test(conformance): dr-restore actually asserts off-cluster restore (R-STATE-03)

Closes the LAST scaffold-only safety-critical requirement. The operator has attested DR
works (Velero -> Proxmox versitygw S3, restore demonstrated), but the L3 test carried the
right tag and layer label over a 5-line TODO body — so coverage counted it and reported
"0 safety-critical gaps" while the suite asserted nothing. That was test debt, not
capability debt. This makes the suite assert what the operator already demonstrated.

Three steps:
1. assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster (read-only): BSL must be phase Available (Velero
   itself reached the store), s3Url host is not localhost/*.svc/*.cluster.local, and the
   resolved IPv4 is none of — loopback, any Node Internal/ExternalIP, any Service
   ClusterIP, any Pod IP, inside any node podCIDR, inside any ServiceCIDR. A BSL that
   exists but never reaches Available FAILS (a live DR defect), it does not skip.
2. assert-backups-are-scheduled: R-STATE-03 says SCHEDULED off-cluster backups — Velero
   + BSL but zero Schedule in phase Enabled is a fail.
3. The drill: seed a nanosecond-unique canary onto a longhorn PVC in its own scratch
   namespace; Backup to Completed; assert a PodVolumeBackup for that volume is Completed
   WITH a non-empty status.snapshotID (the kopia snapshot of volume DATA reached the
   remote repo, not just resource JSON); ANNIHILATE the source (delete ns, poll until
   gone, force-delete a lingering PV, FAIL if the original PV survived — a survivor makes
   the restore prove nothing); Restore with namespaceMapping into a clean namespace;
   assert the restored PVC bound a DIFFERENT PV and that the canary bytes are identical.

Off-cluster proof = endpoint outside every cluster address + BSL Available + kopia
snapshotID present + every in-cluster copy destroyed + restore landing on a new PV. The
bytes could only have come from outside.

Skips GREEN on: no longhorn SC, Velero API absent, no BSL, Velero/node-agent not ready —
all three steps re-derive the same gates so it can never half-run. An RBAC denial is
deliberately NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect. Teardown is a step-level
`finally` that ALWAYS runs — deletes the Restore, issues a DeleteBackupRequest so objects
leave the bucket (2h ttl as backstop), deletes both scratch namespaces by name and by
label, releases leftover PVs whose claimRef is one of its own. Everything it destroys is
something it created.

conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml: authored the R-STATE-03 grants (velero.io backups/
restores/deletebackuprequests create+delete+read; BSL/schedules/podvolume* read-only;
persistentvolumes get/list/DELETE — the off-cluster proof requires destroying the PV).
Also two pre-existing gaps other tests already depended on: storageclasses get/list (the
skip gate of five tests) and apps deployments/daemonsets read. No write verbs on platform
controllers.

NOT ASSERTED, stated in the file header rather than implied: off-HOST (on dev the nodes
are VMs on the same Proxmox host as the S3 target, so this does not survive hypervisor
loss); no direct S3 client read (that would hand a privileged test identity the backup
credential for weaker evidence); real service data (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG drills stay
operator exercises); bare-metal rebuild DR; encryption-at-rest; retention/GC.

status: scaffold-only 5 -> 4; safety-critical w/o executable L3 1 -> 0 (of 6); executable
35 -> 36. coverage unchanged at 40/51 (correct — coverage only asks whether a tagged test
exists). PROVEN stayed 0 / not-derivable: it did NOT flip to proven just because the body
is non-empty.

AUTHORED, NEVER EXECUTED — carries a conformance.home.k3s/never-executed annotation. No
cluster access from this workstation. To convert authored -> proven the operator must, IN
A MAINTENANCE WINDOW (it deletes namespaces and PVs and writes/deletes bucket objects):
apply the updated rbac.yaml, run `./conformance/run.sh --requirements R-STATE-03 --layer
l3`, confirm the log shows DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK and NOT
DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK (green but proves nothing), confirm no leaked *-dr-src/*-dr-dst
namespaces or orphan PVs or *-dr-backup objects, and record the green run.

Serves: R-STATE-03, R-TEST-05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-08-31 23:53:36 -05:00
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@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@ rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [pods/log]
verbs: [get] # read fault/probe Job logs on failure
# ---- Storage-tier precondition gate (READ-ONLY). Every storage test self-skips on the
# absence of the `longhorn` StorageClass rather than failing: data-survival (R-STATE-01),
# node-loss (R-STATE-02), dr-restore (R-STATE-03), vm-data-survival / vm-lifecycle /
# vm-default-deny (R-PLAT-03). Without this read the gate cannot tell "absent" from
# "forbidden" and would skip for the wrong reason.
- apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
resources: [storageclasses]
verbs: [get, list]
# ---- Controller-readiness preconditions (READ-ONLY). dr-restore (R-STATE-03) skips cleanly
# unless the Velero Deployment and its node-agent DaemonSet (kopia File System Backup, the
# volume-DATA path) are actually ready — a backup path that is not up is an absent
# precondition, not a failure. No write verbs: tests never scale or patch a platform
# controller.
- apiGroups: [apps]
resources: [deployments, daemonsets]
verbs: [get, list, watch]
# ---- Probe / fault Jobs (R-TLS-01/03 tls-probe; R-NET-06 tunnel stop/start)
# `create` cannot be constrained by resourceNames, and the fault Job names are
# fixed per-test (tunnel-stop/tunnel-start/tunnel-start-finally); scoped by the
@@ -103,10 +119,29 @@ rules:
# resources: [imagepolicies, imagerepositories]
# verbs: [get, patch]
#
# ---- R-STATE-03 (DR restore): trigger a Velero restore
# - apiGroups: [velero.io]
# resources: [restores, backups]
# verbs: [create, get, list, watch]
# ---- R-STATE-03 (DR restore, tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore): the drill creates a
# Velero Backup of its OWN scratch namespace, destroys that namespace + its PV, creates a
# Restore into a fresh namespace, and (in `finally`) issues a DeleteBackupRequest so the
# objects it wrote are removed from the off-cluster bucket again. `create` cannot be
# constrained by resourceNames; the blast radius is bounded by the fact that every object
# the test creates or deletes is named `<its-own-chainsaw-namespace>-dr-*`.
- apiGroups: [velero.io]
resources: [backups, restores, deletebackuprequests]
verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch]
# Read-only evidence: the BSL is the off-cluster target whose Available phase + endpoint the
# test asserts; schedules prove backups are SCHEDULED (not one-off); podvolumebackups /
# podvolumerestores prove the kopia snapshot of the volume DATA reached/returned from the
# remote repository, and are dumped on failure for diagnosis.
- apiGroups: [velero.io]
resources: [backupstoragelocations, schedules, podvolumebackups, podvolumerestores]
verbs: [get, list, watch]
# R-STATE-03 needs `delete` on the PV, not merely read: the proof that the restore came from
# OFF-cluster is that no in-cluster copy of the data survived. The test asserts its own PV is
# gone, and force-deletes it if a Retain policy or a stuck finalizer left it behind. It only
# ever names the PV bound to the PVC it created itself.
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [persistentvolumes]
verbs: [get, list, delete]
#
# ---- R-GITOPS-03 (drift): mutate a reconciled resource + observe Flux revert
# - apiGroups: [kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io]
@@ -1,17 +1,75 @@
# =============================================================================
# L3 FAULT-INJECTION SCAFFOLD — DR restore (R-STATE-03) *SAFETY-CRITICAL*
# Catalog: docs/14 "DR restore (R-STATE-03, L3)"
# L3 FAULT-INJECTION — DR restore from an OFF-CLUSTER backup (R-STATE-03)
# *SAFETY-CRITICAL* [RUNNABLE / self-skips]
# Catalog: docs/14-testing-and-conformance.md "DR restore (R-STATE-03, L3)"
# DoD: agents/definition-of-done.md — "DR-critical data restores from an
# **off-cluster** backup (drill for at least one service/phase)."
# Spec: docs/04-storage-and-state.md; ADR-0003 (Longhorn + Velero).
# Impl: platform/velero/** (Velero + kopia File System Backup -> the versitygw S3
# endpoint on the Proxmox HOST), reconciled by clusters/base/backup.yaml.
#
# GIVEN an OFF-CLUSTER backup of a namespace + volumes,
# WHEN the namespace + volumes are restored into a CLEAN state,
# THEN the service returns with its data.
# GIVEN a DR-critical stateful workload with known data on the replicated `longhorn`
# tier, and a Velero BackupStorageLocation whose object-store endpoint is
# PROVABLY OUTSIDE this cluster,
# WHEN a backup of that namespace + its volume data is written to that off-cluster
# store, and then EVERY in-cluster copy of the data is DESTROYED (namespace,
# PVC and the underlying PersistentVolume/Longhorn replicas all deleted),
# THEN a Velero restore into a CLEAN, previously-nonexistent namespace brings the
# workload back and the known data reads back byte-identical.
#
# R-TEST-05: proves recoverability by restoring into a genuinely clean namespace
# (not by reading the still-live original). Backup TARGET is OQ-BKP (OPEN) — the
# restore mechanism is Velero (T-4.3/T-4.4); this scaffold is target-agnostic.
# R-TEST-05 (fault injection, not happy-path): the restore is only meaningful because
# the source is annihilated first. After the destroy step there is no PVC, no PV and
# no Longhorn volume left in the cluster holding this data — so the bytes that come
# back can ONLY have come from the off-cluster object store. A restore that silently
# rebound a surviving in-cluster PV is explicitly excluded: the test captures the
# original PV name, asserts it is GONE, and asserts the restored PVC is bound to a
# DIFFERENT, newly provisioned PV.
#
# STATUS: scaffold — needs T-4.3 (Velero + off-cluster schedule) + T-4.4 (drill).
# BLOCKED-BY spec open question OQ-BKP (off-cluster backup target) — see report.
# HOW "OFF-CLUSTER" IS PROVEN (not assumed) — step `assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster`:
# 1. The BackupStorageLocation reports phase `Available` — Velero itself has
# successfully reached and validated that object store.
# 2. Its endpoint host is resolved to an IPv4 address and asserted to be NONE of:
# loopback; any Node InternalIP/ExternalIP; any Service ClusterIP; any Pod IP;
# inside any node's `spec.podCIDR(s)`; inside any `ServiceCIDR` (best-effort).
# It is also asserted not to be a cluster-internal DNS name (*.svc,
# *.cluster.local, localhost). => the bytes leave the cluster's address space.
# 3. The backup's PodVolumeBackup carries a non-empty `status.snapshotID` — the
# kopia snapshot really landed in the remote repository, i.e. VOLUME DATA (not
# merely Kubernetes resource JSON) was uploaded off-cluster.
# 4. Plus the destroy-then-restore sequence above, which removes every in-cluster
# alternative source for the data.
#
# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (asserted nowhere — do not read this test as claiming them):
# * OFF-HOST is NOT proven, only OFF-CLUSTER. On the dev estate the k3s nodes are
# VMs on the same Proxmox host that runs the versitygw S3 target (192.168.1.9),
# so this drill does not survive loss of that hypervisor. Off-site/off-host
# replication is an operator concern outside R-STATE-03's wording.
# * The test does NOT read the backup objects out of the bucket with an S3 client.
# Doing so would require handing the conformance runner the backup credential,
# widening a privileged test identity for weaker evidence than (1)-(4) above.
# * The test restores its OWN scratch workload, never a real service's data. A
# per-service drill (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG) stays an operator exercise.
# * Bare-metal DR (rebuild the cluster itself, then restore) is NOT exercised; this
# asserts namespace+volume restore into a live cluster, which is what the catalog
# entry and the DoD line ask for.
# * Backup ENCRYPTION at rest and retention/GC behaviour are not asserted.
#
# RUNNABLE / SELF-SKIPPING (a skip is honest; a fake pass is a defect). Skips CLEANLY
# (green) when a precondition is absent: no `longhorn` StorageClass; no Velero API
# (CRDs absent); no BackupStorageLocation configured at all; Velero server or its
# node-agent DaemonSet not ready. It runs the full drill the moment those exist — no
# edit needed. RBAC denial is NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect.
#
# DESTRUCTIVE BY DESIGN, SCOPED BY CONSTRUCTION: every object it destroys is one it
# created itself, in two namespaces it names after its own Chainsaw namespace
# (`<ns>-dr-src`, `<ns>-dr-dst`) and labels `conformance.home.k3s/created-by=<ns>`.
# It never touches a real service's namespace, PVC or PV, and it never deletes a
# Backup it did not create.
#
# TEARDOWN ALWAYS RUNS (`finally`, even on failure/timeout/panic): both scratch
# namespaces, any leftover PV, the Restore CR, and the Backup — the latter via a
# Velero DeleteBackupRequest so the objects are removed from the bucket too, with a
# short `ttl` on the Backup as a belt-and-braces backstop if that request is lost.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
@@ -23,31 +81,603 @@ metadata:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-STATE-03"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L3"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "true"
# executable => runs against a cluster; self-skips (green) until Velero + a
# BackupStorageLocation + the longhorn tier exist.
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
Restore a namespace + volumes from an off-cluster backup into a clean state;
the service returns with its data.
conformance.home.k3s/blocked-by: "OQ-BKP (off-cluster backup target, spec-open)"
Seed known data on longhorn, back the namespace + volume data up to the Velero
object store whose endpoint is proven to be outside this cluster, destroy every
in-cluster copy (namespace, PVC and PV), restore into a clean namespace, and read
the known data back from a newly provisioned volume. Skips cleanly until Velero,
a BackupStorageLocation and a longhorn StorageClass exist.
conformance.home.k3s/never-executed: >-
AUTHORED, NOT YET EXECUTED. No workstation in this repo has cluster access, and
the drill is destructive, so it must first be run by the operator against the dev
cluster in a maintenance window before R-STATE-03 may be called proven. Repo-derived
status deliberately reports proof as not-derivable (conformance/lib/status.py).
spec:
# A full backup -> destroy -> restore cycle over kopia File System Backup, plus
# Longhorn provisioning on HDD, is far slower than any other test here. Bound it
# generously but explicitly (no sleep-and-hope; every wait below is a bounded poll).
# Worst-case bound of the drill step, summing every poll below (seed ~5m + stale-target
# clean ~5m + backup 15m + namespace destroy 12m + PV destroy 5m + restore 15m + restored
# workload Ready 10m ~= 67m). Declared at 75m so the step's own bounded polls, not this
# timeout, are what fail first and report WHICH phase stalled. Nothing here sleeps blindly.
timeouts:
exec: 75m
delete: 10m
cleanup: 15m
steps:
- name: given-off-cluster-backup-exists
try:
- script:
content: 'echo "TODO(T-4.3): ensure a Velero backup of ns+volumes exists off-cluster"'
- name: when-restore-into-clean-namespace
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Preconditions + the OFF-CLUSTER property of the backup target. This step makes
# no changes to the cluster; it either skips cleanly or proves the target is
# genuinely outside the cluster's address space.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster
try:
- script:
content: |
set -euo pipefail
echo "TODO(T-4.4): create a clean target ns; trigger Velero restore of ns+PVs"
- name: then-service-returns-with-data
try:
- script:
content: |
set -euo pipefail
echo "TODO: assert app Ready in restored ns AND canary data present"
echo "DR_RESTORE_OK"
set -eu
# ---- helpers -------------------------------------------------------
# Classify a kubectl failure: an RBAC denial is a HARNESS DEFECT and must
# fail loudly; an absent API is a genuine precondition gap and may skip.
die_or_skip() {
case "$2" in
*orbidden*|*Unauthorized*|*cannot\ list*|*cannot\ get*)
echo "FAIL: conformance runner lacks RBAC for $1 -- fix conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml" >&2
echo "$2" >&2
exit 1 ;;
*)
echo "SKIP: $1 not available on this cluster -- $2"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0 ;;
esac
}
ip2int() {
_q="$(echo "$1" | tr '.' ' ')"
set -- $_q
[ $# -eq 4 ] || { echo -1; return 0; }
echo $(( ($1 * 16777216) + ($2 * 65536) + ($3 * 256) + $4 ))
}
# in_cidr <ip> <a.b.c.d/len> -> 0 when the ip is inside the prefix
in_cidr() {
case "$2" in *"/"*) ;; *) return 1 ;; esac
_net="${2%/*}"; _len="${2#*/}"
case "$_len" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 1 ;; esac
[ "$_len" -ge 0 ] && [ "$_len" -le 32 ] || return 1
_i="$(ip2int "$1")"; _n="$(ip2int "$_net")"
[ "$_i" -ge 0 ] && [ "$_n" -ge 0 ] || return 1
[ "$_len" -eq 0 ] && return 0
_d=1; _s=0
while [ "$_s" -lt $((32 - _len)) ]; do _d=$((_d * 2)); _s=$((_s + 1)); done
[ $(( _i / _d )) -eq $(( _n / _d )) ]
}
# ---- Gate 1: the replicated storage tier the DR-critical data lives on --
if ! kubectl get storageclass longhorn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "SKIP: 'longhorn' StorageClass absent -- no DR-critical data tier on this cluster yet"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
# ---- Gate 2: the Velero API + a configured BackupStorageLocation --------
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.provider}{" "}{.spec.default}{" "}{.spec.config.s3Url}{" "}{.spec.objectStorage.bucket}{"\n"}{end}' \
2>&1)" || die_or_skip "velero.io/backupstoragelocations" "$BSL_LINES"
if [ -z "$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero API present but NO BackupStorageLocation is configured -- no off-cluster backup target yet"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "backup storage locations:"
echo "$BSL_LINES"
VNS="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1)"
# ---- Gate 3: Velero server + node-agent (kopia FSB) actually ready -------
# File System Backup is the volume-DATA path (platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml:
# deployNodeAgent=true, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). Without a
# ready node-agent no volume data can be captured, so the drill is not runnable.
VREADY=0; NAREADY=0
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
VREADY="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get deploy velero -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
NAREADY="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get daemonset node-agent -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: velero readyReplicas=${VREADY:-0} node-agent numberReady=${NAREADY:-0}"
if [ "${VREADY:-0}" -ge 1 ] && [ "${NAREADY:-0}" -ge 1 ]; then break; fi
sleep 10
done
if [ "${VREADY:-0}" -lt 1 ] || [ "${NAREADY:-0}" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero server and/or its node-agent DaemonSet are not ready in ns '$VNS' -- backup/restore path not available"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
# ---- Pick the BSL this drill will use: prefer the default, and it MUST be
# Available. A CONFIGURED-BUT-UNAVAILABLE target is NOT a precondition
# gap -- it is a live R-STATE-03 defect, so it FAILS (after a bounded
# wait for first-validation on a cold start), it does not skip. --------
BSL_NS=""; BSL_NAME=""; BSL_URL=""; BSL_BUCKET=""
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.provider}{" "}{.spec.default}{" "}{.spec.config.s3Url}{" "}{.spec.objectStorage.bucket}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | grep ' true ' | head -1 || true)"
[ -n "$CAND" ] || CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | head -1 || true)"
if [ -n "$CAND" ]; then
BSL_NS="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
BSL_NAME="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f2)"
BSL_URL="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f6)"
BSL_BUCKET="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f7)"
break
fi
echo "poll $i: no Available BackupStorageLocation yet"
sleep 10
done
if [ -z "$BSL_NAME" ]; then
echo "FAIL: a BackupStorageLocation is configured but NONE reached phase 'Available'." >&2
echo " The off-cluster backup target is unreachable -- R-STATE-03 is BROKEN, not merely untested." >&2
echo "$BSL_LINES" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "using BSL ${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} bucket=${BSL_BUCKET} endpoint=${BSL_URL}"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (1): an endpoint we can evaluate ------------------
if [ -z "$BSL_URL" ]; then
echo "FAIL: BackupStorageLocation ${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} exposes no spec.config.s3Url;" >&2
echo " the OFF-CLUSTER property of the backup target cannot be established, so this" >&2
echo " test refuses to claim it. (Extend this check for a non-S3 provider.)" >&2
exit 1
fi
HOST="${BSL_URL#*://}" # strip scheme
HOST="${HOST%%/*}" # strip path
HOST="${HOST%%:*}" # strip port
echo "backup endpoint host: $HOST"
case "$HOST" in
localhost|*.svc|*.svc.cluster.local|*.cluster.local)
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint '$HOST' is a CLUSTER-INTERNAL name -- the backup target is IN the cluster." >&2
echo " An in-cluster backup store cannot satisfy R-STATE-03 (off-cluster backup)." >&2
exit 1 ;;
esac
# Resolve to an IPv4 address. If it cannot be resolved we CANNOT establish the
# off-cluster property -- that is a failure, never a silent pass.
case "$HOST" in
*[!0-9.]*)
# Endpoint given as a name. Try the resolvers that may exist in the
# runner image, in order; if none is available or none resolves, the
# test FAILS below rather than guessing.
EPIP="$(getent ahostsv4 "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)"
[ -n "$EPIP" ] || EPIP="$(getent hosts "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)"
[ -n "$EPIP" ] || EPIP="$(nslookup "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | grep -A2 '^Name:' | grep '^Address' | head -1 | sed 's/.*: *//' || true)" ;;
*) EPIP="$HOST" ;;
esac
if [ -z "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: could not resolve backup endpoint host '$HOST' to an IPv4 address;" >&2
echo " the OFF-CLUSTER property cannot be asserted, so this test does not pass." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "backup endpoint resolves to: $EPIP"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (2): the endpoint is outside every cluster address --
case "$EPIP" in 127.*|0.0.0.0) echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is loopback -- not off-cluster" >&2; exit 1 ;; esac
NODE_IPS="$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .status.addresses[*]}{.address}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $NODE_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a NODE address of this cluster -- the backup is not off-cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any node address (checked $(echo "$NODE_IPS" | grep -c . || true) node addresses)"
SVC_IPS="$(kubectl get svc -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.clusterIP}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $SVC_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a Service ClusterIP -- the backup target lives INSIDE the cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any Service ClusterIP (checked $(echo "$SVC_IPS" | grep -c . || true))"
POD_IPS="$(kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.podIP}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $POD_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a POD IP -- the backup target is an in-cluster pod." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any Pod IP (checked $(echo "$POD_IPS" | grep -c . || true))"
POD_CIDRS="$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.podCIDR}{"\n"}{range .spec.podCIDRs[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for c in $POD_CIDRS; do
case "$c" in *:*) continue ;; esac # IPv6 prefixes are out of scope here
if in_cidr "$EPIP" "$c"; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP falls inside node podCIDR $c -- it is in the cluster pod network." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is outside every node podCIDR (checked: $(echo "$POD_CIDRS" | tr '\n' ' '))"
# Best-effort (needs networking.k8s.io/ServiceCIDR, which the least-privilege
# runner may not read): the checks above are the authoritative ones.
SVC_CIDRS="$(kubectl get servicecidrs.networking.k8s.io -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .spec.cidrs[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$SVC_CIDRS" ]; then
for c in $SVC_CIDRS; do
case "$c" in *:*) continue ;; esac
if in_cidr "$EPIP" "$c"; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP falls inside the Service CIDR $c -- it is in the cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is outside every ServiceCIDR ($(echo "$SVC_CIDRS" | tr '\n' ' '))"
else
echo "(ServiceCIDR objects unreadable -- skipping that best-effort check; ClusterIP/PodIP/podCIDR checks stand)"
fi
echo "OFF_CLUSTER_TARGET_OK bsl=${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} endpoint=${EPIP} bucket=${BSL_BUCKET}"
check:
(contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_OK')): true
finally:
# green on either a clean precondition skip or a proven off-cluster target.
(contains($stdout, 'OFF_CLUSTER_TARGET_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# R-STATE-03's "scheduled" half: the backup is not a one-off human action.
# Non-destructive, and skipped in lock-step with the step above.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: assert-backups-are-scheduled
try:
- script:
content: 'echo "TODO: delete the restore target namespace (self-cleaning)"'
content: |
set -eu
SCHED="$(kubectl get schedules.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"/"}{.metadata.name}{" phase="}{.status.phase}{" cron="}{.spec.schedule}{" lastBackup="}{.status.lastBackup}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$(echo "$SCHED" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
# Distinguish "Velero absent" (skip, in lock-step with step 1) from
# "Velero present but nothing scheduled" (a real R-STATE-03 defect).
if kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ -z "$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A -o name 2>/dev/null || true)" ]; then
echo "SKIP: no BackupStorageLocation configured -- scheduling not applicable yet"
echo DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "FAIL: Velero is configured with a backup target but declares NO Schedule --" >&2
echo " R-STATE-03 requires SCHEDULED off-cluster backups, not manual ones." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "SKIP: Velero API absent -- backup scheduling not applicable on this cluster yet"
echo DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "velero schedules:"
echo "$SCHED"
# A Schedule that exists but is paused/disabled backs nothing up.
if echo "$SCHED" | grep -q 'phase=Enabled'; then
echo BACKUPS_ARE_SCHEDULED_OK
else
echo "FAIL: no Velero Schedule is in phase 'Enabled' -- scheduled off-cluster backups are not running." >&2
exit 1
fi
check:
(contains($stdout, 'BACKUPS_ARE_SCHEDULED_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The drill itself: seed -> back up off-cluster -> ANNIHILATE -> restore -> read.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: data-restores-from-the-off-cluster-backup
try:
- script:
content: |
set -eu
NS="$NAMESPACE"
SRC="${NS}-dr-src" # scratch source namespace (destroyed by design)
DST="${NS}-dr-dst" # clean restore target (must not pre-exist)
BK="${NS}-dr-backup"
RS="${NS}-dr-restore"
OWNER_LABEL="conformance.home.k3s/created-by=${NS}"
# ---- Re-derive the preconditions (steps do not share shell state). Every
# skip below mirrors step 1 exactly, so the whole test skips or runs
# as a unit -- it can never half-run. -----------------------------
if ! kubectl get storageclass longhorn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "SKIP: 'longhorn' StorageClass absent"; echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.default}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | grep ' true$' | head -1 || true)"
[ -n "$CAND" ] || CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | head -1 || true)"
if [ -z "$CAND" ]; then
echo "SKIP: no Available BackupStorageLocation (see the off-cluster step for the authoritative verdict)"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
VNS="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
BSL_NAME="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f2)"
if [ "$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get daemonset node-agent -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero node-agent (kopia FSB) not ready -- volume data cannot be backed up"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
echo "velero ns=$VNS bsl=$BSL_NAME src=$SRC dst=$DST"
# A clean restore target means PREVIOUSLY NONEXISTENT, and the source name must
# be free. If either is lying around from an aborted run, remove it before we
# claim "clean" -- and fail loudly if it will not go, because a half-deleted
# namespace would silently invalidate the destroy proof below.
kubectl delete namespace "$DST" "$SRC" --ignore-not-found --wait=true --timeout=300s
# ============================ GIVEN ==============================
# A DR-critical stateful workload with known data on the replicated tier.
CANARY="dr-canary-$(date +%s%N)"
kubectl create namespace "$SRC"
kubectl label namespace "$SRC" "$OWNER_LABEL" --overwrite
kubectl -n "$SRC" apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: dr-data
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
storageClassName: longhorn
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
EOF
kubectl -n "$SRC" apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: dr-workload
labels:
app: dr-workload
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: app
image: busybox:1.36.1
command: ["sh", "-c", "sleep 7200"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: dr-data
EOF
kubectl -n "$SRC" wait --for=condition=Ready pod/dr-workload --timeout=300s
printf '%s' "$CANARY" | kubectl -n "$SRC" exec -i dr-workload -- sh -c 'cat > /data/canary && sync'
echo "seeded canary: $(kubectl -n "$SRC" exec dr-workload -- cat /data/canary)"
ORIG_PV="$(kubectl -n "$SRC" get pvc dr-data -o jsonpath='{.spec.volumeName}')"
[ -n "$ORIG_PV" ] || { echo "FAIL: source PVC never bound to a PV" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "original in-cluster PersistentVolume: $ORIG_PV"
# ======================= WHEN (part 1): back up off-cluster =======
# Created as a Velero Backup CR -- exactly what `velero backup create` does.
# defaultVolumesToFsBackup:true selects the kopia File System Backup path, so
# the VOLUME DATA (not just the resource JSON) is uploaded to the object store.
# ttl is short: if the finally-step DeleteBackupRequest is ever lost, Velero's
# own GC still removes this drill's objects from the bucket.
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Backup
metadata:
name: ${BK}
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
includedNamespaces: [${SRC}]
storageLocation: ${BSL_NAME}
snapshotVolumes: false
defaultVolumesToFsBackup: true
ttl: 2h0m0s
EOF
BPHASE=""
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
BPHASE="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: backup phase=${BPHASE:-<pending>}"
case "${BPHASE:-}" in
Completed|Failed|PartiallyFailed|FailedValidation) break ;;
esac
sleep 10
done
if [ "${BPHASE:-}" != "Completed" ]; then
echo "FAIL: off-cluster backup did not complete (phase=${BPHASE:-<timeout>})" >&2
kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" -o yaml >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
echo "backup $BK Completed to ${BSL_NAME}"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (3): the VOLUME DATA really landed in the remote
# kopia repository -- a PodVolumeBackup Completed with a snapshot ID.
PVB="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumebackups.velero.io \
-l velero.io/backup-name="$BK" \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.status.snapshotID}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "pod volume backups:"
echo "$PVB"
if [ -z "$(echo "$PVB" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
echo "FAIL: the backup captured NO pod volume data (no PodVolumeBackup)." >&2
echo " Resource-only backups cannot restore DR-critical DATA." >&2
exit 1
fi
# A line is "<name> <phase> <snapshotID>"; require Completed AND a
# non-empty snapshot ID (an empty ID means nothing reached the repository).
GOOD_PVB="$(echo "$PVB" | grep -cE ' Completed [^[:space:]]+$' || true)"
if [ "${GOOD_PVB:-0}" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "FAIL: no PodVolumeBackup reached phase Completed with a snapshot ID --" >&2
echo " the volume data did not reach the off-cluster repository." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "volume data uploaded off-cluster (PodVolumeBackup Completed with a kopia snapshotID)"
# ============ WHEN (part 2): FAULT INJECTION -- annihilate the source ====
# Destroy EVERY in-cluster copy: the pod, the PVC, the namespace, and the
# underlying PersistentVolume (and with it the Longhorn replicas). After this
# there is no in-cluster source the restore could quietly read from.
kubectl delete namespace "$SRC" --wait=true --timeout=420s
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if ! kubectl get namespace "$SRC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
echo "poll $i: waiting for namespace $SRC to disappear"
sleep 10
done
if kubectl get namespace "$SRC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: source namespace $SRC did not terminate; the destroy step is not convincing" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "source namespace destroyed"
# The longhorn StorageClass reclaims Delete, so the PV should already be gone;
# force it if a Retain policy (or a stuck finalizer) left it behind, because a
# surviving PV would make the restore prove nothing about off-cluster recovery.
kubectl delete pv "$ORIG_PV" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if ! kubectl get pv "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
echo "poll $i: waiting for PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV to disappear"
sleep 10
done
if kubectl get pv "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: the original PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV SURVIVED the destroy step." >&2
echo " An in-cluster copy of the data still exists, so a successful restore" >&2
echo " would NOT prove recovery from the off-cluster backup. Refusing to pass." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "original PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV is GONE -- no in-cluster copy of the data remains"
# Best-effort corroboration (the least-privilege runner may not read longhorn.io):
# the Longhorn Volume CR and its replicas should be gone too.
if kubectl -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: Longhorn Volume $ORIG_PV still exists after PV deletion -- replicas survive in-cluster" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "(longhorn Volume CR $ORIG_PV not present -- either deleted or not readable by this identity)"
# ============================ RESTORE ============================
# Into a CLEAN, previously-nonexistent namespace (Velero creates it), which is
# the catalog's "restored into a clean state".
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Restore
metadata:
name: ${RS}
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
backupName: ${BK}
includedNamespaces: [${SRC}]
namespaceMapping:
${SRC}: ${DST}
existingResourcePolicy: none
EOF
RPHASE=""
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
RPHASE="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get restores.velero.io "$RS" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: restore phase=${RPHASE:-<pending>}"
case "${RPHASE:-}" in
Completed|Failed|PartiallyFailed|FailedValidation) break ;;
esac
sleep 10
done
if [ "${RPHASE:-}" != "Completed" ]; then
echo "FAIL: restore did not complete (phase=${RPHASE:-<timeout>})" >&2
kubectl -n "$VNS" get restores.velero.io "$RS" -o yaml >&2 || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumerestores.velero.io -l velero.io/restore-name="$RS" -o wide >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
echo "restore $RS Completed into $DST"
# ============================= THEN ==============================
# The service returns WITH ITS DATA. With kopia FSB the restored pod carries a
# `restore-wait` init container that blocks until the node-agent has written the
# volume contents back, so Ready here already implies the data landed.
if ! kubectl -n "$DST" wait --for=condition=Ready pod/dr-workload --timeout=600s; then
echo "FAIL: restored workload never became Ready in the clean namespace $DST" >&2
kubectl -n "$DST" describe pod dr-workload >&2 || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumerestores.velero.io -l velero.io/restore-name="$RS" -o wide >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
NEW_PV="$(kubectl -n "$DST" get pvc dr-data -o jsonpath='{.spec.volumeName}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "restored PVC bound to PersistentVolume: ${NEW_PV:-<none>}"
[ -n "$NEW_PV" ] || { echo "FAIL: restored PVC did not bind a PV" >&2; exit 1; }
if [ "$NEW_PV" = "$ORIG_PV" ]; then
echo "FAIL: the restored PVC rebound the ORIGINAL PersistentVolume ($ORIG_PV)." >&2
echo " That is an in-cluster survival, not an off-cluster restore." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "restored onto a NEW volume ($NEW_PV != $ORIG_PV) -- the data came from outside the cluster"
GOT="$(kubectl -n "$DST" exec dr-workload -- cat /data/canary)"
echo "recovered='$GOT' expected='$CANARY'"
if [ "$GOT" != "$CANARY" ]; then
echo "FAIL: restored data does not match what was backed up -- DR restore lost/corrupted data" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK
check:
# green on either a clean precondition skip or a proven off-cluster restore.
(contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
finally:
# ALWAYS RUNS -- on pass, fail, timeout or panic. This test creates namespaces
# and Velero objects OUTSIDE its Chainsaw namespace, so Chainsaw's own namespace
# teardown cannot reclaim them; everything below is keyed to names/labels derived
# from THIS test's namespace, so it can never touch anything it did not create.
- script:
content: |
set -u
NS="$NAMESPACE"
SRC="${NS}-dr-src"; DST="${NS}-dr-dst"; BK="${NS}-dr-backup"; RS="${NS}-dr-restore"
VNS="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.namespace}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
# Velero objects first: a DeleteBackupRequest makes Velero remove the backup
# DATA from the off-cluster bucket, not just the CR (self-cleaning contract).
if [ -n "$VNS" ]; then
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete restores.velero.io "$RS" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
if kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF || true
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: DeleteBackupRequest
metadata:
name: ${BK}-delete
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
backupName: ${BK}
EOF
for i in $(seq 1 18); do
kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
sleep 10
done
# Backstop if Velero could not process the request (the 2h ttl also GCs it).
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete backups.velero.io "$BK" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete deletebackuprequests.velero.io "${BK}-delete" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
fi
echo "velero objects for $NS cleaned up (ns $VNS)"
fi
# Scratch namespaces (both, in case the run aborted at any point).
for n in "$DST" "$SRC"; do
kubectl delete namespace "$n" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
done
# Anything left labelled as ours (defensive; the two names above are the only
# namespaces this test ever creates).
kubectl delete namespace -l "conformance.home.k3s/created-by=${NS}" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
# Released PVs from either namespace's PVCs would otherwise leak storage.
for pv in $(kubectl get pv -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.spec.claimRef.namespace}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null | grep -E " (${SRC}|${DST})$" | cut -d' ' -f1 || true); do
kubectl delete pv "$pv" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
echo "released leftover PersistentVolume: $pv"
done
echo "dr-restore teardown complete (best-effort; every object was created by this test)"