jakman85andClaude Opus 5
e4bd76070e
Finishes the inherited WIP. qBittorrent 5.x had no WebUI\Username or
WebUI\Password_PBKDF2 in its conf, so it minted a NEW random admin password on
every process start. Both consequences had ALREADY fired: measured before this
change, `POST /api/v3/downloadclient/testall` returned isValid:false with
"Authentication Failure" on BOTH Sonarr and Radarr, so Completed Download
Handling was silently broken, and no human had a stable login either.
Mechanism: the SOPS/age qbittorrent-bootstrap Secret is the single source of
truth; a lifecycle.postStart hook derives qBittorrent's own stored form
(PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100000 iterations, 16-byte salt, 64-byte digest) and
asserts it into the conf on EVERY container start, then logs in to the WebUI to
prove it. Level-triggered like the repo's CronJob reconcilers, but triggered by
the container start because the failure it closes IS a container start: a cron
would leave a window after every restart in which the app serves a random
password, and would have to edit an RWO PVC from outside, under a running
process. AuthSubnetWhitelist was rejected — authentication is not weakened.
Two real bugs found in the WIP, both the postBuild-substitution trap:
* PORT came from a doubled-dollar WEBUI_PORT expansion. Correct on the cluster
(envsubst collapses it) and the renderer accepts it, but run any other way
bash reads the doubled dollar as its PID, so every curl got an unparseable
URL and the hook logged "the WebUI rejected the durable credential" three
times having never asked it anything — see the marker log at 05:35Z. Now a
literal PORT=8080; the script contains no braced expansion at all and
behaves identically however it is run.
* One shared wait budget covered both the s6 wait and the API wait, so the
first consumed all 90s and attempts 2-3 fired instantly. Separate counters
now; "the API never answered" is reported as a distinct fault from "the
password was rejected"; and a rejection restarts qbittorrent-nox so a retry
can actually change its outcome.
apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml did not list the SOPS secret, so Flux would never
have applied it and the adoption of the live-only, kubectl-client-side-apply
qbittorrent-bootstrap Secret would silently not have happened. Listed now; the
decrypted values are SHA-256-identical to the live Secret's, so adopting it
cannot change the password.
Proven on prod: testall flipped isValid false -> true on both apps; after
deleting and recreating the pod the conf still held both keys, the WebUI answered
Ok. to a login with the credential decrypted from git, and both arrs still
reported isValid:true. The post-envsubst manifest was audited as `flux build
kustomization` emits it (no doubled dollar, no braced expansion, PORT=8080,
bash -n clean) and the hook's write path was exercised in-container against a
scratch conf: exit 10 when the keys are absent, exit 0 and a byte-identical file
on a second run, digest verified by an independent PBKDF2.
NOT proven, and recorded as such in DECISIONS-LOG: the hook has not yet run as a
real postStart on prod — the Deployment is Flux-owned from main and both routes
to the live object were refused by the session's permission classifier. Verify
on merge that the marker log gains a VERIFIED line on the next pod start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
catalog — ServiceDefinition entries (the onboarding surface)
One YAML file per service. Each file is a ServiceDefinition conforming to
../schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json. Adding or
editing a service here is the only onboarding step — the platform renders compute, storage, network
policy, egress, TLS, DNS, monitoring, and update policy from it (see
../schemas/renderer-contract.md). Serves R-GITOPS-02.
Source of truth for the initial catalog: spec
docs/13-service-catalog.md (14-service table +
SSO/egress/dependency intent).
Current examples
| File | docs/13 row | exposure | egress | auth | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
pihole.yaml |
6 | internal | internet | forward-auth | admin UI behind oauth2-proxy; config on Longhorn (DR-critical); also platform DNS |
keycloak.yaml |
0 | public | internet | native | the IdP itself (own admin login + MFA); PostgreSQL on Longhorn; DR-critical |
The remaining catalog services (plex, sonarr, radarr, jackett, seerr, nextcloud, minecraft, unifi, semaphore, kasm, gitea, qbittorrent) are onboarded in later phases; they follow the same schema and inherit every guarantee automatically.
Authoring rules
- Only
nameandsourceare mandatory; every other field defaults to docs/13's default posture (kind: container,exposure: internal,egress: internet,auth.mode: forward-auth, stable auto-update, DNS-only default-deny). Set a field only to override the default. - Any exposed UI must have an
authblock:forward-auth(default) oroidc, each with a non-emptyauth.groups;native/noneare documented exceptions only. - Irreplaceable state (
class: longhornconfigs/DBs) must setbackup.policyto an off-cluster schedule — neverreacquirable(R-STATE-03). Only bulk media may bereacquirable. - Shell braces must be escaped
$${...}. Anything rendered verbatim onto the workload — alifecyclepostStart script, anenvvalue — lands underapps/wave-<N>/, and everyapps-wave-<N>Flux Kustomization declarespostBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars. Flux runs envsubst over the WHOLE manifest at reconcile time, so an unescaped${VAR:-}meant for the shell is replaced with the empty string before the container ever starts (this silently killed gitea's and nextcloud's OIDC registration for days). Bare$VARand$(cmd)are left alone and need no escaping; a genuine environment knob is declared inclusters/base/cluster-vars.yamland written bare${KNOB}. Full contract:../clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml.render.pyREFUSES to emit a manifest that breaks this rule (Flux's strict substitution mode cannot: it deliberately exempts the${V:-}/${V:=x}/${V:?}default-operator forms).
Validate before commit — single command, no cluster (R-TEST-02)
check-jsonschema --schemafile schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json catalog/*.yaml
See ../schemas/README.md for install/pinning and a pure-Python fallback.
This is the L0/L1 schema gate (spec docs/14); CI (.gitea/) runs it on every change.
Rendering — render.py (the ServiceDefinition renderer, T-0.3)
render.py compiles a ServiceDefinition into the concrete manifest set defined
by ../schemas/renderer-contract.md: a Namespace (with the
app-namespace/gateway-access labels), the default-deny baseline (R-NET-01), a
Deployment+Service or a KubeVirt VirtualMachine + CDI DataVolume (R-PLAT-02/03), PVCs
(R-STATE), one CiliumNetworkPolicy egress-allow per dependency (R-NET-02), the
egress-class steering label (R-NET-05), HTTPRoute(s) on the shared Gateway (R-TLS/R-DNS),
ServiceMonitor + SLI alerts (R-OBS-01), the Flux ImageRepository/ImagePolicy update plumbing
(R-UPD), and the auth-mode / backup wiring hints (R-IDP/R-STATE-03).
python3 catalog/render.py catalog/pihole.yaml # render one SD to stdout
python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o out/ # render every SD to out/<name>.yaml
python3 catalog/render.py --selftest # deterministic self-test (no cluster)
- Deterministic: identical input → byte-identical output (golden-diffable). The L1 render
conformance tests (
conformance/tests/l1-rendering/*) diff the output against committed goldens — run offline byconformance/run.sh --layer l1andci/l1.sh(no cluster). - How CI/Flux consume it: CI invokes
render.pyin the L1 stage; a GitOps flow renders--all catalog -o <rendered-dir>and Flux reconciles the rendered directory. Design choice (renderer-contract is silent on mechanism): a render-then-consume script is the simplest reproducible option — see the header ofrender.py. - Dependency: PyYAML (the renderer's single dependency; the conformance harness stays stdlib-only and only shells out to this script + diffs text).