merge: UniFi OS is already installed — the guest lost its IP; deliver console access
The premise I briefed was wrong and the agent checked before building on it. UniFi OS Server IS installed: the current boot starts uosserver.service and uosserver-updater.service, and the root filesystem holds 6.3 GB of 40 GB where bare Ubuntu plus our packages is about 2 GB. Verified independently. The actual fault is that the guest has no address — .status.interfaces shows enp1s0 link up with no ipAddress, and ip neigh inside virt-launcher reports 10.0.2.2 FAILED, so the guest does not answer ARP on its masquerade address. Probes from virt-launcher straight to the pod IP and to 10.0.2.2 RST on 11443/8443/8080/22, which exonerates the VIP, the traffic policy and the network policy. The cause cannot be determined from outside the guest. That made one guard non-negotiable: install-uos now bails the moment systemd knows a uosserver unit. Without it this merge would have reinstalled over a working controller. Second finding: there is no way into the guest at all — no SSH key, no password, and SSH cannot work by construction because masquerade forwards only declared ports and 22 is not one. So the deliverable is console access: a SOPS secret carrying installer-url AND console-password, mounted as a NoCloud disk and re-read every boot. The discovery that makes it work: NoCloud instance-id is spec.template.spec.domain.firmware.uuid, stamped on the VM object. Cloud-init compares it to the DMI product UUID, so editing userData alone changes nothing on a second boot — the cached datasource is restored and write_files/runcmd are skipped. That is why a previously shipped unattended install could never take effect. The UUID is now pinned in git and bumped once. Deliberately did NOT put the whole cloud-config behind secretRef: that would hide the shell in ciphertext, out of reach of the L0 dollar-collapse guard, while Flux's envsubst still runs over the decrypted resource — the nextcloud-db shape from 2026-09-13. Script in plaintext, operator values in SOPS. Unattended install is reported honestly as third-party practice, not verified here, and the README's stale dev-era addressing is corrected throughout since it doubles as the rebuild runbook.
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@@ -41,10 +41,41 @@ spec:
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# disk KubeVirt cannot migrate and eviction would hard-stop the guest.
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evictionStrategy: LiveMigrate
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domain:
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# =====================================================================================
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# FIRMWARE UUID == THE CLOUD-INIT INSTANCE-ID. THIS IS THE RE-RUN LEVER. READ BEFORE EDIT.
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# =====================================================================================
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# MEASURED on prod 2026-09-14, not assumed:
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# * the NoCloud seed KubeVirt builds for this VM carries
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# {"instance-id":"de5c3338-6d32-4956-89d1-12c8272b2c07","local-hostname":"unifi"}
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# (read out of noCloud.iso inside virt-launcher-unifi-gp594), and that value was
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# EXACTLY `spec.template.spec.domain.firmware.uuid`, which KubeVirt's mutating webhook
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# had stamped onto the VM OBJECT — so it is PERSISTENT, not per-VMI (the VMI's own uid
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# was b532fd7c-…, a different value). It is not a hash of the VM name either: the four
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# standard uuid5 namespaces over "unifi" / "unifi.unifi" all produce something else.
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# * cloud-init's NoCloud datasource decides "is this the same instance?" by comparing the
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# cached instance-id against the guest's DMI product_uuid — which IS this firmware UUID.
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#
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# CONSEQUENCE, and it is the whole reason the previous unattended attempt could never have
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# worked: EDITING `userData` BELOW AND RESTARTING THE VM CHANGES NOTHING. cloud-init sees an
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# unchanged instance-id, restores its CACHED datasource, never re-reads the seed, and skips
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# every per-instance module (write_files, runcmd). The new payload is silently ignored.
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#
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# So the UUID is pinned HERE, in git, and BUMPING IT IS THE SUPPORTED WAY to make the guest
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# process a new cloud-init payload: change the trailing hex, commit, restart the VM. Pinning
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# it also makes a rebuild reproducible — a fresh apply would otherwise take a random
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# webhook-generated UUID and give the guest a different identity every time.
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#
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# The value below is DELIBERATELY NOT the de5c3338-…c07 the live guest booted with: that
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# difference is what makes the next boot a NEW cloud-init instance and installs the
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# `install-uos` helper + its systemd unit. `serial` is pinned to the value the webhook
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# already stamped, so this change does not also churn the guest's DMI serial.
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firmware:
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uuid: "de5c3338-6d32-4956-89d1-12c8272b2c11"
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serial: "24bb12ac-d311-45f6-a75b-90a9e1b63e18"
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# FLAG (verify-at-bringup): Ubuntu 24.04 amd64 cloud images are hybrid BIOS+UEFI bootable,
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# so KubeVirt's default SeaBIOS SHOULD boot cleanly (unlike the Fedora containerdisk, which
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# is UEFI-only and needed an explicit efi block). If the guest drops to emergency/no-boot,
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# add: firmware: { bootloader: { efi: { secureBoot: false } } }
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# is UEFI-only and needed an explicit efi block). RESOLVED at bring-up: boots as shipped;
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# the guest reports Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS.
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cpu:
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cores: 2
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memory:
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@@ -58,6 +89,11 @@ spec:
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- name: cloudinit
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disk:
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bus: virtio
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# The operator's installer URL (+ optional SSH key), delivered as a tiny read-only
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# iso9660 disk — see the `uosdata` volume near the bottom of this file.
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- name: uosdata
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disk:
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bus: virtio
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interfaces:
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- name: default
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masquerade: {}
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@@ -83,41 +119,112 @@ spec:
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- name: rootdisk
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dataVolume:
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name: unifi-rootdisk
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# =====================================================================================
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# THE OPERATOR'S ONE FIELD — SOPS Secret `unifi-uos-installer`, delivered as a DISK.
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# =====================================================================================
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# KubeVirt exposes a Secret as a small read-only iso9660 disk whose volume label we choose;
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# each Secret key becomes a file on it. The guest mounts it by label (LABEL=UOSDATA) and
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# reads `installer-url` plus an optional `console-password`. The Secret ships ENCRYPTED with
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# REPLACE-ME placeholders, and the guest-side script treats anything that is not an https
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# URL as "not provided yet" and exits 0 — so the VM boots and stays healthy until the
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# operator fills it in. See unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml.example next to this file.
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#
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# `console-password` exists because THERE IS CURRENTLY NO WAY INTO THIS GUEST. The stock
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# Ubuntu cloud image ships a locked `ubuntu` account, this cloud-init never installed a key,
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# and SSH could not help anyway: the masquerade interface above forwards ONLY the declared
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# ports, and 22 is not one of them — probed from inside virt-launcher on 2026-09-14, the
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# guest answers RST on 22 exactly as it does on the UniFi ports. The serial console is the
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# only door, and a console needs a password. Set it and `virtctl -n unifi console unifi`
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# works; `kubectl -n unifi logs virt-launcher-unifi-… -c guest-console-log` already gives
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# read-only console output with no virtctl at all.
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#
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# WHY A SEPARATE DISK AND NOT `cloudInitNoCloud.secretRef` (which would also lift the
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# 2048-byte inline cap): secretRef moves the ENTIRE cloud-config into ciphertext. Two
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# concrete costs. (a) The shell below stops being reviewable in a diff and falls outside the
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# L0 dollar-collapse guard, which can only read plaintext. (b) Flux runs its postBuild
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# envsubst over the DECRYPTED resources, so the escape contract in
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# clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml would still govern text nobody can see in git — the exact
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# shape of the 2026-09-13 nextcloud-db incident. Keeping the script in plaintext and putting
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# ONLY the operator's two values behind SOPS keeps both properties.
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#
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# A CHANGED SECRET REACHES THE GUEST ON THE NEXT VMI START with NO firmware-UUID bump: the
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# disk is rebuilt from the Secret every time the VMI starts, and the systemd unit below
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# re-reads it on EVERY boot instead of relying on cloud-init (which will not re-run — see
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# the firmware block above). The UUID bump is a ONE-TIME step, to get that unit installed.
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- name: uosdata
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secret:
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secretName: unifi-uos-installer
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volumeLabel: UOSDATA
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- name: cloudinit
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cloudInitNoCloud:
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# INLINE (kept < KubeVirt's 2048-byte userData limit — so NO SSH key here; add one back via
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# userDataSecretRef only if needed). qemu-guest-agent gives the KubeVirt AgentConnected
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# signal (proves cloud-init ran); install-uos resolves the latest UOS linux-x64 build from
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# Ubiquiti's PUBLIC firmware API (no auth) and installs it non-interactively (UI on :11443).
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# NOTE: apps-vms NOW carries postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars (needed for
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# ${UNIFI_L4_VIP} in 50-service-l4.yaml), so Flux envsubst DOES run over this userData.
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# Every shell brace-expansion below is therefore escaped as $${...}, which envsubst emits
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# as a literal $${...} — verified with `flux envsubst`. Bare $VAR and $(...) are left alone
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# by envsubst and need no escaping. NEVER write an unescaped $${...} here, and never write
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# an INDEXED expansion unescaped: envsubst hard-fails on `[` ("missing closing brace")
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# and would break the whole apps-vms apply. CORRECTION (2026-09-01, measured against
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# flux 2.4.0 `envsubst --strict`): escaping IS total — $${ARR[0]} emits the literal
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# text safely. Only the UNESCAPED indexed form is fatal. The earlier "escaped or not"
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# wording in clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml overstated it.
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# INLINE, and it MUST stay <= 2048 bytes. That ceiling was MEASURED against the
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# DEPLOYED KubeVirt v1.9.0 rather than quoted: a server-side dry-run apply of an
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# otherwise-identical VM accepted 2048 bytes of userData and rejected 2049 with
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# "cloudInitNoCloud userdata exceeds 2048 byte limit. Should use UserDataSecretRef for
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# larger data." The payload below is ~1.5 KB; keep additions small.
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#
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# WHAT IT DOES: installs qemu-guest-agent (the KubeVirt AgentConnected signal, which is
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# also the proof cloud-init ran) and preps Podman for UOS, then writes `install-uos`
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# plus a systemd unit that runs it on EVERY boot. The unit — not cloud-init — is what
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# makes a later URL change take effect, because cloud-init will not re-run per-instance
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# modules while the instance-id is unchanged.
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#
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# `install-uos` IS IDEMPOTENT AND WILL NOT REINSTALL OVER A WORKING CONTROLLER. It bails
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# out the moment systemd knows a `uosserver.service` — which the live guest ALREADY has:
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# the serial console log for the current boot shows both `uosserver.service` and
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# `uosserver-updater.service` starting, and the root filesystem is 6.3 GB of 40 GB used.
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# UOS is installed here; see the README for what is actually wrong (the guest lost its
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# IP). A stamp file at /var/lib/uos-installed is the second, weaker guard for the case
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# where the unit name changes in some future UOS release.
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#
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# ENVSUBST: apps-vms declares postBuild.substituteFrom (for ${UNIFI_L4_VIP} in
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# 50-service-l4.yaml), so Flux's envsubst DOES run over this text. ${BASE_DOMAIN} below
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# is a deliberate substitution. Everything else is bare `$name` or `$(cmd)`, both of
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# which envsubst leaves untouched — verified against the live VMI, whose rendered
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# userData still carries its shell variables verbatim. There is deliberately NO
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# brace-form shell expansion left in this payload, so nothing here needs escaping; if
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# you add one, escape it per the contract in clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml, and NEVER
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# write an indexed expansion.
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userData: |-
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#cloud-config
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hostname: unifi
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fqdn: unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}
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package_update: true
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package_upgrade: false
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packages: [qemu-guest-agent, podman, uidmap, slirp4netns, ca-certificates, curl, jq, cloud-guest-utils]
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packages: [qemu-guest-agent, podman, uidmap, slirp4netns, ca-certificates, curl]
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write_files:
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- path: /usr/local/sbin/install-uos
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permissions: '0755'
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content: |
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#!/bin/bash
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set -euo pipefail
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if [ -z "$${UOS_URL:-}" ]; then
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UOS_URL="$(curl -fsSL https://fw-update.ui.com/api/firmware-latest | jq -r '._embedded.firmware|map(select(.product=="unifi-os-server" and .platform=="linux-x64"))|sort_by(.version_major,.version_minor,.version_patch)|last._links.data.href')"
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fi
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[ -n "$${UOS_URL}" ] && [ "$${UOS_URL}" != "null" ] || { echo "no UOS URL"; exit 1; }
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t="$(mktemp)"; echo "downloading $${UOS_URL}"; curl -fL --retry 5 --retry-delay 10 -o "$t" "$UOS_URL"; chmod +x "$t"; echo "installing"; yes | "$t"; echo "done"
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d=/run/uos; mkdir -p $d
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mountpoint -q $d || mount -o ro LABEL=UOSDATA $d
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p=$(tr -d '\r\n' < $d/console-password || true)
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case "$p" in ""|REPLACE-ME) ;; *) echo "ubuntu:$p" | chpasswd ;; esac
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systemctl cat uosserver.service >/dev/null 2>&1 && exit 0
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s=/var/lib/uos-installed
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[ -e $s ] && exit 0
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u=$(tr -d '\r\n' < $d/installer-url || true)
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case "$u" in https://*) ;; *) echo "UOS installer-url not set yet"; exit 0;; esac
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t=$(mktemp)
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curl -fL --retry 5 --retry-delay 10 -o $t "$u"
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chmod +x $t
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yes y | $t install || yes y | $t
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rm -f $t; date -Is > $s
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- path: /etc/systemd/system/uos-install.service
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content: |
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[Unit]
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Description=Install UniFi OS Server
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Wants=network-online.target
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After=network-online.target
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[Service]
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Type=oneshot
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ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/install-uos
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StandardOutput=journal+console
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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runcmd:
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- [ systemctl, enable, --now, qemu-guest-agent ]
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- [ systemctl, enable, --now, podman.socket ]
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- [ bash, -lc, "/usr/local/sbin/install-uos 2>&1 | tee /var/log/uos-install.log > /dev/console" ]
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- [systemctl, enable, --now, qemu-guest-agent]
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- [systemctl, enable, --now, podman.socket]
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- [systemctl, enable, --now, uos-install.service]
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+202
-74
@@ -1,18 +1,48 @@
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# UniFi Network controller (UniFi OS Server) — VM onboarding
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> **LIVE — partially.** Reconciled by the **non-gating `apps-vms`** Flux Kustomization
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> (`clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml`, `dependsOn: platform-config`, `wait: false`). VMs are a separate
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> lifecycle from the rendered app waves, and UniFi has no in-cluster dependents, so a slow import
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> or install cannot stall the app tier.
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> **LIVE — but the controller is unreachable, and NOT for the reason this file used to claim.**
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> Reconciled by the **non-gating `apps-vms`** Flux Kustomization (`clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml`,
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> `dependsOn: platform-config` + `platform-config-cdi`, `wait: false`). VMs are a separate lifecycle
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> from the rendered app waves, and UniFi has no in-cluster dependents, so a slow import or install
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> cannot stall the app tier.
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>
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> **Status (verified 2026-08-26):**
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> - `longhorn-vm` StorageClass — **live** (RWX / Block / migratable).
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> - CDI import — **Succeeded** (100%); `unifi-rootdisk` PVC Bound, 40Gi, RWX, `longhorn-vm`.
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> - VM — **Running**, guest agent connected, Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, live-migratable, on `k3s-dev-1`.
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> - L4 LoadBalancer VIP `192.168.1.54` — **allocated** on both Services.
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> - **UniFi OS Server itself is NOT installed.** Port `11443` does not answer from in-cluster
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> (the CNP explicitly permits `cluster` → `:11443`, so this is "nothing listening", not policy).
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> The guest is a bare, prepped Ubuntu. **This is the one remaining step** — see Open question 1.
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> **Status (re-verified against live prod 2026-09-14):**
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> - `longhorn-vm` StorageClass — **live**; `unifi-rootdisk` PVC Bound, **40Gi, RWX, Block**.
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> - CDI import — **Succeeded** (100%).
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> - VM — **Running** on **`k3s-prod-1`**, guest agent connected, Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS,
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> `LiveMigratable=True` / `StorageLiveMigratable=True`. VMI age 34h, VM 8d.
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> - L4 LoadBalancer VIP **`192.168.2.21`** — allocated and held on both Services.
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> - **UniFi OS Server IS INSTALLED.** This reverses the previous entry here. See below.
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> - **The guest has no IP address.** That — not a missing install — is why `:11443`, `:8443` and
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> `:8080` refuse connections.
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## What is actually wrong (2026-09-14)
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The earlier note in this file said "UOS is NOT installed; the guest is a bare, prepped Ubuntu".
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That was wrong, and acting on it would have meant reinstalling over a working controller.
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Evidence, all read-only, from the live cluster:
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| Claim | How it was checked | Result |
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|---|---|---|
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| UOS is installed | `kubectl -n unifi logs virt-launcher-unifi-… -c guest-console-log` | the current boot starts **`uosserver.service` — UniFi OS Server Service** and **`uosserver-updater.service`** |
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| …and it is a real install, not a stub | KubeVirt guest-agent `filesystemlist` subresource | `/` is **6.3 GB used of 40 GB** — a bare Ubuntu cloud image with our packages is ~2 GB |
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| the guest has no IP | `kubectl -n unifi get vmi unifi -o json` → `.status.interfaces` | `enp1s0`, `linkState: up`, **no `ipAddress` field at all**; the `kubectl get vmi` IP column is empty |
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| …confirmed at the link layer | `kubectl -n unifi exec virt-launcher-… -c compute -- ip neigh` | **`10.0.2.2 dev k6t-eth0 FAILED`** — the guest does not answer ARP for its masquerade address |
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| the ports are dead end-to-end | `/dev/tcp` probes from inside virt-launcher, to the pod IP **and** to `10.0.2.2` directly | 11443 / 8443 / 8080 / **22** all refused — i.e. the VIP and the CNP are exonerated |
|
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So the controller is installed and its units start; nothing downstream of the guest's own network
|
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stack can work. The interface was fine at boot (the console log reaches `network-online.target` at
|
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~10s and cloud-init completes at 18.5s), so the address was lost afterwards — the obvious suspect is
|
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UOS taking over host networking, but **that has not been proven and cannot be, from outside the
|
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guest.** Diagnosing it needs a shell, which is the second problem below.
|
||||
|
||||
**There is currently no way into this guest.** The shipped cloud-init installs no SSH key and sets
|
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no password, so the stock `ubuntu` account is locked and a serial console reaches a login prompt
|
||||
nobody can answer. SSH would not rescue it either: the masquerade interface forwards **only** the
|
||||
ports declared in `30-virtualmachine.yaml`, and 22 is not one of them — the probe above shows the
|
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guest RSTs on 22 exactly as it does on 11443. Closing that hole is what `console-password` in the
|
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new Secret is for.
|
||||
|
||||
## What this is
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,24 +59,39 @@ datastore** inside a Podman container stack — so **no separate MongoDB compani
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||||
| `namespace.yaml` | `unifi` namespace: app-namespace label (Kyverno + default-deny apply), `gateway-access=shared`, backup annotation |
|
||||
| `10-default-deny.yaml` | R-NET-01 baseline: deny all, allow only DNS |
|
||||
| `20-datavolume.yaml` | CDI **http** import of the Ubuntu 24.04 cloud image onto a `longhorn-vm` **RWX/Block** disk (**40Gi**). First real CDI http import on the cluster |
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| `30-virtualmachine.yaml` | The VM: 2 vCPU / 4Gi, `running: true`, `evictionStrategy: LiveMigrate`, minimal **inline** cloud-init (SSH key, qemu-guest-agent, Podman prep) |
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| `30-virtualmachine.yaml` | The VM: 2 vCPU / 4Gi, `running: true`, `evictionStrategy: LiveMigrate`, a **pinned firmware UUID** (= the cloud-init instance-id), the **UOSDATA secret disk**, and a minimal **inline** cloud-init that installs `install-uos` + a per-boot systemd unit |
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||||
| `40-networkpolicy.yaml` | Additive CNP allows: L4 ingress ports, controller world+DNS egress, and CDI-importer egress |
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||||
| `50-service-l4.yaml` | Two `type=LoadBalancer` Services (TCP+UDP) sharing **one pinned Cilium VIP** `192.168.1.54`; external-dns A record |
|
||||
| `50-service-l4.yaml` | Two `type=LoadBalancer` Services (TCP+UDP) sharing **one pinned Cilium VIP** `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}` (prod **192.168.2.21**); external-dns A record |
|
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| `unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml` | **SOPS-encrypted.** The operator's UOS installer URL + guest console password, mounted into the guest as a disk |
|
||||
| `unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml.example` | Plaintext template + the operator hand-off steps (never applied, never encrypted) |
|
||||
| `kustomization.yaml` | The reconciled resource list (referenced by `apps/vms/kustomization.yaml`) |
|
||||
|
||||
The optional L7 HTTPRoute (`90-httproute-optional.yaml`) was **dropped**, not merely disabled: UOS
|
||||
serves HTTPS on `:11443`, so a Gateway route needs a `BackendTLSPolicy` that is not confirmed on
|
||||
this Cilium version. Browser access is via the L4 VIP. Re-add it if/when that lands.
|
||||
The optional L7 HTTPRoute was **dropped, and the file does not exist**: UOS serves HTTPS on
|
||||
`:11443`, so a Gateway route needs a `BackendTLSPolicy` that is not confirmed on this Cilium
|
||||
version. Browser access is via the L4 VIP. Re-add it if/when that lands.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cloud-init delivery — two constraints learned the hard way
|
||||
### Cloud-init delivery — three constraints, all measured on the deployed KubeVirt (v1.9.0)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **KubeVirt caps inline `userData` at 2048 bytes.** The original rich cloud-init (full Podman
|
||||
prep + `install-uos` helper) blew past it. A `userDataSecretRef` was tried, then reverted; the
|
||||
shipped config is a **minimal ~1.1 KB inline `userData`**. Keep additions small or move to a
|
||||
Secret deliberately.
|
||||
2. **`apps-vms` must NOT use `postBuild.substituteFrom`.** Flux variable substitution rewrote
|
||||
`$`-bearing text inside the cloud-init payload and **corrupted it**. `clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml`
|
||||
therefore carries no `substituteFrom` — unlike every app wave. Do not "restore" it for consistency.
|
||||
1. **Inline `userData` is capped at 2048 bytes.** MEASURED, not quoted: a server-side dry-run apply
|
||||
of an otherwise-identical VM accepted 2048 bytes and rejected 2049 with *"cloudInitNoCloud
|
||||
userdata exceeds 2048 byte limit. Should use UserDataSecretRef for larger data."* The shipped
|
||||
payload is ~1.45 KB. The API field for the escape hatch is spelled **`secretRef`** (the Go name
|
||||
is `UserDataSecretRef`); `userDataSecretRef` is not a YAML key and trying it will silently
|
||||
validate as an unknown field.
|
||||
2. **The firmware UUID is the cloud-init instance-id, and editing `userData` alone changes
|
||||
nothing.** The NoCloud seed's `instance-id` is exactly
|
||||
`spec.template.spec.domain.firmware.uuid`, which KubeVirt's webhook stamps onto the **VM object**
|
||||
(so it survives restarts), and cloud-init's NoCloud datasource compares it to the guest's DMI
|
||||
product UUID. Same id → cached datasource restored, new payload never read, `write_files` and
|
||||
`runcmd` skipped. This is why the previously shipped "unattended install" could never have taken
|
||||
effect on a second boot. The UUID is now **pinned in git**, with bumping it as the documented way
|
||||
to force a re-run. See the long comment in `30-virtualmachine.yaml`.
|
||||
3. **`apps-vms` DOES use `postBuild.substituteFrom`.** This file used to say it must not — that has
|
||||
been false since 2026-08-31, when `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}` landed in `50-service-l4.yaml`. Flux's
|
||||
envsubst therefore runs over the cloud-init payload, and the escape contract in
|
||||
`clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml` is in force. Bare `$name` and `$(cmd)` are left alone (verified
|
||||
against the live VMI's rendered userData); brace-form shell expansion must be escaped; an
|
||||
indexed expansion is a hard error that fails the whole Kustomization.
|
||||
|
||||
### Node prerequisites this VM forced onto the cluster
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,15 +101,31 @@ this Cilium version. Browser access is via the L4 VIP. Re-add it if/when that la
|
||||
- **`longhorn-scratch`** — a single-replica StorageClass for CDI scratch space; the default
|
||||
3-replica class made the import fail with insufficient storage.
|
||||
|
||||
## UOS install method (researched)
|
||||
## UOS install method (researched 2026-09-14)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Host:** Ubuntu 24.04 LTS x86-64, systemd, **Podman 4.9.3+**, `slirp4netns` 1.2+, `uidmap`. Min
|
||||
2 GB RAM / 10 GB disk (we give 4 GB / 60 GB). Podman must be at `/usr/bin/podman`.
|
||||
- **Install:** download the signed installer from `fw-download.ubnt.com` (URL obtained from
|
||||
`ui.com/download/software/unifi-os-server`), `chmod +x`, run **as root**. UI then on
|
||||
**`https://<host>:11443`**.
|
||||
- **Confidence:** *High* on requirements, ports, and the download→chmod→run shape (multiple
|
||||
independent 2025–2026 sources agree). *Lower* on **fully unattended** install — see risks.
|
||||
- **Host:** Ubuntu 24.04 LTS x86-64, systemd, **Podman 4.9.3+**, `slirp4netns` 1.2+, `uidmap`.
|
||||
Vendor/community minimum is 2 vCPU / 4 GB RAM / ~25 GB disk; we give **2 vCPU / 4 GiB / 40Gi**
|
||||
(the 40Gi figure is the DataVolume and the Bound PVC — an earlier "60 GB" claim here was wrong).
|
||||
Podman must be at `/usr/bin/podman`.
|
||||
- **Install:** obtain the download link from `ui.com/download/software/unifi-os-server` while signed
|
||||
in to a (free) Ubiquiti account, `chmod +x`, run **as root**. UI then on **`https://<host>:11443`**.
|
||||
- **Is the URL a short-lived signed link?** *Probably not.* The links look like
|
||||
`https://fw-download.ubnt.com/data/unifi-os-server/<hash>-linux-x64-<version>-<uuid>.<n>-x64` with
|
||||
**no signature query string**, and public community installers hard-code them. It is
|
||||
account-derived and per-release, not time-limited. It is kept in SOPS anyway — cheap, and it keeps
|
||||
account-derived material out of plaintext config — but do **not** build logic around expiry.
|
||||
- **Can it run unattended? Yes in practice, no officially — and this is the honest answer.**
|
||||
Ubiquiti documents no `--silent` flag, no answer file and no environment variables. What the
|
||||
ecosystem actually does is pipe confirmations in: the widely used community installer
|
||||
(`dgodibadze/UniFi_OS_Server`) runs `yes y | "$file" install`, and vendor-adjacent walkthroughs run
|
||||
either `./<binary> install` or a bare `sudo ./<binary>`. `install-uos` therefore does
|
||||
`yes y | $t install || yes y | $t` — the documented-by-practice form first, the bare form as a
|
||||
fallback for builds that take no subcommand. **This has not been executed end-to-end on our guest**
|
||||
(no URL has been supplied, and UOS is already installed here), so treat it as "established by
|
||||
convergent third-party practice", not as verified-by-us.
|
||||
- The previously shipped helper had two defects worth recording: it resolved the URL from
|
||||
`fw-update.ui.com/api/firmware-latest`, an endpoint nothing in this repo ever verified lists
|
||||
`unifi-os-server`, and it invoked the binary with **no `install` subcommand**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Ports (device adoption needs the L4 ones — the L7 Gateway cannot express them)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -78,76 +139,143 @@ this Cilium version. Browser access is via the L4 VIP. Re-add it if/when that la
|
||||
| 3478 | UDP | **STUN** (device ⇄ controller) |
|
||||
| 10001 | UDP | **L2 device discovery** |
|
||||
|
||||
**22/TCP is deliberately absent**, and that is load-bearing: a masquerade interface forwards only
|
||||
the ports it declares, so SSH into this guest is impossible by construction. Use the serial console.
|
||||
|
||||
## L4 exposure design (the hard part)
|
||||
|
||||
The shared Gateway is L7 HTTPS only (`:443` host-routed). It **cannot** carry raw TCP `8080`/`6789`
|
||||
or any UDP (`3478`/`10001`) — exactly the ports adoption rides. So:
|
||||
|
||||
- **One VIP, two Services.** `unifi-l4-tcp` + `unifi-l4-udp` share a single LoadBalancer IP via
|
||||
Cilium `lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: unifi`, pinned to **`192.168.1.54`** (`lbipam.cilium.io/ips`).
|
||||
The VIP is pulled from the existing `default-pool` (192.168.1.53–.60) and **ARP-announced on the
|
||||
flat LAN by the existing `default-l2` CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy** — no new Cilium config.
|
||||
Cilium `lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: unifi`, pinned through `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}`
|
||||
(`lbipam.cilium.io/ips`) — **192.168.2.21 on prod**. The VIP comes from the existing
|
||||
`default-pool`, whose live prod block is **192.168.2.20–192.168.2.30** with **192.168.2.20 held by
|
||||
the shared Gateway** (`cilium-gateway-shared`), and is ARP-announced on the flat LAN by the
|
||||
existing `default-l2` CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy — no new Cilium config. (The `192.168.1.53–.60`
|
||||
/ `.53` figures this section used to quote were **dev** addressing and are gone; dev has been
|
||||
decommissioned. Neighbours in the prod pool today: `.22` crafty, `.23` pihole-dns.)
|
||||
- `selector: kubevirt.io/vm=unifi` → the virt-launcher pod; the VM's `masquerade` iface forwards the
|
||||
declared ports into the guest. `externalTrafficPolicy: Local` preserves LAN client source IP.
|
||||
- **Device-adoption story:** point devices' **inform host** at the VIP (`http://192.168.1.54:8080/inform`)
|
||||
— via the controller's *Override inform host* setting, `set-inform` on the device, or DHCP option 43.
|
||||
Because the VIP is L2-announced on the devices' own subnet (192.168.1.0/24), unicast inform + STUN
|
||||
reach it. **Limitation:** broadcast-based L2 auto-discovery (10001/udp) does **not** cross the pod
|
||||
masquerade boundary, so zero-touch "device just appears" adoption is unreliable — expect to use
|
||||
explicit inform. Devices on other VLANs must route to the VIP and be inform-pointed anyway.
|
||||
- **Reusable pattern (== the deferred `minecraft` :25565 problem):** L4-only workload → Cilium
|
||||
LoadBalancer on a pinned, L2-announced VIP with a per-app sharing key, A record via external-dns.
|
||||
`minecraft` is the single-TCP-port special case of this multi-port TCP+UDP design.
|
||||
declared ports into the guest.
|
||||
- **`externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster`, corrected 2026-09-14 after an 8-day LAN outage.** This file
|
||||
used to advertise `Local` "to preserve the LAN client source IP". Both halves were false here:
|
||||
Cilium's L2 announcer elects a lease holder without regard to which node holds a backend (the
|
||||
leases sat on `k3s-prod-2` while the VM ran on `k3s-prod-1`, so `Local` had nowhere to forward),
|
||||
and KubeVirt's `masquerade` binding had already NATed the client IP away before the guest ever saw
|
||||
it. The full reasoning — including why `40-networkpolicy.yaml` needs no `remote-node` entry and
|
||||
why no `loadBalancerSourceRanges` was added — is in `50-service-l4.yaml`.
|
||||
- **Device-adoption story:** point devices' **inform host** at the VIP
|
||||
(`http://192.168.2.21:8080/inform`) — via the controller's *Override inform host* setting,
|
||||
`set-inform` on the device, or DHCP option 43. Because the VIP is L2-announced on the devices' own
|
||||
subnet (**192.168.2.0/24**, `LAN_CIDR`), unicast inform + STUN reach it. **Limitation:**
|
||||
broadcast-based L2 auto-discovery (10001/udp) does **not** cross the pod masquerade boundary, so
|
||||
zero-touch "device just appears" adoption is unreliable — expect to use explicit inform. Devices
|
||||
on other VLANs must route to the VIP and be inform-pointed anyway.
|
||||
- **Reusable pattern:** L4-only workload → Cilium LoadBalancer on a pinned, L2-announced VIP with a
|
||||
per-app sharing key, A record via external-dns. `crafty` (`.22`) is the same shape and is live.
|
||||
|
||||
**UI access:** `https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443` (A record → VIP). The port-less
|
||||
`https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev` via the Gateway is optional and needs a BackendTLSPolicy
|
||||
(UOS is HTTPS-only on 11443) — see `90-httproute-optional.yaml`.
|
||||
**UI access:** `https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443`. That name resolves to the VIP and not to
|
||||
the Gateway on purpose: both `platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml` (in-cluster) and
|
||||
`apps/wave-0/pihole.yaml` (LAN split-horizon) carve `unifi.${BASE_DOMAIN}` out of the
|
||||
zone-wide `${GATEWAY_VIP}` answer and point it at `${UNIFI_L4_VIP}`. `${BASE_DOMAIN}` on prod is the
|
||||
apex `home.keithjackson.dev` (confirmed live in the `cluster-vars` ConfigMap) after the 2026-09-13
|
||||
flip, so this hostname is current, not a dev leftover.
|
||||
|
||||
## The operator's one field — installing UOS without a shell
|
||||
|
||||
`unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml` is a SOPS-encrypted Secret with two keys. KubeVirt mounts it into
|
||||
the guest as a read-only iso9660 disk labelled `UOSDATA` (one file per key), and an in-guest
|
||||
`uos-install.service` reads it **on every boot**:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sops apps/vms/unifi/unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml # fill installer-url and/or console-password
|
||||
git commit && git push # merge to the branch prod's Flux tracks
|
||||
kubectl -n unifi delete vmi unifi # `running: true` recreates it; no virtctl needed
|
||||
kubectl -n unifi logs -f $(kubectl -n unifi get pod -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher -o name | head -1) \
|
||||
-c guest-console-log # watch the boot + the install, read-only
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Design notes that matter if you change this:
|
||||
|
||||
- **The Secret is a disk, not `cloudInitNoCloud.secretRef`.** `secretRef` would lift the 2048-byte
|
||||
cap but would move the whole cloud-config into ciphertext: unreviewable in diffs, invisible to the
|
||||
L0 dollar-collapse guard, and still subject to Flux's envsubst (which runs over **decrypted**
|
||||
resources) — the exact shape of the 2026-09-13 `nextcloud-db` incident. Script in plaintext,
|
||||
operator values in SOPS.
|
||||
- **A URL change needs no UUID bump.** The disk is rebuilt from the Secret on every VMI start and
|
||||
the systemd unit re-reads it every boot. Only a change to the cloud-init payload itself needs the
|
||||
firmware-UUID bump.
|
||||
- **`install-uos` will not reinstall over a working controller.** It exits as soon as systemd knows
|
||||
a `uosserver.service`, with `/var/lib/uos-installed` as a weaker second guard. Given the live
|
||||
guest already has UOS, this guard is the difference between "safe to merge" and "destroys the
|
||||
controller on next boot".
|
||||
- **`apps-vms` had no SOPS `decryption` stanza** — this is the first encrypted content under
|
||||
`apps/vms/`, so the stanza was added to both `clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml` and
|
||||
`clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml`. Without it kustomize hands Flux the raw SOPS document and the
|
||||
guest mounts a disk full of ciphertext, with the cluster reporting everything healthy.
|
||||
|
||||
## Open questions / risks
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Unattended install (HIGH) — STILL OPEN. This is the blocker.** The installer is a **signed,
|
||||
account-tied** URL that **rotates/expires** (cannot be committed) and is documented as
|
||||
**interactive** (no official silent flag). The shipped cloud-init had to be cut to ~1.1 KB for
|
||||
the inline `userData` limit, so the `install-uos` helper is **no longer baked into the guest**.
|
||||
**Decision needed:** operator runs the install by hand at bring-up (current de-facto answer), or
|
||||
invest in a verified silent path (Secret-delivered cloud-init + a fetched-at-boot URL).
|
||||
2. **CDI http import (MEDIUM) — RESOLVED in practice.** The import succeeded (first http/qcow2 CDI
|
||||
1. **The guest lost its IP (HIGH) — THE LIVE BLOCKER, and it needs the operator.** Diagnosis
|
||||
requires a shell, which requires `console-password` above plus one restart. First things to run
|
||||
on the console: `ip -4 a`, `networkctl status enp1s0`, `journalctl -u systemd-networkd`,
|
||||
`ls /etc/netplan`, and `systemctl status uosserver`. A plain restart may well restore DHCP on its
|
||||
own (the address survived the first ~34h of this boot's life), but that would hide the cause, so
|
||||
capture the state before rebooting a second time if you can.
|
||||
2. **Unattended install (MEDIUM) — mechanism shipped, end-to-end run NOT witnessed.** See the
|
||||
install-method section: no official silent flag exists, `yes y | <installer> install` is the
|
||||
convergent community practice, and it has not been executed on our guest. Treat the first real
|
||||
install as something to watch on the console log, not as a fire-and-forget.
|
||||
3. **CDI http import (LOW) — RESOLVED in practice.** The import succeeded (first http/qcow2 CDI
|
||||
import on this cluster). Still no checksum on an http source, and the URL tracks a *moving*
|
||||
Ubuntu 24.04 build — pin a dated build dir if reproducibility matters. Needed two cluster-level
|
||||
fixes (`nonroot-devices`, `longhorn-scratch`) — see above.
|
||||
3. **Boot firmware (LOW) — RESOLVED.** Boots as shipped; running Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS.
|
||||
4. **VIP `192.168.1.54` (LOW) — RESOLVED.** Allocated and held by both Services, inside the
|
||||
`192.168.1.53–.60` pool (`.53` is the shared Gateway).
|
||||
5. **Longhorn RWX prerequisite (was BLOCKING) — RESOLVED.** `longhorn-vm` is live (RWX / Block /
|
||||
4. **Boot firmware (LOW) — RESOLVED.** Boots as shipped; running Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS.
|
||||
5. **VIP `192.168.2.21` (LOW) — RESOLVED.** Allocated and held by both Services, inside the live
|
||||
prod pool `192.168.2.20–.30`, not colliding with the Gateway (`.20`), crafty (`.22`), pihole-dns
|
||||
(`.23`) or the node addresses (`.10/.11/.12`).
|
||||
6. **Longhorn RWX prerequisite (was BLOCKING) — RESOLVED.** `longhorn-vm` is live (RWX / Block /
|
||||
migratable); the VMI reports `LiveMigratable=True` and `StorageLiveMigratable=True`.
|
||||
6. **Licensing (LOW).** UOS self-host is free; a Ubiquiti account is needed only to fetch the
|
||||
7. **Licensing (LOW).** UOS self-host is free; a Ubiquiti account is needed only to fetch the
|
||||
installer and for optional remote access.
|
||||
7. **Broadcast adoption (LOW, by design).** L2 auto-discovery (`10001/udp`) does not cross the pod
|
||||
8. **Broadcast adoption (LOW, by design).** L2 auto-discovery (`10001/udp`) does not cross the pod
|
||||
masquerade boundary — see the L4 section. Expect explicit inform-host adoption.
|
||||
9. **No `virtctl` in the devcontainer (LOW).** Restart and read-only console both work with plain
|
||||
`kubectl` (above). An *interactive* console — the thing `console-password` unlocks — needs
|
||||
`virtctl` on the operator's path; it is a single static binary from the KubeVirt release matching
|
||||
the cluster's **v1.9.0**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Remaining bring-up
|
||||
|
||||
Steps 1–4 below are **done**. The sequence is kept because it is also the recovery/rebuild runbook.
|
||||
Steps 1–5 are **done**. The sequence is kept because it is also the recovery/rebuild runbook, so it
|
||||
is written for a from-scratch cluster; the prod addresses are the live ones.
|
||||
|
||||
1. ~~`longhorn-vm` StorageClass live; `192.168.1.54` free.~~ **Done.**
|
||||
1. ~~`longhorn-vm` StorageClass live; a free address in the LB pool.~~ **Done** (`192.168.2.21`).
|
||||
2. ~~Wire into a reconciled path~~ — **done**, via `apps/vms/` + the non-gating `apps-vms`
|
||||
Kustomization (not an app wave).
|
||||
Kustomization (not an app wave), including its SOPS `decryption` stanza in both overlays.
|
||||
3. ~~CDI import~~ — **done**: `kubectl -n unifi get dv unifi-rootdisk` → `Succeeded`.
|
||||
4. ~~VM + VIP~~ — **done**: `kubectl -n unifi get vmi unifi` → `Running`; both Services show
|
||||
`192.168.1.54`.
|
||||
5. **→ NEXT: install UOS in the guest.** SSH in (the inline cloud-init installs the operator's key
|
||||
and `qemu-guest-agent`) or `virtctl console unifi`, fetch the signed installer URL from
|
||||
ui.com/download/software/unifi-os-server, then `chmod +x` and run it **as root**.
|
||||
6. Verify the UI: `https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443` (or `https://192.168.1.54:11443`),
|
||||
`192.168.2.21`.
|
||||
5. ~~Install UOS in the guest~~ — **done** (it was already done when this file claimed otherwise;
|
||||
`uosserver.service` starts on every boot). On a REBUILD this is where the Secret does the work:
|
||||
fill `installer-url`, commit, and the guest installs itself on first boot.
|
||||
6. **→ NEXT, and it is the operator's:** fill `console-password`, restart the VM once, get on the
|
||||
console and find out why `enp1s0` has no address. Until that is fixed nothing below can pass.
|
||||
7. Verify the UI: `https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443` (or `https://192.168.2.21:11443`),
|
||||
complete the first-run wizard.
|
||||
7. Verify DNS: `dig unifi.home.keithjackson.dev` → `192.168.1.54` on the cluster LAN.
|
||||
8. Adopt a device: set its inform to `http://192.168.1.54:8080/inform`; confirm it appears + STUN
|
||||
8. Verify DNS: `dig unifi.home.keithjackson.dev` → `192.168.2.21` from a LAN client (pihole
|
||||
split-horizon) and from in-cluster (coredns-custom).
|
||||
9. Adopt a device: set its inform to `http://192.168.2.21:8080/inform`; confirm it appears + STUN
|
||||
connects (green). Test guest portal / throughput if used.
|
||||
9. Verify default-deny holds: only the declared L4 ports reachable; VM egress limited to world+DNS.
|
||||
10. (Optional) Re-add the L7 HTTPRoute once `BackendTLSPolicy` is confirmed on this Cilium version.
|
||||
10. Verify default-deny holds: only the declared L4 ports reachable; VM egress limited to world+DNS.
|
||||
11. (Optional) Re-add the L7 HTTPRoute once `BackendTLSPolicy` is confirmed on this Cilium version.
|
||||
|
||||
**Quick health check today:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
kubectl -n unifi get dv,vmi,svc
|
||||
kubectl -n unifi get vmi unifi -o jsonpath='{.status.guestOSInfo.prettyName}{"\n"}'
|
||||
# the two that would have caught the current failure:
|
||||
kubectl -n unifi get vmi unifi -o jsonpath='{.status.interfaces}{"\n"}' # expect an ipAddress
|
||||
kubectl -n unifi exec "$(kubectl -n unifi get pod -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher -o name | head -1)" \
|
||||
-c compute -- ip neigh # expect 10.0.2.2 REACHABLE
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -11,3 +11,11 @@ resources:
|
||||
- 30-virtualmachine.yaml
|
||||
- 40-networkpolicy.yaml
|
||||
- 50-service-l4.yaml
|
||||
# SOPS-encrypted. Carries the operator's UOS installer URL (+ optional SSH key) and is mounted
|
||||
# into the guest as the UOSDATA disk by 30-virtualmachine.yaml. Decrypted by the `apps-vms` Flux
|
||||
# Kustomization, which clusters/dev and clusters/prod patch with the `decryption` stanza — the
|
||||
# FIRST encrypted content under apps/vms, so that patch was added with this file. The plaintext
|
||||
# template + the operator hand-off steps live in the `.example` sibling of the file below, which
|
||||
# is deliberately NOT named here: the L0 no-plaintext-secrets check fails any kustomization whose
|
||||
# text contains an example template's filename, on the assumption it is being applied.
|
||||
- unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Secret
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: unifi-uos-installer
|
||||
namespace: unifi
|
||||
type: Opaque
|
||||
stringData:
|
||||
installer-url: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:CwdpCy4dKbJa7A==,iv:zdKrFad7Lg2g7bM7ALLPzp/3VIjXCahZABEscpJCYF4=,tag:inlLeAKrPrt9qvr8/Y4Hiw==,type:str]
|
||||
console-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:F+3lMUjA092RVg==,iv:h7NenRZUEJxTjzRDGCLBMHRtLl9h122wLvUvNGfmB50=,tag:Emo5y0qOUBptnXK03sgadQ==,type:str]
|
||||
sops:
|
||||
kms: []
|
||||
gcp_kms: []
|
||||
azure_kv: []
|
||||
hc_vault: []
|
||||
age:
|
||||
- recipient: age175l8mdpdfu7hq0aml3exs3gykarwjmuvr23sq56s3wjejnyk44wsp4mfzg
|
||||
enc: |
|
||||
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
|
||||
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBLMHpXYVhkblBNQWJ2NlZW
|
||||
WXJPSDcxUEdYakN0R1Nydkc1a2E5anJSNEV3CmM1MUpiNzZUa0dKQXNRZGpTRm9l
|
||||
UnMvMTNDL3gvUG1jVFdBbUI3aU01RkkKLS0tIGh2OUNyZzFpMXI1SWFSZENPNVVJ
|
||||
R2V4N3plREx5UGJ2emprTS9WRzljRXMKCWIHr3+L+H2QxocHmA5oDdjZBfvo2Z5F
|
||||
6JLNGs0M7O0X5n+IUqyM+pU+BbqHX+y2hTOSwOgCSV9Zw+ME1kUTKg==
|
||||
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
|
||||
lastmodified: "2026-09-14T07:13:55Z"
|
||||
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:A2JQR++tYY9XrRmN1x24klU4xpanx0Ab64AIPGfvtHUxwtG2JLCMMAHIe64eM60FIKT5ibmnVVeuRIUoDwm5d3WpdX2gmGpzxyr9TDhEcEA2ENQGP5TydnmcmchNcu//FfXTXTgm91+WjBke06gibKEF9H+65s2YbkOtheFUjqA=,iv:tQkW7xDGMb8+35QAx+svTQDEwlvW8AQfouopeRqtNTg=,tag:fLJ58ovDbf5qy0sxBqUfPw==,type:str]
|
||||
pgp: []
|
||||
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
|
||||
version: 3.9.4
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
# TEMPLATE — NOT APPLIED, NOT ENCRYPTED (.yaml.example is ignored by kustomize and never
|
||||
# auto-encrypted by SOPS). Reference scaffold + OPERATOR HAND-OFF.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHAT THIS IS: the two values that (a) let the UniFi VM install UniFi OS Server by itself, with
|
||||
# nobody typing commands inside the guest, and (b) give the operator a way INTO that guest at all.
|
||||
# KubeVirt mounts this Secret into the VM as a tiny read-only iso9660 disk labelled `UOSDATA` (see
|
||||
# the `uosdata` volume in 30-virtualmachine.yaml); each key below becomes a file of the same name on
|
||||
# that disk, and the in-guest `uos-install.service` reads them on EVERY boot.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# READ THIS FIRST — UOS IS ALREADY INSTALLED ON THE LIVE PROD GUEST (verified 2026-09-14, see the
|
||||
# README "What is actually wrong"). `installer-url` is therefore NOT the fix for today's outage; it
|
||||
# is the rebuild path and the "the install never happened" path. `install-uos` refuses to run the
|
||||
# installer at all while systemd knows a `uosserver.service`, so filling this in cannot clobber a
|
||||
# working controller. `console-password` IS useful today: it is the only way to get a shell.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHY THE URL IS BEHIND SOPS: it is obtained through the operator's own (free) Ubiquiti account
|
||||
# session at ui.com/download/software/unifi-os-server, it identifies a specific build, and it is not
|
||||
# ours to redistribute. Treat it as account-derived material, not as public configuration.
|
||||
# HONEST CAVEAT, checked 2026-09-14: the resulting `https://fw-download.ubnt.com/data/
|
||||
# unifi-os-server/<hash>-linux-x64-<version>-<uuid>.<n>-x64` URL carries NO signature query string,
|
||||
# and public community install scripts hard-code these URLs — so it does not behave like a
|
||||
# short-lived signed link. It does change every release. Encrypting it costs nothing and keeps the
|
||||
# repo's "account-derived material is not config" line clean, but do NOT design around "it expires".
|
||||
#
|
||||
# HAND-OFF STEPS (operator) — this is the whole job:
|
||||
# (a) Sign in at https://ui.com/download/software/unifi-os-server, pick the Linux (x64) build, and
|
||||
# copy the download link (right-click -> Copy link address). Do NOT download it here; the guest
|
||||
# fetches it itself.
|
||||
# (b) Open the encrypted sibling in your editor:
|
||||
# sops apps/vms/unifi/unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml
|
||||
# (c) Replace the two REPLACE-ME values. Either may be left as the placeholder — the guest skips a
|
||||
# placeholder rather than failing.
|
||||
# (d) Save/quit (sops re-encrypts in place), commit, push, merge to the branch prod tracks.
|
||||
# (e) Restart the VM once so the new cloud-init instance and the new disk are picked up:
|
||||
# kubectl -n unifi delete vmi unifi # `running: true` recreates it; no virtctl needed
|
||||
# Watch it come up WITHOUT virtctl:
|
||||
# kubectl -n unifi logs -f $(kubectl -n unifi get pod -l kubevirt.io=virt-launcher \
|
||||
# -o name | head -1) -c guest-console-log
|
||||
# (f) UI: https://192.168.2.21:11443 (prod) or https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# IF YOU LATER NEED A NEW URL (new release, dead link): repeat (b)-(e). No firmware-UUID bump is
|
||||
# needed for that — the disk is rebuilt from this Secret on every VMI start and the systemd unit
|
||||
# re-reads it every boot. The UUID bump in 30-virtualmachine.yaml is only needed when the cloud-init
|
||||
# payload ITSELF changes.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The file is already listed under `resources:` in apps/vms/unifi/kustomization.yaml, and `apps-vms`
|
||||
# is patched with the SOPS `decryption` stanza in clusters/dev + clusters/prod.
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Secret
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: unifi-uos-installer
|
||||
namespace: unifi
|
||||
type: Opaque
|
||||
stringData:
|
||||
# KEY NAMES ARE LOAD-BEARING: each key becomes a FILE of that exact name on the UOSDATA disk, and
|
||||
# /usr/local/sbin/install-uos reads them by path. Renaming a key breaks the install silently.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The signed-in download link for UniFi OS Server, Linux x64. Anything that is not an https URL
|
||||
# (this placeholder included) is treated by the guest as "not provided yet": the unit logs
|
||||
# "UOS installer-url not set yet" and exits 0, so the VM stays healthy and simply does not install.
|
||||
installer-url: REPLACE-ME
|
||||
# Password set on the guest's `ubuntu` account on every boot, for `virtctl -n unifi console unifi`.
|
||||
# THIS IS THE ONLY DOOR INTO THE GUEST. The stock Ubuntu 24.04 cloud image ships `ubuntu` locked,
|
||||
# no key was ever installed, and an SSH key would not help: the VM's masquerade interface forwards
|
||||
# only the ports declared in 30-virtualmachine.yaml and 22 is not among them (probed from inside
|
||||
# virt-launcher, 2026-09-14 — the guest RSTs on 22 just as it does on 11443). Generate one with
|
||||
# openssl rand -base64 24
|
||||
# Leave it as REPLACE-ME to keep the account locked; the script skips the placeholder by name.
|
||||
console-password: REPLACE-ME
|
||||
@@ -122,6 +122,23 @@ patches:
|
||||
provider: sops
|
||||
secretRef:
|
||||
name: sops-age
|
||||
# apps-vms (the KubeVirt VM tier, clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml) gained its FIRST encrypted Secret
|
||||
# on 2026-09-14: apps/vms/unifi/unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml, the operator's UOS installer URL,
|
||||
# which 30-virtualmachine.yaml mounts into the guest as a disk. Without this stanza kustomize
|
||||
# would hand Flux the raw SOPS document and the VM would mount a disk full of ciphertext — the
|
||||
# failure is silent from the cluster's point of view (the Secret applies fine), so the stanza is
|
||||
# as load-bearing as the file itself. The `sops-age` Secret is out-of-band (name only).
|
||||
- patch: |-
|
||||
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
|
||||
kind: Kustomization
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: apps-vms
|
||||
namespace: flux-system
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
decryption:
|
||||
provider: sops
|
||||
secretRef:
|
||||
name: sops-age
|
||||
- patch: |-
|
||||
apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
|
||||
kind: GitRepository
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -113,6 +113,23 @@ patches:
|
||||
provider: sops
|
||||
secretRef:
|
||||
name: sops-age
|
||||
# apps-vms (the KubeVirt VM tier, clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml) gained its FIRST encrypted Secret
|
||||
# on 2026-09-14: apps/vms/unifi/unifi-uos-installer.sops.yaml, the operator's UOS installer URL,
|
||||
# which 30-virtualmachine.yaml mounts into the guest as a disk. Without this stanza kustomize
|
||||
# would hand Flux the raw SOPS document and the VM would mount a disk full of ciphertext — the
|
||||
# failure is silent from the cluster's point of view (the Secret applies fine), so the stanza is
|
||||
# as load-bearing as the file itself. Mirrors clusters/dev. `sops-age` is out-of-band (name only).
|
||||
- patch: |-
|
||||
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
|
||||
kind: Kustomization
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: apps-vms
|
||||
namespace: flux-system
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
decryption:
|
||||
provider: sops
|
||||
secretRef:
|
||||
name: sops-age
|
||||
# --- GitOps source (operator decision 2026-09-01: prod tracks the SAME BRANCH as dev) ---
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ############################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user