Greenfield spec set for a GitOps-driven PaaS+IaaS home platform: vision & requirements (R-* IDs), architecture, 14 domain specs, 11 ADRs, roadmap (phases + workstreams), and AI-agent coordination (roles, protocol, definition-of-done, task board). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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03 — Networking, Isolation & Egress
Serves: R-NET-01..07, R-SEC-02. Related: ADR-0002 (Cilium), ADR-0008 (VPN egress).
This is the most safety-critical spec. Get default-deny and the VPN kill-switch right; everything else is convenience.
Principles
- Deny by default, allow by exception. No service may talk to another unless a rule explicitly permits it, at the port/protocol level (R-NET-01/02).
- Egress is a declared property. Each service declares an egress class; the platform routes it accordingly (R-NET-05/07).
- VPN means VPN-only. A VPN-class service must never leak to the plain internet, including during tunnel failure (R-NET-06, kill-switch).
- Isolation is auditable. An operator can prove what a service can and cannot reach (R-SEC-03).
CNI: Cilium
Cilium replaces the default k3s CNI and provides:
- NetworkPolicy / CiliumNetworkPolicy for L3/L4 (and optional L7) enforcement.
- kube-proxy replacement (eBPF) for efficient service routing.
- Egress Gateway to force selected pods' egress through a chosen node/identity/SNAT IP — the building block for WAN/VPN path selection.
- Hubble for flow observability — the audit and troubleshooting tool for isolation.
- Gateway API implementation for north-south ingress (see 09).
Segmentation model
- Namespaces as trust zones. Each service (or tightly-coupled service group) gets its own namespace. Namespace = isolation boundary.
- Egress classes as zones:
internetandvpnare first-class labels that drive both network policy and egress routing. - Platform namespace(s) (Flux, cert-manager, monitoring, storage) are isolated from application namespaces; only the specific flows they need (e.g. metrics scraping) are opened.
Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01)
Every namespace gets a baseline policy set applied by GitOps at namespace creation:
- Deny all ingress and deny all egress by default.
- Then explicitly allow only:
- DNS to the in-cluster resolver (required for anything to function).
- Declared intra-cluster dependencies (source → destination → port).
- The declared egress class path (internet or VPN).
- Observability scraping from the monitoring namespace (metrics/logs).
A workload with no explicit allow rules can do nothing except resolve DNS. This is the intended starting posture for every onboarded service.
Explicit allow rules (R-NET-02)
Service dependencies from the catalog compile into allow rules. Example intent (illustrative, not final manifest):
seerr → sonarr tcp/8989 (Seerr requests to Sonarr)
seerr → radarr tcp/7878 (Seerr requests to Radarr)
seerr → plex tcp/32400 (Seerr talks to Plex)
Rules are declared once in the service's catalog entry (its dependencies) and rendered into
CiliumNetworkPolicies by the platform. Reviewers see the intent, not hand-written policy YAML.
Multi-WAN & egress routing (R-NET-04/05)
The platform recognizes egress profiles. Initial profiles:
| Profile | Meaning | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
internet |
Standard local network → default WAN(s) | Normal pod egress via node → edge router |
vpn |
Routed through a commercial VPN tunnel | Gluetun sidecar and/or Cilium Egress Gateway to a VPN egress node (ADR-0008) |
Where multi-WAN policy routing lives (OQ-1):
- Physical multi-WAN (two ISP uplinks, failover/balancing by routing rules) is primarily an
edge-router/firewall responsibility (e.g. OPNsense/pfSense) sitting in front of the cluster.
Traffic leaving the cluster on the
internetprofile is policy-routed by the edge router across available WANs. - In-cluster egress selection (which pods use VPN vs. plain internet) is handled by Cilium Egress Gateway + the VPN egress model. The cluster decides class; the edge router decides physical WAN for the internet class.
- Final split between edge-router and in-cluster responsibility is pinned once OQ-1 (WAN hardware)
is answered. The service-facing contract does not change: a service still just declares
egress: internet|vpn.
VPN egress model (R-NET-05/06 — ADR-0008)
VPN-class services: sonarr, radarr, jackett, qbittorrent. Requirements: all their egress leaves via the VPN; if the tunnel drops, they lose connectivity rather than leaking.
Two supported patterns (ADR-0008 selects the default; both preserve the egress: vpn contract):
- Pattern A — Gluetun sidecar per pod. A Gluetun container in the pod holds the WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnel; the app container shares its network namespace and routes all traffic through it. Gluetun's firewall kill-switch blocks non-tunnel egress by default — satisfies R-NET-06 intrinsically. Simple, self-contained, per-service isolation; more sidecars to run.
- Pattern B — Central VPN egress gateway + Cilium Egress Gateway. One (HA) VPN gateway
deployment holds the tunnel; Cilium Egress Gateway steers
vpn-labeled pods' egress through it. Fewer tunnels; a shared failure domain; kill-switch enforced at the gateway + policy denying fallback to the internet path.
Kill-switch is mandatory in both patterns and is an acceptance gate: with the tunnel forcibly
down, a vpn service must fail closed (no packets to the plain internet). This must be tested, not
assumed.
Ingress (north-south) — summary
North-south exposure is handled by Gateway API implemented by Cilium, with TLS from
cert-manager and DNS from ExternalDNS. Detailed in 09-dns-and-ingress.md.
Exposure is a declared property: internal (LAN-only) vs public (port-forwarded at the edge).
Observability of the network (supports R-SEC-03, R-OBS-04)
- Hubble provides flow visibility to verify default-deny and troubleshoot allow rules.
- Alert on: VPN tunnel down, egress-gateway unhealthy, unexpected denied flows spiking, policy
reconciliation errors. Wired into
10-observability-and-alerting.md.
Acceptance gates for this spec
- A freshly onboarded service with no rules can reach nothing but DNS (default-deny proven via Hubble + a connectivity probe).
- Declared dependencies work; undeclared ones are blocked.
- A
vpnservice's public egress IP is the VPN's, not the home IP (verified). - Kill-switch: tunnel down ⇒
vpnservice has no internet path;internetservices unaffected. - Changing a service's
egressclass in git flips its path with no workload rearchitecting.
Open questions
- OQ-1 — WAN uplink count and edge-router product; determines edge-vs-cluster routing split.
- OQ-3 — VPN provider/protocol (WireGuard preferred), number of concurrent tunnels / distinct egress IPs (affects Pattern A vs B and HA of the gateway).