Merge pull request 'feat(sec): constrain the conformance CI trigger at admission' (#13) from feat/conformance-trigger-admission-boundary into main

Reviewed-on: #13
Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]>

ci/l0.sh

@@ -79,12 +79,37 @@ else
   cp -a "${KYVERNO_POLICY_DIR}/." "$l0_render/"
   find "$l0_render" -type f -name '*.yaml' -print0 \
     | xargs -0 sed -i "s/\${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}/${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}/g"
-  if kyverno test "$l0_render"; then
-    ok "Kyverno L0 policy tests passed"
-    summary "- kyverno-l0: **passed**"
+  # DO NOT TRUST `kyverno test`'s EXIT CODE ALONE. A policy that fails to LOAD (schema
+  # error, bad match block, malformed JMESPath) does not fail the run: every result row
+  # becomes `Skip / Invalid Policy` and the CLI still prints "N tests passed" and exits 0.
+  #
+  # MEASURED 2026-09-29 while authoring conformance-trigger-job-shape: the policy had its
+  # `subjects` in a separate `match.all` entry from its `resources` — a schema error. All 9
+  # rows came back `Skip / Invalid Policy`, and the summary read:
+  #     Test Summary: 9 tests passed and 0 tests failed
+  # `kyverno apply` on the same file reported `error: 1` and named the path. So the gate's
+  # own policy stage would have certified a SECURITY POLICY THAT DOES NOT LOAD as green.
+  #
+  # This is not specific to that policy: a typo in restrict-host-namespaces or
+  # secret-provenance would silently disable it and the gate would stay green. Scan the
+  # output for the load failure the exit code hides.
+  l0_kout="$(mktemp)"
+  if kyverno test "$l0_render" 2>&1 | tee "$l0_kout"; then
+    if grep -q 'Invalid Policy' "$l0_kout"; then
+      err "Kyverno reported 'Invalid Policy' — one or more policies FAILED TO LOAD and were"
+      err "  skipped, so their rules were never evaluated. The CLI exits 0 for this; the gate"
+      err "  must not. Run 'kyverno apply <policy> --resource <resources>' for the exact path."
+      grep -n 'Invalid Policy' "$l0_kout" | head -5 >&2
+      summary "- kyverno-l0: **FAILED — policy did not load** (Invalid Policy; rules never evaluated)"
+      rc=1
+    else
+      ok "Kyverno L0 policy tests passed"
+      summary "- kyverno-l0: **passed**"
+    fi
   else
     err "Kyverno L0 policy tests failed"; summary "- kyverno-l0: **FAILED**"; rc=1
   fi
+  rm -f "$l0_kout"
   rm -rf "$l0_render"
 fi
 

clusters/base/conformance.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+# Conformance identities (ns + conformance-runner + conformance-trigger RBAC).
+#
+# NON-GATING, exactly like apps-vms: `wait: false` and its own Kustomization, so a conformance
+# identity can never gate the platform or app tiers. A test harness that stalls the estate it is
+# meant to verify is worse than no harness.
+#
+# dependsOn platform-config only — it needs nothing from the app waves, and nothing in the app
+# waves needs it.
+#
+# NOTE: this reconciles RBAC that is INERT until
+# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml is also enforcing. That policy
+# ships in the `platform` tier, which reconciles before this. Do not reorder them so that the
+# trigger identity can exist while the policy bounding it does not.
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: conformance
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  retryInterval: 2m
+  timeout: 5m
+  prune: true
+  wait: false
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: platform-config
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  path: ./conformance/incluster

clusters/base/kustomization.yaml

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ resources:
   - apps-wave-2.yaml     # Flux Kustomization -> ./apps/wave-2 (dependsOn apps-wave-1)
   # VM tier (KubeVirt) — non-gating (wait:false), separate lifecycle from the app waves.
   - apps-vms.yaml        # Flux Kustomization -> ./apps/vms (dependsOn platform-config)
+  - conformance.yaml     # Flux Kustomization -> ./conformance/incluster (non-gating; R-SEC-02 trigger identity)
   # oauth2-proxy forward-auth — POST-platform tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false). A leaf
   # service that needs Keycloak + trusted TLS + split-horizon DNS must NOT sit in the gating
   # `platform` tier, where it self-gated its own dependencies into a cold-start deadlock (twice).

conformance/incluster/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Reconciled by clusters/base/conformance.yaml (non-gating, wait:false).
+#
+# RBAC ONLY. chainsaw-job.yaml is deliberately NOT listed: that manifest is a TEMPLATE the CI
+# trigger renders and submits per run (with the commit SHA and the touched --requirements). Flux
+# reconciling it would create a permanent Job object and fight the trigger for ownership.
+#
+# The identities here are inert without
+# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which is what actually bounds
+# the trigger to the committed run shape. RBAC is the necessary half, that policy the sufficient
+# half — see the header of rbac.yaml.
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - rbac.yaml

conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml

@@ -174,3 +174,68 @@ subjects:
   - kind: ServiceAccount
     name: conformance-runner
     namespace: conformance
+---
+# =============================================================================
+# THE TRIGGER IDENTITY — deliberately NOT conformance-runner.
+#
+# THE ESCALATION THIS EXISTS TO CLOSE (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4):
+# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. So any principal
+# that can `create jobs` in this namespace can create a Job with
+# `serviceAccountName: conformance-runner` and an ARBITRARY command — i.e. run arbitrary
+# code with the runner's privileges (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch, jobs).
+# A CI-held token with plain `create jobs` therefore IS the privileged identity, no matter
+# how narrow its own RBAC looks. That would break R-SEC-02 ("CI holds no broad cluster
+# access") while appearing to satisfy it.
+#
+# RBAC ALONE CANNOT FIX THIS. The real boundary is the admission policy
+# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which admits Jobs from
+# THIS ServiceAccount only when they match the committed conformance shape. This Role is
+# the necessary half; that policy is the sufficient half. Neither works alone — do not
+# grant this Role without that policy reconciled and ENFORCING.
+#
+# Namespaced Role, bound only in `conformance`. No ClusterRole, deliberately.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: conformance-trigger
+  namespace: conformance
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Role
+metadata:
+  name: conformance-trigger
+  namespace: conformance
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
+rules:
+  # Create the run, and watch it to completion.
+  - apiGroups: [batch]
+    resources: [jobs]
+    verbs: [create, get, list, watch]
+  # Read the Job's pod and its log — this is how results come back. Deliberately NOT
+  # pods/exec and NOT `kubectl cp`: the run tars its artifacts to stdout and CI decodes
+  # them from the log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources: [pods, pods/log]
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  # NOTHING ELSE. In particular NO delete on jobs (a trigger that can delete can hide a
+  # failed run), no secrets, no configmaps, no exec, no create on pods.
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: RoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: conformance-trigger
+  namespace: conformance
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: conformance
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: Role
+  name: conformance-trigger
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: conformance-trigger
+    namespace: conformance

conformance/tests/l0-static/c2-root-surface/check.sh

@@ -216,6 +216,20 @@ def is_literal_base(host: str) -> bool:
 DELIVERY_ROOTS = ("apps", "platform", "platform-config", "platform-config-cdi",
                   "runbooks", "clusters", "bootstrap", "catalog")
 
+# NARROW EXEMPTION to (0), for reconciled trees that deliberately serve NOTHING.
+# `conformance/incluster` (the L2/L3 runner + CI-trigger identities, R-SEC-02) is reconciled
+# by clusters/base/conformance.yaml but contains only a Namespace, ServiceAccounts, RBAC and
+# an admission-bounded Job template. Adding "conformance" to DELIVERY_ROOTS instead would be
+# wrong for the reason stated above: it would sweep in this harness's synthetic fixture
+# routes and make (8) demand the operator's dashboard link them.
+#
+# THE EXEMPTION POLICES ITSELF. An unchecked allowlist is how (0) would rot into a fail-open —
+# add a tree here, later put an HTTPRoute in it, and the forward direction goes quietly green
+# on a hidden service. So each exempted tree is ASSERTED below to declare no route and no
+# hostname-publishing Service. If that ever stops being true the check fails and the tree must
+# become a real delivery root.
+NON_SERVING_RECONCILED = ("conformance/incluster",)
+
 
 def tracked_yaml() -> list[Path]:
     out = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "-z", "--", "*.yaml", "*.yml"],
@@ -262,12 +276,31 @@ flux_ks = [(p, d) for p, d in docs_all()
 # a Kustomization declared elsewhere); they name no source and reconcile nothing, so requiring
 # a path of them would fail on a file that is correct.
 reconcilers = [(p, d) for p, d in flux_ks if (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("sourceRef")]
+def _reconciled_path(d):
+    return (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("path", "").lstrip("./").rstrip("/")
+
+
 unscanned = sorted({
     f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)}:{(d.get('spec', {}) or {}).get('path', '') or '(no path)'}"
     for p, d in reconcilers
-    if (d.get("spec", {}) or {}).get("path", "").lstrip("./").split("/")[0]
-    not in DELIVERY_ROOTS
+    if _reconciled_path(d).split("/")[0] not in DELIVERY_ROOTS
+    and _reconciled_path(d) not in NON_SERVING_RECONCILED
 })
+
+# The exemption's own guard: an exempted tree must actually serve nothing.
+exempt_serving = sorted({
+    f"{p.relative_to(ROOT)} ({d.get('kind')})"
+    for p, d in docs_all()
+    if any(str(p.relative_to(ROOT)).startswith(t + "/") for t in NON_SERVING_RECONCILED)
+    and (d.get("kind") == "HTTPRoute"
+         or (d.get("kind") == "Service"
+             and any("hostname" in str(k).lower()
+                     for k in ((d.get("metadata", {}) or {}).get("annotations", {}) or {}))))
+})
+check(not exempt_serving,
+      f"(0b) every NON_SERVING_RECONCILED tree really serves nothing — an exempted tree that "
+      f"gains a route would hide a service from this check entirely "
+      f"{exempt_serving if exempt_serving else ''}")
 check(len(reconcilers) >= 10 and not unscanned,
       f"(0) all {len(reconcilers)} Flux-reconciled path(s) lie inside a scanned root — a "
       f"reconciled tree this check does not read is a service it cannot require a link for "

platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+# Serves: R-SEC-02 (CI holds no broad cluster access)
+#
+# THIS POLICY IS THE SECURITY BOUNDARY. The RBAC in conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml is not.
+#
+# Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Pod/Job's `serviceAccountName`. Any principal that can
+# `create jobs` in namespace `conformance` can therefore create a Job that runs as
+# `conformance-runner` — a privileged SA (nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch) — with an
+# arbitrary command. So the CI trigger credential, however narrow its own Role looks, IS the
+# privileged identity unless something constrains the SHAPE of what it may create.
+#
+# That is what this does: for Jobs created by `conformance-trigger` ONLY, admit exactly the
+# committed conformance run and deny everything else. The operator chose this model
+# (docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §4, primary model) over the zero-credential
+# GitOps-native alternative.
+#
+# ENFORCE AND FAIL-CLOSED, NOT SUBSTITUTED. Note this does NOT use
+# ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION} like the other admission policies: a security boundary that an
+# environment overlay can downgrade to Audit is not a boundary. `failurePolicy: Fail` means a
+# Kyverno outage blocks conformance Jobs rather than silently admitting unconstrained ones.
+# Blocking CI is the correct failure direction here; admitting arbitrary privileged code is not.
+#
+# SCOPE: it constrains ONLY `conformance-trigger`. Jobs created by humans, by Flux, or by any
+# other SA are untouched — so a broken policy cannot wedge the rest of the cluster.
+#
+# IMAGE PINNING — HONEST LIMIT, READ BEFORE RELYING ON THIS. The plan specifies pinning the
+# exact `CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE` digest. That image does not exist yet, so this enforces the
+# enforceable half: the image must live under the conformance repository path AND be
+# digest-pinned (`@sha256:`), never a mutable tag. Residual surface: anyone who can PUSH to that
+# registry path could publish a different digest. TIGHTEN THIS when the image is built by
+# replacing the `image` pattern below with the literal digest — a one-line change, reviewed in a
+# PR, which is exactly where a change to the security boundary belongs.
+apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
+kind: ClusterPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+  annotations:
+    policies.kyverno.io/title: Constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create
+    policies.kyverno.io/category: Supply chain
+    policies.kyverno.io/severity: critical
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements: R-SEC-02
+    homelab.keithjackson.dev/scope: admission-only
+spec:
+  validationFailureAction: Enforce
+  failurePolicy: Fail
+  background: false
+  rules:
+    - name: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
+      # resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
+      # As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
+      # and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
+      match:
+        all:
+          - resources:
+              kinds:
+                - Job
+              namespaces:
+                - conformance
+            subjects:
+              - kind: ServiceAccount
+                name: conformance-trigger
+                namespace: conformance
+      validate:
+        message: >-
+          conformance-trigger may create ONLY the committed conformance run: a single container,
+          digest-pinned conformance-runner image, serviceAccountName conformance-runner,
+          command ["./run.sh"], no host namespaces, non-root with privilege escalation disabled,
+          and only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. See
+          platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml.
+        pattern:
+          spec:
+            template:
+              spec:
+                serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+                =(hostNetwork): "false"
+                =(hostPID): "false"
+                =(hostIPC): "false"
+                containers:
+                  - image: "gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:*"
+                    command:
+                      - "./run.sh"
+                    securityContext:
+                      runAsNonRoot: true
+                      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+                      =(privileged): "false"
+
+    - name: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
+      # resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
+      # As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
+      # and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
+      match:
+        all:
+          - resources:
+              kinds:
+                - Job
+              namespaces:
+                - conformance
+            subjects:
+              - kind: ServiceAccount
+                name: conformance-trigger
+                namespace: conformance
+      validate:
+        message: >-
+          conformance-trigger Jobs may mount only the `workspace` and `results` volumes. An extra
+          volume is how a constrained pod reaches a host path, a secret, or another SA's token.
+        # foreach, NOT a `pattern` list: a Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one element
+        # matches", which would happily admit a Job carrying `workspace` PLUS a hostPath. This
+        # asserts EVERY volume is one of the two allowed names.
+        foreach:
+          - list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.volumes"
+            deny:
+              conditions:
+                all:
+                  - key: "{{ element.name }}"
+                    operator: AnyNotIn
+                    value: ["workspace", "results"]
+
+    - name: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
+      # resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
+      # As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
+      # and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
+      match:
+        all:
+          - resources:
+              kinds:
+                - Job
+              namespaces:
+                - conformance
+            subjects:
+              - kind: ServiceAccount
+                name: conformance-trigger
+                namespace: conformance
+      validate:
+        message: >-
+          conformance-trigger Job args may contain only the conformance run's own flags
+          (--layer, --requirements, --include-scope, --strict-coverage) and their plain values.
+          Anything else — a shell, a path, a redirect — is denied.
+        foreach:
+          - list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args"
+            deny:
+              conditions:
+                all:
+                  - key: "{{ regex_match('^(--layer|--requirements|--include-scope|--strict-coverage|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9,._-]*)$', element) }}"
+                    operator: Equals
+                    value: false

platform/kyverno/admission/kustomization.yaml

@@ -20,3 +20,7 @@ resources:
   # --- secrets: the admission variant REPLACES the CI-only sops-block policy ---
   #     (../policies/disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml is CI-only; see secret-provenance.yaml)
   - secret-provenance.yaml
+  # --- R-SEC-02: constrain what the conformance CI trigger may create ---
+  # THE security boundary for CI cluster access. Enforce + fail-closed, deliberately NOT
+  # subject to ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}. See the file header.
+  - conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml

platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/kyverno-test.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# R-SEC-02 — the conformance CI trigger cannot escalate to arbitrary privileged execution.
+#
+# Each DENY case below is a real escalation path, not a style violation. The one that matters
+# most is `evil-command`: correct SA, correct image, arbitrary command. That is the attack the
+# whole model exists to stop, and RBAC alone cannot — Kubernetes places no `use` check on
+# serviceAccountName, so `create jobs` in this namespace IS the privileged identity without
+# this policy.
+#
+# user-info.yaml supplies the requesting identity. WITHOUT it the policy's `subjects` match
+# never fires and every case trivially passes — a test that proves nothing.
+apiVersion: cli.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Test
+metadata:
+  name: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+policies:
+  - ../../admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
+resources:
+  - resources.yaml
+userinfo: user-info.yaml
+results:
+  # ---- the committed run is ADMITTED ----
+  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+    rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
+    kind: Job
+    resources: [good-run]
+    result: pass
+  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+    rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
+    kind: Job
+    resources: [good-run]
+    result: pass
+  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+    rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
+    kind: Job
+    resources: [good-run]
+    result: pass
+
+  # ---- THE escalation: runner SA + arbitrary command ----
+  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+    rule: trigger-may-create-only-the-committed-conformance-run
+    kind: Job
+    resources: [evil-command, evil-image, tag-not-digest, host-namespaces]
+    result: fail
+
+  # ---- an extra volume is the way out of a constrained pod ----
+  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+    rule: trigger-volumes-must-be-workspace-or-results
+    kind: Job
+    resources: [extra-volume]
+    result: fail
+
+  # ---- args beyond the committed flags ----
+  - policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
+    rule: trigger-args-must-be-the-committed-flags
+    kind: Job
+    resources: [injected-args]
+    result: fail

platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/resources.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+# The committed shape — must be ADMITTED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: good-run
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
+          command: ["./run.sh"]
+          args: ["--layer", "l2,l3", "--requirements", "R-NET-01"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}
+        - name: results
+          emptyDir: {}
+---
+# THE ESCALATION: runner SA, but an arbitrary command. Must be DENIED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: evil-command
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
+          command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}
+---
+# An arbitrary image running as the privileged SA. Must be DENIED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: evil-image
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
+          command: ["./run.sh"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}
+---
+# A mutable TAG instead of a digest — republishable under the same reference. Must be DENIED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: tag-not-digest
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner:latest
+          command: ["./run.sh"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}
+---
+# Host namespaces + privilege escalation. Must be DENIED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: host-namespaces
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      hostPID: true
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
+          command: ["./run.sh"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: false
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}
+---
+# An extra volume — the way out of a constrained pod. Must be DENIED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: extra-volume
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
+          command: ["./run.sh"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}
+        - name: hostroot
+          hostPath:
+            path: /
+---
+# Injected args beyond the committed flags. Must be DENIED.
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: injected-args
+  namespace: conformance
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
+      containers:
+        - name: runner
+          image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
+          command: ["./run.sh"]
+          args: ["--layer", "l2", ";", "curl", "http://evil/"]
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+      volumes:
+        - name: workspace
+          emptyDir: {}

platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/user-info.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# The requesting identity the policy keys on. Without this the `subjects` match never fires and
+# every case below would trivially "pass" — proving nothing.
+apiVersion: cli.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
+kind: UserInfo
+metadata:
+  name: conformance-trigger
+userInfo:
+  username: system:serviceaccount:conformance:conformance-trigger
+  groups:
+    - system:serviceaccounts
+    - system:serviceaccounts:conformance
+    - system:authenticated