /certs/client/ca.pem. A full TLS-verified `docker info` proves BOTH that the certs
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# are usable and that the daemon answers.
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#
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# CORRECTION (measured 2026-09-29, after this conversion shipped): the commit that
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# introduced this claimed the conversion would REMOVE the one-per-start dockerd line
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# `http: TLS handshake error from 127.0.0.1: EOF`. IT DOES NOT. Exactly one still
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# appears, immediately after "API listen on [::]:2376" -- it is now this probe's FIRST
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# attempt, landing microseconds after dockerd begins listening and cut off by
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# timeoutSeconds: 1. The next poll succeeds. It is cosmetic, exactly as cosmetic as it
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# was before, and deliberately NOT chased: raising timeoutSeconds to hide one benign
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# startup line would slow every subsequent poll. Left documented rather than silenced.
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#
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# periodSeconds 1 x failureThreshold 60 preserves the previous 60s cap.
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initContainers:
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- name: dind
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restartPolicy: Always # <- this field is what makes it a SIDECAR
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image: docker:29-dind
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securityContext:
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privileged: true
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env:
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# Generate + publish TLS certs into the shared emptyDir; dockerd then listens
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# on tcp://0.0.0.0:2376 (TLS) which the runner reaches at localhost:2376.
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- name: DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR
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value: /certs
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volumeMounts:
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- name: certs
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mountPath: /certs
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- name: dind-storage
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mountPath: /var/lib/docker
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 100m
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memory: 256Mi
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limits:
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memory: 2Gi
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startupProbe:
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exec:
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command:
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- docker
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- --host=tcp://127.0.0.1:2376
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- --tlsverify
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- --tlscacert=/certs/client/ca.pem
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- --tlscert=/certs/client/cert.pem
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- --tlskey=/certs/client/key.pem
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- info
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periodSeconds: 1
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failureThreshold: 60
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containers:
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# ---- act_runner: registers with Gitea, dispatches jobs to the DinD daemon ----
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- name: runner
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image: gitea/act_runner:0.6.1
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# No `command:` override. The image's own entrypoint (/sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh)
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# registers from env on first boot and runs `act_runner daemon`. The two wait-loops
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# that used to live here are gone: kubelet now holds this container until the dind
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# sidecar's startupProbe passes (see initContainers above).
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env:
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- name: GITEA_INSTANCE_URL
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value: https://gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}
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- name: GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: gitea-actions-runner
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key: token
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- name: GITEA_RUNNER_NAME
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value: incluster-dind
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# runs-on label -> job image. Both map to the catthehacker "act" image, which
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# carries bash/git/curl/tar/python3+pip/node so .gitea/workflows scripts can
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# install the pinned CI toolchain (ci/versions.env) and actions/checkout runs.
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- name: GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS
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value: "ubuntu-latest:docker://ghcr.io/catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04,homelab:docker://ghcr.io/catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04"
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# Reach the DinD daemon over the shared pod network namespace, TLS-verified
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# against the certs the sidecar drops into the shared /certs emptyDir.
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- name: DOCKER_HOST
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value: tcp://localhost:2376
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- name: DOCKER_CERT_PATH
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value: /certs/client
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- name: DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY
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value: "1"
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volumeMounts:
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- name: data
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mountPath: /data
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- name: certs
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mountPath: /certs
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readOnly: true
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 100m
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memory: 128Mi
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limits:
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memory: 512Mi
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volumes:
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- name: data
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persistentVolumeClaim:
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claimName: act-runner-data
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- name: certs
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emptyDir: {}
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- name: dind-storage
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emptyDir: {}
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