jakman85andClaude Opus 5
dc136a4943
Widens the cookie-collision fix to the whole sidecar contract, because all three
defects live in the same function and land on the same five goldens, so they are one
atomic change or they are five conflicting ones.
Added to _oauth2_sidecar_container(), on top of the cookie-name/cookie-domain fix:
--cookie-refresh=2m30s
The session died FIVE MINUTES after sign-in. Keycloak's homelab realm issues
300-second access tokens (MEASURED on a live session: expires - created =
300.000s exactly, with refresh_token:true on the same line), and
--cookie-refresh defaults to 0 -- which the pinned binary's own help spells
"0 to disable". So the proxy held a refresh token it was never told to spend.
Refresh at HALF the lifetime: two chances to renew before expiry.
This, not the collision, is what dominates the rejection VOLUME -- ~95% of
radarr's 155 rejections in 12h carry no cookie at all.
--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180 + a `metrics` container port
Without the flag the /metrics listener never starts, so no per-app sidecar was
serving metrics at all (`ports` was ['http'] on all six). 44180 is the
platform's existing convention, measured not chosen: the shared proxy already
runs the same flag and port with 2 ready endpoints.
PREREQUISITE ONLY -- NOT scraped. A container port is not a Service port, and
each namespace's default-deny baseline is `ingress: []`, so this is unreachable
until a Service port (or PodMonitor), a monitoring allow and a ServiceMonitor
land. Do not read this as "the sidecars have metrics now".
EVERY FLAG VERIFIED AGAINST THE PINNED v7.8.1 BINARY (`--help`), not against docs or
the shared proxy -- which runs v7.15.3 and could not have vouched for v7.8.1:
* --metrics-address exists in 7.8.1, so this cannot crashloop the pods
* --cookie-refresh ... "0 to disable" confirms the default
* --cookie-name ... (default "_oauth2_proxy") -- this confirms from the
IMPLEMENTATION the constant the new L0 check is built on
* --api-route is SINGULAR; the plural does not exist and the proxy refuses to start
* --session-cookie-minimal exists and is mutually exclusive with --cookie-refresh,
so dropping --pass-access-token is a least-privilege argument, never a size fix
NOT done, deliberately: --api-route=^/api/ renderer-wide. It was measured on jackett
and PiHole does not serve /api/, so a renderer constant would apply one app's path
shape to five. It needs a per-app hook the `auth` schema forbids
(additionalProperties: false) -- a schema change, separate PR.
Also records the mechanism that made this INTERMITTENT, as a renderer comment, because
nobody would reconstruct it from the flags: the loser does not just fail to read the
cookie, it calls ClearSession, which expires the cookie on its own --cookie-domain --
the whole zone. The *arr UIs poll (/api/v3/command, /api/v3/queue/details,
/signalr/negotiate), so every poll carrying an undecryptable cookie clears it again:
A LEFT-OPEN RADARR TAB DELETED JACKETT'S COOKIE EVERY FEW SECONDS, from another
namespace, with no user action. That is why signing in again never helped for longer
than the gap between two polls.
Crafty's counter-evidence resolved: the 81:1 ratio was a 24h window straddling a
13h52m-old pod. Bounded to the fixed process, crafty's ENTIRE life is 3 rejections in
6743 log lines, with ZERO `removing session` and ZERO `cookie signature not valid`
against unfixed radarr's 8 and 8. The eviction fingerprint is gone where the fix is
deployed. It logged 0 AuthSuccess too, so that is absence-of-the-failure-mode rather
than a session watched working -- stated as such in the handoff.
Renderer selftest gains six assertions, including a --cookie-refresh check that PARSES
the duration and requires 0 < refresh < 300s (so 2m30s/150s/2.5m all stay green while a
silent widening past the token lifetime does not). NOTE, and it is in the handoff as the
top follow-up: NOTHING IN ci/ RUNS `render.py --selftest`, so those assertions are
dev-time only. conformance/tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible/check.sh:291
already drives other tools' selftests for exactly this reason and is the one-line fix.
Gate (toolbox, worktree shim with the spec repo mounted at /home-network-k3s): rc 3
UNDETERMINED. Green: spec-immutability, decisions-log, lint, l0, render-golden, l1,
approval-policy. Skipped: gitea-settings (no local token), conformance (declared).
The new L0 check PASSES on this branch -- all five apps fixed in one commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
392 lines
21 KiB
YAML
392 lines
21 KiB
YAML
---
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# Namespace (trust zone; default-deny + policies apply)
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Namespace
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metadata:
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name: qbittorrent
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labels:
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace: 'true'
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gateway-access: shared
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annotations:
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/backup-policy: daily-offcluster
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---
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# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all, allow only DNS
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: default-deny
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namespace: qbittorrent
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labels:
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
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spec:
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podSelector: {}
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policyTypes:
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- Ingress
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- Egress
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ingress: []
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egress:
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
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ports:
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- protocol: UDP
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port: 53
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 53
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---
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# PersistentVolume qbittorrent-downloads - static external NFS (bulk tier)
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: PersistentVolume
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metadata:
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name: qbittorrent-downloads
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
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spec:
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capacity:
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storage: 9Ti
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accessModes:
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- ReadWriteMany
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persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain
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storageClassName: ''
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mountOptions:
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- nfsvers=4.1
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- hard
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- noatime
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- timeo=600
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- retrans=2
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nfs:
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server: ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
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path: /mnt/Storage/plex
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claimRef:
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namespace: qbittorrent
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name: qbittorrent-downloads
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---
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# PVC qbittorrent-config (R-STATE)
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
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metadata:
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name: qbittorrent-config
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namespace: qbittorrent
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
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spec:
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accessModes:
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- ReadWriteOnce
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storageClassName: longhorn
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resources:
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requests:
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storage: 5Gi
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---
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# PVC qbittorrent-downloads (R-STATE)
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
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metadata:
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name: qbittorrent-downloads
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namespace: qbittorrent
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
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spec:
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accessModes:
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- ReadWriteMany
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storageClassName: ''
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volumeName: qbittorrent-downloads
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resources:
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requests:
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storage: 9Ti
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---
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# Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
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apiVersion: apps/v1
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kind: Deployment
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metadata:
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name: qbittorrent
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namespace: qbittorrent
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
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spec:
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replicas: 1
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strategy:
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type: Recreate
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selector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
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template:
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metadata:
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labels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: vpn
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
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annotations:
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
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homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
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spec:
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containers:
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- name: qbittorrent
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image: lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:5.1.2
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ports:
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- containerPort: 8080
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env:
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- name: PUID
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value: '1000'
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- name: PGID
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value: '3000'
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- name: QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: qbittorrent-bootstrap
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key: webui-username
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- name: QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: qbittorrent-bootstrap
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key: webui-password
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volumeMounts:
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- name: config
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mountPath: /config
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- name: downloads
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mountPath: /downloads
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subPath: downloads
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lifecycle:
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postStart:
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exec:
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command:
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- /bin/bash
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- -c
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- "# Assert the durable WebUI credential in the config PVC's qBittorrent.conf, then PROVE the\n# running WebUI accepts it. Idempotent: the steady-state path writes nothing at all.\n#\n# THIS SCRIPT CONTAINS NO BRACED DOLLAR EXPANSION AT ALL, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE.\n# apps-wave-0 declares postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux runs envsubst over\n# this whole manifest at RECONCILE time. The repo's escape contract (double the dollar;\n# enforced by render.py's assert_substitution_safe) makes such a form correct ON THE\n# CLUSTER \u2014 but only there:\n# envsubst collapses the doubled dollar, so the SAME text run any other way (a `kubectl\n# apply` of the golden, which runs no envsubst; a hand `kubectl exec` of the script during\n# development) keeps the doubled dollar, which bash reads as its own PID. Not hypothetical;\n# see the PORT comment below for the bug it actually caused here. Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)`\n# are untouched by envsubst, so they are used throughout and the script behaves IDENTICALLY\n# however it is run.\nset -u\nCONF=/config/qBittorrent/qBittorrent.conf\nSVC=/run/service/svc-qbittorrent\n# The WebUI's listening port, as a LITERAL. It matches ingressRoutes[0].port in this\n# ServiceDefinition \u2014 which is the single place the renderer takes the containerPort, the\n# Service port and the HTTPRoute backend port from \u2014 and the image exposes no WEBUI_PORT\n# env var for a lookup to read anyway.\n# It USED to be a doubled-dollar default-operator expansion of a WEBUI_PORT env var, and\n# that cost real time: run without envsubst, bash read the doubled dollar as its own PID,\n# so PORT became \"<pid>{WEBUI_PORT:-8080}\" \u2014 the brace never expanded, the digits never\n# matched. Every curl below then got an unparseable URL, returned nothing, and the hook\n# logged \"the WebUI rejected the durable\n# credential\" \u2014 having never actually asked it. That MISDIAGNOSIS is preserved in this\n# service's own marker log at 2026-09-13T05:35Z (three \"rejected\" lines, then GAVE UP,\n# against a WebUI that accepted the credential perfectly well). A literal cannot be mangled.\nPORT=8080\n# A postStart hook's stdout/stderr goes to the KUBELET, not to `kubectl logs` \u2014 so a hook\n# that only echoes is effectively silent (gitea's hits the same wall and writes a marker\n# file for it). Every outcome therefore also lands, timestamped, on the persistent config\n# volume: /config/qbittorrent-webui-cred.log is where an operator looks to see whether the\n# credential from git was asserted and accepted on this start.\nlog() {\n echo \"[qbt-webui-cred] $*\"\n printf '%s [qbt-webui-cred] %s\\n' \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)\" \"$*\" \\\n >> /config/qbittorrent-webui-cred.log 2>/dev/null || true\n}\n\n# (1) The image's init-qbittorrent-config copies /defaults/qBittorrent.conf onto the PVC\n# before it starts the service. Wait (bounded, ~30s) so we EDIT that file instead of\n# racing to create one it would then not overwrite.\nn=0\nwhile [ ! -s \"$CONF\" ] && [ \"$n\" -lt 120 ]; do n=$((n + 1)); sleep 0.25; done\n\nwaited=0\nattempt=0\nwhile [ \"$attempt\" -lt 3 ]; do\n attempt=$((attempt + 1))\n\n # (2) Converge the conf. 0 = already correct (steady state: NO write, NO re-salt),\n # 10 = rewritten, anything else = could not write.\n python3 - \"$CONF\" <<'PY'\nimport base64, hashlib, hmac, os, stat, sys\n\nconf = sys.argv[1]\nuser = os.environ.get(\"QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME\", \"\")\npw = os.environ.get(\"QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD\", \"\")\nif not user or not pw:\n sys.stderr.write(\"[qbt-webui-cred] credential env is empty - refusing to touch the conf\\n\")\n raise SystemExit(1)\n\n# qBittorrent's OWN parameters (base/utils/password.cpp): PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100000\n# iterations, 16-byte random salt, 64-byte digest, stored as\n# WebUI\\Password_PBKDF2=\"@ByteArray(<base64 salt>:<base64 digest>)\"\n# Get any one of them wrong and the app simply rejects every login.\nITERATIONS, DIGEST_LEN, SALT_LEN = 100000, 64, 16\nUKEY, PKEY, SECTION = \"WebUI\\\\Username\", \"WebUI\\\\Password_PBKDF2\"\
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, \"[Preferences]\"\n\ndef matches(raw):\n \"\"\"True iff the stored digest is one OUR password produces (salt is read from it).\"\"\"\n v = raw.strip().strip('\"')\n if v.startswith(\"@ByteArray(\") and v.endswith(\")\"):\n v = v[len(\"@ByteArray(\"):-1]\n try:\n salt_b64, digest_b64 = v.split(\":\", 1)\n salt = base64.b64decode(salt_b64, validate=True)\n digest = base64.b64decode(digest_b64, validate=True)\n except Exception:\n return False\n if not salt or not digest:\n return False\n return hmac.compare_digest(\n hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(\"sha512\", pw.encode(), salt, ITERATIONS, len(digest)), digest)\n\ntry:\n lines = open(conf, encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\").read().splitlines()\nexcept FileNotFoundError:\n lines = []\n\ndef value_of(key):\n for i, line in enumerate(lines):\n if line.startswith(key + \"=\"):\n return i, line.split(\"=\", 1)[1]\n return -1, None\n\nui, uval = value_of(UKEY)\npi, pval = value_of(PKEY)\nif uval == user and pval is not None and matches(pval):\n raise SystemExit(0) # converged - leave the file (and its salt) alone\n\nsalt = os.urandom(SALT_LEN)\ndigest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(\"sha512\", pw.encode(), salt, ITERATIONS, DIGEST_LEN)\nstored = base64.b64encode(salt).decode() + \":\" + base64.b64encode(digest).decode()\ndesired = [UKEY + \"=\" + user, PKEY + '=\"@ByteArray(' + stored + ')\"']\n\nout = [line for i, line in enumerate(lines) if i not in (ui, pi)]\nif SECTION in out:\n at = out.index(SECTION) + 1\nelse:\n if out and out[-1].strip():\n out.append(\"\")\n out.append(SECTION)\n at = len(out)\nout[at:at] = desired\n\ntry:\n os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(conf) or \".\", exist_ok=True)\n tmp = conf + \".webui-cred.new\"\n with open(tmp, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as fh:\n fh.write(\"\\n\".join(out) + \"\\n\")\n fh.flush()\n os.fsync(fh.fileno())\n # This hook runs as ROOT; the service runs as PUID:PGID. A root-owned 0600 conf would\n # cost the app the ability to save its own settings, so carry the ownership over.\n try:\n st = os.stat(conf)\n os.chown(tmp, st.st_uid, st.st_gid)\n os.chmod(tmp, stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode))\n except FileNotFoundError:\n os.chown(tmp, int(os.environ.get(\"PUID\", \"1000\")),\n int(os.environ.get(\"PGID\", \"1000\")))\n os.chmod(tmp, 0o664)\n os.replace(tmp, conf) # atomic: the app never reads a half-written conf\nexcept OSError as exc:\n sys.stderr.write(\"[qbt-webui-cred] cannot write %s: %s\\n\" % (conf, exc))\n raise SystemExit(1)\nraise SystemExit(10)\nPY\n rc=$?\n\n if [ \"$rc\" = 0 ]; then\n log \"conf already holds the durable credential for '$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME' (no write)\"\n elif [ \"$rc\" = 10 ]; then\n log \"asserted WebUI Username + Password_PBKDF2 into $CONF\"\n # postStart runs CONCURRENTLY with the s6 init chain, so qbittorrent-nox may ALREADY\n # have read the old, credential-less conf and be serving a random temporary password.\n # Restart the SUPERVISED SERVICE (not the pod) so it re-reads what was just written.\n # Nothing to do when the service has not started yet - it will read the new file.\n # Its own counter, NOT the shared `waited` API budget: sharing one counter is how the\n # 2026-09-13 failure spent the entire verification budget before the first login and\n # then fired attempts 2 and 3 with no wait left at all.\n sv=0\n while [ \"$sv\" -lt 60 ] && [ \"$(s6-svstat -u \"$SVC\" 2>/dev/null)\" != \"true\" ]; do\n sv=$((sv + 1)); sleep 1\n done\n if [ \"$(s6-svstat -u \"$SVC\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"true\" ]; then\n log \"qbittorrent-nox was already running - restarting it to load the credential\"\n s6-svc -r \"$SVC\" || log \"s6-svc -r failed (continuing to verify anyway)\"\n sleep 3\n fi\n else\n log \"FAILED to write the credential into $CONF (helper exit $rc). The WebUI will keep\" >&2\n log \"minting a random password\
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\ every start and BOTH arrs will break. Fix and restart.\" >&2\n exit 0\n fi\n\n # (3) GROUND TRUTH: the WebUI itself must accept it. Wait for the API to answer at ALL\n # (shared ~120s budget across attempts), then spend exactly ONE login per attempt -\n # at most 3 rejected logins, which stays under qBittorrent's default ban threshold.\n #\n # \"THE API NEVER ANSWERED\" IS A DIFFERENT FAULT FROM \"THE PASSWORD WAS REJECTED\", and\n # conflating them is what made this hook lie once already (see the PORT comment). An\n # unreachable WebUI is reported as unreachable, and the hook stops rather than spending\n # its remaining login attempts to produce two more identical wrong diagnoses.\n api_ok=0\n while [ \"$waited\" -lt 120 ]; do\n code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -m 3 -w '%{http_code}' \"http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/\" 2>/dev/null)\n if [ -n \"$code\" ] && [ \"$code\" != \"000\" ]; then api_ok=1; break; fi\n waited=$((waited + 1)); sleep 1\n done\n if [ \"$api_ok\" != 1 ]; then\n log \"the WebUI never answered on 127.0.0.1:$PORT within the wait budget, so the\" >&2\n log \"credential in $CONF is UNVERIFIED. This is NOT a rejected password - it was\" >&2\n log \"never submitted. Do not rotate the credential on the strength of this line.\" >&2\n exit 0\n fi\n body=$(curl -sS -m 10 \\\n --data-urlencode \"username=$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"password=$QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD\" \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/api/v2/auth/login\" 2>/dev/null)\n if [ \"$body\" = \"Ok.\" ]; then\n log \"VERIFIED: the WebUI accepts the durable credential for '$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME'\"\n exit 0\n fi\n log \"WebUI rejected the durable credential (login said '$body')\" >&2\n # A rejection when the conf was ALREADY converged (rc=0, nothing written) can only mean\n # the running qbittorrent-nox is serving something it read from an EARLIER conf, so\n # rewriting the same bytes on the next attempt would change nothing. The remedy is to\n # make the process RE-READ the file, so restart the supervised service and let the next\n # attempt re-verify. Without this the retry loop could never change its own outcome.\n if [ \"$(s6-svstat -u \"$SVC\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"true\" ]; then\n log \"restarting qbittorrent-nox so it re-reads $CONF, then re-verifying\" >&2\n s6-svc -r \"$SVC\" || log \"s6-svc -r failed (continuing to verify anyway)\" >&2\n sleep 3\n fi\ndone\n\nlog \"GAVE UP after $attempt attempts: the WebUI does not accept the credential from git.\" >&2\n# A postStart hook MUST exit 0 - a non-zero exit makes the kubelet KILL the container\n# (FailedPostStartHook -> CrashLoopBackOff), turning a credential fault into an outage.\n# Both failure paths above therefore log LOUDLY and exit 0; the `up` SLI still watches the\n# app, and the arrs' own download-client health check surfaces a broken credential.\nexit 0\n"
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- name: oauth2-proxy
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image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1
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imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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args:
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- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
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- --reverse-proxy=true
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- --provider=oidc
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- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
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- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8080
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- --email-domain=*
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- --scope=openid email profile
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- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
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- --allowed-group=media-users
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- --allowed-group=platform-admins
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- --skip-provider-button=true
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- --redirect-url=https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
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- --cookie-name=_oauth2_proxy_qbittorrent
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- --cookie-domain=qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
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- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
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- --cookie-secure=true
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- --cookie-refresh=2m30s
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- --pass-access-token=true
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- --set-xauthrequest=true
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- --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180
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env:
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- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy
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key: client-id
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- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy
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key: client-secret
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- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_SECRET
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valueFrom:
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secretKeyRef:
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name: qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy
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key: cookie-secret
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ports:
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- name: http
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containerPort: 4180
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protocol: TCP
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- name: metrics
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containerPort: 44180
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protocol: TCP
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 25m
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memory: 64Mi
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limits:
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memory: 128Mi
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securityContext:
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
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capabilities:
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drop:
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- ALL
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livenessProbe:
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httpGet:
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path: /ping
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port: http
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initialDelaySeconds: 5
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periodSeconds: 15
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readinessProbe:
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httpGet:
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path: /ping
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port: http
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initialDelaySeconds: 5
|
|
periodSeconds: 15
|
|
securityContext:
|
|
fsGroup: 3000
|
|
volumes:
|
|
- name: config
|
|
persistentVolumeClaim:
|
|
claimName: qbittorrent-config
|
|
- name: downloads
|
|
persistentVolumeClaim:
|
|
claimName: qbittorrent-downloads
|
|
---
|
|
# Service
|
|
apiVersion: v1
|
|
kind: Service
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
spec:
|
|
selector:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
ports:
|
|
- name: port-8080
|
|
port: 8080
|
|
targetPort: 8080
|
|
- name: authproxy
|
|
port: 4180
|
|
targetPort: 4180
|
|
---
|
|
# CiliumNetworkPolicy reciprocal ingress allow (R-NET-02): qbittorrent-allow-radarr-8080
|
|
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
|
|
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-allow-radarr-8080
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
spec:
|
|
endpointSelector:
|
|
matchLabels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
ingress:
|
|
- fromEndpoints:
|
|
- matchLabels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: radarr
|
|
k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: radarr
|
|
toPorts:
|
|
- ports:
|
|
- port: '8080'
|
|
protocol: TCP
|
|
---
|
|
# CiliumNetworkPolicy reciprocal ingress allow (R-NET-02): qbittorrent-allow-sonarr-8080
|
|
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
|
|
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-allow-sonarr-8080
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
spec:
|
|
endpointSelector:
|
|
matchLabels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
ingress:
|
|
- fromEndpoints:
|
|
- matchLabels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: sonarr
|
|
k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: sonarr
|
|
toPorts:
|
|
- ports:
|
|
- port: '8080'
|
|
protocol: TCP
|
|
---
|
|
# CiliumNetworkPolicy gateway-ingress allow (R-NET-01/02): qbittorrent-allow-gateway-ingress
|
|
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
|
|
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-allow-gateway-ingress
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
spec:
|
|
endpointSelector:
|
|
matchLabels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
ingress:
|
|
- fromEntities:
|
|
- ingress
|
|
toPorts:
|
|
- ports:
|
|
- port: '4180'
|
|
protocol: TCP
|
|
---
|
|
# CiliumNetworkPolicy world egress allow (egress class governs the path; R-NET-05): qbittorrent-allow-internet-egress
|
|
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
|
|
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-allow-internet-egress
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
spec:
|
|
endpointSelector:
|
|
matchLabels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
egress:
|
|
- toEntities:
|
|
- world
|
|
- toEndpoints:
|
|
- matchLabels:
|
|
io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: keycloak
|
|
app: keycloak
|
|
---
|
|
# HTTPRoute qbittorrent-8080 (R-TLS/R-DNS)
|
|
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
|
|
kind: HTTPRoute
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-8080
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
annotations:
|
|
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
|
|
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
|
|
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller: none
|
|
spec:
|
|
parentRefs:
|
|
- name: shared
|
|
namespace: gateway
|
|
sectionName: https
|
|
hostnames:
|
|
- qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
|
|
rules:
|
|
- matches:
|
|
- path:
|
|
type: PathPrefix
|
|
value: /
|
|
backendRefs:
|
|
- name: qbittorrent
|
|
port: 4180
|
|
---
|
|
# PrometheusRule SLI alerts (R-OBS-01)
|
|
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
|
|
kind: PrometheusRule
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-slis
|
|
namespace: qbittorrent
|
|
labels:
|
|
release: kube-prometheus-stack
|
|
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
|
|
spec:
|
|
groups:
|
|
- name: qbittorrent.slis
|
|
rules:
|
|
- alert: qbittorrent-down
|
|
expr: kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace="qbittorrent", deployment="qbittorrent"} == 0 or absent(kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace="qbittorrent", deployment="qbittorrent"})
|
|
for: 5m
|
|
labels:
|
|
severity: critical
|
|
service: qbittorrent
|
|
annotations:
|
|
summary: qbittorrent is down
|
|
description: 'qbittorrent: its Deployment has no available/ready replica for 5m, or the signal is gone entirely (SLI: up, via kube_deployment_status_replicas_available).'
|