jakman85andClaude Opus 5
6a8953e288
Minimal prod delivery, authored directly on main (= prod's live revision d1a6628)
rather than by merging work/prod-standup-campaign. That branch carries the DNS apex
inversion, which would have set prod's BASE_DOMAIN to home.keithjackson.dev; prod
runs external-dns with policy: sync and txtOwnerId: prod, so it would have begun
rewriting apex records dev owns while the non-k3s prod still serves 443 there.
Operator sequencing is "dev migrates first". Nothing under clusters/ is touched
here at all, which is what makes this safe to land now.
Also deliberately EXCLUDED, because prod's live cluster-vars has no CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
key and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions would fail the whole tier: the R2 rework of
platform/velero/ and the CNPG destinationPath changes. Those land as
feat/r2-backup-prod together with the endpoint and bucket knobs.
WHAT THIS FIXES
1. Nothing was watching CNPG. All three prod databases have run since bootstrap with
ContinuousArchiving=False and firstRecoverabilityPoint=null, and no alert existed
anywhere. Because archive_mode=on and the archive command fails, Postgres refuses
to recycle WAL: keycloak-db holds every segment ever written (257 MiB on a 5 GiB
volume, ~6.8 MiB/h) — roughly 29 days to a disk-full PANIC on the cluster's SSO
database. Found by hand, 38h late. CNPGWALArchiveBacklog would have fired within
the hour, and evaluates to 3 firing series on prod today.
Rules key on cnpg_collector_* rather than cnpg_pg_stat_archiver_*, because
nextcloud-db's exporter cannot log in to its own database (permission denied for
database "nextcloud", both clusters) so the pg_stat_archiver family does not exist
for it — the obvious metric would have been blind to one database in three.
2. No PVC outside namespace=monitoring had any fill alert. New rules are partitioned
by namespace so they cannot double-fire with MonitoringVolumeFillingUp, pinned to
job="kubelet" (the apiserver copy of the same series reports namespace=default),
and guarded by inodes > 0 — block-mode PVCs such as unifi-rootdisk report
available=0 forever and would otherwise have fired critical permanently.
3. VPNTunnelDown could never clear on a cluster with no gateway node; it has been
firing critical on prod since 2026-09-05. Now guarded so prod self-arms the moment
a node carries the egress-gateway label, with dev's behaviour unchanged today.
4. The Keycloak realm import fails OPEN: an unresolved placeholder is stored
LITERALLY and the import still reports success, then sits at Done=True and never
re-runs. On 2026-09-06 all 12 prod OIDC clients held the literal
$(env:..._CLIENT_SECRET) string and every SSO login failed, while every signal was
green. The CronJob is the level-triggered correction; two alerts make its silence
observable. Repaired live already — this stops it recurring.
Also: the R-NET-04 conformance scan descended into nested agent worktrees under
.claude/, counting 4 egress policies where 1 is authored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
333 lines
17 KiB
YAML
333 lines
17 KiB
YAML
# =============================================================================
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# L2 BEHAVIORAL — Exposed app reachable through the Gateway under default-deny
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# (R-NET-01, R-NET-02, R-NET-03) [RUNNABLE]
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# Catalog: docs/14 (default-deny + explicit allow family)
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# Spec: docs/03 "Default-deny baseline" / "Explicit allow rules";
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# docs/09 "Interaction with default-deny" (ingress opens NORTH-SOUTH only).
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#
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# THE GAP THIS CLOSES: an onboarded app's rendered default-deny has `ingress: []`
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# (deny ALL), so the Cilium Gateway (Envoy, reserved identity `ingress`) cannot
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# reach the backend — an Accepted HTTPRoute is still unreachable. The renderer now
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# also emits an ADDITIVE gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allowing ONLY the
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# `ingress` identity to ONLY the declared port. This test proves that end-to-end
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# through the REAL shared Gateway:
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#
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# GIVEN an exposed app namespace with default-deny + the gateway-ingress allow
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# (fromEntities: [ingress] -> declared port 8080 only), attached to the
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# shared Gateway with a declared route (8080) and an undeclared route (9091),
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# WHEN a client dials the Gateway VIP for the DECLARED host -> THEN it reaches the
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# backend (proves the additive allow opens the north-south path, R-NET-02/03);
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# WHEN a client dials the Gateway VIP for the UNDECLARED port -> THEN the backend is
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# NOT reached (default-deny still drops it, R-NET-02);
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# WHEN an in-namespace peer (NOT the `ingress` identity) dials the declared port
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# east-west -> THEN it is DENIED (the allow is least-privilege / gateway-only;
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# default-deny east-west is intact, R-NET-01).
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#
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# This asserts observable BEHAVIOR through the live Gateway (green Job = the intended
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# verdict), not object existence (R-TEST-01).
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#
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# TWO FAILURE MODES ARE DISTINGUISHED (per the WS-NET pod->Gateway-VIP reachability
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# finding, DECISIONS-LOG): the gateway probes classify each attempt as
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# * REACHED (backend marker in the body) -> the intended verdict for the declared host;
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# * DENIED (a real HTTP status, e.g. 503, but NO backend marker) -> default-deny drop
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# (the intended verdict for the undeclared port);
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# * NO-GATEWAY (curl code 000 / connect timeout) -> the probe's node cannot reach the
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# Gateway VIP AT ALL. That is a SEPARATE platform fault (a node-local Cilium L7LB/
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# envoy desync makes pods on an affected node unable to reach the Gateway VIP or
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# ClusterIP), NOT default-deny. The probe SELF-SKIPS that case (exits 0 with a SKIP
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# note) so this test never false-fails on the unrelated reachability bug. The
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# hermetic east-west denial (below) needs no Gateway and always asserts.
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#
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# SELF-SKIPPING: the whole L2 layer is gated by CLUSTER_AVAILABLE in conformance/
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# run.sh (skipped with no cluster). Within the test, `given` asserts the shared
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# Gateway is Programmed (a missing Gateway fails fast/diagnostically), and the gateway
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# probes self-skip the node-local reachability fault as above. The backend uses NO
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# readinessProbe: the default-deny baseline blocks the kubelet node->pod probe, so a
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# probe-bearing pod would never go Ready (DECISIONS-LOG K4); `phase: Running` is the
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# correct readiness signal. Cleanup deletes both fixture namespaces in `finally`.
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# =============================================================================
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apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
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kind: Test
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metadata:
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name: gateway-ingress-reachable
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labels:
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conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-01: "true"
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conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-02: "true"
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conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-03: "true"
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annotations:
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conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-01, R-NET-02, R-NET-03"
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conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
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conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
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conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
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conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
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An exposed app is reachable through the shared Gateway under default-deny via an
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additive gateway-ingress allow (ingress identity -> declared port only); an
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undeclared port is not reachable through the Gateway and east-west stays denied.
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spec:
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# A generous timeout: pulling images + programming two HTTPRoutes on the Gateway.
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timeouts:
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apply: 60s
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assert: 180s
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# -- R-ENV-02: the fixture's route hostnames MUST fall under the Gateway's wildcard listener
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# (*.${BASE_DOMAIN}) or they never attach — so the suffix is READ FROM THE CLUSTER UNDER TEST
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# (flux-system/cluster-vars, the ConfigMap Flux substitutes ${BASE_DOMAIN} from) rather than
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# authored here. Test-level => in scope for the fixture apply AND every probe step below
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# (step `outputs`, by contrast, are step-scoped — see the gwvip re-capture comments).
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# fixtures/app-and-probe.yaml consumes it via chainsaw resource templating.
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bindings:
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- name: baseDomain
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value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
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steps:
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# -- GIVEN: the exposed-app fixture (default-deny + gateway-ingress allow + backend +
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# Service + declared/undeclared HTTPRoutes) and a probe namespace. Assert the shared
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# Gateway is Programmed (precondition) and the backend pod is Running (listeners up).
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# Each gateway-probe step below re-captures the Gateway VIP into a binding (chainsaw
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# output bindings are step-scoped) so probes dial the real ingress address that
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# split-horizon DNS resolves service hostnames to — env-agnostic, no hardcoded IP.
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- name: given-exposed-app-under-default-deny
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try:
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- apply:
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file: fixtures/app-and-probe.yaml
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: Gateway
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metadata:
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name: shared
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namespace: gateway
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# JMESPath binding (parenthesized key) rather than a list literal: chainsaw does
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# STRICT length-equal list matching, so asserting one element against the full
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# conditions[] would fail (DECISIONS-LOG K4). This pinpoints Programmed=True.
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status:
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(conditions[?type == 'Programmed'] | [0].status): "True"
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata:
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: gw-backend
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namespace: conformance-gw-ingress
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status:
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# scalar match — Running means both httpd listeners are up (no readinessProbe
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# under default-deny; DECISIONS-LOG K4).
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phase: Running
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# -- THEN(reachable): a client in the unrestricted probe namespace dials the Gateway VIP
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# for the DECLARED host. --connect-to sets SNI/Host to the hostname but dials the VIP
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# (the real ingress address; -k because we test REACHABILITY, not TLS — trusted-tls
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# covers the chain). The backend's marker in the body proves the Gateway (identity
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# `ingress`) reached the backend THROUGH default-deny (green Job = REACHED). If the
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# probe's node cannot reach the VIP at all (code 000), self-skip (green + SKIP note):
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# that is the separate pod->Gateway-VIP platform fault, not default-deny.
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- name: then-reachable-through-gateway
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try:
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# chainsaw output bindings are step-scoped, so re-capture the VIP in this step.
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- command:
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entrypoint: kubectl
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args: [-n, gateway, get, gateway, shared, -o, "jsonpath={.status.addresses[0].value}"]
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outputs:
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- name: gwvip
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value: ($stdout)
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- apply:
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resource:
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apiVersion: batch/v1
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kind: Job
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metadata:
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name: probe-reachable
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namespace: conformance-gw-probe
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spec:
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backoffLimit: 6
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activeDeadlineSeconds: 180
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template:
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spec:
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restartPolicy: Never
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containers:
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- name: probe
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image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
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env:
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- name: GWVIP
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value: ($gwvip)
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- name: BASE_DOMAIN
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value: ($baseDomain)
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command:
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- sh
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- -c
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- |
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set -u
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host="gw-declared-conformance.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
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last=000
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i=0
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while [ "$i" -lt 30 ]; do
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code="$(curl -k -sS --max-time 8 -o /tmp/body \
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-w '%{http_code}' \
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--connect-to "${host}:443:${GWVIP}:443" \
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"https://${host}/" 2>/dev/null || echo 000)"
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last="$code"
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if grep -q GW_BACKEND_REACHED /tmp/body 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "REACHED: Gateway reached the backend through default-deny (code ${code})"
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exit 0
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fi
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i=$((i+1)); sleep 5
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done
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if [ "$last" = "000" ]; then
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echo "SKIP: this node cannot reach the Gateway VIP (code 000) —" 1>&2
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echo " separate pod->Gateway-VIP platform fault, NOT default-deny" 1>&2
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exit 0
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fi
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echo "FAIL: Gateway returned ${last} but the backend marker was absent — default-deny drop of the declared port?" 1>&2
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exit 1
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: batch/v1
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kind: Job
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metadata: { name: probe-reachable, namespace: conformance-gw-probe }
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status: { succeeded: 1 }
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# -- THEN(undeclared port denied through the Gateway): same Gateway VIP, same backend, the
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# UNDECLARED host -> port 9091. Routing is identical to the declared route (proven to
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# reach the backend), so the ONLY difference is the missing allow on 9091: the Gateway
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# Envoy's upstream connect is DROPPED by default-deny. The backend marker MUST be
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# absent. A leak (the 9091 marker appears) fails the Job. If the node cannot reach the
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# VIP at all (code 000), self-skip (same platform fault as above).
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- name: then-undeclared-port-denied-through-gateway
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try:
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# chainsaw output bindings are step-scoped, so re-capture the VIP in this step.
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- command:
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entrypoint: kubectl
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args: [-n, gateway, get, gateway, shared, -o, "jsonpath={.status.addresses[0].value}"]
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outputs:
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- name: gwvip
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value: ($stdout)
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- apply:
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resource:
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apiVersion: batch/v1
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kind: Job
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metadata:
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name: probe-undeclared
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namespace: conformance-gw-probe
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spec:
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backoffLimit: 4
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activeDeadlineSeconds: 150
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template:
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spec:
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restartPolicy: Never
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containers:
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- name: probe
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image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
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env:
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- name: GWVIP
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value: ($gwvip)
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- name: BASE_DOMAIN
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value: ($baseDomain)
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command:
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- sh
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- -c
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- |
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set -u
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host="gw-undeclared-conformance.${BASE_DOMAIN}"
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reached_gw=no
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i=0
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while [ "$i" -lt 8 ]; do
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code="$(curl -k -sS --max-time 8 -o /tmp/body \
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-w '%{http_code}' \
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--connect-to "${host}:443:${GWVIP}:443" \
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"https://${host}/" 2>/dev/null || echo 000)"
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if grep -q GW_BACKEND_UNDECLARED /tmp/body 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "LEAK: undeclared port 9091 reachable through the Gateway (code ${code})" 1>&2
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exit 1
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fi
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[ "$code" != "000" ] && reached_gw=yes
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i=$((i+1)); sleep 5
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done
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if [ "$reached_gw" = "yes" ]; then
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echo "DENIED: undeclared port not reachable through the Gateway (backend marker never returned)"
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exit 0
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fi
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echo "SKIP: this node cannot reach the Gateway VIP (code 000) —" 1>&2
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echo " separate pod->Gateway-VIP platform fault, NOT default-deny" 1>&2
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exit 0
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: batch/v1
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kind: Job
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metadata: { name: probe-undeclared, namespace: conformance-gw-probe }
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status: { succeeded: 1 }
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# -- THEN(east-west still denied): HERMETIC (no Gateway needed). An in-namespace peer
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# (NOT the `ingress` identity), covered by the namespace-wide default-deny, dials the
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# DECLARED port east-west. The gateway-ingress allow is least-privilege (only
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# fromEntities: [ingress]), so this connect MUST be dropped — default-deny east-west
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# is intact (R-NET-01). The probe EXITS 0 only when the connection is BLOCKED (green
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# Job = denied). This step always runs the real assertion (independent of the pod->VIP
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# reachability fault above).
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- name: then-east-west-still-denied
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try:
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- apply:
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resource:
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apiVersion: batch/v1
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kind: Job
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metadata:
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name: probe-eastwest
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namespace: conformance-gw-ingress
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spec:
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backoffLimit: 4
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activeDeadlineSeconds: 120
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template:
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metadata:
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labels: { app: eastwest-peer }
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spec:
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restartPolicy: Never
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containers:
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- name: probe
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image: busybox:1.36.1
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command:
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- sh
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- -c
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- |
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set -u
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# DNS resolves (baseline allows it); the TCP connect must drop.
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if nc -w 5 gw-backend 8080 </dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "LEAK: east-west reached the declared port under default-deny" 1>&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "DENIED: east-west blocked; gateway allow is least-privilege"
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exit 0
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: batch/v1
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kind: Job
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metadata: { name: probe-eastwest, namespace: conformance-gw-ingress }
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status: { succeeded: 1 }
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# -- Cleanup: delete both fixture namespaces (fixed names, outside chainsaw's managed
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# namespace). finally accepts delete (DECISIONS-LOG: step-level finally = script/
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# command/delete/wait only).
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finally:
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- delete:
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ref:
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Namespace
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name: conformance-gw-ingress
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- delete:
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ref:
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Namespace
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name: conformance-gw-probe
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
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# chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
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# green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
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# GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
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# `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
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# forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-NET-01/02/03 — north-south reachability under default-deny, part of the isolation proof
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# — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
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# acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
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# is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
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# tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
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- name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
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try:
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- script:
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content: echo GATEWAY_INGRESS_ISOLATION_PROVEN_OK
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check:
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(contains($stdout, 'GATEWAY_INGRESS_ISOLATION_PROVEN_OK')): true
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