Files
home-network-k3s/docs/08-tls-and-certificates.md
jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5 18f7ba8d0f docs: apply the operator's rulings on Kasm, revocation and fault injection
Retire Kasm from the catalog. Drop ACME revocation from R-TLS-02. Make L3
fault injection operator-run and exclude it from the merge gate (R-TEST-03,
ADR-0026). Update the gap register to match; Homepage authentication is now
ruled must-enforce and stays a gap until the implementation lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-11-08 23:06:26 -06:00

5.4 KiB

08 — TLS & Certificates

Serves: R-TLS-01/02/03, R-DNS-01. Related: ADR-0006 (cert-manager + Let's Encrypt), ADR-0016 (Cloudflare Tunnel public ingress).

Requirement recap

Every externally reachable service presents TLS from a credible, trusted, non-self-signed authority, with certificates auto issued and renewed — including for internal-only services (R-TLS-01/02/03).

Solution: cert-manager + Let's Encrypt via DNS-01

  • cert-manager runs in the cluster and manages the full certificate lifecycle.
  • Let's Encrypt is the trusted, non-self-signed CA (publicly trusted; free; automatable) — satisfies R-TLS-01.
  • ACME DNS-01 challenge against the keithjackson.dev DNS zone (Cloudflare or equivalent, per OQ-4). DNS-01 is the key choice because it validates domain control without exposing the service publicly — so internal-only services get real, trusted certs (R-TLS-03), and wildcard certificates (*.home.keithjackson.dev) are possible.

Issuance model

  • A ClusterIssuer for Let's Encrypt production (and one for staging, used during bring-up to avoid rate limits).
  • Certificates are requested declaratively — either a wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert shared by the Gateway, or per-service certs, decided per ADR-0006. Recommendation: a wildcard cert for *.home.keithjackson.dev terminated at the Gateway simplifies onboarding (a new service needs no new cert), with per-service certs available where isolation warrants (Plex's L4 VIP name has its own).
  • The DNS provider API token is a SOPS-encrypted secret (07).

DNS-01 challenge access (OQ-4 — RESOLVED: scoped Cloudflare API token)

Certificate issuance needs programmatic write access to the zone: ACME DNS-01 must write _acme-challenge TXT records, including for two-label-deep names like plex.home.keithjackson.dev.

Decision (OQ-4): use a scoped Cloudflare API token — Zone·DNS·Edit limited to the keithjackson.dev zone — stored SOPS-encrypted (07). With it:

  • cert-manager solves DNS-01 by writing/removing TXT challenge records automatically (issue, renew — R-TLS-02), including the wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert and internal-only services (R-TLS-03).
  • ExternalDNS manages the *.home.keithjackson.dev records automatically (09, R-DNS-02) — no manual record editing for public services.
  • cloudflare-ddns keeps the DNS-only wan. record current for WireGuard (09).

Operator prerequisite: create the scoped token in Cloudflare and hand it over once; it is then committed SOPS-encrypted and never touched manually again. The token is least-privilege (single zone, DNS edit only) so its blast radius is bounded (R-SEC-02). Rotation = re-encrypt + commit.

Renewal (R-TLS-02)

  • cert-manager renews well before expiry automatically; no human action.
  • Removing or rotating a certificate is a declarative change; cert-manager issues the replacement. The platform does not perform ACME revocation: a compromised key is handled by rotation. Expiry monitoring is an alert condition (10, R-OBS-04).

Where TLS terminates

  • North-south: at the Gateway API listener (implemented by Cilium, 09), using the cert-manager-issued cert. Internal services resolve to the Gateway on the LAN.

  • Public services via the Cloudflare Tunnel (ADR-0016) are TLS twice:

    • Edge: Cloudflare terminates the client's TLS with an ACM/Total TLS certificate. It is publicly trusted and auto-renewed (R-TLS-01/02). Universal SSL is not enough, because it covers only one subdomain level.
    • Origin: cloudflared re-encrypts to the Gateway and validates the Let's Encrypt wildcard, using the service hostname as SNI. Verification is never disabled.

    Cloudflare sees plaintext between the two legs, a trade-off accepted in ADR-0016.

  • Internal service-to-service traffic relies primarily on network policy for security; mTLS between workloads is optional future hardening (could be added via Cilium/service mesh) and is not a launch requirement — record as a possible future ADR.

Trust chain for internal clients

Both certificates a client can meet are publicly trusted, so internal clients need no custom CA distribution. A name Pi-hole holds a local record for (09) resolves to the internal Gateway and serves the Let's Encrypt wildcard; any other public name resolves to Cloudflare's edge and serves its edge certificate.

Acceptance gates

  • https://<service>.home.keithjackson.dev serves a valid, non-self-signed, unexpired certificate (verified by an external TLS checker), including for internal-only services.
  • Certificates renew automatically ahead of expiry with no manual step (observed across a renewal).
  • Certificate expiry and issuance failures raise alerts.
  • Onboarding a new service requires no manual certificate step.

Resolved

  • OQ-4 — DNS-01 via a scoped Cloudflare API token (Zone·DNS·Edit, keithjackson.dev), SOPS-encrypted; drives cert-manager DNS-01, ExternalDNS and the wan. record updater.
  • Wildcard vs. per-service certs default — wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev (ADR-0006).