Files
home-network-k3s-impl/conformance/tests
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 fe45d0f5c5 feat(conformance): cover R-TLS-02, R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03 — 42/51 -> 45/51, and find a real gap
DECISIONS-LOG records Phase 7 being opened knowingly while the uncovered set
included R-ENV-01/02/03 — the very requirements prod provisioning serves. Two of
those three are now covered, plus R-TLS-02.

  tls-lifecycle-automated          R-TLS-02  L0 (in the merge gate)
  cert-lifecycle-automated         R-TLS-02  L2 (authored, NOT executed)
  dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code    R-ENV-01  L0
  prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface   R-ENV-03  L0

Coverage 42/51 (82.4%) -> 45/51 (88.2%), 6 gaps, 0 safety-critical. Remaining:
R-C2-01, R-C2-02, R-NET-04, R-PLAT-01, R-SEC-03, R-STATE-04. Verified through the
real runner: --layer l0 7/7 PASS, the three new ones 3/3 PASS, --strict-coverage
exit 0 with 0 label/annotation mismatches.

*** R-TLS-02 "REVOKED" IS NOT SATISFIED — A REAL GAP, NOT A TEST DEFECT. ***
The spec requires certificates be "issued, renewed, AND REVOKED without manual
steps", and docs/08 reads revocation as "removing/rotating a certificate is a
declarative change". That needs enableCertificateOwnerRef: true;
platform/cert-manager/helmrelease.yaml does not set it (chart default false).
Verified read-only on BOTH live clusters: gateway/wildcard-home-tls has ZERO
ownerReferences, so deleting the Certificate would leave the private key serving
indefinitely. The L2 test asserts the requirement AS WRITTEN and will fail until
this is decided. It was deliberately NOT softened — weakening a test to match the
implementation is how a suite stops meaning anything.

NOT FLIPPED UNATTENDED, and the reason is specific rather than caution: the
wildcard Certificate lives under ./platform, which runs prune: true. With owner
refs ON, any transient prune of that Certificate — exactly what happened to the
CDI StorageProfiles hours ago — would delete the SERVING TLS Secret for every
host, and reissuance is bounded by Let's Encrypt's duplicate-certificate limit
(5/week per identical name set), which could leave a cluster with no trusted cert
for a week. Security gap vs a plausible week-long TLS outage is an operator call.

NON-VACUITY DEMONSTRATED, which is the part that makes these worth having:
7/7 perturbations fail for R-TLS-02, 8/8 for R-ENV-01, 13/13 for R-ENV-03, and
each restored copy passes. Perturbations were applied to a throwaway copy; neither
this repo nor the read-only spec repo was modified.

TWO CHECKS INITIALLY PASSED WHEN PERTURBED and were rewritten — the exact
degrade-to-no-op failure this repo keeps hitting. The first draft asked "is this
file's DIRECTORY referenced by a kustomization", which a directory reference always
satisfies, and keyed Secrets by name alone, so external-dns's copy of
`cloudflare-api-token` satisfied cert-manager's reference. Now a recursive
kustomize resource-graph walk from each Flux path, and Secrets keyed by
(namespace, name). Both bite.

SECURITY NOTE, recorded because this project has already leaked a password once:
`ansible-inventory --list` PRINTS DECRYPTED VAULT VALUES — it emitted the prod
become-password to stdout during exploration, since the vault passphrase file is
mounted into the dev container. Both new checks use only --syntax-check and
--list-hosts, and say so in a comment. Confirmed no plaintext value reached disk:
vault.yml is still AES256-encrypted and the tree has no assigned value.

WHAT IS NOT PROVEN, per requirement: R-TLS-02 "revoked" (above), and issuance +
observed renewal await the unexecuted L2. R-ENV-01 cannot prove the running VMs
came from this module (needs OpenTofu state) — it proves the four lifecycle stages
exist as code and cover every dev node, and that the chain RESOLVES under real
ansible-playbook. R-ENV-03 cannot prove the HARDWARE (the K8s API exposes no
"am I virtual" fact; mini-PC/bare-metal is operator-attested) — it proves prod is
AUTHORED as 3 directly-reached nodes with no IaC creating them, sharing dev's
playbooks and roles, with no prod-only manifest, branch or role anywhere.

VERIFIED BY ME: coverage delta and the 3/3 L0 pass through the real runner; the
zero-ownerReferences finding on both clusters; that the new checks avoid
ansible-inventory; that no credential material reached disk. Full CI gate PASS.

Refs R-TLS-02, R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-TEST-01..05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-05 14:17:03 -05:00
..

Conformance tests — layout & requirement-tagging convention

Every test is a Chainsaw Test in its own directory:

tests/
  l0-static/           L0 — whole-repo invariants over the tracked tree (no cluster)
  l1-rendering/        L1 — ServiceDefinition -> rendered resources match golden
  l2-behavioral/       L2 — real runtime behavior (probes against a cluster)
  l3-fault-injection/  L3 — break something; assert fail-closed / no-data-loss
  meta/                harness self-checks (R-TEST-*), cluster-independent
    <test-name>/chainsaw-test.yaml

The layer a test belongs to is its subtree and its .../layer annotation; the coverage generator cross-checks the two.

L0 static (l0-static/) — what belongs here, and what does not

docs/14's L0 row is "Pre-apply, in CI · manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants". Kyverno (platform/kyverno/) covers the invariants expressible over a single resource. This subtree covers the L0 invariants that are properties of the repository as a whole and that no per-resource policy can state — e.g. no plaintext secret exists anywhere in the tracked tree, no tracked RoleBinding grants a workload identity a privileged role, the spec-immutability gate actually blocks a modified spec.

Each l0-static/<name>/ dir carries a check.sh: a self-contained offline assertion script (git + Python stdlib/PyYAML; no cluster, no network) that exits 0/1. It is executed:

  • by conformance/run.sh --layer l0 (and as the offline leg of a full run), via lib/run_l1_offline.py, producing a REAL pass/fail JUnit entry — never a skip; and
  • by the merge gate's ci/l0.sh stage, so these assertions run on every PR; and
  • by the wrapping Chainsaw Test, which runs the SAME check.sh, so an in-cluster run executes byte-identical assertions.

Two authoring rules specific to this layer:

  1. State the gap. A statically-provable half of a requirement is still only half. Every check.sh header ends with an explicit "what this does NOT prove" list naming the cluster-layer remainder. Covering a requirement at L0 does not finish it.
  2. Exemptions must be self-policing. Where a check must tolerate something (a deliberately-plaintext policy fixture, an .example template), the exemption is conditioned on a property that would break if the exemption were abused — e.g. the plaintext Secret fixture is exempt only while a kyverno-test.yaml asserts the policy rejects it. Never a bare path allowlist.

Requirement-tagging convention (authoritative)

A test declares the requirement(s) it verifies three ways; the label is the source of truth, the annotations must agree with it (the coverage generator fails on drift):

metadata:
  name: default-deny
  labels:
    # ONE label per verified R-* ID. Machine-selectable + coverage source of truth.
    conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-01: "true"
  annotations:
    # Human-readable canonical list — MUST equal the label set.
    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-01"
    # Declared layer (L0|L1|L2|L3|META) — must match the subtree.
    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
    # true => R-TEST-05 requires this to be (or have) an L3 fault-injection test.
    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
    # Given/When/Then intent, for the coverage report and reviewers.
    conformance.home.k3s/intent: "Given ... When ... Then ..."

Why a label per requirement (not a comma list): Kubernetes label values can't hold a comma-separated list, and chainsaw test --selector selects on label keys/values. One conformance.home.k3s/<R-ID>=true label per requirement makes both subset-selection and coverage extraction exact and robust.

How this drives the tooling

  • Subset runs (merge gate): run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-06 resolves the R-IDs to the set of test dirs carrying those labels (union, deduped) and runs each once.
  • Coverage (lib/coverage.py): reads these labels from every chainsaw-test.yaml, maps each registry requirement -> its verifying test(s), and flags gaps + any label/annotation mismatch + tags not in the registry.
  • JUnit: results (real or skipped-scaffold) carry the R-IDs in classname + properties, so the JUnit itself stays traceable (R-TEST-04).

Authoring rules (R-TEST-01/02/06)

  • Behavior, not existence. Assert what the system does (a probe cannot connect), never that an object merely exists (a policy can exist and not enforce).

  • Given/When/Then structure with given-*/when-*/then-* step names.

  • Hermetic & self-cleaning. Rely on Chainsaw's per-test namespace + auto-teardown; put any out-of-namespace fixture cleanup in a finally block. A leaked fixture is a failure.

  • Bounded, deterministic waits. Use assert/error polling within the config timeouts; never sleep-and-hope.

  • Safety-critical => fault-injection. For a safety-critical requirement, actually break the thing and assert fail-closed / no-data-loss, with finally restoring state.

  • Never weaken a test to go green (R-TEST-06). If the spec can't be met, escalate to the PM — do not relax the assertion or the requirement.

  • Never write a per-environment value into a test (R-ENV-02). No hostname suffix, no Gateway VIP, no LB-pool range. One authored suite must run green against dev and prod, so a test asks the cluster it is pointed at what it is. The mechanism is a chainsaw binding over the same ConfigMap Flux substitutes from:

    spec:
      bindings:
        - name: baseDomain
          value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.BASE_DOMAIN)
    

    Declare it at test level (step outputs/bindings are step-scoped), then consume it: ($baseDomain) for a pod env: value, (join('.', ['myhost', $baseDomain])) where a full hostname is needed — including inside a fixtures/*.yaml applied with apply: file:, which chainsaw templates with the same bindings. Prefer reading the actual observed value over restating a range (e.g. assert the DNS answer equals GATEWAY_VIP, or equals the LB IP the Service was assigned) — it is both stricter and environment-independent. Never take the environment from a CLI flag or an exported variable: a flag someone forgets is how a suite ends up silently asserting the other cluster's expectations. L1 goldens are the one exception: they are rendering fixtures and carry the literal ${BASE_DOMAIN} token.

Scaffolds in this tree carry TODO(T-x.y) markers where a fixture/assertion lands as a later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test. lib/status.py treats such a marker — in the chainsaw-test.yaml, in render-check.sh, or in check.sh — as outranking any conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true" annotation, so a placeholder body can never be reported as an executable test.