Three corrections after rebasing onto main. 1. THE GUARD CAUGHT A REAL ONE ON ITS FIRST CONTACT WITH main. main had gained `CNPGPrimariesCoLocated` (platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml) pointing at /runbooks/cnpg-primary-spread, with no runbook. The check failed the rebase exactly as designed — 46 annotations, 35 names, 34 present — naming both the missing file AND the missing configMapGenerator entry. runbooks/cnpg-primary-spread.md now exists: what co-located primaries actually cost here (blast radius, not an outage, because instances: 3 + required anti-affinity), why the drift is uncorrectable-by-declaration (CNPG has no primary-placement field), the readiness gate that keeps the rule quiet during a real node outage, and the ~9s-per-database switchover rebalance, one cluster at a time. The 2026-09-07 outage in which all three primaries sat on one node is the reason the alert exists at all. 2. WHOLE-REPO SCOPE, NOT A HAND-WRITTEN STAGE. main's refactor replaced ci/l0.sh's per-check "UNCONDITIONAL" stages with a declaration: `conformance.home.k3s/scope: "whole-repo"`, unioned into every gate run by Stage 3b's `--include-scope`. My +38-line Stage 3f is removed (ci/l0.sh is now byte-identical to main) and the annotation is declared instead. Assertion (7) of the check was rewritten to match: it no longer asserts its own path appears in ci/l0.sh — it asserts the test DECLARES the scope and that ci/l0.sh still passes --include-scope, since neither half alone makes the check load-bearing. That matters here because ci/touched-requirements.sh maps platform/monitoring/* to "R-OBS-01 R-OBS-02", not R-OBS-04, and maps platform/kubevirt/* and runbooks/* to nothing at all. 3. A FACTUAL CORRECTION IN ALL 35 RUNBOOKS. Every page claimed `dev.sh` defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. main's `9b4744d fix(devcontainer): dev.sh defaults to prod` made that false, and a runbook that misstates which cluster a command talks to is worse than one that says nothing. The pages now say what is durably true: the default has already changed once, so naming `--context k3s-prod` is what makes a command mean the same thing next month, and the per-invocation banner is there to be read. The check's own failure message was corrected the same way. Re-verified after all three: check green at 374 assertions (46 annotations, 35/35 runbooks present, 35/35 projected), re-applied to prod, and re-probed in-cluster through the Gateway — node-down, keycloak-down, keycloak-client-secrets, cnpg-archiving, longhorn-faulted, vpn-down, node-io and cnpg-primary-spread all HTTP 200 with text/plain; charset=utf-8 and 8.9-12.1 KB of real body; /runbooks/ index 200; an unknown name 404s with a pointer rather than a blank page; and homepage still answers the apex `/`, confirming Gateway API longest-path precedence. Full merge gate: PASS (spec-immutability, lint, l0, render-golden, l1 all green; prom-rules SKIPPED for want of promtool in the image; L2/L3 SKIPPED, no cluster). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
12 KiB
keycloak-client-secrets — The OIDC client reconciler is failing or has gone silent
Alerts: KeycloakClientSecretReconcilerFailing (warning, 15m) and
KeycloakClientSecretReconcilerStale (warning, 2h)
File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.identity
Expressions:
max(kube_job_status_failed{namespace="keycloak", job_name=~"keycloak-client-secret-reconciler-.*"}) > 0
absent(kube_job_status_succeeded{namespace="keycloak", job_name=~"keycloak-client-secret-reconciler-.*"} == 1)
What this means here
These two rules watch the CronJob (every 15 minutes) that repairs OIDC client secrets and environment-derived client URLs in the Keycloak realm. They exist because of the single worst green-looking outage this cluster has had, and they are best understood through it.
The 2026-09-06 lockout — why "everything is green" means nothing here
The Keycloak Operator resolves each OIDC client's secret from an (env:NAME) placeholder in the realm
import. When it cannot resolve one, it stores the LITERAL placeholder text as the client secret and the
import Job still reports SUCCESS. On prod, all 12 clients ended up holding the literal placeholder
and every OIDC login on the cluster failed with "Invalid client or Invalid client credentials".
Meanwhile: the import Job succeeded, the CR rested at Done=True / Started=False,
KeycloakDown and KeycloakDatabaseDown were quiet, and the conformance test that asserts
Done=True passed throughout the outage. The only observable was a human failing to log in. Dev had
exactly one broken client (oauth2-proxy — its key was added after dev's import completed, and
a completed import is never re-run).
The realm import is a ONE-SHOT that fails open: the operator logs "Job already executed - not
recreating", so a git change to keycloak-realm-import.yaml does not re-import.
The second half: redirect URIs, same one-shot, one field over
The realm import carries 26 ${BASE_DOMAIN} references (39 files under platform/ and apps/
reference the knob). Substitution happened once, at the old hostname, and then froze. After the apex
flip, "every OIDC login fails with a redirect_uri mismatch while the CR still reads Done=True and
nothing alerts." The reconciler was extended with a second pass over redirectUris, webOrigins,
rootUrl, baseUrl and adminUrl, with desired state generated by
ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py (gated by an L0 --check).
Semantics worth knowing before you read a Job log:
- URLs are copied verbatim, including
${BASE_DOMAIN}, and rendered by the same Flux Kustomization as the import. - List fields compare order-insensitively (
sorted, notset) — measured, not defensive: Keycloak genuinely reorders lists, and an order-sensitive compare would have rewrittenkubernetes(8 URIs) andoauth2-proxy(2) every 15 minutes forever while reporting success. - A field the desired state omits is UNMANAGED, never forced empty.
- Public clients' URLs are managed even though their secrets are not (
kubernetesis public, with PKCE, so no kubeconfig holds a secret). - The two passes fail closed independently — demonstrated live: pass 1 failed on an empty secrets directory while pass 2 completed.
Why there are exactly two rules, and what each catches
...Failing sees a run that ran and failed — unrepairable drift, or the admin API unreachable. It
fires alongside KeycloakDown during an IdP outage, deliberately: the reconciler genuinely is not
running, so treat KeycloakDown as the cause when both are lit. Self-clears when failed Jobs age out
(TTL 1h).
...Stale sees the healer being quietly absent — the CronJob suspended, never applied by Flux, or
unable to schedule a pod at all. That is the "looks applied and isn't" failure this whole change exists
to end. It is also the rule that would catch the healer missing during a domain migration.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once — it was k3s-dev
until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
to talk to — read it. Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once; they share one container and
interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (git push origin main is the deploy).
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so.
First commands
Does the CronJob exist, is it suspended, and when did it last succeed?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get cronjobs.batch \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,SCHEDULE:.spec.schedule,SUSPEND:.spec.suspend,LAST:.status.lastScheduleTime,LASTSUCCESS:.status.lastSuccessfulTime'
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get jobs.batch --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,SUCCEEDED:.status.succeeded,FAILED:.status.failed,START:.status.startTime | tail -15'
Read the Job log — it names the pass, the client, and for a URL the exact before/after, and it never prints a secret (that is a design property, asserted by the L0 check):
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak logs job/$(kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get jobs.batch \
--sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp -o jsonpath="{.items[-1:].metadata.name}") --tail=200'
Is the IdP itself up? (If not, that is the cause; come back here after.)
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n keycloak get pods; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -n keycloak'
Confirm the declaration is self-consistent offline, before touching the cluster — this is the same check the merge gate runs unconditionally (Stage 3d):
bash conformance/tests/l0-static/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler/check.sh
python3 ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py --check
Confirm what a user actually experiences:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' --resolve keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev:443:192.168.2.20 \
https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod auth whoami'
(Expected on a working OIDC path: oidc:<user> with [oidc:platform-admins]. From this workstation the
OIDC context hangs on a browser prompt — that is not evidence of breakage.)
Likely causes, most likely first
1. Keycloak or its database is down, so the reconciler cannot reach the admin API
...Failing fires alongside KeycloakDown by design. Fix the IdP first: /runbooks/keycloak-down,
/runbooks/keycloak-db. Nothing here is actionable until the admin API answers.
2. Unresolvable drift on one client
The log names the client and the pass. Most often a secret key missing from the SOPS Secret, or a client
in the realm that git does not describe. The contract: keys are <clientId>-client-secret, and the
public kubernetes client declares no secret. Remediation is a git change to the declaration, then
let the CronJob heal it — the reconciler is compare-then-write and idempotent.
3. A hostname migration left the realm behind
The redirect_uri mismatch case. Regenerate desired state with ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py and
push; the reconciler's second pass applies it. Historical scale: re-rendering at the post-flip apex
produced 24 drifted fields across 12 clients, with kubernetes correctly ok because its localhost
callbacks are not domain-derived.
4. The CronJob is suspended or was never applied (...Stale)
Check spec.suspend and the Flux tier. The ordering requirement is a real Flux dependsOn edge with
wait: true, not a comment — the L0 check asserts that, because a comment is not an ordering guarantee.
5. The pod cannot read its own secrets
A specific, recorded trap: the reconciler needs fsGroup: 65532 with the client-secrets volume at
defaultMode: 0440. With 0400 and no fsGroup the container dies with PermissionError on every
run. If the log shows that, this is it.
6. Everything is green and logins still fail
Then trust the human, not the dashboard — that is the entire lesson of 2026-09-06. Audit the live realm
directly with kcadm.sh inside keycloak-0.
When to escalate or stop
- Do not "fix" the realm by re-applying the import. It is a one-shot: the operator logs "Job already
executed - not recreating" and nothing happens. The documented path is
kcadm.shinsidekeycloak-0(admin credentials in Secretkeycloak-admin-credentials;kcadmis present,curlandpython3are not) and fixing git so the change is reproducible. Doing only the live half creates drift; doing only the git half changes nothing. - Never print or paste a client secret. The reconciler deliberately logs URL values in full (they are public hostnames) and never logs secrets. Keep that property.
- Do not widen the reconciler's endpoint allow-list. It is hard-scoped so that
/users,/groups,/rolesand/authenticationare unreachable — a blast-radius bound, not an oversight. - Do not disable or suspend the CronJob to stop the alert. That is the healer, and
...Staleexists precisely because a suspended healer is invisible. - Escalate for: rotating client secrets, editing the live realm, or anything touching MFA (a
conditional-OTP misconfiguration once 403'd every platform-admin login with
"Invalid role name: null", fixed tocondUserRole: platform-admin).
Source of truth: runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: ci/l0.sh Stage 3d and
conformance/tests/l0-static/keycloak-client-secret-reconciler/check.sh (the 2026-09-06 incident and the
reconciler's contract — 212 L0 assertions, an 84-assertion selftest, 12/12 injected regressions killed);
DECISIONS-LOG.md "Keycloak client REDIRECT URIs reconcile too — the same one-shot, one field over".