Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl
2
0 Fork 0
Code Issues 2 Pull Requests 6 Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Files
ce849032d571af961a70dcbe2472e76b1d1aac1c
home-network-k3s-impl/clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml
T
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 0747849837
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m53s
Details
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
Details
fix(bulk-nfs): repoint at the TrueNAS (192.168.2.30); the PVs must be recreated, not reconciled 
Both ZFS pools moved off the Proxmox host onto a standalone TrueNAS on
192.168.2.30 -- prod's OWN /24, so the pfSense crossing that made this knob
load-bearing is gone, along with the DNAT at 192.168.2.102 it mounted through.
Measured 2026-10-07: 192.168.2.102:2049 no longer answers; .30:2049 and :111 do.

BULK_NFS_SERVER -> 192.168.2.30 in prod, base and dev. The dev value is marked
inert (dev is decommissioned); it carries the real address only so nothing in
the tree renders a host that no longer exists.

THE OPERATIONAL POINT, and why this is not just a value change: a bound
PersistentVolume's NFS source is immutable. Server dry-run, 2026-10-07:

  spec.persistentvolumesource: Forbidden: spec.persistentvolumesource is
  immutable after creation

so Flux's apply FAILS rather than updating, and the pods keep their old, dead
mount. The five PVs must be deleted and recreated -- safe, because Retain never
touches data and render.py emits a pre-set claimRef so each PV rebinds its own
PVC. The sequence is docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md section 10 and is an OPERATOR
action; this commit does not perform it.

Pairs with the hazard already on the page: spec.nfs.server is unvalidated at
create (any string binds) and immutable at update. A wrong value is accepted
silently and then cannot be corrected in place.

docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md: sections 1 and 5 rewritten for TrueNAS -- the measured
exports, the service settings that decide whether uid 1000 survives the wire,
the three stale ZFS sharenfs properties that had to be cleared, and the ACL
hazard (acltype=nfsv4 + aclinherit=passthrough means one click in the ACL editor
propagates to the whole future library). Section 7 rewritten now that the
placeholder is gone, section 9 retargeted from dev to prod, section 10 new.
Sections 2/3/4/6 are unchanged by the move.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-10-07 01:15:04 -05:00

673 lines
42 KiB
YAML
Raw Blame History

---
# clusters/prod — DESIGN-ONLY overlay. NOT a build target until roadmap Phase 7 opens prod
# (spec roadmap/phases.md, AGENTS.md §6: "Never build directly on production").
#
# When Phase 7 is opened, `flux bootstrap ... --path=clusters/prod` points the prod cluster's Flux
# here. Like dev, this overlay adds NO resources — it ONLY patches cluster-vars with prod-scoped
# values (R-ENV-02). Promotion to prod is a change to THESE variables, never a base edit.
#
# *** PHASE-7 BLOCKER — READ BEFORE BOOTSTRAPPING PROD ***
# `clusters/base/platform.yaml` now carries `dependsOn: [flux-system]` (the 2026-09-01 substitution-
# race fix). That names the ROOT Kustomization, which clusters/dev supplies as `dev/sync.yaml`
# (path ./clusters/dev). THIS overlay has no sync.yaml yet, so as written a prod bootstrap would
# leave `platform` stuck on "dependency 'flux-system/flux-system' is not ready" FOREVER and nothing
# downstream would reconcile. Phase 7 MUST add `clusters/prod/sync.yaml` — a copy of dev/sync.yaml
# with `path: ./clusters/prod` — as part of opening this overlay. (Adding it now is deliberately NOT
# done here: prod is design-only and its root object is the prod bring-up owner's call.)
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- ../base
- sync.yaml # self-managing root Kustomization -> ./clusters/prod (REQUIRED: see below)
patches:
# --- SOPS decryption (operator decision 2026-09-01: prod uses the SAME age key as dev) ---
# Mirrors clusters/dev exactly, one stanza per Kustomization that carries encrypted Secrets.
# The `sops-age` Secret is created OUT OF BAND on the prod cluster
# (bootstrap/sops/install-age-key.sh) — referenced by NAME only, never inlined.
# Add a stanza here whenever `render.py --emit-waves` introduces a new deepest wave.
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: platform
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-wave-0
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-wave-1
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-wave-2
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: oauth2-proxy
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: headlamp
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: crafty
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: velero
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
# vpn-ingress (the WireGuard remote-access VPN, clusters/base/vpn-ingress.yaml) carries
# platform/vpn-ingress/wg-server-key.sops.yaml — the WireGuard SERVER private key, the one
# secret in that component. Without this stanza kustomize hands Flux the raw ciphertext and the
# Secret applies full of ENC[...]: the APPLY SUCCEEDS and every Flux condition stays green, and
# the only symptom is a VPN that no client can handshake with. The DaemonSet's init container
# validates the value with `wg pubkey` specifically so that state is a named CrashLoop instead.
# The `sops-age` Secret is out-of-band (name only).
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: vpn-ingress
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
# pm-agent (the Program Manager agent service, clusters/base/pm-agent.yaml) carries
# pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml — the Gitea write token for the dedicated non-admin bot
# account and the Anthropic subscription token from `claude setup-token`. Without this
# stanza kustomize hands Flux the raw SOPS document and the Secret applies full of
# ciphertext: the APPLY SUCCEEDS, and the only symptom is a dispatcher that cannot
# authenticate to Gitea — so this stanza is as load-bearing as the file it decrypts (same
# silent-failure shape as the apps-vms note below/above). The `sops-age` Secret is created
# out-of-band (name only).
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: pm-agent
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
# apps-vms (the KubeVirt VM tier, clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml) gained its FIRST encrypted Secret
# on 2026-09-14: apps/vms/unifi/unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml, the operator's UOS installer URL,
# which 30-virtualmachine.yaml mounts into the guest as a disk. Without this stanza kustomize
# would hand Flux the raw SOPS document and the VM would mount a disk full of ciphertext — the
# failure is silent from the cluster's point of view (the Secret applies fine), so the stanza is
# as load-bearing as the file itself. Mirrors clusters/dev. `sops-age` is out-of-band (name only).
- patch: |-
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: apps-vms
namespace: flux-system
spec:
decryption:
provider: sops
secretRef:
name: sops-age
# --- GitOps source (operator decision 2026-09-01: prod tracks the SAME BRANCH as dev) ---
#
# ############################################################################################
# ### ###
# ### *** T E M P O R A R Y B O O T S T R A P S O U R C E — NOT PERMANENT *** ###
# ### ###
# ### The url below is a Gitea container running ON THE OPERATOR'S WORKSTATION, outside ###
# ### any cluster. It exists ONLY to get prod's first reconcile off the ground. It MUST ###
# ### be cut over to the in-cluster URL once Gitea runs on prod. If you are reading this ###
# ### and prod has been serving traffic for months, THE CUTOVER WAS NEVER DONE — that is ###
# ### a live single point of failure, not a settled design. See "CUTOVER" below. ###
# ### ###
# ############################################################################################
#
# WHY THE IN-CLUSTER URL CANNOT BE USED YET (blocker found 2026-09-01, still true; the
# unusable value was `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git`).
# Two independent reasons, both consequences of the split-horizon design:
# 1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY. Gitea runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER. Prod syncing from it means prod's
# GitOps source lives inside the very cluster slated for decommission. Gitea must move to
# prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is retired, or prod loses its source of truth.
# 2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS SENDS IT TO THE WRONG PLACE. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml
# answers the ENTIRE home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. On prod that is
# 192.168.2.20 — PROD's own gateway, where no Gitea is listening. Prod's Flux would resolve
# gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to itself and never reach a repository.
#
# WHAT THE TEMPORARY SOURCE IS (stood up 2026-09-04 on explicit operator direction):
# bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh with HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132 — a podman container on the
# operator's workstation, Gitea 1.22.6, listening on 192.168.2.132:3000. All three prod nodes
# reach it DIRECTLY on the LAN: no libvirt NAT hop (that network is retired) and no firewall
# change was needed. This is the same "local bootstrap source" pattern dev itself used before
# its Phase-6 cutover (docs/05 "Source-of-truth").
#
# PLAIN HTTP, AND WHY THAT IS ACCEPTED HERE: the bootstrap Gitea has no TLS, so there is no cert
# for Flux to trust and no caCertSecretRef to wire. Traffic is LAN-local between prod nodes and
# the workstation, the repo carries NO plaintext secrets (everything sensitive is SOPS-encrypted,
# .sops.yaml), and the window is the bring-up only. Do NOT extend this posture past cutover.
#
# NO secretRef, DELIBERATELY: the repo is PUBLIC on the bootstrap Gitea, so anonymous clone
# works and Flux needs no git credentials. VERIFIED 2026-09-04 by unauthenticated request:
# curl http://192.168.2.132:3000/api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl -> "private":false
# git ls-remote http://192.168.2.132:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git -> refs/heads/main
# If the GitRepository ever reports an auth failure that looks like a network problem, RE-CHECK
# THAT FIRST: a private repo here fails exactly that way.
#
# *** CUTOVER — the exit condition, mirroring dev's Phase-6 cutover (docs/05) ***
# WHEN: Gitea runs on prod (reconciled in-cluster) and answers gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
# through prod's own Gateway VIP with a publicly-trusted cert.
# DO: 1. push/mirror this repo into the prod in-cluster Gitea;
# 2. change the url below to
# https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
# and DELETE this whole TEMPORARY block (dev's equivalent stanza, ~15 lines above in
# clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml, is what "done" looks like);
# 3. confirm `flux get sources git -n flux-system` reconciles the new revision;
# 4. only THEN stop the workstation container. Keep it stopped-not-deleted as recovery,
# exactly as dev retained its bootstrap Gitea.
# UNTIL THEN: prod's reconciliation depends on a container on a workstation that may be
# powered off. Flux keeps the last-reconciled state running, but NO new revision lands while
# it is down. Tracked as an open blocker in infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7.
#
# The BRANCH below is settled and correct: prod tracks `main`, the same branch as dev.
# CONSEQUENCE, recorded deliberately: once prod is live, EVERY MERGE TO main RECONCILES BOTH
# CLUSTERS. There is no promotion step and no soak window — dev and prod move together.
# NOTE for bring-up: bootstrap-gitea.sh pushes the operator's CURRENT HEAD to the bootstrap
# Gitea's `main`, whatever branch that is. Before bootstrapping prod, confirm that remote `main`
# is the revision you intend prod to run (`git ls-remote` above, against local `main`).
- patch: |-
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: GitRepository
metadata:
name: flux-system
namespace: flux-system
spec:
# CUTOVER DONE 2026-09-06 (operator direction: "move the repo to prod"). Prod now reconciles
# from PROD'S OWN in-cluster Gitea. The workstation bootstrap container
# (http://192.168.2.132:3000) is retired as prod's source — it was a podman container on the
# operator's workstation holding a DHCP lease on WIFI, i.e. production's source of truth was a
# laptop. It is kept only as a recovery path (bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh).
#
# THIS LINE IS SELF-REFERENTIAL AND THAT IS THE WHOLE DIFFICULTY. The root Kustomization
# renders ./clusters/prod, which contains this patch — so a live `kubectl patch` of
# GitRepository.spec.url is REVERTED on the next reconcile unless the authored value moves
# too. The cutover therefore had to be: (1) push the repo to prod's Gitea, (2) fast-forward
# its `main` to the exact commit prod was already running so the source swap changed nothing
# else, (3) live-patch the url to open a window, (4) land THIS commit through that window so
# the authored value agrees. Dev hit the identical trap on 2026-09-05
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10a "D0/D1 as executed").
#
# Verified before the switch: a throwaway pod INSIDE prod resolved this host through
# in-cluster CoreDNS to the Gateway VIP and cloned over the public LE cert with no CA
# supplied. The workstation being able to reach it proves nothing about pod egress.
# MOVED WITH THE APEX FLIP (2026-09-13) — and it had to move in the SAME fetch.
# This URL is a hardcoded literal, NOT templated on ${BASE_DOMAIN}, so the flip did not
# carry it. But the flip DOES rename prod's own HTTPRoute hostnames, so:
# - external-dns (policy=sync) deletes gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and
# - platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml answers the whole ${BASE_DOMAIN} zone with
# ${GATEWAY_VIP}, so in-cluster resolution moves from prod.home. to home.
# Leaving this on the old name would therefore have severed prod from its OWN GitOps
# source moments after the flip reconciled — self-reference, the same class of trap as
# patching this url live and having the root Kustomization revert it. The fix has to land
# THROUGH THE OLD SOURCE, which is why it is in the same push as the flip rather than
# after it.
# FOLLOW-UP worth doing: point this at the in-cluster Service
# (gitea-http.gitea.svc.cluster.local) so prod's GitOps stops depending on public DNS and
# on its own Gateway at all. Deferred: it needs the TLS/credential path rethought.
# IN-CLUSTER SERVICE, NOT A PUBLIC HOSTNAME (2026-09-13). This is the durable fix for a
# deadlock the apex flip walked straight into, and it is worth stating precisely.
#
# The url used to be a public name. The flip renamed prod's HTTPRoute hostnames, so the
# name this GitRepository pointed at stopped serving — but the HTTPRoute that WOULD have
# served the new name lives in a DOWNSTREAM tier, which cannot reconcile while the source
# is broken. Source down -> routes never rename -> source stays down. Observed live:
# `srcReady=False`, "unable to list remote for https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev".
#
# Pointing at the Service breaks the cycle permanently: prod's GitOps no longer depends on
# public DNS, on Cloudflare, on its own Gateway, or on ${BASE_DOMAIN} at all. A future
# domain change cannot sever prod from its own source again.
#
# Plain http is deliberate and safe here: it is cluster-internal traffic to a ClusterIP,
# TLS terminates at the Gateway for external clients only, the GitRepository has no
# secretRef (the repo is cloned anonymously), and every secret in the tree is SOPS-encrypted
# at rest regardless of transport.
url: http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
ref:
branch: main
- target:
kind: ConfigMap
name: cluster-vars
patch: |-
- op: replace
path: /data/CLUSTER_ENV
value: "prod"
# trusted, rate-limited real certs in prod — ADR-0006.
- op: replace
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — the fix for the 2026-09-04 incident.
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD SERVES ITS OWN SUBDOMAIN. Until 2026-09-04 every hostname was HARDCODED to
# home.keithjackson.dev in the base manifests, so prod was authored to serve the EXACT SAME
# public names as the live dev cluster out of the SAME Cloudflare zone. Two consequences, one
# of which already happened:
# 1. HAPPENED: prod's external-dns (policy: sync, owner id `default` — the same implicit
# default dev had) concluded it owned dev's records and DELETED EVERY ONE of them.
# 2. QUEUED BEHIND IT: platform-config would have requested a `*.home.keithjackson.dev`
# wildcard from letsencrypt-prod for a cert dev already holds, and both clusters would
# have raced each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records on that one zone.
# Moving prod to its own suffix dissolves both: the two clusters can no longer name the same
# record. This is what makes ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER: letsencrypt-prod above safe here.
#
# dev -> home.keithjackson.dev (UNCHANGED — dev is live; phase 2 moves it)
# prod -> prod.home.keithjackson.dev (this knob)
#
# CONSEQUENCE — prod's hostnames are NOT the apex names. Prod's Gitea is
# gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, its Keycloak keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and so
# on; the wildcard cert becomes `*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. The apex CNAMEs that make
# `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` point at prod are PHASE 2, deliberately not done here — they
# would take traffic off the live dev cluster. infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# [parity] MUST equal k3s_base_domain in infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml.
# The kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is an INSTALL-TIME k3s flag, not a manifest, so it is
# set Ansible-side from that variable and cannot read this one. If they disagree, kubectl SSO
# trusts a different Keycloak than the one prod actually runs.
- op: replace
path: /data/BASE_DOMAIN
# APEX AS OF 2026-09-13. Prod now serves home.keithjackson.dev directly; dev has been
# decommissioned and released the name. Prerequisites completed and VERIFIED before this
# flip, in this order:
# 1. dev's 18 A records released by its own external-dns (policy=sync, sources deleted)
# 2. dev's 18 LEGACY UNPREFIXED TXT registry entries deleted from Cloudflare by hand —
# external-dns v0.21.0 removed only the `a-` prefixed form and then reported "All
# records are already up to date", so it would NEVER have cleared them. They carried
# `owner=default`, and prod runs `owner=prod`, so prod could not have claimed these
# names while they existed. Confirmed gone at the AUTHORITY (betty.ns.cloudflare.com);
# 1.1.1.1 served stale cache for minutes afterwards and must not be trusted here.
# 3. dev's `*.home.keithjackson.dev` + apex Certificate deleted, so it stops renewing.
# It was issued ~18d ago, so prod's request is #1 this week against LE's duplicate
# limit of 5 per identical name set per week.
# NOTE the zone has wildcards `*.keithjackson.dev` AND `*.home.keithjackson.dev` pointing
# at the public IP 136.51.115.252 (legacy non-k3s prod). Dev's specific records were
# SHADOWING that wildcard; prod's new specific records shadow it again. The legacy stack
# lives on `*.keithjackson.dev` and is untouched by any of this.
value: "home.keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #2 (independent of the owner id below): narrow ExternalDNS's name scope to prod's
# OWN subtree, so prod cannot create, update or delete any record outside it no matter what the
# TXT registry says. VERIFY ON FIRST RECONCILE — the Cloudflare provider uses this value for
# ZONE selection too, and on the version in use in 2026-08 a strict-subdomain filter dropped
# the parent zone ("no hosted zone matching record DNS Name"). If prod's external-dns logs no
# matching zone, it will create NOTHING — fail-closed, and it can still never delete dev's
# records. Fallback in that case: set this to "keithjackson.dev" (dev's value) and rely on
# EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID below, which is sufficient on its own.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER
# MUST be the Cloudflare ZONE, not prod's subdomain. FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG,
# 2026-08-17) proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE: ExternalDNS generated the
# record then skipped it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS Name", so prod would
# publish NOTHING. Isolation from dev does NOT come from this filter — it comes from
# (1) prod only requesting *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev hostnames, and
# (2) txtOwnerId: prod, so prod's registry never claims dev's `default`-owned records.
# That pairing is what the 2026-09-04 incident needed and this filter cannot provide.
value: "keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #1 — THE ACTUAL ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. Both clusters left this unset and so
# both inherited the chart default `default`; prod then treated dev's TXT-registry entries as
# its own and, under policy: sync, deleted the records behind them. This value MUST differ from
# dev's (`default`, pinned in clusters/dev — dev's live records are registered under it and
# cannot be renamed without orphaning them). `prod` is distinct, which is the entire fix.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
value: "prod"
- op: replace
path: /data/LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT
value: "3"
# Longhorn's on-node replica directory: a SUBDIRECTORY of the claimed data partition, not
# the mount root. Prod's ~424 GB partition (LABEL=k3s-data) is mounted at the neutral /data
# and serves TWO tenants — /data/longhorn here, and /data/k3s for k3s's entire data dir
# (embedded etcd + the containerd image store), which had to move off the 11.8 GiB /var:
# measured on dev, containerd alone is 21-25 GB per node, so prod would have filled /var on
# its first image pulls and etcd could not have written its WAL. infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2.
#
# [parity] MUST equal node_baseline_longhorn_data_path in
# infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — Ansible creates and mounts the
# directory, this tells Longhorn to use it. If they disagree, Longhorn writes replicas to a
# path on the OS filesystem instead of the data partition and /var fills up.
- op: replace
path: /data/LONGHORN_DATA_PATH
value: "/data/longhorn"
# longer retention / larger volumes on prod NVMe.
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_RETENTION
value: "30d"
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_PVC_SIZE
value: "50Gi"
# Size-cap below the 50Gi PVC (headroom for WAL + head + compaction scratch): prod may hit the
# size cap before 30d if series volume is high, keeping the disk from filling either way.
- op: replace
# LOWERED 45GiB -> 36GiB on 2026-09-13. 45 of 50Gi left only 5 GiB, which is not headroom for
# what the comment above already names: retentionSize counts ONLY persisted blocks, not the WAL,
# not the head's in-flight segments, and not compaction scratch, and a large compaction can need
# roughly the size of the blocks being merged. At 90% one bad compaction is ENOSPC, and ENOSPC on
# /prometheus wedges every WAL commit: scrapes keep succeeding, nothing is stored, and every
# absent()/==0 alert in the platform fires falsely at once. Costs NO history: the TSDB is 11.2 GiB
# at 30d today, so 36GiB is ~3x current and 30d stays the binding limit. To keep more history,
# grow the PVC rather than the fraction of it.
path: /data/MONITORING_PROMETHEUS_RETENTION_SIZE
value: "36GiB"
- op: replace
path: /data/MONITORING_LOKI_PVC_SIZE
value: "50Gi"
# HA control-plane addons in prod.
- op: replace
path: /data/KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS
value: "2"
- op: replace
path: /data/OAUTH2_PROXY_REPLICAS
value: "2"
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_RETENTION
value: "720h"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD LAN ADDRESSING (192.168.2.0/24). Nodes: k3s-prod-1/2/3 = .10 / .11 / .12.
# ==========================================================================================
# These knobs were HARDCODED to the dev LAN inside base manifests until 2026-08-31; prod would
# have come up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN. They are knobs now, and
# this overlay supplies every one of them. Anything the operator has NOT yet decided stays an
# INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholder on purpose: base defaults are the DEV values, so an OMITTED
# op means prod silently inherits a dev address — far worse than a failed apply. `TBD-PROD-*`
# is not a valid IP/URL, so Cilium CRD validation / LB-IPAM / CNPG / Velero reject it LOUDLY.
#
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31) — see infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4 for the full table.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# nodes 192.168.2.10 / .11 / .12 (Ansible inventory)
# control-plane VIP 192.168.2.9 (Ansible group_vars/k3s_prod — NOT here)
# ingress Gateway VIP 192.168.2.20 (GATEWAY_VIP, below)
# Cilium LB pool 192.168.2.20 - .30 (CILIUM_LB_POOL_*, below)
#
# CONTAINMENT INVARIANT SATISFIED: GATEWAY_VIP (.20) IS CILIUM_LB_POOL_START, mirroring dev
# (.53 of .53-.60). This matters because the `shared` Gateway (platform/gateway/gateway.yaml)
# pins NOTHING — no `lbipam.cilium.io/ips`, no spec.addresses (unlike platform/crafty and
# apps/vms/unifi, which DO pin) — so Cilium LB-IPAM assigns it the FIRST FREE address of a
# matching pool block. Had GATEWAY_VIP stayed outside every pool (the original .21-.30
# proposal), the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon coredns-custom kept
# answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing announces — blackholing
# in-cluster hairpin traffic (OIDC clients -> Keycloak/Grafana) while looking healthy.
# KEEP GATEWAY_VIP == CILIUM_LB_POOL_START when changing either.
# The control-plane VIP (.9) is deliberately OUTSIDE this pool: kube-vip floats it, and
# LB-IPAM must never be able to hand it to a Service.
- op: replace
path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
value: "192.168.2.20"
# Cilium LB IP pool, operator-supplied: 192.168.2.20-.30 (START == GATEWAY_VIP, see above).
# Mirror this range into the prod tofu reservation (cilium_l2_vip_range) if prod ever gets one.
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_START
value: "192.168.2.20"
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP
value: "192.168.2.30"
# k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials. This is the prod CONTROL-PLANE VIP
# (kube-vip), NOT .20 (the ingress VIP) and NOT the single node address .10.
#
# *** DECIDED 2026-09-06 by the operator: the VIP, as intended. *** (This block previously
# read "Not yet decided" while shipping .10 — the founder's own address — and that is what
# the LIVE prod cluster is running: all three cilium-agents carry
# KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST=192.168.2.10 while kube-vip holds .9, verified 2026-09-06. On a
# 3-node HA cluster that makes the CNI's control-plane path depend on k3s-prod-1: lose it and
# the datapath keeps running off Cilium's cache while no service or policy update lands, with
# nothing looking broken. The VIP is a virtual address that reaches the cluster wherever the
# control plane is, which is the whole reason kube-vip exists here.)
#
# It is owned Ansible-side by **k3s_apiserver_endpoint** (group_vars/all.yml, derived from
# this environment's kube_vip_address = 192.168.2.9 in group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml) and MUST
# equal that value — [parity] contract in platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml. NOT k3s_api_host:
# that variable still exists and still holds the FOUNDER's .10, because the cold-bootstrap
# `--server` join needs a host that is up before any VIP is floated. Two addresses, two
# variables, deliberately.
#
# .9 sits OUTSIDE the Cilium LB pool (.20-.30) and is not a node address, so kube-vip and
# LB-IPAM can never be handed the same IP — asserted by
# conformance/tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code.
- op: replace
path: /data/K3S_API_HOST
value: "192.168.2.9"
# --- still UNDECIDED -> loud placeholders (must be real before `flux bootstrap`) ------------
# Pinned L4 VIPs, both carved out of the pool by lbipam.cilium.io/ips. Not yet assigned for
# prod. Leaving the dev literals in place would hand a prod LoadBalancer a dev-LAN address, so
# they stay placeholders; whatever is chosen MUST fall inside [POOL_START, POOL_STOP] and not
# collide with the Gateway VIP or the node IPs (.10/.11/.12).
- op: replace
path: /data/UNIFI_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.21"
- op: replace
path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.22"
# PiHole's DNS listener VIP — udp/53 + tcp/53 for LAN clients (apps/wave-0/pihole-dns.yaml).
# 192.168.2.23 is the NEXT FREE address in the prod pool 192.168.2.20-.30, verified live
# 2026-09-14: the CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool` reported IPsTotal 11 / IPsUsed 3 /
# IPsAvailable 8, and the only three allocations are .20 (cilium-gateway-shared), .21
# (unifi-l4-tcp/-udp) and .22 (crafty-l4-tcp/-udp). ARP-probed from a LAN host in the same
# broadcast domain (arping 192.168.2.23, 3 probes, 0 responses), so nothing off-cluster holds
# it either, and it is inside the pool block the operator already asserted sits outside the
# SOHO router's DHCP scope.
- op: replace
path: /data/PIHOLE_DNS_VIP
value: "192.168.2.23"
# Plex's remote-access listener VIP — raw tcp/32400 for REMOTE Plex clients
# (apps/wave-0/plex-remote.yaml). 192.168.2.24 is the NEXT FREE address in the prod pool
# 192.168.2.20-.30, verified live 2026-10-03: the CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool`
# reported IPsTotal 11 / IPsUsed 4 / IPsAvailable 7, and the only four allocations are .20
# (cilium-gateway-shared), .21 (unifi-l4-tcp/-udp), .22 (crafty-l4-tcp/-udp) and .23
# (pihole-dns-tcp/-udp). It is inside the pool block the operator already asserted sits outside
# the SOHO router's DHCP scope, and it is not a node address (.10/.11/.12) or the
# control-plane VIP (.9).
#
# UNLIKE .23, THIS ONE IS ALSO A WAN PORT-FORWARD TARGET. The router forwards WAN tcp/32400
# here, by hand, off-repo — so changing this value is a two-place edit and the router is the
# half that CI cannot check. runbooks/plex-remote-access.md is the procedure.
#
# NOT ARP-PROBED. .23 was verified free with `arping` from a LAN host before it was claimed;
# for .24 only the in-cluster pool accounting above was checked, so an off-cluster squatter on
# this address would not have been caught. Probe before trusting it if remote access comes up
# with a conflict.
- op: replace
path: /data/PLEX_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.24"
# The prod flat LAN. This is the 192.168.2.0/24 segment the SOHO ROUTER at 192.168.2.1 owns —
# NOT pfSense's 192.168.1.0/24, which is a different network and not in the LAN-DNS path.
# It scopes the ingress allow for PiHole's DNS listener to LAN clients only.
- op: replace
path: /data/LAN_CIDR
value: "192.168.2.0/24"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# BULK (EXTERNAL NFS) STORAGE HOST — the TrueNAS at 192.168.2.30.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Backs every `class: bulk` volume: the 8.33 T media library (Storage/plex — plex, sonarr,
# radarr, qbittorrent) and the 270 G legacy Nextcloud archive (Storage/nextcloud).
#
# THIS WAS THE REPO'S ONE LOAD-BEARING PLACEHOLDER, AND THE REASON IT COULD BE IS NOW GONE.
# The datasets lived on a Proxmox host with a single interface on pfSense's LAN
# (192.168.1.9), which prod could reach only through a DNAT at 192.168.2.102 — so the correct
# value here depended on an undecided operator choice, and guessing it would have authored a
# cluster that mounts nothing. Both pools were physically moved onto a standalone TrueNAS at
# 192.168.2.30, prod's OWN /24. No crossing to arrange, no candidates to choose between.
# Measured 2026-10-07: 192.168.2.102:2049 no longer answers; 192.168.2.30:2049 and :111 do.
#
# ONE PORT IS STILL ALL IT NEEDS: tcp/2049. The PVs mount nfsvers=4.1 and NFSv4 carries mount
# and lock in-protocol — no rpcbind/111, no mountd, no statd. The NAS advertises
# `+3 +4 +4.1 +4.2` (/proc/fs/nfsd/versions, measured), so 4.1 negotiates.
- op: replace
path: /data/BULK_NFS_SERVER
# VERIFIED ON THE NAS 2026-10-07, before any cluster touched it (`exportfs -v`):
# /mnt/Storage/plex 192.168.2.10/.11/.12 rw,sec=sys,secure,root_squash,no_all_squash
# /mnt/Storage/nextcloud 192.168.2.10/.11/.12 ro,sec=sys,secure,root_squash,no_all_squash
#
# no_all_squash is the flag the entire permission model rests on: client uids pass through
# untouched, so the arrs' PUID=1000 arrives as the owner of a 0755 1000:3000 tree. sec=sys
# keeps that numeric rather than principal-mapped. The export deliberately does NOT carry
# no_root_squash, which the Proxmox one did: nothing here needs it, because every write to
# the tree happens after the LSIO drop to uid 1000 and the images only chown their Longhorn
# /config. Both subPath directories (plex/downloads, nextcloud/nextcloud) already exist at
# 0755 1000:3000, so a squashed root can still traverse them for subPath resolution.
#
# The ro= posture on the archive is now SERVER-enforced, which the old export also managed.
# The media tree's read-only half (plex) stays a CLIENT-side guarantee — all four media pods
# can land on any node, so the server sees the same three addresses for reader and writers
# alike and cannot tell them apart. Unchanged by the move; see docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §5.
#
# *** CHANGING THIS VALUE REQUIRES DELETING AND RECREATING THE PVs. *** A bound PV's
# spec.nfs is immutable — measured by server dry-run 2026-10-07:
# spec.persistentvolumesource: Forbidden: spec.persistentvolumesource is immutable after creation
# so Flux's apply FAILS rather than updating and the pods keep their old, dead mount. The
# operator sequence is docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §10. Retain + the renderer's pre-set
# claimRef make it safe: no data is touched and each recreated PV rebinds its own PVC.
value: "192.168.2.30"
# ==========================================================================================
# OFF-CLUSTER DR TARGET — Cloudflare R2 (operator, 2026-09-05; bucket + token 2026-09-07).
# ==========================================================================================
# Dev's versitygw/MinIO (192.168.1.9:9000) sits on the DEV side of the network and is NOT an
# option for prod, for two independent reasons:
# 1. UNREACHABLE. Prod is on the SOHO network 192.168.2.0/24 — pfSense's WAN — while that
# MinIO is inside pfSense's LAN. Measured from a pod INSIDE prod (the workstation proves
# nothing about pod egress): `curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live` → connection
# timed out after 15s. Reaching it would need a WAN→LAN rule that does not exist.
# 2. NOT OFF-CLUSTER DR. It runs on the same Proxmox host as dev's VMs, so it already shares
# a physical failure domain with dev. R2 is genuinely off-site, and its free egress means
# restore REHEARSALS cost nothing — R-STATE-03 has no financial disincentive to stay proven.
#
# THIS UNBLOCKS AN ACTIVE INCIDENT, not just a roadmap item. All three prod CNPG Clusters ship
# `archive_mode=on` with `endpointURL: TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT`, so barman-cloud-wal-archive
# exits 4 on every segment and Postgres — correctly — REFUSES TO RECYCLE WAL. Verified live
# 2026-09-07: keycloak-db / nextcloud-db / semaphore-db all report
# ContinuousArchiving=False/ContinuousArchivingFailing, and keycloak-db's 5 GiB PVC is at
# 579 MiB used / 4360 MiB free and climbing monotonically. A disk-full PANIC there takes the
# cluster's SSO database down, and with it kubectl OIDC, Grafana, Headlamp, Gitea and
# forward-auth. Fixing the endpoint lets Postgres drain the whole backlog.
#
# ENDPOINT IS ACCOUNT-SCOPED, so it stays a prod-overlay value even though it is not a LAN
# address: this is the operator's Cloudflare account id, confirmed from inside a prod pod
# (`head-bucket` on k3s-prod-backup → BucketRegion WNAM; PUT and DELETE both succeed).
# It is NOT put in base, because base is dev's live MinIO and dev is deliberately STAYING
# there — moving dev to R2 would reset its PITR window and orphan the backups its PROVEN
# restore depends on. Two environments, two targets, isolated by URL *and* by bucket.
- op: replace
path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
value: "https://7ce452a1b3d6c86daf2c020edcb82d37.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"
# R2 requires the region string to be exactly `auto`. (`head-bucket` answers
# `{"BucketRegion":"WNAM"}` — that is a PHYSICAL LOCATION HINT, not a signing region; using it
# here produces AuthorizationHeaderMalformed.) Dev keeps the base `us-east-1` its live MinIO
# has always been signed with.
- op: replace
path: /data/S3_BACKUP_REGION
value: "auto"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OBJECT TENANCY INSIDE THE ONE BUCKET. The operator created a SINGLE R2 bucket, so velero and
# barman cannot be separated by bucket the way they are on dev's MinIO (`velero` and `cnpg`).
# They are separated by disjoint TOP-LEVEL PREFIXES instead:
#
# s3://k3s-prod-backup/velero/… Velero: kopia repo + backup metadata
# s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman/<clusterName>/… CNPG: WAL + base backups
#
# The bucket ROOT is left empty on purpose — a misrendered prefix then lands somewhere
# obviously wrong instead of silently colliding with a live tenant. Velero's retention TTL
# deletes objects under its own prefix only, so it can never reap a WAL segment; and barman's
# per-cluster serverName subdirectory keeps the three Postgres servers' chains apart, which
# matters because interleaving two servers' WAL into one prefix corrupts the chain outright.
# Dev cannot be reached from any of these: different endpoint AND different bucket names.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_BUCKET
value: "k3s-prod-backup"
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX
value: "velero"
- op: replace
path: /data/CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
value: "s3://k3s-prod-backup/barman"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHICH CREDENTIAL SIGNS THE REQUESTS TO THAT BUCKET (per-env credential split, 2026-09-07).
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The knobs above moved the ENDPOINT and the OBJECT LAYOUT per environment. The credential did
# not move with them, and it could not: the four backup-credential Secrets are SHARED BASE
# manifests, applied to both clusters by the same Flux tiers. Writing the R2 token into them
# gave prod a working key by TAKING DEV'S AWAY — dev would have signed MinIO requests with an
# R2 key id, and under archive_mode=on that is a filling pgdata PVC, not a missing backup.
#
# So each credential is now two objects, and this suffix selects prod's:
# velero-cloud-credentials-prod the R2 token in the AWS INI `cloud` shape
# <db>-backup-credentials-prod the same token as ACCESS_KEY_ID / ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
# for keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db. Both halves ship to both clusters (they are
# base resources); ONLY this value decides which one each consumer reads. It is a SUFFIX rather
# than four secret-name knobs deliberately — four could be updated three-quarters of the way,
# leaving one consumer on dev's MinIO key with nothing rendering wrong, and strict-mode
# substitution cannot catch a defined-but-stale variable.
#
# THE R2 TOKEN IS THE ONE PROVEN FROM INSIDE PROD (chore/r2-credentials 0a6a862): head-bucket on
# k3s-prod-backup returns BucketRegion WNAM, and PUT and DELETE both succeed. Rotating it now
# touches ONLY the four `-prod` files; dev's MinIO keys are untouched objects. That isolation is
# the structural reason for the split, independent of dev's eventual decommission.
- op: replace
path: /data/BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX
value: "-prod"
# TODO(WS-INFRA, Phase 7): pin prod node placement once the bare-metal role labels exist.
Reference in new issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink