feat(pm-agent): pin the first published agent-runner digest, start dry, and fix the token scopes
Rebased #61 onto the CI image pipeline (#81). This commit makes the remaining in-git blockers to going live go away: - deployment.yaml and PM_WORKER_IMAGE pin images run 340's digest (sha256:c4eba5b3..., tag sha-523cd9118f95 = main), read from the registry. Renovate markers unchanged. - PM_DRY_RUN=true and PM_REQUIRE_LABEL=agent for the first run. Dry run is required, not just cautious: the run-340 image's baked worker template predates imagePullSecrets, so admission would deny its Jobs until CI re-publishes after this merge and Renovate bumps. - Token scopes: Gitea 1.24.3 scopes GET /api/v1/user (the dispatcher's first call) under read:user. The documented list was missing it. Now read:user, write:repository, write:issue, read:package everywhere. - Org-package read documented as a team (Packages=Read, no repos), not just a scope. - sops is toolbox-only; the .examples say so and give the in-place edit. - runbook: key-name check no longer emits Secret values before the pipe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -46,15 +46,17 @@ waive the sensitive-path human review on its own pull request.
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Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
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1. **The image is published by CI, not by a person.** `platform/pm-agent/deployment.yaml` and
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`PM_WORKER_IMAGE` in `configmap.yaml` carry an all-zero digest placeholder until the first
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publish. `.gitea/workflows/images.yaml` builds `agent-runner` on rootless BuildKit
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`PM_WORKER_IMAGE` in `configmap.yaml` carry the digest of the **first** publish (images
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run 340, `sha-523cd9118f95`), pinned once on 2026-10-30 so going live did not wait on
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Renovate's first run; every later bump is Renovate's. That digest predates the worker
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template's `imagePullSecrets` entry, so worker Jobs built from it are refused by
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admission — which is why `PM_DRY_RUN` starts `true` (see `configmap.yaml`). `.gitea/workflows/images.yaml` builds `agent-runner` on rootless BuildKit
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(`platform/buildkit/`) — the same Containerfile, and the same `verify` stage, that
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`infra/agent/build-image.sh` builds locally — and on a push to `main` publishes it to
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`gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner` under `sha-<commit>` and `main`.
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Renovate then follows the `main` tag through the `# renovate-digest:` marker above **both**
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lines and moves them together in one pull request. Nobody builds-and-pushes this image from
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a workstation, and nobody pastes a digest. Until the first publish, and until that PR
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merges: `ImagePullBackOff`. The one operator prerequisite on the publishing side is the
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a workstation. The one operator prerequisite on the publishing side is the
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`REGISTRY_PUSH_TOKEN` Actions secret (see the header of `.gitea/workflows/images.yaml`);
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without it the publish job fails loudly rather than skipping.
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@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
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`pm-agent-registry` is a `dockerconfigjson` Secret referenced by both the Deployment and
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the committed worker Job template, and the admission policy pins it to exactly that
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name. What is left to you is the value: the Gitea token must carry **`read:package`** in
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addition to `write:repository` and `write:issue`, and the dockerconfigjson is built from
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addition to `read:user`, `write:repository` and `write:issue`, and the dockerconfigjson is built from
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it. Steps:
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[`pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml.example`](./pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml.example).
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@@ -99,8 +101,11 @@ Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
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They hold the **same** Gitea token in two formats, because a Secret cannot be both — the
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same one-value-in-two-files pattern the Keycloak client secret already uses here. So mint
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it once, with all three scopes: `read:package` (the pull), `write:repository` (clone,
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branch push, pull request) and `write:issue` (issue comments). The first `.example`
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it once, with all four scopes: `read:package` (the pull), `read:user` (the dispatcher's
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startup `GET /user` — Gitea 1.24.3 scopes the whole `/user` group), `write:repository`
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(clone, branch push, pull request) and `write:issue` (issue comments). The account also
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needs package *permission*, not just the scope: a `pm-agent-pull` org team with Packages
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= Read and no repositories (steps in the registry `.example`). The first `.example`
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explains which account to create and why it must *not* be an administrator.
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Until they are filled in: the pull fails `401`, and if you fix only the pull, the
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@@ -174,7 +179,7 @@ Job from a committed template. **The model's output is data, never a command.**
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- **The worker's own credentials are inside the model's reach.** The session runs as the same
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uid in the same container as the wrapper, so it can read the environment, including its
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`GITEA_TOKEN` and `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`. There is no isolation between them and none is
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claimed. What bounds it: the Gitea token is scoped `write:repository, write:issue` on **one
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claimed. What bounds it: the Gitea token is scoped `read:user, write:repository, write:issue, read:package` on **one
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repository** with no admin permission, and egress reaches only this Gitea and tcp/443.
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- **`world:443` is wider than `api.anthropic.com`.** Cilium can express the tighter rule
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(`toFQDNs`) but nothing in this repository uses FQDN policy and its prerequisite (Cilium's
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@@ -51,15 +51,20 @@ data:
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# the dispatcher and its workers share the committed Job template and the env-name
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# contract. A tag here is refused at startup (and would be DENIED by admission anyway).
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#
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# PLACEHOLDER UNTIL THE IMAGE IS PUBLISHED. The all-zero digest below is deliberately
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# impossible. CI builds, verifies and — on main — publishes agent-runner
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# (.gitea/workflows/images.yaml), and Renovate replaces this value with the digest the
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# REGISTRY returned for the image's `main` tag, in a pull request that also moves the
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# Deployment's image (same marker, same branch). Nobody pushes this image from a workstation.
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# Until the first publish the dispatcher starts, fails to pull, and says so — which is the
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# visible failure, not a silent one.
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# THE FIRST PUBLISHED DIGEST. CI builds, verifies and — on main — publishes agent-runner
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# (.gitea/workflows/images.yaml). This value is images run 340's publish (tag
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# sha-523cd9118f95, which `main` pointed at), read from the registry on 2026-10-30. From here
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# on Renovate replaces it with the digest the REGISTRY returns for the `main` tag, in a pull
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# request that also moves the Deployment's image (same marker, same branch). Nobody pushes
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# this image from a workstation.
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#
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# READ BEFORE TURNING PM_DRY_RUN OFF: this digest PREDATES the worker template's
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# `imagePullSecrets` entry (PR #61). Its baked template has none, and admission now REQUIRES
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# it — so a worker Job built from this image is DENIED. The merge that adds the entry
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# changes infra/agent/**, CI re-publishes agent-runner, and Renovate's bump to that digest
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# is what makes worker Jobs admissible. Until then, dry run is the only mode that works.
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# renovate-digest: image=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner tag=main
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PM_WORKER_IMAGE: "gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
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PM_WORKER_IMAGE: "gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner@sha256:c4eba5b3c508bf456a03391ac76f8275e7ea28a829da1450d99f6f6f25c6eb42"
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# --- the model -------------------------------------------------------------
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# The PM only reads a thread and answers with one JSON object, so it holds no tools and
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@@ -104,13 +109,21 @@ data:
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# work somebody deliberately handed it while trust is being established, with no code
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# change and no redeploy of anything but this ConfigMap. The operator's call; the default
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# here honours the request as made.
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PM_REQUIRE_LABEL: ""
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#
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# SET TO `agent` FOR THE FIRST RUN (2026-10-30, docs/plans/pm-agent-issue-to-pr.md
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# follow-up 3). The label does not exist in the repository yet: create it in Gitea
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# (Issues -> Labels -> New Label, name `agent`) before labelling a test issue.
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PM_REQUIRE_LABEL: "agent"
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# Dry run: the PM still reads threads, still asks the model and still posts its decision as
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# an issue comment — so the operator can read exactly what it WOULD have done — but creates
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# no worker Job and so changes no code. The honest way to watch this service for a day
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# before letting it write anything.
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PM_DRY_RUN: "false"
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#
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# "true" FOR THE FIRST RUN, and not only for caution: the pinned digest above cannot yet
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# create an admissible worker Job (see the PM_WORKER_IMAGE comment). Flip to "false" in the
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# same pull request as — or after — Renovate's first agent-runner digest bump.
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PM_DRY_RUN: "true"
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# If the gate refuses a worker's change, the branch is NOT pushed by default and the issue
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# gets the gate log instead. Set to "true" to push anyway and open a red pull request —
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ spec:
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# It is a hand-maintained marker rather than a computed hash because Flux's
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# Kustomization here does not run a configmap generator; bump it in the same commit
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# as a change to configmap.yaml.
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pm-agent.homelab.keithjackson.dev/config-generation: "1"
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pm-agent.homelab.keithjackson.dev/config-generation: "2"
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spec:
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serviceAccountName: pm-agent
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# The kubelet's credential for pulling this image. Not the agent's Gitea credential —
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@@ -73,10 +73,12 @@ spec:
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# disagree about the shape the admission policy enforces. Replaced together, in ONE
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# Renovate pull request: both lines carry the same marker, so Renovate treats them as
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# one dependency and bumps them in the same branch. The digest comes from CI's publish
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# of agent-runner's `main` tag (.gitea/workflows/images.yaml) — the all-zero
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# placeholder below is impossible on purpose (see configmap.yaml PM_WORKER_IMAGE).
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# of agent-runner's `main` tag (.gitea/workflows/images.yaml). The value below is the
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# FIRST publish (images run 340, tag sha-523cd9118f95 = main at the time), read from
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# the registry's manifest endpoint on 2026-10-30 and pinned by hand once so the
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# dispatcher does not wait on Renovate's first run; every later bump is Renovate's.
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# renovate-digest: image=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner tag=main
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image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner@sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
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image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner@sha256:c4eba5b3c508bf456a03391ac76f8275e7ea28a829da1450d99f6f6f25c6eb42
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imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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command:
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- /usr/local/bin/pm-dispatch
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@@ -60,11 +60,21 @@
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# Keycloak service-account token therefore cannot authenticate to Gitea's API or to
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# git-over-HTTP. Do not "upgrade" this to Keycloak without re-reading that.
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#
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# Scopes: `write:repository` and `write:issue`. Nothing else — in particular NOT
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# `write:admin`, NOT `write:organization`, NOT `write:user`.
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# Scopes, exactly these four (one token serves both Secrets — see
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# pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml.example):
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# read:user GET /user, the dispatcher's startup identity check. Gitea 1.24.3
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# puts the whole /api/v1/user group behind the `user` scope
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# category (routers/api/v1/api.go), so without it the dispatcher
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# CrashLoops on its first call even with an otherwise-valid token.
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# write:repository the clone, the branch push, the pull-request create, and the
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# dispatcher's reads of pulls/branches/commits.
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# write:issue reading open issues and posting issue comments.
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# read:package the kubelet's image pull (pm-agent-registry).
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# Nothing else — in particular NOT `write:admin`, NOT `write:organization`, NOT
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# `write:user`. (Until 2026-10-30 this list said two scopes; `read:user` was missing
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# and `read:package` lived only in the registry template.)
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#
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# `write:repository` covers the clone, the branch push and the pull-request create;
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# `write:issue` covers reading and posting issue comments. (The repository's OTHER CI
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# (The repository's OTHER CI
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# token, `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`, is a separate credential with `read:admin` — do not
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# conflate them, and do not give this service that one. The 2026-10-02 measurement on
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# PR #38 recorded in infra/gitea/approval-policy.json is about that token, not this one.)
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@@ -94,6 +104,17 @@
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#
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# (4) COPY, FILL, ENCRYPT, COMMIT:
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#
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# `sops` IS IN THE PINNED TOOLBOX, NOT ON THE HOST (measured 2026-10-30: absent from the
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# workstation's PATH; sops 3.9.4 and vi in the toolbox). The simplest path needs no
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# plaintext file at all — edit the committed, already-encrypted file in place, from a
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# worktree, the way runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md does for its key:
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#
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# ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml
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#
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# It opens vi on the decrypted document; replace the REPLACE-ME value(s), save, quit, and
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# sops re-encrypts on write. If you take the cp route below instead, run the `sops -e -i`
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# line through `./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run` as well, and delete any plaintext temp file.
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#
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# cp platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml.example \
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# platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml
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# $EDITOR platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-credentials.sops.yaml # the two real values
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@@ -120,7 +141,7 @@ metadata:
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type: Opaque
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stringData:
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# Gitea token for the dedicated, NON-ADMIN `pm-agent` account.
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# Scopes: write:repository, write:issue.
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# Scopes: read:user, write:repository, write:issue, read:package.
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gitea-token: REPLACE-ME-gitea-token
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# Output of `claude setup-token` on a subscription account. One year's validity.
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claude-code-oauth-token: REPLACE-ME-claude-code-oauth-token
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@@ -34,12 +34,31 @@
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# package and nothing else.
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#
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# (2) ADD THE PACKAGE SCOPE. Gitea token scopes are fixed at creation, so this means
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# generating a token with all three scopes and using it in BOTH Secrets:
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# generating a token with all four scopes and using it in BOTH Secrets:
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#
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# read:package <- NEW, what the kubelet needs to pull
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# read:user <- the dispatcher's startup GET /user (Gitea 1.24.3 scopes it)
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# write:repository <- the agent's clone / branch push / pull-request create
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# write:issue <- the agent's issue comments
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#
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# THE SCOPE IS NOT THE PERMISSION. `read:package` only lets the token use whatever
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# package access the ACCOUNT has, and these packages belong to the ORGANISATION
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# (`home-network/…`), not to a repository. Gitea 1.24.3 decides org-package access in
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# services/context/package.go `determineAccessMode`: the highest Packages-unit mode of
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# any org team the user is in, else READ if the org is visible to that user. Home-Network
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# is `public` today (measured 2026-10-30), so a signed-in non-member already gets read —
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# but that is a side effect of a visibility setting nobody chose for this. Make it
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# explicit, and independent of visibility:
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#
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# Organisation Home-Network -> Teams -> New Team
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# name: pm-agent-pull permission: none (unit-level)
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# repositories: NONE (do not tick "all repositories")
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# units: Packages = Read; every other unit = No Access
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# then add `pm-agent` as its only member.
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#
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# That grants package read on the org and nothing on any repository; the repo `Write`
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# comes only from the collaborator entry in the credentials template.
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#
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# Gitea -> (as pm-agent) Settings -> Applications -> Generate New Token.
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# Put the SAME value in `pm-agent-credentials` (`gitea-token`) and in the
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# `.dockerconfigjson` below. One token, two consumers, two formats — the same
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@@ -64,6 +83,17 @@
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#
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# (4) COPY, FILL, ENCRYPT, COMMIT:
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#
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# `sops` IS IN THE PINNED TOOLBOX, NOT ON THE HOST (measured 2026-10-30: absent from the
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# workstation's PATH; sops 3.9.4 and vi in the toolbox). The simplest path needs no
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# plaintext file at all — edit the committed, already-encrypted file in place, from a
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# worktree, the way runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md does for its key:
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#
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# ./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml
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#
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# It opens vi on the decrypted document; replace the REPLACE-ME value(s), save, quit, and
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# sops re-encrypts on write. If you take the cp route below instead, run the `sops -e -i`
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# line through `./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run` as well, and delete any plaintext temp file.
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#
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# cp platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml.example \
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# platform/pm-agent/pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml
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# # paste the one-line JSON from step 3 as the .dockerconfigjson value
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