jakman85andClaude Opus 5
092a0921c4
Reported: "crafty does not sign in after signing into keycloak, and there is
no way to set the service up without credentials."
MEASURED, not inferred. The sidecar log settles which layer refused:
GET / -> 302 to Keycloak
[AuthSuccess] ... groups:[platform-admins] <- oauth2-proxy is FINE
GET /oauth2/callback -> 302
GET /login?next=/panel/dashboard -> 200 <- Crafty's OWN login page
POST /api/v2/auth/login/ -> 401 <- Crafty refused
So the Keycloak gate was never broken. Crafty 4 has no OIDC and cannot consume
the sidecar's identity headers, so it shows its own local login to an already
authenticated user. That second factor is intended. What was NOT intended is
that nothing documented where its password comes from, which is exactly why
setup was impossible: Crafty generates it ONCE on first boot (users table
empty -> DatabaseBuilder.default_settings()) into /crafty/app/config/
default-creds.txt, mode 0600, on the PVC's `config` subPath. Never in git;
a fresh PVC generates a new one. The README asserted the double login was
"expected, not a bug" and then left the reader with no way forward.
Verified in-cluster that the existing credential is still usable, so the
service can be set up without touching the DB: users.last_update equals
users.created for `admin` (09/05/2026, 08:10:04), i.e. the password has never
been changed, and admin's last_login is 09/14 from 127.0.0.1 -- the API login
that created the "homelab" server. default-creds.txt is therefore live.
ALSO FIXED -- a real, separate defect found while proving the above, which
produces the reported symptom intermittently and would have been blamed on
Keycloak forever: this sidecar and the SHARED forward-auth oauth2-proxy both
emitted oauth2-proxy's DEFAULT cookie names (_oauth2_proxy,
_oauth2_proxy_csrf) scoped to .home.keithjackson.dev, while holding DIFFERENT
cookie-secrets (compared the two live Secrets: they differ, so neither can
decrypt the other's cookie). One cookie pair, two proxies: whichever
authenticated last clobbered the other's session; the loser logged "No valid
authentication in request", bounced to Keycloak, and -- SSO session still live
-- was redirected straight back, clobbering it again. Fixed on this side only
(renaming the shared proxy's cookie would sign out every other gated app):
a unique --cookie-name plus a host-scoped --cookie-domain, since a per-app
reverse proxy has no reason to broadcast its session zone-wide.
--whitelist-domain stays zone-wide: it governs redirect targets, not cookies.
Two traps measured rather than assumed, both now documented:
- The 3-strikes cooldown CANNOT fire behind this sidecar. Crafty records
attempts under get_remote_ip() (honours X-Forwarded-For -- the live
tracker key is the chain "192.168.2.132, 10.0.0.123") but checks the
cooldown under request.remote_ip, which is always 127.0.0.1 here. The
halves key differently, so get_recent_attempts() always reads empty.
Good (no lockout risk) and bad (that throttle is not a control we have).
- Crafty's `set_passwd` console command is unreachable in k8s: it calls
getpass.getpass() and needs a TTY; the container runs `main.py -d -i`.
Recovery has to go through the DB, and argon2 is installed ONLY in
/crafty/.venv/bin/python -- the system python3 lacks it.
Deliberately NOT done: an initContainer seeding default.json from a SOPS
Secret to make a rebuilt Crafty's password deterministic. Crafty does support
that hook (find_default_password reads app/config/default.json, min 8 chars),
but the image entrypoint pulls its default config ONLY when app/config is
EMPTY -- so writing a file there pre-boot suppresses the whole config
bootstrap. Buying reproducibility means co-owning image-internal bootstrap
logic that a 4.11 bump could silently change, to replace a one-command
retrieval. Recorded in DECISIONS-LOG as considered and rejected.
New runbook runbooks/crafty-admin-credential.md: tell the two auth layers
apart from the sidecar log, retrieve and rotate the bootstrap credential,
and reset a lost one via argon2 -- generating the password in-pod into a 0600
file rather than passing it in, because dev.sh does not forward stdin (a
`kubectl exec -i` through it hangs; verified). Registered in the configMapGenerator
so the URL actually resolves, not just the file exists.
Gate: toolbox ./ci/gate.sh -- lint/l0/render-golden/l1 green, spec-immutability
green. rc 3 overall: gitea-settings SKIPPED (no SETTINGS_API_TOKEN) and L2/L3
NOT RUN (CLUSTER_AVAILABLE unset). No runtime browser round-trip performed --
the sign-in fix is UNVERIFIED end-to-end and needs the human test in the README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
platform/
Cluster-wide platform services, Flux-managed (R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01/02/03). Reconciled
by the platform Flux Kustomization defined in clusters/base/platform.yaml,
before apps/.
Governing spec: docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md,
docs/01-architecture-overview.md.
Phase 0 scaffolding only. Every component here is a structurally-correct stub — a Flux HelmRelease and/or Kustomization with a values placeholder, a README citing the governing ADR/spec, and TODOs for the phase that fills it in. No cluster exists; nothing reconciles yet. Do not add working config, secrets, or provisioning under Phase 0 (spec
AGENTS.md§1/§5/§6,roadmap/phases.md).
Reconciliation flow (how a change lands)
git (source of truth)
│ operator PR → CI (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · Chainsaw) → merge to tracked branch
▼
Flux GitRepository (clusters/base/flux-system.yaml)
▼
Flux Kustomization "platform" → ./platform (this dir) ── substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┐
│ prune=true (drift correction, R-GITOPS-03) · wait=true │ R-ENV-02
▼ │
Flux Kustomization "apps" → ./apps (dependsOn platform) ─ substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┘
Git is authoritative; the cluster conforms to git and drift is auto-corrected (R-GITOPS-01/03).
Manual kubectl apply of platform state is prohibited (spec AGENTS.md §5).
The dev ↔ prod overlay model (R-ENV-02)
Platform manifests are authored once. Every value that legitimately differs between environments
is a ${TOKEN} resolved from the cluster-vars ConfigMap via Flux postBuild.substituteFrom. The
clusters/dev and clusters/prod overlays differ only by the values they patch into
cluster-vars (issuer, replica counts, storage sizes, retention). See
clusters/README.md. Base manifests are never forked per environment.
Components (one directory each)
| Dir | Component | Governing ADR / spec | Serves |
|---|---|---|---|
cilium/ |
CNI + kube-proxy replacement + Gateway API + Egress Gateway + Hubble | ADR-0002, docs/03 | R-NET-* |
longhorn/ |
Replicated block storage; 3-replica default StorageClass + bulk tier | ADR-0003, docs/04 | R-STATE-* |
cert-manager/ |
TLS via Let's Encrypt DNS-01 (Cloudflare); staging + prod ClusterIssuers | ADR-0006, docs/08 | R-TLS-* |
externaldns/ |
Automatic DNS records for public services (Cloudflare) | docs/09 | R-DNS-* |
gateway/ |
Gateway API GatewayClass + shared HTTPS Gateway + wildcard cert | ADR-0002/ADR-0006, docs/09 | R-DNS-01, R-TLS-01 |
monitoring/ |
kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Grafana Alloy + Alertmanager | docs/10 | R-OBS-* |
velero/ |
Off-cluster backup/DR of volumes + resource state | ADR-0003, docs/04 | R-STATE-03 |
kubevirt/ |
KubeVirt + CDI (IaaS: application VMs on the same K8s surface) | ADR-0005, docs/06 | R-PLAT-03 |
image-automation/ |
Flux image-update-automation (hands-off image tag advance) | ADR-0009, docs/11 | R-UPD-02 |
keycloak/ |
Platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn | ADR-0014, docs/15 | R-IDP-* |
oauth2-proxy/ |
Forward-auth at the Gateway for non-OIDC apps → Keycloak | ADR-0014, docs/15 | R-IDP-* |
kyverno/ |
L0 policy-as-code gate — OWNED BY THE POLICY ENGINEER (WS-TEST). | ADR-0011, docs/14 | R-TEST-* |
⚠️ INTEGRATION TODO(PM): wire kyverno into the platform kustomization
platform/kyverno/ is authored by a different agent (the policy engineer, WS-TEST). This
workstream did not create any files under platform/kyverno/ and must not.
platform/kustomization.yaml intentionally omits - kyverno. Once the
policy engineer's files land, the PM must add - kyverno to that list (recommended first, so
policies are present before other components reconcile). The line is present as a commented TODO in
the kustomization.
Secrets
Every secret referenced below (Cloudflare API token, Velero backup-target creds, Keycloak admin/DB, oauth2-proxy cookie/client secrets) is referenced by name only and will be committed SOPS-encrypted (WS-SEC, ADR-0007). No plaintext secret appears anywhere in this tree.
Cross-workstream contracts surfaced by these stubs
- cilium (WS-NET ↔ WS-INFRA): Cilium's initial CNI install is done by Ansible at cluster bootstrap (docs/02, Phase 1). The HelmRelease here manages Cilium config thereafter; its Helm values MUST match the Ansible bootstrap values (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port, API server host) or reconciliation will fight the bootstrap. Contract owner: WS-NET + WS-INFRA.
- gateway + cert-manager + externaldns (WS-NET + WS-SEC): the shared Gateway listener, the
wildcard
*.home.keithjackson.devcert, and the ExternalDNS source all reference each other; they form the "Issuer + Gateway TLS" interface inroadmap/workstreams.md. - image-automation (WS-UPDATE): this dir holds only the cluster-wide ImageUpdateAutomation +
git write-back. Per-service
ImageRepository/ImagePolicyare rendered from each ServiceDefinition'supdateblock (WS-GITOPS/WS-UPDATE), living withapps/. - keycloak/oauth2-proxy (WS-SEC): the SSO/auth contract (
authblock → Keycloak client / oauth2-proxy protection) is owned by WS-SEC; these are placeholders pending that contract.