Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl
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home-network-k3s-impl/apps/wave-0/qbittorrent.yaml
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 cf7d97e546 fix(obs): twelve app SLI rules read a signal that exists; kill the dead ServiceMonitors 
Twelve `<app>-down` SLI rules were STRUCTURALLY INERT. Each read `up{job="<app>"} == 0`,
and the ServiceMonitor rendered beside it named `endpoints[].port: metrics` — a port NO
rendered app Service defined. Every monitor discovered ZERO targets, so no `up{job="<app>"}`
series existed and the rule could not fire. Verified on prod before this change:
`count by (job) (up)` listed 24 jobs and not one of the twelve appeared; `up{job="plex"}`
and `up{job="gitea"}` both returned nothing. `PrometheusTargetsMissing` could not see it
either — a target that was never discovered has no `up` series to be 0.

THE PORT NAME WAS NEVER THE MISSING PIECE. Ground truth per app: Plex, Pi-hole, Jackett,
qBittorrent, Sonarr, Radarr, Seerr, Semaphore and Nextcloud export NO Prometheus metrics
without a separate exporter sidecar; Gitea can but only with app.ini metrics enabled;
Keycloak does, on the operator's management port, already scraped by
platform/keycloak/servicemonitor.yaml; vm-demo is a KubeVirt VM with no Service at all, so
its monitor selected nothing whatsoever. `metrics: true` was asserting a fact none of them
had. There was also a THIRD layer of inertness nobody had hit yet: every app namespace ships
default-deny with `ingress: []` and the renderer emitted no monitoring allow, so even a
correct port would have been dropped by policy — while renderer-contract.md claimed the
baseline carried such an allow.

FIXED IN THE GENERATOR, not in twelve rendered files:
  * `slis: [up]` now renders a `<app>-down` alert against kube-state-metrics readiness of the
    service's own workload object —
    `kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace,deployment} == 0 or absent(...)`,
    `kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready` for a StatefulSet, and
    `absent(kubevirt_vmi_info{namespace,name,phase="running"})` for a VM. The same idiom
    KeycloakDown has used since it was fixed. kube-state-metrics IS scraped, so this needs no
    exporter and no new target. The `or absent(...)` half is load-bearing: the signal
    DISAPPEARING now fires the alert instead of silencing it.
  * schema 1.6.0 adds `observability.metricsEndpoint` — WHERE metrics are served. A
    ServiceMonitor is rendered ONLY from it, and it renders all three halves of a working
    scrape together: the named Service port, the monitor endpoint, and the
    monitoring-namespace CiliumNetworkPolicy allow. No catalog entry declares one, so twelve
    dead ServiceMonitors are gone. `metrics: true` keeps meaning logs-to-Loki plus
    kube-state-metrics liveness.
  * schema 1.6.0 also adds `observability.livenessWorkload`, and catalog/keycloak.yaml uses
    it. Keycloak's server is a StatefulSet run by the operator; the default Deployment shape
    would have made its `absent()` half fire FOREVER — the other failure mode this repo has
    shipped.
  * renderer selftest gains cases 9/9a/9b/9c: no metricsEndpoint => no monitor; the up SLI
    must not read `up{job=...}`; endpoint port must exist on the Service; the metrics port
    must NOT reach the Gateway allow; an unknown livenessWorkload.kind is REFUSED.

PROOF, both directions, for all twelve (apps/wave-{0,1,2}/tests/app-slis.test.yaml, run by
platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh over the RENDERED manifests):
  * quiet on the healthy state; firing on no-ready-replica; firing when the series is ABSENT;
    the VM asserted both gone and in a non-running phase; per-app isolation asserted, and
    keycloak asserted un-maskable by its neighbours (keycloak-operator Deployment,
    keycloak-db StatefulSet ready in the same namespace).
  * mutation-checked: six mutations, each turning its suite red — reverting plex to
    `up{job=...} == 0`; dropping seerr's `absent()` half; pointing keycloak at a Deployment;
    capitalising the VMI phase to `Running`; widening keycloak's matcher to the namespace;
    inverting plex's `== 0` to `!= 0`. Control run green.
  * live on prod with `promtool query instant`: all ten deployed app Deployments export
    `kube_deployment_status_replicas_available`,
    `kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="keycloak",statefulset="keycloak"}` = 2,
    `kubevirt_vmi_info` present with a lowercase `phase="running"`; and evaluating the twelve
    SHIPPED expressions returns no series for eleven (quiet, not permanently firing). The
    twelfth is vm-demo, which is not in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml and so is not deployed
    — its rule is not applied either.

DELETION WAS NOT THE ANSWER, and the evidence is recorded rather than assumed:
kube-prometheus-stack's `kubernetes-apps` group IS live on prod (17 rules, KubePodNotReady /
KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch among them), so app pods are not unmonitored — but that is a
generic warning keyed to a namespace, not the per-service CRITICAL SLI R-OBS-01 declares.
platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml carries no generic app-readiness rule at all.

GUARD SO IT CANNOT RECUR SILENTLY: new whole-repo L0 invariant
conformance/tests/l0-static/servicemonitor-ports-resolve. It walks the MONITORS, not the
alerts, so it needs no `up{job=...}` rule to reach one, and resolves each endpoint by SELECTOR
across the whole tree rather than by same-file adjacency. Fixing the alerts DELETED the only
thing that made the broken monitors visible to the sibling check, which is exactly why this
axis needed its own home. It declares `conformance.home.k3s/scope: whole-repo` and adds no
ci/l0.sh stage. Proven to FAIL on the pre-fix tree: 15 failures — eleven port disagreements,
vm-demo's monitor matching no Service at all, and the three generator/contract assertions —
and to pass after. Its resolver is additionally proven on in-check fixtures (agreeing pair
accepted, disagreeing pair rejected, target-less endpoint rejected), because after the fix
there are zero in-repo monitors left for it to judge and a guard whose only evidence is
"nothing failed" cannot be told apart from one that stopped working. It also asserts
r_servicemonitor does not HARDCODE a port name — the mechanism by which one edit gave twelve
services the same wrong one.

Also fixed, found on the way:
  * platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh discovered the SUITE convention only inside
    platform/monitoring/tests/ while documenting it as general — a suite added anywhere else
    was never run and still looked like coverage. Now discovered tree-wide; a misplaced
    *.test.yaml fails loudly instead of vanishing.
  * KNOWN_UNWIRED_JOBS in alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets is now EMPTY, and the twelve
    apps/* entries in alert-rules-unit-tested's UNTESTED_FILES are gone — both because the
    gaps were CLOSED, not waived. Both registers are shrink-only and a stale entry fails.
  * renderer-contract.md claimed the default-deny baseline carried a standing monitoring
    scrape allow. It never did; the claim is corrected and the allow is now real, per declared
    metrics endpoint and scoped to that one port.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-13 17:11:30 -05:00

385 lines
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---
# Namespace (trust zone; default-deny + policies apply)
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: qbittorrent
labels:
homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace: 'true'
gateway-access: shared
annotations:
homelab.keithjackson.dev/backup-policy: daily-offcluster
---
# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all, allow only DNS
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
ingress: []
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
---
# PersistentVolume qbittorrent-downloads - static external NFS (bulk tier)
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolume
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-downloads
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
capacity:
storage: 9Ti
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain
storageClassName: ''
mountOptions:
- nfsvers=4.1
- hard
- noatime
- timeo=600
- retrans=2
nfs:
server: ${BULK_NFS_SERVER}
path: /mnt/Storage/plex
claimRef:
namespace: qbittorrent
name: qbittorrent-downloads
---
# PVC qbittorrent-config (R-STATE)
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-config
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: longhorn
resources:
requests:
storage: 5Gi
---
# PVC qbittorrent-downloads (R-STATE)
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-downloads
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ''
volumeName: qbittorrent-downloads
resources:
requests:
storage: 9Ti
---
# Deployment (R-PLAT-02)
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: qbittorrent
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: vpn
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
annotations:
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
spec:
containers:
- name: qbittorrent
image: lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:5.1.2
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
env:
- name: PUID
value: '1000'
- name: PGID
value: '3000'
- name: QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: qbittorrent-bootstrap
key: webui-username
- name: QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: qbittorrent-bootstrap
key: webui-password
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /config
- name: downloads
mountPath: /downloads
subPath: downloads
lifecycle:
postStart:
exec:
command:
- /bin/bash
- -c
- "# Assert the durable WebUI credential in the config PVC's qBittorrent.conf, then PROVE the\n# running WebUI accepts it. Idempotent: the steady-state path writes nothing at all.\n#\n# THIS SCRIPT CONTAINS NO BRACED DOLLAR EXPANSION AT ALL, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE.\n# apps-wave-0 declares postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux runs envsubst over\n# this whole manifest at RECONCILE time. The repo's escape contract (double the dollar;\n# enforced by render.py's assert_substitution_safe) makes such a form correct ON THE\n# CLUSTER \u2014 but only there:\n# envsubst collapses the doubled dollar, so the SAME text run any other way (a `kubectl\n# apply` of the golden, which runs no envsubst; a hand `kubectl exec` of the script during\n# development) keeps the doubled dollar, which bash reads as its own PID. Not hypothetical;\n# see the PORT comment below for the bug it actually caused here. Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)`\n# are untouched by envsubst, so they are used throughout and the script behaves IDENTICALLY\n# however it is run.\nset -u\nCONF=/config/qBittorrent/qBittorrent.conf\nSVC=/run/service/svc-qbittorrent\n# The WebUI's listening port, as a LITERAL. It matches ingressRoutes[0].port in this\n# ServiceDefinition \u2014 which is the single place the renderer takes the containerPort, the\n# Service port and the HTTPRoute backend port from \u2014 and the image exposes no WEBUI_PORT\n# env var for a lookup to read anyway.\n# It USED to be a doubled-dollar default-operator expansion of a WEBUI_PORT env var, and\n# that cost real time: run without envsubst, bash read the doubled dollar as its own PID,\n# so PORT became \"<pid>{WEBUI_PORT:-8080}\" \u2014 the brace never expanded, the digits never\n# matched. Every curl below then got an unparseable URL, returned nothing, and the hook\n# logged \"the WebUI rejected the durable\n# credential\" \u2014 having never actually asked it. That MISDIAGNOSIS is preserved in this\n# service's own marker log at 2026-09-13T05:35Z (three \"rejected\" lines, then GAVE UP,\n# against a WebUI that accepted the credential perfectly well). A literal cannot be mangled.\nPORT=8080\n# A postStart hook's stdout/stderr goes to the KUBELET, not to `kubectl logs` \u2014 so a hook\n# that only echoes is effectively silent (gitea's hits the same wall and writes a marker\n# file for it). Every outcome therefore also lands, timestamped, on the persistent config\n# volume: /config/qbittorrent-webui-cred.log is where an operator looks to see whether the\n# credential from git was asserted and accepted on this start.\nlog() {\n echo \"[qbt-webui-cred] $*\"\n printf '%s [qbt-webui-cred] %s\\n' \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)\" \"$*\" \\\n >> /config/qbittorrent-webui-cred.log 2>/dev/null || true\n}\n\n# (1) The image's init-qbittorrent-config copies /defaults/qBittorrent.conf onto the PVC\n# before it starts the service. Wait (bounded, ~30s) so we EDIT that file instead of\n# racing to create one it would then not overwrite.\nn=0\nwhile [ ! -s \"$CONF\" ] && [ \"$n\" -lt 120 ]; do n=$((n + 1)); sleep 0.25; done\n\nwaited=0\nattempt=0\nwhile [ \"$attempt\" -lt 3 ]; do\n attempt=$((attempt + 1))\n\n # (2) Converge the conf. 0 = already correct (steady state: NO write, NO re-salt),\n # 10 = rewritten, anything else = could not write.\n python3 - \"$CONF\" <<'PY'\nimport base64, hashlib, hmac, os, stat, sys\n\nconf = sys.argv[1]\nuser = os.environ.get(\"QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME\", \"\")\npw = os.environ.get(\"QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD\", \"\")\nif not user or not pw:\n sys.stderr.write(\"[qbt-webui-cred] credential env is empty - refusing to touch the conf\\n\")\n raise SystemExit(1)\n\n# qBittorrent's OWN parameters (base/utils/password.cpp): PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100000\n# iterations, 16-byte random salt, 64-byte digest, stored as\n# WebUI\\Password_PBKDF2=\"@ByteArray(<base64 salt>:<base64 digest>)\"\n# Get any one of them wrong and the app simply rejects every login.\nITERATIONS, DIGEST_LEN, SALT_LEN = 100000, 64, 16\nUKEY, PKEY, SECTION = \"WebUI\\\\Username\", \"WebUI\\\\Password_PBKDF2\"\
, \"[Preferences]\"\n\ndef matches(raw):\n \"\"\"True iff the stored digest is one OUR password produces (salt is read from it).\"\"\"\n v = raw.strip().strip('\"')\n if v.startswith(\"@ByteArray(\") and v.endswith(\")\"):\n v = v[len(\"@ByteArray(\"):-1]\n try:\n salt_b64, digest_b64 = v.split(\":\", 1)\n salt = base64.b64decode(salt_b64, validate=True)\n digest = base64.b64decode(digest_b64, validate=True)\n except Exception:\n return False\n if not salt or not digest:\n return False\n return hmac.compare_digest(\n hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(\"sha512\", pw.encode(), salt, ITERATIONS, len(digest)), digest)\n\ntry:\n lines = open(conf, encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\").read().splitlines()\nexcept FileNotFoundError:\n lines = []\n\ndef value_of(key):\n for i, line in enumerate(lines):\n if line.startswith(key + \"=\"):\n return i, line.split(\"=\", 1)[1]\n return -1, None\n\nui, uval = value_of(UKEY)\npi, pval = value_of(PKEY)\nif uval == user and pval is not None and matches(pval):\n raise SystemExit(0) # converged - leave the file (and its salt) alone\n\nsalt = os.urandom(SALT_LEN)\ndigest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(\"sha512\", pw.encode(), salt, ITERATIONS, DIGEST_LEN)\nstored = base64.b64encode(salt).decode() + \":\" + base64.b64encode(digest).decode()\ndesired = [UKEY + \"=\" + user, PKEY + '=\"@ByteArray(' + stored + ')\"']\n\nout = [line for i, line in enumerate(lines) if i not in (ui, pi)]\nif SECTION in out:\n at = out.index(SECTION) + 1\nelse:\n if out and out[-1].strip():\n out.append(\"\")\n out.append(SECTION)\n at = len(out)\nout[at:at] = desired\n\ntry:\n os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(conf) or \".\", exist_ok=True)\n tmp = conf + \".webui-cred.new\"\n with open(tmp, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as fh:\n fh.write(\"\\n\".join(out) + \"\\n\")\n fh.flush()\n os.fsync(fh.fileno())\n # This hook runs as ROOT; the service runs as PUID:PGID. A root-owned 0600 conf would\n # cost the app the ability to save its own settings, so carry the ownership over.\n try:\n st = os.stat(conf)\n os.chown(tmp, st.st_uid, st.st_gid)\n os.chmod(tmp, stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode))\n except FileNotFoundError:\n os.chown(tmp, int(os.environ.get(\"PUID\", \"1000\")),\n int(os.environ.get(\"PGID\", \"1000\")))\n os.chmod(tmp, 0o664)\n os.replace(tmp, conf) # atomic: the app never reads a half-written conf\nexcept OSError as exc:\n sys.stderr.write(\"[qbt-webui-cred] cannot write %s: %s\\n\" % (conf, exc))\n raise SystemExit(1)\nraise SystemExit(10)\nPY\n rc=$?\n\n if [ \"$rc\" = 0 ]; then\n log \"conf already holds the durable credential for '$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME' (no write)\"\n elif [ \"$rc\" = 10 ]; then\n log \"asserted WebUI Username + Password_PBKDF2 into $CONF\"\n # postStart runs CONCURRENTLY with the s6 init chain, so qbittorrent-nox may ALREADY\n # have read the old, credential-less conf and be serving a random temporary password.\n # Restart the SUPERVISED SERVICE (not the pod) so it re-reads what was just written.\n # Nothing to do when the service has not started yet - it will read the new file.\n # Its own counter, NOT the shared `waited` API budget: sharing one counter is how the\n # 2026-09-13 failure spent the entire verification budget before the first login and\n # then fired attempts 2 and 3 with no wait left at all.\n sv=0\n while [ \"$sv\" -lt 60 ] && [ \"$(s6-svstat -u \"$SVC\" 2>/dev/null)\" != \"true\" ]; do\n sv=$((sv + 1)); sleep 1\n done\n if [ \"$(s6-svstat -u \"$SVC\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"true\" ]; then\n log \"qbittorrent-nox was already running - restarting it to load the credential\"\n s6-svc -r \"$SVC\" || log \"s6-svc -r failed (continuing to verify anyway)\"\n sleep 3\n fi\n else\n log \"FAILED to write the credential into $CONF (helper exit $rc). The WebUI will keep\" >&2\n log \"minting a random password\
\ every start and BOTH arrs will break. Fix and restart.\" >&2\n exit 0\n fi\n\n # (3) GROUND TRUTH: the WebUI itself must accept it. Wait for the API to answer at ALL\n # (shared ~120s budget across attempts), then spend exactly ONE login per attempt -\n # at most 3 rejected logins, which stays under qBittorrent's default ban threshold.\n #\n # \"THE API NEVER ANSWERED\" IS A DIFFERENT FAULT FROM \"THE PASSWORD WAS REJECTED\", and\n # conflating them is what made this hook lie once already (see the PORT comment). An\n # unreachable WebUI is reported as unreachable, and the hook stops rather than spending\n # its remaining login attempts to produce two more identical wrong diagnoses.\n api_ok=0\n while [ \"$waited\" -lt 120 ]; do\n code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -m 3 -w '%{http_code}' \"http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/\" 2>/dev/null)\n if [ -n \"$code\" ] && [ \"$code\" != \"000\" ]; then api_ok=1; break; fi\n waited=$((waited + 1)); sleep 1\n done\n if [ \"$api_ok\" != 1 ]; then\n log \"the WebUI never answered on 127.0.0.1:$PORT within the wait budget, so the\" >&2\n log \"credential in $CONF is UNVERIFIED. This is NOT a rejected password - it was\" >&2\n log \"never submitted. Do not rotate the credential on the strength of this line.\" >&2\n exit 0\n fi\n body=$(curl -sS -m 10 \\\n --data-urlencode \"username=$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"password=$QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD\" \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/api/v2/auth/login\" 2>/dev/null)\n if [ \"$body\" = \"Ok.\" ]; then\n log \"VERIFIED: the WebUI accepts the durable credential for '$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME'\"\n exit 0\n fi\n log \"WebUI rejected the durable credential (login said '$body')\" >&2\n # A rejection when the conf was ALREADY converged (rc=0, nothing written) can only mean\n # the running qbittorrent-nox is serving something it read from an EARLIER conf, so\n # rewriting the same bytes on the next attempt would change nothing. The remedy is to\n # make the process RE-READ the file, so restart the supervised service and let the next\n # attempt re-verify. Without this the retry loop could never change its own outcome.\n if [ \"$(s6-svstat -u \"$SVC\" 2>/dev/null)\" = \"true\" ]; then\n log \"restarting qbittorrent-nox so it re-reads $CONF, then re-verifying\" >&2\n s6-svc -r \"$SVC\" || log \"s6-svc -r failed (continuing to verify anyway)\" >&2\n sleep 3\n fi\ndone\n\nlog \"GAVE UP after $attempt attempts: the WebUI does not accept the credential from git.\" >&2\n# A postStart hook MUST exit 0 - a non-zero exit makes the kubelet KILL the container\n# (FailedPostStartHook -> CrashLoopBackOff), turning a credential fault into an outage.\n# Both failure paths above therefore log LOUDLY and exit 0; the `up` SLI still watches the\n# app, and the arrs' own download-client health check surfaces a broken credential.\nexit 0\n"
- name: oauth2-proxy
image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.8.1
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
args:
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab
- --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:8080
- --email-domain=*
- --scope=openid email profile
- --oidc-groups-claim=groups
- --allowed-group=media-users
- --allowed-group=platform-admins
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback
- --cookie-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --whitelist-domain=.${BASE_DOMAIN}
- --cookie-secure=true
- --pass-access-token=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
env:
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy
key: client-id
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy
key: client-secret
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy
key: cookie-secret
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 4180
protocol: TCP
resources:
requests:
cpu: 25m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
memory: 128Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 15
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 15
securityContext:
fsGroup: 3000
volumes:
- name: config
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: qbittorrent-config
- name: downloads
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: qbittorrent-downloads
---
# Service
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: qbittorrent
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
ports:
- name: port-8080
port: 8080
targetPort: 8080
- name: authproxy
port: 4180
targetPort: 4180
---
# CiliumNetworkPolicy reciprocal ingress allow (R-NET-02): qbittorrent-allow-radarr-8080
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-allow-radarr-8080
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: radarr
k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: radarr
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: '8080'
protocol: TCP
---
# CiliumNetworkPolicy reciprocal ingress allow (R-NET-02): qbittorrent-allow-sonarr-8080
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-allow-sonarr-8080
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: sonarr
k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: sonarr
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: '8080'
protocol: TCP
---
# CiliumNetworkPolicy gateway-ingress allow (R-NET-01/02): qbittorrent-allow-gateway-ingress
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-allow-gateway-ingress
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
ingress:
- fromEntities:
- ingress
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: '4180'
protocol: TCP
---
# CiliumNetworkPolicy world egress allow (egress class governs the path; R-NET-05): qbittorrent-allow-internet-egress
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-allow-internet-egress
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
egress:
- toEntities:
- world
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: keycloak
app: keycloak
---
# HTTPRoute qbittorrent-8080 (R-TLS/R-DNS)
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-8080
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
annotations:
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: forward-auth
homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups: media-users,platform-admins
spec:
parentRefs:
- name: shared
namespace: gateway
sectionName: https
hostnames:
- qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
rules:
- matches:
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /
backendRefs:
- name: qbittorrent
port: 4180
---
# PrometheusRule SLI alerts (R-OBS-01)
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: qbittorrent-slis
namespace: qbittorrent
labels:
release: kube-prometheus-stack
app.kubernetes.io/name: qbittorrent
spec:
groups:
- name: qbittorrent.slis
rules:
- alert: qbittorrent-down
expr: kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace="qbittorrent", deployment="qbittorrent"} == 0 or absent(kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace="qbittorrent", deployment="qbittorrent"})
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
service: qbittorrent
annotations:
summary: qbittorrent is down
description: 'qbittorrent: its Deployment has no available/ready replica for 5m, or the signal is gone entirely (SLI: up, via kube_deployment_status_replicas_available).'
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