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home-network-k3s-impl/platform/kured/helmrelease.yaml
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 a2440a3125
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feat(upgrades): automated OS reboots (kured) + security-only unattended-upgrades, and give Renovate a runner
Two halves of one repeatable upgrade process. Neither works alone.

(a) OS upgrades and reboots

platform/kured/ — Kubernetes Reboot Daemon, chart 6.1.0/app 1.23.0, in its own
Flux Kustomization (dependsOn platform, wait:true). NOT in platform/kustomization.yaml:
that tier gates platform-config and every apps wave, so a wedged reboot daemon there
could stall every application. A component added to make maintenance safer must not be
able to cause an outage.

infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades/ — new role (node_baseline is touched by other
open branches, and this is a different lifecycle), enabled for prod in group_vars.

The human gate is the SENTINEL, which is how this honours node_baseline's "IT DOES NOT
REBOOT" (k3s-prod-2 hung on a warm reboot 2026-09-03) and cluster-upgrade-plan.md's
rejection of automating away the gate between nodes: u-u is security-only with the
kernel blacklisted, so it essentially never writes /var/run/reboot-required. That file
appears when an operator deliberately runs node-baseline.yml --tags kernel. kured then
does only the mechanical half, including the ordering rule node_baseline has to shout.

Quorum: concurrent reboots are structurally impossible, not merely unlikely.
concurrency:1 plus kured's single lock annotation (API-server optimistic concurrency),
and lockTtl:0 — an expiring lock is exactly the 3-node etcd catastrophe, so a hung node
holds it forever and nothing cascades.

Longhorn: measured 25 volumes x 3 replicas, hard anti-affinity, 600s replenishment wait,
serialized rebuild — so every drain degrades ALL volumes to 2/3 and the inter-node gate
must be volume robustness, not pod readiness. Doubled: lockReleaseDelay 30m
(unconditional) plus kured's Prometheus alert gate (semantic).

alertFilterMatchOnly:true is load-bearing — the flag inverts the regexp's meaning, and
under the chart default kured would have been blocked on day one by the five alerts
measured firing with no end in sight, and never rebooted anything.

Kernel floor (kernel >= 6.13, EFI memattr): excluded TWICE. The running kernel comes
from o=Debian Backports, which is not an allowed origin, so u-u cannot see a kernel
upgrade; and ^linux- is blacklisted anyway so widening origins later cannot re-arm it.
Asserted against apt-config dump, not against the file just written. 6.12 kernels are
still installed and bootable on all three nodes, and nothing was held.

Closes a silent no-op: update-notifier-common was absent on all three nodes, so NOTHING
could create the sentinel. kured alone would have idled forever at 1/1 Running.

platform/kured/alerts.yaml — three rules over kured's only metric, with a companion
promtool suite pinning each both ways, plus runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md.
Window is DAILY 03:00-06:00 because a weekly one forces for:8d, longer than this
cluster's 7d Prometheus retention.

(b) Image/dependency automation

Renovate was aspirational: renovate.json present and complete, with no workflow, no
in-cluster workload, and its docker+kubernetes managers disabled — so every plain
image: tag was maintained by nothing while seven files claimed otherwise.

.gitea/workflows/renovate.yaml — scheduled daily, dry_run default true for a safe
first run, and a preflight that FAILS (not skips) without RENOVATE_TOKEN, because a
skipped Gitea job reports success and that is how this stayed inert.

Renovate now owns both halves; Flux image-automation is formally closed: it pushes
commits rather than opening PRs (bypassing CLAUDE.md §1), and it cannot work here
anyway — main is protected user_can_push:false and the flux-system GitRepository has
no secretRef. Its controllers are installed and have idled 43 days with zero CRs.

conformance/: +34/-0, one new SCRAPE_OWNERS entry claiming kured_. Weakens nothing;
tightens the check for this component (requires service.create+metrics.create, both
chart-default false, plus a companion NetworkPolicy requirement). Required because
assertion (3) fails an alert over an unclaimed metric and KNOWN_UNWIRED_METRICS is
shrink-only.

Sensitive paths touched: clusters/**, conformance/**, .gitea/** — needs a non-author
approving review; /approve-override deliberately NOT posted.

NOT verified: no OS upgrade run, no node rebooted, no lock observed, the Ansible role
never executed, and whether CNPG switches its primary on a drain-induced eviction (the
most likely way the first real reboot fails). Full list in the handoff entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-10-18 00:10:29 -05:00

290 lines
21 KiB
YAML

---
# kured (Kubernetes Reboot Daemon) — coordinated, one-node-at-a-time reboots of the three prod
# control-plane nodes.
#
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# READ THIS FIRST: kured DOES NOT DECIDE *WHETHER* TO REBOOT. IT ONLY DECIDES *WHEN* AND *HOW*.
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# kured reboots a node if and only if the file `/var/run/reboot-required` exists on it. On these
# nodes exactly one thing creates that file: a deliberate operator run of
# `playbooks/node-baseline.yml --tags kernel` (which advances the backports kernel). The
# unattended-upgrades role this PR also adds installs SECURITY updates only and BLACKLISTS
# `linux-image-*`/`linux-headers-*`, so it can never produce a reboot-required sentinel on its own —
# see infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades/defaults/main.yml for that argument in full.
#
# That is the whole answer to this repo's two standing objections to reboot automation:
#
# * infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/tasks/main.yml:61-67 — "IT DOES NOT REBOOT." k3s-prod-2 hung
# on a warm reboot on 2026-09-03 (powered, off the LAN ~38 minutes, physical power button
# required), so rebooting was made "a SERIALIZED, SUPERVISED operator step ... and a role cannot
# enforce that." STILL TRUE, and nothing here changes it: node_baseline continues not to reboot.
# * docs/plans/cluster-upgrade-plan.md:291-299 — system-upgrade-controller was rejected because it
# "automates away the human gate between nodes", and the operator's hard requirement is an
# explicit PASS/STOP verification BETWEEN every node.
#
# THE HUMAN GATE IS PRESERVED, AND IT IS THE SENTINEL. The operator decides whether a kernel moves
# and on which hosts (`--limit k3s-prod-1`), which is what writes the sentinel on those hosts and
# only those hosts. kured then performs the cordon/drain/reboot/uncordon that the operator would
# otherwise have typed by hand — the error-prone mechanical half, including the ordering rule
# node_baseline's own message has to shout ("NEVER node 2 first"). Run the kernel play one host at a
# time and the operator keeps per-node PASS/STOP control exactly as before; run it on all three and
# kured still does them strictly one at a time, just in an order it chooses. Both are safe for
# quorum; only the first preserves the ordering preference. See runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md.
#
# cluster-upgrade-plan.md:329-330 and :545-548 name the condition under which its own rejection
# reverses — "SUC becomes viable once the cluster is on fast disks ... where drain-driven rebuild is
# cheap" — and prod is that cluster. This component takes that clause up, but NOT its drain
# assumption: see the Longhorn section below, where drain-driven rebuild is measurably NOT free even
# on SSD, and is gated on explicitly rather than waved through.
#
# WHAT IS STILL UNMITIGATED, STATED PLAINLY: kured cannot press a power button. If a node hangs on
# warm reboot the way k3s-prod-2 did in September, kured will not recover it. The blast radius is
# bounded by design rather than by luck — `concurrency: 1` plus `lockTtl: 0` means the hung node
# keeps the cluster lock forever, so NO second node is ever rebooted behind it; etcd keeps 2/3 quorum
# and the cluster stays up, degraded, until a human attends. The KuredRebootPending alert in
# alerts.yaml is what tells them. That is strictly better than the previous automation story (none)
# but it is NOT the same as "safe to ignore at 3am on a Sunday".
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
name: kured
namespace: kured
spec:
interval: 30m
chart:
spec:
chart: kured
# Chart 6.1.0 -> appVersion 1.23.0 (published 2026-06-30; newest of the 80 entries in
# https://kubereboot.github.io/charts/index.yaml, read 2026-10-17).
#
# THE `<6.2.0` CEILING IS A DELIBERATE CHOICE HERE, NOT THE REFLEX IT IS ELSEWHERE. This PR's
# own audit found that 9 of 12 HelmReleases in this repo pin a minor-locking range, and that
# this is a MAIN CAUSE of pin rot: Renovate can then only ever offer patches inside a line it
# has been told not to leave (kube-prometheus-stack is stuck 4 chart majors back that way).
# For a component whose job is to reboot control-plane nodes, that ceiling is worth paying on
# purpose: a kured MINOR may change drain or lock semantics, and this is the one component
# where "a human looked at the changelog" should be a precondition, not a nice-to-have.
# Renovate will raise the minor as a non-automerged PR (see the kured packageRule in
# renovate.json), so the ceiling is a review prompt, not a wall.
version: ">=6.1.0 <6.2.0"
sourceRef:
kind: HelmRepository
name: kured
namespace: kured
install:
remediation:
retries: 3
upgrade:
remediation:
retries: 3
values:
# ── IDENTITY / PLACEMENT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# No tolerations. Measured 2026-10-17: all three prod nodes carry `spec.taints` EMPTY (k3s does
# not taint its servers), so a DaemonSet reaches every node untainted. If a future node IS
# tainted, kured silently stops covering it and that node then never reboots — invisible,
# because the other two keep reporting. KuredNodeCoverageGap in alerts.yaml is the detector: it
# compares kured's per-node series count against the node count rather than merely asking
# whether kured exists.
priorityClassName: system-node-critical
# The chart's defaults are kept: `hostPID: true` and `containerSecurityContext.privileged: true`
# with `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`. Both are load-bearing and neither is reducible:
# `rebootMethod: command` runs the reboot by nsenter'ing /proc/1/ns/mnt, which needs the host PID
# namespace to see PID 1 and the privilege to enter its mount namespace. The documented
# lower-privilege alternative (privileged:false + CAP_KILL) applies ONLY to
# `rebootMethod: signal`, which signals a host-side kured-reboot.service that does not exist on
# these nodes. Choosing `signal` would mean shipping and maintaining that unit via Ansible for a
# capability reduction on a DaemonSet that is already cluster-admin-adjacent by function; it is a
# reasonable future hardening step and is explicitly NOT taken here.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
# No CPU limit on purpose (the repo's node-pressure work treats CPU limits on tiny system
# agents as a throttling hazard). Memory is capped: kured holds no state beyond one
# annotation and a gauge, and 128Mi is ~4x its idle RSS upstream reports.
memory: 128Mi
configuration:
# ── THE QUORUM CONSTRAINT: TWO NODES MUST NEVER BE DOWN AT ONCE ──────────────────────────
# All three prod nodes are control-plane + etcd (measured 2026-10-17: every node reports
# `control-plane,etcd`). etcd quorum is 2 of 3, so one node down is degraded-but-up and two
# nodes down is a LOST CLUSTER that does not self-heal. Everything in this block exists to
# make the second case structurally unreachable rather than merely unlikely.
#
# concurrency: 1 — kured's cluster-wide lock is a single annotation
# (`weave.works/kured-node-lock`) on kured's OWN DaemonSet object, and a node reboots only
# while it holds that lock. One lock + concurrency 1 = one reboot, enforced by the API server's
# optimistic concurrency rather than by timing. This is the chart default; it is written out
# explicitly because it is the single most important value in this file.
concurrency: 1
# lockTtl: 0 (DISABLED) — THIS IS A SAFETY DECISION, NOT A DEFAULT WE FORGOT TO TUNE.
# A TTL makes the lock EXPIRE, which exists for the case "the lock holder died and we want
# reboots to continue". On a 3-node etcd cluster that is precisely the catastrophe: if node A
# has hung on a warm reboot (which has happened here — see the header) and its lock expires,
# node B becomes eligible and takes the cluster from 2/3 to 1/3. We would rather the reboot
# cycle STOP FOREVER and page a human than have it step over a corpse. The cost is that a
# genuinely stale lock needs manual clearing; runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md has the
# procedure, and KuredRebootPending is the alert that surfaces it.
lockTtl: 0
# lockReleaseDelay: 30m — hold the lock for 30 minutes AFTER this node is back and uncordoned,
# before any other node may take it. See the Longhorn section: this is the STRUCTURAL half of
# the inter-node gate, deliberately not dependent on an alert's `for:` timer having latched.
lockReleaseDelay: 30m
# ── THE MAINTENANCE WINDOW: 03:00-06:00 EVERY DAY, America/New_York ──────────────────────
# The timezone and the 03:00-06:00 band match renovate.json's existing
# `"schedule": ["after 3am and before 6am"]` / `"timezone": "America/New_York"`, so every
# unattended change in this repo lands in the same quiet 3-hour window.
#
# DAILY, NOT WEEKLY, AND THE REASON IS THE ALERT — not impatience. A weekly (`- sun`) window
# was the first draft and it breaks the only alert that can tell you this mechanism has
# stalled. With a Sunday-only window, a kernel upgraded on a Monday legitimately waits six
# days, so "a reboot has been pending too long" cannot be distinguished from "it is Tuesday"
# until the threshold exceeds a full 7-day cycle. That forces `for: 8d`+, which is longer than
# this cluster's Prometheus retention (MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_RETENTION is 7d) and is reset by
# any Prometheus restart beyond the 1h default for-outage-tolerance — i.e. the alert would be
# unreliable in exactly the direction that matters. A daily window caps the legitimate wait at
# under 24h, which makes KuredRebootPending's `for: 36h` both robust and meaningful: 36 hours
# with a sentinel still set means at least one full window passed and SOMETHING BLOCKED IT.
#
# Daily does NOT weaken the quorum guarantee — that is `concurrency: 1` plus the lock, not the
# calendar. It does mean a 3-node kernel rollout can finish in one to three nights instead of
# three weeks, with each node still gated on the previous one's Longhorn rebuilds (below).
rebootDays:
- su
- mo
- tu
- we
- th
- fr
- sa
startTime: "03:00"
endTime: "06:00"
timeZone: America/New_York
# How often to re-evaluate (sentinel + window + alerts + lock). 1h is the chart default; at a
# 3h window that is three evaluation opportunities per node per night.
period: 1h
# ── THE SENTINEL ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Written ONLY by a deliberate operator kernel upgrade (see the header). `update-notifier-common`
# — the package that owns /etc/kernel/postinst.d and actually creates this file on Debian — was
# measured ABSENT on all three nodes on 2026-10-17, which is why the unattended_upgrades role
# installs it. Without that package nothing ever writes this path, kured correctly never
# reboots, every probe looks healthy, and the entire mechanism is a silent no-op. That failure
# mode is the reason KuredNotReporting exists.
#
# THE PATH kured LOGS IS NOT THIS PATH, and that trips people debugging it. The chart
# defaults `useRebootSentinelHostPath: true` (kept), which bind-mounts the DIRNAME of this
# value onto /sentinel read-only and renders the flag as
# `--reboot-sentinel=/sentinel/reboot-required` (daemonset.yaml:134). So the container watches
# /sentinel/reboot-required and the host file is /var/run/reboot-required. Same file, two
# names. Set this value as the HOST path, as below.
rebootSentinel: /var/run/reboot-required
# ── THE LONGHORN GATE: WHY POD READINESS IS NOT A SUFFICIENT INTER-NODE SIGNAL ────────────
# Measured on prod 2026-10-17, and this is the finding that shaped this file:
# * 25 Longhorn volumes, ALL `numberOfReplicas: 3`, all healthy, with exactly 25 replicas on
# each of the 3 nodes. So there is no single-replica volume to lose today.
# * BUT `replica-soft-anti-affinity: false` (replicas may not share a node) and
# `disable-scheduling-on-cordoned-node: true`. With 3 nodes and 3 replicas, cordoning ONE
# node leaves nowhere to place a replacement — so every drain takes ALL 25 volumes to
# degraded 2/3 for the whole reboot.
# * Recovery is slow and serialized: `replica-replenishment-wait-interval: 600` (10 minutes
# before a rebuild even starts) and `concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit: 1`.
# Therefore: if the next node is rebooted before rebuilds finish, those volumes go to 1/3, and
# the drain after that genuinely CAN hit Longhorn's `node-drain-policy:
# block-if-contains-last-replica` and block forever. The inter-node gate must be VOLUME
# ROBUSTNESS, not "are the pods Ready again".
#
# It is gated twice, on purpose, because each half covers the other's blind spot:
# 1. lockReleaseDelay: 30m (above) — unconditional. Covers the 600s replenishment wait with
# margin and does not depend on any alert having fired.
# 2. The Prometheus alert gate below — semantic. Covers a rebuild that takes LONGER than 30
# minutes (25 serialized rebuilds on one node can), which a fixed delay cannot.
prometheusUrl: http://kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:9090
# Only consider alerts that are FIRING, not merely pending. A `pending` alert is a 10-minute
# guess; blocking a weekly reboot on one would make the gate fire on noise.
alertFiringOnly: true
# ── alertFilterMatchOnly: true IS LOAD-BEARING. DO NOT DROP IT. ──────────────────────────
# kured's two alert modes are near-opposites and the flag name does not advertise it:
# * false (the chart default): alertFilterRegexp is an IGNORE list — kured blocks on ANY
# firing alert except those matching.
# * true: alertFilterRegexp is an ALLOW list — kured blocks ONLY on alerts that match.
# We need `true`, because this cluster always has something firing. Measured via the Prometheus
# API on 2026-10-17, these five were firing with no reboot pending and no end in sight:
# CNPGPrimariesCoLocated, KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch, KubeDeploymentRolloutStuck,
# KubePodNotReady, OAuth2ProxyGateUnobserved (the last three all trace to the pm-agent pod,
# ImagePullBackOff on a placeholder digest for 12 days). Under the default `false`, kured would
# have been blocked by those on day one and would never have rebooted anything — a silent
# no-op indistinguishable, from outside, from "no reboots were needed".
alertFilterMatchOnly: true
# The ALLOW list: the conditions under which rebooting ANOTHER node risks data or quorum.
# Anchored and explicit — a prefix match here would silently re-admit the chronic five above.
# LonghornVolumeDegraded — the inter-node gate (see above). `longhorn_volume_robustness
# {state="degraded"} == 1`, for: 10m, in platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml.
# LonghornVolumeFaulted — data already at risk; never reboot into this.
# KubeNodeNotReady — a node is already down. Rebooting a second one loses quorum. This
# is the single most important entry for the etcd constraint.
# NodeExporterDown — a node we cannot see the health of. Treated as "assume the worst".
# DELIBERATELY NOT INCLUDED: NodeEtcdRequestsSlow and the NodeIOPressure* family. They are
# exactly the conditions you would want to pause for, but prod-1 has a documented history of
# etcd WAL I/O starvation, so including them risks a permanent wedge that looks like safety.
# Revisit once those are quiet for a sustained period; KuredRebootPending makes a wedge visible
# either way.
alertFilterRegexp: ^(LonghornVolumeDegraded|LonghornVolumeFaulted|KubeNodeNotReady|NodeExporterDown)$
# ── THE DRAIN ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# NOTE ON FLAGS THAT DO NOT EXIST: there is no `--ignore-daemonsets`, no
# `--delete-emptydir-data` and no `--force` in kured 1.23.0. Read from
# cmd/kured/main.go:438-449 on 2026-10-17, kured HARDCODES
# `IgnoreAllDaemonSets: true`, `DeleteEmptyDirData: true` and `Force: true` in the drain
# helper. Passing them as extraArgs would CrashLoop the DaemonSet on an unknown flag. This
# matters because all three are genuinely REQUIRED here and it is easy to assume they must be
# configured: 12 DaemonSets and 135 emptyDir-carrying pods were measured on 2026-10-17, and a
# drain without those three settings refuses to start.
#
# drainTimeout: 15m — the chart/kured default is 0, meaning INFINITE, and infinite is the wrong
# answer here. Measured 2026-10-17, six PodDisruptionBudgets currently allow ZERO voluntary
# disruptions, and a plain drain loops on them indefinitely:
# * 3x longhorn-system/instance-manager-* — one per node, `minAvailable: 1` against a
# selector pinned to a single node's single pod, so disruptionsAllowed is STRUCTURALLY 0
# forever. This is the mechanism by which Longhorn's node-drain-policy blocks: the
# longhorn-manager deletes the node's instance-manager PDB only once it judges the drain
# safe. The drain is SUPPOSED to wait on this one.
# * 3x CNPG `<cluster>-primary` (keycloak-db, nextcloud-db, semaphore-db) — `minAvailable: 1`
# against a selector matching exactly one pod (the primary), so again structurally 0 until
# the CNPG operator switches the primary away. All three primaries were on k3s-prod-1.
# With a timeout, a drain that is genuinely stuck ABORTS, the lock is released, and kured
# retries next period instead of holding the cluster lock forever on a wedged node. 15m is
# chosen to be longer than a CNPG switchover and longer than the `unifi` VM's eviction (below)
# usually needs, while still being well inside the 3h window.
drainTimeout: 15m
# Taint a node PreferNoSchedule while its reboot is pending, so the scheduler stops placing new
# pods on a node that is about to go away. With concurrency 1 this is a small win (there is no
# second rebooting node to shed pods onto) but it is free and it shortens the drain.
preferNoScheduleTaint: weave.works/kured-node-reboot
# Record reboot state on the Node objects (`weave.works/kured-reboot-in-progress`,
# `weave.works/kured-most-recent-reboot-needed`). Off by default. Turned on because the only
# other observability kured offers is ONE gauge, and during an incident `kubectl get node -o
# yaml` is the thing an operator can reach without Prometheus.
annotateNodes: true
logFormat: json
# ── METRICS: BOTH OF THESE MUST BE true OR THE ALERTS IN alerts.yaml CANNOT FIRE ───────────
# The chart ships `service.create: false` AND `metrics.create: false`. Leaving either at its
# default means no Service, or a ServiceMonitor with nothing to select, so `kured_reboot_required`
# is never scraped — and a PrometheusRule over a series that no target produces is INERT: quiet
# forever, indistinguishable from healthy. This repo has shipped that exact bug twice
# (VeleroNoRecentBackup over an absent series; the inert gotk_* rules in
# runbooks/image-automation.md), which is why platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh exists at all.
# KuredNotReporting (alerts.yaml) is the standing detector for this pair regressing.
# Prometheus selects ServiceMonitors cluster-wide: measured 2026-10-17, `serviceMonitorSelector`
# and `serviceMonitorNamespaceSelector` are both `{}`, so no label plumbing is needed here.
service:
create: true
port: 8080
metrics:
create: true
interval: 60s