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home-network-k3s-impl/platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 8eb5baffa4
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feat(sec): constrain the conformance CI trigger at admission (R-SEC-02)
Implements the credential model the operator chose for wiring L2/L3 into CI: a narrow
trigger SA bounded by a fail-closed Kyverno admission policy, rather than the
zero-credential GitOps-native alternative (plan section 4, primary model).

THE ESCALATION THIS CLOSES. Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Job's
serviceAccountName. Any principal that can `create jobs` in ns conformance can create a Job
running as conformance-runner -- nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch -- with an
arbitrary command. A CI token with plain `create jobs` IS that privileged identity no matter
how narrow its own Role looks. RBAC cannot fix this; only constraining the SHAPE of what the
trigger may create can.

Adds:
  * SA/Role/RoleBinding conformance-trigger -- create+get+list+watch jobs, get pods and
    pods/log, nothing else. Namespaced. No delete (a trigger that can delete can hide a
    failed run), no exec, no secrets. Results come back as a tarball on stdout read via
    pods/log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
  * ClusterPolicy conformance-trigger-job-shape -- Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail. It does NOT
    use ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}: a security boundary an overlay can downgrade to Audit
    is not a boundary. It constrains ONLY conformance-trigger, so a mistake here cannot wedge
    the rest of the cluster.
  * Flux Kustomization `conformance` -> ./conformance/incluster, wait:false and non-gating
    like apps-vms, so a test identity can never stall the platform or app tiers.
  * A kyverno test with seven cases, six of them real escalation paths.

VERIFIED by `kyverno apply` (pass: 10, fail: 6, error: 0), not assumed:
  evil-command    DENIED at /spec/template/spec/containers/0/command/   <- THE attack
  evil-image      DENIED at .../image/
  tag-not-digest  DENIED at .../image/          (mutable tag is republishable)
  host-namespaces DENIED at /spec/template/spec/hostPID/
  extra-volume    DENIED by the volumes foreach
  injected-args   DENIED by the args foreach
  good-run        ADMITTED

ALSO FIXES A FAIL-OPEN IN THE GATE ITSELF. `kyverno test` does NOT fail when a policy cannot
LOAD: every row becomes "Skip / Invalid Policy" and it still prints "N tests passed" and
exits 0. Measured while writing this policy -- a schema error (subjects in a separate
match.all entry from resources) produced exactly that, and ci/l0.sh would have certified a
security policy that does not load as green. This is not specific to this policy: a typo in
restrict-host-namespaces or secret-provenance would silently disable it with the gate still
green. ci/l0.sh now scans for "Invalid Policy" and fails. Proven: broken policy -> l0 rc=1,
restored -> rc=0.

IMAGE PINNING, HONEST LIMIT: the plan specifies pinning the exact runner image digest. That
image does not exist yet, so this enforces the enforceable half -- the image must be under
the conformance repository path AND digest-pinned, never a mutable tag. Residual surface:
anyone who can PUSH to that path could publish a different digest. Tighten to the literal
digest when the image is built; it is a one-line change to the pattern, reviewed in a PR,
which is where a change to a security boundary belongs.

NOT YET WIRED, deliberately: no runner image, no trigger kubeconfig, no CLUSTER_AVAILABLE.
The identities here are inert until those exist, and PR #12 makes CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true
block rather than fake a green in the meantime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 03:22:41 -05:00

145 lines
6.8 KiB
YAML

# Serves: R-SEC-02 (CI holds no broad cluster access)
#
# THIS POLICY IS THE SECURITY BOUNDARY. The RBAC in conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml is not.
#
# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. Any principal that can
# `create jobs` in namespace `conformance` can therefore create a Job that runs as
# `conformance-runner` — a privileged SA (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch) — with an
# arbitrary command. So the CI trigger credential, however narrow its own Role looks, IS the
# privileged identity unless something constrains the SHAPE of what it may create.
#
# That is what this does: for Jobs created by `conformance-trigger` ONLY, admit exactly the
# committed conformance run and deny everything else. The operator chose this model
# (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4, primary model) over the zero-credential
# GitOps-native alternative.
#
# ENFORCE AND FAIL-CLOSED, NOT SUBSTITUTED. Note this does NOT use
# ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION} like the other admission policies: a security boundary that an
# environment overlay can downgrade to Audit is not a boundary. `failurePolicy: Fail` means a
# Kyverno outage blocks conformance Jobs rather than silently admitting unconstrained ones.
# Blocking CI is the correct failure direction here; admitting arbitrary privileged code is not.
#
# SCOPE: it constrains ONLY `conformance-trigger`. Jobs created by humans, by Flux, or by any
# other SA are untouched — so a broken policy cannot wedge the rest of the cluster.
#
# IMAGE PINNING — HONEST LIMIT, READ BEFORE RELYING ON THIS. The plan specifies pinning the
# exact `CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE` digest. That image does not exist yet, so this enforces the
# enforceable half: the image must live under the conformance repository path AND be
# digest-pinned (`@sha256:`), never a mutable tag. Residual surface: anyone who can PUSH to that
# registry path could publish a different digest. TIGHTEN THIS when the image is built by
# replacing the `image` pattern below with the literal digest — a one-line change, reviewed in a
# PR, which is exactly where a change to the security boundary belongs.
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
annotations:
policies.kyverno.io/title: Constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create
policies.kyverno.io/category: Supply chain
policies.kyverno.io/severity: critical
homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements: R-SEC-02
homelab.keithjackson.dev/scope: admission-only
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
failurePolicy: Fail
background: false
rules:
- name: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger may create ONLY the committed conformance run: a single container,
digest-pinned conformance-runner image, serviceAccountName conformance-runner,
command ["./run.sh"], no host namespaces, non-root with privilege escalation disabled,
and only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. See
platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml.
pattern:
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
=(hostNetwork): "false"
=(hostPID): "false"
=(hostIPC): "false"
containers:
- image: "gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:*"
command:
- "./run.sh"
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
=(privileged): "false"
- name: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may mount only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. An extra
volume is how a constrained pod reaches a host path, a secret, or another SA's token.
# foreach, NOT a `pattern` list: a Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one element
# matches", which would happily admit a Job carrying `workspace` PLUS a hostPath. This
# asserts EVERY volume is one of the two allowed names.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.volumes"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ element.name }}"
operator: AnyNotIn
value: ["workspace", "results"]
- name: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Job args may contain only the conformance run's own flags
(--layer, --requirements, --include-scope, --strict-coverage) and their plain values.
Anything else — a shell, a path, a redirect — is denied.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ regex_match('^(--layer|--requirements|--include-scope|--strict-coverage|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9,._-]*)$', element) }}"
operator: Equals
value: false