The hostPath mechanism was MEASURED NOT TO WORK. In the live Plex pod on
k3s-prod-2, 2026-10-01: the device node was VISIBLE in the container
(`crw-rw---- root video2 226,128 renderD128`) and could not be opened --
`uid 0 O_RDWR -> EPERM` and `uid 1000 O_RDWR -> EPERM`. EPERM from the DEVICE
CGROUP, not EACCES from file permissions, proven three ways: root on the HOST
opens the same device rc=0; the node is unified cgroup2fs; and the container's
runc config.json read `linux.resources.devices: [{allow: False, access: 'rwm'}]`
with `linux.devices: None` -- one deny-all rule, no allow entry for major 226.
A hostPath is a filesystem operation: it binds the device node in but adds no
cgroup allow rule, because Kubernetes cannot infer one from a volume.
The Intel GPU device plugin produces that allow rule
(`createDeviceSpecsFromDrmFiles` emits `DeviceSpec{..., Permissions: "rw"}`).
It shipped as #36 and is live: all three prod nodes advertise
`gpu.intel.com/i915: 1`, DaemonSet 3/3/3 (measured 2026-10-01).
ZERO ServiceDefinition field changes, which was the entire point of making the
field an enum of capability classes rather than a device path. `catalog/plex.yaml`'s
`hardware:` block comes through byte-identical; only its comment changes, because
it restated the old mechanism. Contract invariant 8 holds, now demonstrated rather
than claimed.
- catalog/render.py: `DRI_VOLUME_NAME`/`DRI_DEVICE_DIR` retired for
`QUICKSYNC_RESOURCE`; the hardware branch now sets
`resources.limits["gpu.intel.com/i915"] = 1` on the APP container only (never a
sidecar) and emits no volume, no mount, no securityContext, no nodeSelector.
`limits` not `requests` is mandatory: Kubernetes mirrors requests from limits,
and a requests-only extended resource is invalid. This is the only app-container
`resources` render path and is deliberately narrow -- no general CPU/memory
feature was invented.
- selftests: resources dict asserted EXACTLY; hostPath/mount asserted ABSENT; the
no-`hardware` negative extended to `resources`; the podSecurityContext
pass-through and the no-synthesised-securityContext assertions kept; one new
assertion that the limit never reaches the oauth2-proxy sidecar. Mutation-tested:
8/8 mutants caught (requests-instead-of-limits, emission dropped, hostPath
re-added, emitted unconditionally, supplementalGroups synthesised, wrong resource
name, quantity as a string, limit leaked onto the sidecar).
- apps/wave-0/plex.yaml: six hostPath lines removed, a three-line resources block
added. Only golden touched; keycloak/vm-demo unchanged.
THE REGRESSION, STATED RATHER THAN SOLD. Before: device missing ->
`DirectoryOrCreate` mounted an empty dir -> Plex ran and SILENTLY
software-transcoded (invisible, harmless to everything else). After: resource
unavailable (plugin broken, removed, or not yet reconciled) -> Plex is
UNSCHEDULABLE, and `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` with `apps-wave-1` dependsOn it,
so that STALLS THE APP TIER. Unavoidable: an extended resource is a hard
scheduling constraint, and it is also the only thing that produces the cgroup
allow rule. There is no graceful-degradation variant. Plex's schedulability is now
coupled to the intel-gpu-plugin DaemonSet. Escape hatch, one field and no code
change: delete the `hardware:` block from catalog/plex.yaml and re-render.
Documented in the contract, the runbook (its own top-of-page section and a
"Plex will not schedule" procedure) and the handoff.
HARDWARE TRANSCODING IS STILL NOT OBSERVED WORKING. The decisive open() test
cannot be re-run until this merges and Flux reconciles, and the Plex-side
`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` toggle is still unset. A green gate proves the
manifest renders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
schemas — the ServiceDefinition contract
This directory holds the ServiceDefinition interface — the highest-traffic contract in the
platform (spec agents/coordination-protocol.md §2). Onboarding a service is adding/editing one
ServiceDefinition under ../catalog/; the platform compiles it into concrete
resources. Operators declare what; the platform provides the how.
Source of truth: the read-only spec
docs/13-service-catalog.md. This schema matches
docs/13 exactly. Do not diverge from it here — escalate spec problems, don't fork the contract.
Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
servicedefinition.schema.json |
Formal JSON Schema (draft 2020-12) for a ServiceDefinition. Enforces enums, required fields, patterns, and cross-field invariants. |
renderer-contract.md |
Authoritative field → rendered-resource mapping, with requirement IDs. The contract other workstreams consume. |
Schema version: 1.8.0 (in the schema description, which carries the full per-version changelog — this line had said 1.0.0 since 1.1.0 and is now synced). Treat any change as an interface change:
propose on the task board, update dependent renderers/tests in the same change, never silently break a
consumer (coordination-protocol §2).
Required vs. defaulted fields
- Required:
name,source(withsource.imageforkind: container,source.vmTemplateforkind: vm). - Everything else is optional and carries a default matching docs/13's "default posture"
(
kind: container,exposure: internal,egress: internet,auth.mode: forward-auth,update.channel: stable,update.autoRollbackOnFailedHealth: true,observability.metrics: true,dependencies: []⇒ DNS-only). A renderer MUST materialize defaults before rendering — seerenderer-contract.md§"Default posture".
Cross-field rules the schema enforces
kind: vm⇒source.vmTemplaterequired; otherwisesource.imagerequired.auth.mode: oidc | forward-auth⇒auth.groupspresent and non-empty (R-IDP-06 — access is "in an authorized group," not merely authenticated).ingressRoutes[].hostmust match<label>.home.keithjackson.dev.storage[].class ∈ {longhorn, bulk};exposure ∈ {internal, public};egress ∈ {internet, vpn};auth.mode ∈ {oidc, forward-auth, native, none}.hardware.gpu ∈ {intel-quicksync}— a host capability class, never a device path. The enum is the contract: the mechanism that satisfies it lives only incatalog/render.py(seerenderer-contract.md§hardware).additionalProperties: falseeverywhere — unknown keys are rejected (catches typos in review/CI).
Validate examples against the schema — L1, no cluster (R-TEST-02)
Reproducible, single command, no cluster required. Canonical tool: check-jsonschema (YAML-native, pins the schema file, pin the tool version for determinism):
# one-time (pin the version for reproducibility)
pip install check-jsonschema==0.38.0
# validate every catalog entry against the contract
check-jsonschema --schemafile schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json catalog/*.yaml
# -> "ok -- validation done"
Fallback with no extra tool (Python jsonschema + pyyaml only):
python3 - <<'PY'
import json, yaml, glob, sys
from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator
schema = json.load(open('schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json'))
Draft202012Validator.check_schema(schema)
v = Draft202012Validator(schema); bad = False
for f in sorted(glob.glob('catalog/*.yaml')):
errs = sorted(v.iter_errors(yaml.safe_load(open(f))), key=lambda e: list(e.path))
print(('PASS ' if not errs else 'FAIL ') + f)
for e in errs: print(' ', list(e.path), e.message); bad = True
sys.exit(1 if bad else 0)
PY
Both are pure manifest/schema checks (L0/L1 in spec docs/14, table row "L1 Rendering") — they run in
CI with no cluster and are wired into the .gitea/ schema-validation gate by WS-TEST.
See also
renderer-contract.md— what each field renders into (Deployment/VM, PVC, CiliumNetworkPolicy, egress steering, HTTPRoute/Certificate/DNS, ServiceMonitor/alerts, ImagePolicy, Keycloak/oauth2-proxy).- Example ServiceDefinitions:
../catalog/pihole.yaml,../catalog/keycloak.yaml.