jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
3472f1d161
Lets users kubectl into the cluster via Keycloak SSO, mapping realm groups to cluster RBAC. The cert-based admin kubeconfig is untouched and remains a fully independent break-glass path (works even if Keycloak/OIDC is down). - keycloak-realm-import.yaml: new `kubernetes` PUBLIC client + PKCE (S256) — no client secret in any kubeconfig; kubelogin runs auth-code+PKCE to localhost. groups mapper + email/profile/roles scopes. - k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (NEW, platform-config): ClusterRoleBindings oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view. - k3s_server role: kube-apiserver-arg OIDC flags (issuer=homelab realm, client-id=kubernetes, username-claim=email + oidc: prefix, groups-claim=groups + oidc: prefix). No oidc-ca-file (nodes reach the issuer via the gateway VIP and trust the public LE cert). Applied via the rolling Restart k3s handler. Keycloak/RBAC land via Flux now; the API-server flags take effect on the next `ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml` rolling restart (deferred until cluster load from the VM-import incident settles). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
214 lines
8.3 KiB
YAML
214 lines
8.3 KiB
YAML
---
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# Identity config as code (R-IDP-03): the `homelab` realm — groups, roles, OIDC clients, brute-force
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# hardening, and a conditional MFA flow that REQUIRES OTP for platform-admins (R-IDP-04). Reconciled
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# declaratively by the Keycloak Operator; CARRIED BY platform-config (dependsOn platform).
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#
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# Client secrets are NOT in this file: they are injected from the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients
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# Secret via spec.placeholders ($(env:...)) — so secrets exist only encrypted (R-IDP-04; SOPS, docs/07).
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# Until that Secret is filled (operator hand-off, see keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml.example), this
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# import stays PENDING on the unresolved placeholder.
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apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
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kind: KeycloakRealmImport
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metadata:
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name: homelab
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namespace: keycloak
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spec:
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keycloakCRName: keycloak
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placeholders:
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GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: grafana-client-secret
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OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: oauth2-proxy-client-secret
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realm:
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realm: homelab
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enabled: true
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displayName: "Homelab SSO"
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loginWithEmailAllowed: true
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registrationAllowed: false
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resetPasswordAllowed: true
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# Hardening (docs/15): brute-force detection ON; SSL required for external (edge-TLS) requests.
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bruteForceProtected: true
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permanentLockout: false
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sslRequired: external
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# --- Authorization model (R-IDP-06): groups drive access; platform-admins carry a realm role. ---
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roles:
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realm:
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- name: platform-admin
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description: "Privileged platform administrators — MFA required (R-IDP-04)."
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groups:
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- name: platform-admins
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realmRoles:
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- platform-admin
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- name: media-users
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- name: viewers
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# --- OIDC clients (native SSO). Group membership is exposed as a `groups` claim so apps and
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# oauth2-proxy can authorize by group (R-IDP-06). ---
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clients:
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# Grafana — the concrete native-OIDC SSO proof target (docs/10 / deliverable #4).
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- clientId: grafana
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name: Grafana
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev/login/generic_oauth
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webOrigins:
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- https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# oauth2-proxy — forward-auth for non-OIDC UIs (PiHole, *arr, Prometheus, Alertmanager, …).
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- clientId: oauth2-proxy
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name: oauth2-proxy (forward-auth)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://*.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
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- https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
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webOrigins:
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- https://*.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# kubernetes — kubectl OIDC login via kubelogin (int128/kubelogin `oidc-login`). PUBLIC client +
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# PKCE (S256) so NO client secret lives in any user's kubeconfig; kubelogin runs the auth-code
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# +PKCE flow against a localhost callback and caches the ID token. The k3s API server validates
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# that ID token (kube-apiserver oidc-issuer-url=this realm, oidc-client-id=kubernetes,
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# oidc-username-claim=email, oidc-groups-claim=groups); RBAC binds the `groups` claim — see
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# k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view). The cert
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# kubeconfig remains the break-glass admin, independent of Keycloak/OIDC availability.
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- clientId: kubernetes
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name: Kubernetes (kubectl)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: true
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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attributes:
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"pkce.code.challenge.method": "S256"
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redirectUris:
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- http://localhost:8000
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- http://localhost:8000/
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- http://localhost:18000
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- http://localhost:18000/
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- http://127.0.0.1:8000
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- http://127.0.0.1:8000/
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- http://127.0.0.1:18000
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- http://127.0.0.1:18000/
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webOrigins:
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- http://localhost
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- http://127.0.0.1
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# --- MFA for platform-admins (R-IDP-04): a browser flow whose OTP step is CONDITIONAL on the
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# platform-admin role. Non-admins log in without OTP; platform-admins must enroll/present TOTP.
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# Set as the realm browserFlow below. VERIFY at bring-up (see runbook): a malformed flow fails
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# the whole import — if so, the fallback is to comment this block + browserFlow and configure
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# the conditional-OTP-by-role flow via the admin console. ---
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authenticationFlows:
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- alias: browser-mfa
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description: "Browser flow with conditional OTP required for platform-admins."
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providerId: basic-flow
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topLevel: true
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builtIn: false
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authenticationExecutions:
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- authenticator: auth-cookie
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authenticatorFlow: false
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requirement: ALTERNATIVE
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priority: 10
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- authenticator: identity-provider-redirector
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authenticatorFlow: false
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requirement: ALTERNATIVE
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priority: 20
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- authenticatorFlow: true
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requirement: ALTERNATIVE
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priority: 30
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flowAlias: browser-mfa-forms
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- alias: browser-mfa-forms
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description: "Username/password then conditional OTP."
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providerId: basic-flow
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topLevel: false
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builtIn: false
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authenticationExecutions:
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- authenticator: auth-username-password-form
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authenticatorFlow: false
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requirement: REQUIRED
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priority: 10
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- authenticatorFlow: true
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requirement: CONDITIONAL
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priority: 20
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flowAlias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- alias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
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description: "Require OTP only for users with the platform-admin role."
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providerId: basic-flow
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topLevel: false
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builtIn: false
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authenticationExecutions:
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- authenticator: conditional-user-role
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authenticatorFlow: false
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requirement: REQUIRED
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priority: 10
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authenticatorConfig: conditional-otp-platform-admin
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- authenticator: auth-otp-form
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authenticatorFlow: false
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requirement: REQUIRED
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priority: 20
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userSetupAllowed: false
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authenticatorConfig:
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- alias: conditional-otp-platform-admin
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config:
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"condition.evaluated.user.role": platform-admin
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negate: "false"
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browserFlow: browser-mfa
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