docs: apply the operator's rulings on Kasm, revocation and fault injection

Retire Kasm from the catalog. Drop ACME revocation from R-TLS-02. Make L3
fault injection operator-run and exclude it from the merge gate (R-TEST-03,
ADR-0026). Update the gap register to match; Homepage authentication is now
ruled must-enforce and stays a gap until the implementation lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-08 23:06:26 -06:00
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@@ -15,15 +15,11 @@ has yet to reach.
## Operator decisions needed
These cannot be settled by reading either repository.
This cannot be settled by reading either repository.
| Topic | Question | Evidence (implementation repo) |
|---|---|---|
| Bulk-tier photos (R-STATE-03/04) | The bulk tier has no platform backup, and its media dataset includes a `photos/` tree. Is that tree irreplaceable, and if so, what protects it? | `docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md` §2; `platform/velero/volume-policies.yaml` |
| Homepage exposure (R-IDP-02) | The apex is routed publicly with no enforced authentication. Enforce the gate (the requirement stands), or rule on an exception? | `platform/homepage/httproute.yaml`; `platform/homepage/README.md` |
| ACME revocation (R-TLS-02) | cert-manager has no revocation mechanism. Amend the requirement, or keep it as an open gap? | `conformance/tests/l0-static/tls-lifecycle-automated/chainsaw-test.yaml:36` |
| L3 in CI (R-TEST-03, R-TEST-05) | Production is the only cluster. Is automated fault injection against it acceptable once CI is wired? | `docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` |
| Kasm (docs/13) | Never onboarded, and no decision retires it. Onboard it, or retire it from the catalog? | `catalog/README.md:20` |
## Environment and provisioning
@@ -56,7 +52,6 @@ These cannot be settled by reading either repository.
| VPN port forwarding (docs/03, ADR-0015) | The spec requires a host-side PIA port-forward helper for qBittorrent and an alert on PF acquisition failure; neither exists. | `infra/ansible/roles/vpn_egress_gateway/README.md:170`, `platform/vpn-egress/README.md` |
| R-NET-01 | Every namespace must carry a default-deny baseline; Kyverno generates it only for `app-namespace=true`, and no policy file exists for cert-manager, cnpg, external-dns, longhorn, velero, backup, image-automation, external-snapshotter or vpn-egress. | `platform/kyverno/policies/require-default-deny-baseline.yaml`, `decisions/2026-10-03-public-dns-wan-target.md` |
| R-SEC-03, R-OBS-04 | docs/03 requires alerting on unexpected denied flows; `HubbleDeniedFlowSpike` cannot fire because no Cilium or Hubble metrics are scraped. | `platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml:1047-1050,1162-1173` |
| R-TLS-02 | Certificates must be automatically revoked; renewal is met, but cert-manager performs no ACME revocation and no layer proves it. | `conformance/tests/l0-static/tls-lifecycle-automated/chainsaw-test.yaml:36`, `DECISIONS-LOG.md:3350,3786` |
| Client IP (ADR-0016) | IP-based logging and policy must read `CF-Connecting-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For` and trust them only from cloudflared; no trusted-proxy or client-IP configuration exists in `catalog/`, `platform/` or `apps/`. | `platform/cloudflared/config.yaml` (no client-IP handling downstream of it) |
| R-DNS-04 | The edge must not forward 80/443; closing them is a manual router step, last recorded as not done, so the state is unverified. | `decisions/2026-11-08-dns-via-cloudflare-tunnel.md`, `runbooks/cloudflare-tunnel.md:47-55` |
| R-DNS-04, R-DNS-05, R-SEC-04 | docs/09 and docs/14 require behavioural proof at the tunnel and from the LAN through a public resolver; only L0 static checks exist, and no L2 test touches the tunnel. | `conformance/tests/l0-static/cloudflared-ingress-rules`, `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/dns-exposure/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
@@ -65,7 +60,7 @@ These cannot be settled by reading either repository.
| Requirement or area | Requirement and shortfall | Evidence (implementation repo) |
|---|---|---|
| R-IDP-02, R-IDP-06 | No management UI may be exposed unauthenticated and the C2 requires an authorized group, but Homepage at the apex is routed straight to its Service with no gate and its `forward-auth` annotation enforces nothing. | `platform/homepage/httproute.yaml`, `platform/homepage/README.md` |
| R-IDP-02, R-IDP-06 (operator ruling 2026-11-08: enforce it) | No management UI may be exposed unauthenticated and the C2 requires an authorized group, but Homepage at the apex is routed straight to its Service with no gate and its `forward-auth` annotation enforces nothing. | `platform/homepage/httproute.yaml`, `platform/homepage/README.md` |
| R-SEC-03, R-C2-02 | Operational actions must be audited, but the k3s API server has only OIDC arguments and no audit log or audit policy. | `infra/ansible/roles/k3s_server/tasks/main.yml` |
| R-SEC-01 | The acceptance gate requires no plaintext secret anywhere in git history (scanned), but the check inspects the tracked tree only and no history scanner runs in CI. | `conformance/tests/l0-static/no-plaintext-secrets/check.sh`, `ci/` |
| R-SEC-01 | Rotation is meant to trigger a workload restart through reconcile (e.g. a checksum annotation), but no generated mechanism exists; the only annotations are hand-stamped on Homepage and Grafana. | `platform/homepage/deployment.yaml`, `platform/monitoring/kube-prometheus-stack.yaml`, `catalog/render.py` |
@@ -78,7 +73,7 @@ These cannot be settled by reading either repository.
| R-OBS-03 | Per-service dashboards are specified as onboarding output, but the renderer emits no dashboards; the in-repo dashboards are node pressure, KubeVirt and Keycloak only. | `catalog/render.py`, `platform/monitoring/node-pressure-dashboard.yaml`, `platform/kubevirt/dashboard.yaml`, `platform/keycloak/grafana-dashboard.yaml` |
| R-OBS-01, R-ENV-02 | Log retention is specified as an overlay setting, but Loki's retention is hardcoded with no overlay knob. | `platform/monitoring/loki.yaml`, `platform/monitoring/README.md` |
| R-OBS-04 | Monitoring storage is specified on Longhorn, but Alertmanager and Grafana run without persistent volumes, so silences and notification state are lost on restart. | `platform/monitoring/kube-prometheus-stack.yaml` |
| R-OBS-02, R-OBS-04 | Acceptance requires platform alerts to fire and email in injected-fault tests, but the L3 alerting test is a scaffold and L2/L3 do not run in CI. | `conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/alerting/chainsaw-test.yaml`, `CLAUDE.md` |
| R-OBS-02, R-OBS-04 | Acceptance requires platform alerts to fire and email in injected-fault tests, but the L3 alerting test is a scaffold. | `conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/alerting/chainsaw-test.yaml`, `CLAUDE.md` |
| R-C2-01 | Homepage is specified as a live catalog with status pings and per-service widgets, but it is a hand-maintained ConfigMap of link tiles with no status or widgets. | `platform/homepage/configmap.yaml`, `platform/homepage/README.md` |
| R-C2-02 | The C2 must surface platform health and firing alerts, but none is shown on the C2 landing surface; health is reachable only by linking out to Grafana. | `platform/homepage/configmap.yaml` |
| R-C2-02 | Grafana dashboards are specified as embedded in the C2, but Homepage only links to Grafana. | `platform/homepage/configmap.yaml` |
@@ -89,7 +84,6 @@ These cannot be settled by reading either repository.
| Requirement or area | Requirement and shortfall | Evidence (implementation repo) |
|---|---|---|
| docs/13 catalog row 11 (kasm), R-IDP-02 | The catalog includes Kasm with native OIDC, and no ServiceDefinition, manifest or decision exists for it, so it is not onboarded. | `catalog/README.md:20` (only mention in the repo) |
| R-STATE-03, docs/13 `backup.policy` | `backup.policy` must reference a named off-cluster schedule, and `daily-offcluster` resolves to no schedule object; it is an annotation only, while coverage comes from cluster-wide Velero schedules. | `platform/velero/README.md:33-34`, `schemas/renderer-contract.md:428`, `catalog/*.yaml` (`backup.policy`) |
| R-UPD-01/02, docs/13 `update.cadence` | `update.cadence` should set how often a service checks or applies updates, and the renderer does not read it for containers or VMs. | `catalog/render.py` (no `cadence` reference), `schemas/renderer-contract.md:388-390` |
@@ -97,8 +91,8 @@ These cannot be settled by reading either repository.
| Requirement or area | Requirement and shortfall | Evidence (implementation repo) |
|---|---|---|
| R-TEST-03 | Merges require the tests for touched requirements to pass; the gate runs L0/L1 and tagged-coverage only, because L2/L3 do not run in CI (job disabled, trigger path unimplemented, cluster not declared), and a PASS names that declared gap. | `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml` (`conformance` job `if: false`), `ci/conformance.sh`, `docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` |
| R-TEST-03 | Phase exits require the full suite and regression runs continuously; no pipeline runs the full-suite gate and no scheduled run exists, so L2/L3 evidence comes only from operator-recorded runs, last recorded 2026-09-19. | `conformance/run.sh` (`--require-all`, `--record`), `conformance/runs/ledger.jsonl` |
| R-TEST-03 | Merges require the tests for touched requirements to pass; the gate runs L0/L1 and tagged-coverage only, because L2 does not run in CI (job disabled, trigger path unimplemented, cluster not declared), and a PASS names that declared gap. | `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml` (`conformance` job `if: false`), `ci/conformance.sh`, `docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` |
| R-TEST-03 | Phase exits require the full suite and regression runs continuously; no pipeline runs the full-suite gate and no scheduled run exists, so L2 evidence comes only from operator-recorded runs, last recorded 2026-09-19. L3 is operator-run by design (ADR-0026). | `conformance/run.sh` (`--require-all`, `--record`), `conformance/runs/ledger.jsonl` |
| R-TEST-01, R-TEST-04 | A requirement with no passing test is not satisfied; all 51 registry requirements have a tagged test but PROVEN is 0 (3 stale: R-NET-06, R-STATE-02, R-STATE-03; 48 not derivable from the ledger). | `conformance/lib/status.py`, `conformance/runs/ledger.jsonl` |
| R-OBS-02, R-GITOPS-02, R-GITOPS-03 | Each requirement needs an executable behavior test; the only verifying tests (`alerting`, `onboarding-completeness`, `gitops-drift`) are scaffolds. | `conformance/lib/status.py`, `conformance/tests/` |
| R-TEST-06 | The spec must be verifiably immutable to agents; CI never checks the spec repo out, so spec-immutability always skips there (tolerated) and only local gates with a sibling checkout enforce it. | `.gitea/workflows/gate.yml:193,227`, `ci/spec-immutability.sh`, `ci/gate.sh` (`REQUIRE_SPEC_VERIFICATION`) |