docs: apply the operator's rulings on Kasm, revocation and fault injection
Retire Kasm from the catalog. Drop ACME revocation from R-TLS-02. Make L3 fault injection operator-run and exclude it from the merge gate (R-TEST-03, ADR-0026). Update the gap register to match; Homepage authentication is now ruled must-enforce and stays a gap until the implementation lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Serves: **R-TLS-01/02/03**, **R-DNS-01**. Related: [ADR-0006 (cert-manager + Let
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## Requirement recap
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Every externally reachable service presents TLS from a **credible, trusted, non-self-signed**
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authority, with certificates **auto issued, renewed, and revoked** — including for **internal-only**
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authority, with certificates **auto issued and renewed** — including for **internal-only**
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services (R-TLS-01/02/03).
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## Solution: cert-manager + Let's Encrypt via DNS-01
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@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Certificate issuance needs programmatic write access to the zone: ACME DNS-01 mu
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**Decision (OQ-4):** use a **scoped Cloudflare API token** — `Zone·DNS·Edit` limited to the
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`keithjackson.dev` zone — stored **SOPS-encrypted** ([07](07-security-and-secrets.md)). With it:
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- **cert-manager** solves DNS-01 by writing/removing TXT challenge records automatically (issue,
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renew, revoke — R-TLS-02), including the wildcard `*.home.keithjackson.dev` cert and internal-only
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renew — R-TLS-02), including the wildcard `*.home.keithjackson.dev` cert and internal-only
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services (R-TLS-03).
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- **ExternalDNS** manages the `*.home.keithjackson.dev` records automatically ([09](09-dns-and-ingress.md),
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R-DNS-02) — no manual record editing for public services.
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@@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ Certificate issuance needs programmatic write access to the zone: ACME DNS-01 mu
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committed SOPS-encrypted and never touched manually again. The token is least-privilege (single zone,
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DNS edit only) so its blast radius is bounded (R-SEC-02). Rotation = re-encrypt + commit.
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## Renewal & revocation (R-TLS-02)
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## Renewal (R-TLS-02)
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- cert-manager renews well before expiry automatically; no human action.
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- Revocation: removing/rotating a certificate is a declarative change; cert-manager handles
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issuance of replacements. Expiry monitoring is an alert condition ([10](10-observability-and-alerting.md), R-OBS-04).
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- Removing or rotating a certificate is a declarative change; cert-manager issues the replacement.
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The platform does not perform ACME revocation: a compromised key is handled by rotation. Expiry monitoring is an alert condition ([10](10-observability-and-alerting.md), R-OBS-04).
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## Where TLS terminates
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