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feat(dns): INVERT to operator's simpler layout — dev to subdomain, prod to apex

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*** DO NOT MERGE TO main WHILE THE OPERATOR IS AWAY. MERGING IS THE MIGRATION. ***

Operator simplified the architecture, inverting c8c1d29:
  dev  -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev        (was the apex)
  prod -> *.home.keithjackson.dev            (the apex; no prod. subdomain, no CNAME layer)

WHY MERGING IS DANGEROUS, and this is the finding that matters most here:
clusters/dev/sync.yaml self-reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` every 10 minutes. Merging
these files EXECUTES the cutover on the live dev cluster, unattended. And because the same
commit moves dev's GitRepository url to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, dev STRANDS — it
stops reconciling and cannot be fixed by pushing, because the broken thing IS the path Flux
reads pushes through. Banners added at the top of clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml and beside
the url itself. That url cannot be tokenized: the root Kustomization declares no
substituteFrom, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` would ship the literal token.

Verified dev is currently safe: this work is NOT on origin/main, dev is reconciling
main@4809199, and its live BASE_DOMAIN is still home.keithjackson.dev. Deliberately NOT
pushed to the bootstrap Gitea either — prod reconciles from there, and prod on `prod.home.`
cannot collide with dev on the apex, so that is the safer interim for prod.

VALUES
                BASE_DOMAIN                  TXT_OWNER_ID   DOMAIN_FILTER
  base          dev.home.keithjackson.dev    sentinel       keithjackson.dev
  dev           dev.home.keithjackson.dev    dev            keithjackson.dev
  prod          home.keithjackson.dev        prod           keithjackson.dev
Ansible seam inverted too: role default k3s_base_domain = dev's subdomain, group_vars/k3s_prod
overrides to the apex.

dev's txtOwnerId moves `default` -> `dev`. The old value was FORCED (its live apex records
were already registered under `default`, so renaming would have orphaned them). On a new
suffix dev publishes a brand-new record set with no prior registry, so the id is chosen on
merits — and `default` has none: it is what you get by FORGETTING the flag, which is exactly
how both clusters came to share it and delete each other's records. Operationally it also
means dev's old apex records stay owned by a now-unclaimed id, so nothing deletes them
implicitly and vacating the apex becomes an explicit sequenceable step rather than a race
between two reconcile loops. PROD MUST NEVER BE GIVEN `default`: prod inherits the apex
NAMES, so `default` is the one value that would let it adopt and policy:sync-delete dev's
still-live apex records — the same incident with the roles swapped.

DOMAIN_FILTER stays the ZONE for both, with F-DNS1 written into all three files as a
do-not-retry: a subdomain filter drops the parent zone and publishes NOTHING.

VERIFICATION — the property changed, and so did the method. "Dev renders byte-identically" no
longer applies because dev is deliberately migrating. Instead: apply the INVERSE substitution
to the new render and demand byte-identity with the baseline. 145 changed line pairs, every
one classified: 143 hostname-move, 2 declared owner-id, ZERO unexplained, ZERO bare-apex
remnants. cilium and velero show 0 changes and provably contain no hostname, so they are not
blind spots. Prod: 0 occurrences of prod.home., 0 of dev.home., 143 apex names. Certs: dev
*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod *.home.keithjackson.dev.

THREE positive controls, all fire — including one that proves the two checks are not
redundant: injecting a single un-moved hostname SURVIVES the inverse-substitution check and is
caught only by the independent bare-apex scan. That is why both exist.

Ansible probe (connection: local, zero SSH): dev nodes -> keycloak.dev.home..., prod nodes ->
keycloak.home.... Used roles: + --tags probe rather than include_vars, because include_vars
outranks group_vars and would have FALSELY shown prod inheriting dev's value.

Gates all PASS: l0, l1, render-golden (10 goldens), lint, substitution (254 assertions),
render.py --selftest, spec-immutability. Catalog ServiceDefinitions edited, never rendered apps/.

RUNBOOK rewritten in §10 + §10a with the ordering that avoids stranding: D0 snapshot escape
routes -> D1 break the automatic trigger -> D2 publish and PROVE gitea.dev.home + the new
wildcard cert WHILE dev still serves the apex -> D3 merge -> D4 release reconciliation
deliberately -> D5 Keycloak issuer + ~12 clients (headlamp's is SOPS, by hand) -> D6
one-server-at-a-time k3s restart + SSO re-issue (service restart only, NO reboots) -> D7
retire old apex records -> D8 verify the apex is empty AGAINST CLOUDFLARE, not pfSense —
the gate on everything after. Then P1 unsuspend prod.

ACME: prod's wildcard is EXACTLY the name set dev holds today, so prod's orders share dev's
5-per-week duplicate-certificate bucket. Order after D8, delete dev's old Certificate rather
than let it renew, rehearse on staging.

The 6 L2 chainsaw tests hardcoding the apex are enumerated but deliberately NOT edited — while
dev is live on the apex they are correct; they need per-environment parameterisation.

Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01/02/03, R-TLS-01.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-09-04 23:08:50 -05:00
1 parent c8c1d2935d
commit 9137bbd0c3
8 files changed
+556 -234
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catalog/render.py
+3 -2
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ LBL = "homelab.keithjackson.dev"
# The platform hostname suffix, emitted as the Flux post-build TOKEN rather than a literal.
# Every rendered manifest lands under a Flux path whose Kustomization declares
# postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so `${BASE_DOMAIN}` is resolved per environment at
# reconcile time: dev renders home.keithjackson.dev, prod renders prod.home.keithjackson.dev.
# reconcile time: dev renders dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod renders home.keithjackson.dev (the
# APEX — operator decision 2026-09-04; prod IS the apex, so there is no `prod.` label and no CNAMEs).
# It is a DECLARED cluster-vars knob (clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml), so it is written BARE —
# the escape contract below reserves `$${...}` for expansions meant for a container's shell.
# Hardcoding the literal here is what let prod be authored to serve dev's public hostnames,
@@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ def r_internet_egress(s: dict) -> dict:
def r_httproutes(s: dict) -> list:
"""One HTTPRoute per ingressRoute, attaching host -> service port on the shared Gateway.
TLS is the Gateway's wildcard *.home.keithjackson.dev cert (no per-service cert step);
TLS is the Gateway's wildcard *.${BASE_DOMAIN} cert (no per-service cert step);
ExternalDNS manages the record from the HTTPRoute (R-TLS/R-DNS, renderer-contract).
"""
out = []
clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml
+64 -30
View File
@@ -26,36 +26,49 @@ data:
# authored to serve the SAME hostnames out of the SAME Cloudflare zone, so prod's external-dns
# (policy: sync, owner `default`) concluded it owned dev's public records and DELETED ALL OF THEM.
# See infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10. The fix is architectural: each environment gets its OWN
# subdomain, so the two clusters can no longer describe the same name.
# suffix, so the two clusters can no longer describe the same name.
#
# dev -> home.keithjackson.dev (UNCHANGED — see below)
# prod -> prod.home.keithjackson.dev
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (a subdomain; = this base default)
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX — prod IS the apex, no `prod.` label)
#
# DEV DELIBERATELY STAYS ON THE APEX `home.keithjackson.dev`. The target architecture puts dev on
# `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` with apex CNAMEs `<svc>.home` -> `<svc>.prod.home`, but moving dev
# relocates its Keycloak issuer, every OIDC client redirect URI, kubectl SSO, its wildcard cert and
# the Gitea host that IS the GitOps source — on a live cluster. Deferred to phase 2
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10). Base default is therefore the DEV value, the same convention as
# GATEWAY_VIP / LONGHORN_DATA_PATH: the base default is the known-good working value, dev restates
# it verbatim, and prod overrides it. Dev's rendered output is byte-identical to the pre-
# tokenization hardcoded manifests (verified 2026-09-04, all 12 substituted paths).
BASE_DOMAIN: "home.keithjackson.dev"
# OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-04 (supersedes the interim split committed earlier the same day, which
# had prod on `prod.home.` with apex CNAMEs pointing at it). PROD IS THE APEX. That deletes the
# whole CNAME layer — `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` is prod's real name, not an alias — and it is
# DEV that carries a label. Convention is unchanged from GATEWAY_VIP / LONGHORN_DATA_PATH: the base
# default is the DEV value (dev restates it verbatim) and prod overrides it. What changed is which
# string dev holds.
#
# DEV'S VALUE IS A MIGRATION, NOT A VARIABLE CHANGE. The live dev cluster is serving the APEX right
# now: its wildcard cert, every public DNS record, its Keycloak issuer, ~12 OIDC clients' redirect
# URIs, kubectl SSO, and gitea.home.keithjackson.dev — which IS this repo's GitOps source AND the
# push target. Flipping this value on dev without first standing up the new host set STRANDS DEV:
# Flux's GitRepository url moves to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, which has no DNS record and no
# cert, so dev stops reconciling and cannot be fixed by pushing. ORDERED CUTOVER, operator present:
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# DEV MUST VACATE THE APEX BEFORE PROD PUBLISHES THERE. Both clusters describing
# `*.home.keithjackson.dev` at once is the 2026-09-04 incident precondition, re-created.
BASE_DOMAIN: "dev.home.keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS `--domain-filter` (platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml). SAFETY NET #2 behind
# EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID: a record whose name falls outside this filter is not even considered,
# so it cannot be created, updated or deleted regardless of TXT ownership.
#
# DEV KEEPS THE ZONE APEX `keithjackson.dev`, and must: dev serves the `home.keithjackson.dev`
# apex itself, and the Cloudflare provider filters the ACCOUNT'S ZONES by this value — a filter
# that is a strict subdomain of the zone dropped the parent zone outright ("no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name", DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08) on the version in use then. So dev's value is unchanged
# from the retired `DNS_ZONE` knob this replaces, and dev renders byte-identically.
# BOTH ENVIRONMENTS USE THE CLOUDFLARE **ZONE**, `keithjackson.dev`. This value is NOT a per-
# environment isolation knob and must not be narrowed to either environment's BASE_DOMAIN.
#
# PROD NARROWS TO ITS OWN SUBTREE `prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. VERIFY ON PROD'S FIRST RECONCILE
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10): if the zone-lookup limitation above still applies to the pinned
# chart, prod's external-dns will select NO zone and create NO records. That failure is FAIL-CLOSED
# — it can never delete another environment's records — and the fallback is to set prod's value
# back to "keithjackson.dev", leaving EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID as the sole (and sufficient) guard.
# FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) — the Cloudflare provider uses --domain-filter for ZONE
# SELECTION as well as name filtering, so a filter that is a STRICT SUBDOMAIN of the hosted zone
# matches NO zone: ExternalDNS generates the record and then skips it with "no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name", publishing NOTHING. This has been tried and reverted more than once (an agent
# narrowed prod to prod.home.keithjackson.dev on 2026-09-04; overridden in review). DO NOT "harden"
# it — the change is not defence in depth, it is a total outage of DNS publication.
#
# WHERE ISOLATION ACTUALLY COMES FROM, and it is sufficient:
# (1) the two environments request DISJOINT hostname sets (dev.home.… vs the apex), and
# (2) EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID differs, so neither registry ever claims the other's records.
# That pairing is what the 2026-09-04 incident needed; a domain filter cannot provide it, because
# both environments live in the one zone either way.
EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER: "keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS TXT registry owner id (`--txt-owner-id`). THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE 2026-09-04 INCIDENT:
@@ -64,14 +77,35 @@ data:
# `policy: sync`, to DELETE when no local resource claims it. Two clusters sharing an owner id on
# one zone therefore garbage-collect each other. Each environment MUST have a distinct value.
#
# DEV MUST RENDER EXACTLY `default`. Dev's LIVE public records are already registered in Cloudflare
# under owner `default`; changing dev's value would make dev's own external-dns stop recognising
# them, and it would re-create duplicates alongside the orphaned originals. Dev's overlay pins it.
# dev -> `dev` prod -> `prod` base default -> a non-colliding sentinel (below)
#
# THE BASE DEFAULT IS A NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL, deliberately NOT `default`. A new environment that
# forgets this knob must not silently inherit dev's identity — that is precisely the incident. With
# this sentinel such a cluster owns nothing, so it can DELETE nothing; it would publish under a
# visibly wrong owner id (grep the TXT records) instead of destroying a live environment's DNS.
# DEV IS `dev`, NOT `default` (changed 2026-09-04 with the move to dev.home.keithjackson.dev). Until
# this migration dev HAD to render `default`, because its LIVE apex records were already registered
# in Cloudflare's TXT registry under that owner and renaming would have orphaned every one of them.
# THAT CONSTRAINT NO LONGER BINDS: dev is publishing an ENTIRELY NEW record set under
# *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, with no pre-existing registry entries to recognise, so the owner id
# is now free to be chosen on its merits. Two reasons to take `dev`:
# - `default` is THE VALUE YOU GET BY FORGETTING (it is the external-dns chart default, and both
# clusters silently shared it, which IS the incident). An environment whose identity is the
# forget-value can never be told apart from a misconfigured newcomer. No environment should
# hold it.
# - It makes vacating the apex an EXPLICIT, ORDERED, VERIFIABLE step. Dev's old apex records stay
# owned by `default`, which no environment now claims, so nothing deletes them implicitly on
# some future reconcile — they are retired deliberately, and prod's publish is gated on that
# retirement being confirmed in Cloudflare (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10) rather than on a
# race between two reconcile loops.
#
# PROD STAYS `prod` AND MUST NOT BECOME `default`, even though prod now serves the apex names that
# dev's `default`-owned records currently occupy. Giving prod `default` would hand prod ownership of
# the LIVE dev cluster's records while dev is still serving them, and under `policy: sync` prod
# would delete the ones no prod source claims. That is the 2026-09-04 incident, re-armed, with the
# roles swapped. Prod inherits the apex NAMES; it must never inherit the apex OWNER ID.
#
# THE BASE DEFAULT IS A NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL, deliberately NOT `default` and not any real
# environment's id. A new environment that forgets this knob must not silently inherit another's
# identity — that is precisely the incident. With this sentinel such a cluster owns nothing, so it
# can DELETE nothing; it would publish under a visibly wrong owner id (grep the TXT records)
# instead of destroying a live environment's DNS.
EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID: "unset-see-cluster-vars"
ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER: "letsencrypt-staging" # dev: staging | prod: letsencrypt-prod (ADR-0006)
@@ -79,7 +113,7 @@ data:
# ingress VIP of the `shared` Gateway. MUST equal the FIRST address of
# ${CILIUM_LB_POOL_START}..${CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP} below — the Gateway
# takes the pool's first free IP, and coredns-custom answers
# *.home.keithjackson.dev with THIS so pod -> public-hostname traffic
# *.${BASE_DOMAIN} with THIS so pod -> public-hostname traffic
# hairpins through the Gateway (correct SNI -> wildcard cert).
# Base default = the DEV LAN VIP (was 10.73.0.240, an address on the
# long-RETIRED libvirt network — corrected 2026-08-31 so an overlay that
clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml
+80 -22
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@
# reconciliation graph and patches the shared cluster-vars ConfigMap with dev-scoped values (R-ENV-02).
# It also adds a self-managing ROOT Kustomization (sync.yaml) so the whole graph reconciles from git
# on every push — no more manual `kubectl apply -k` for cluster-vars/overlay changes (F-OPS1).
#
# ##############################################################################################
# ### *** DO NOT MERGE THIS FILE TO `main` UNATTENDED (as of 2026-09-04) *** ###
# ### ###
# ### This overlay now carries dev's DNS MIGRATION target: BASE_DOMAIN moves from the apex ###
# ### `home.keithjackson.dev` to `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`, and the GitRepository url ###
# ### moves with it. sync.yaml reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` EVERY 10 MINUTES, so a ###
# ### merge to main IS the cutover — it executes on the live dev cluster with nobody present. ###
# ### Dev's Gitea is both its GitOps source and the push target: if the new host is not up ###
# ### with a Ready cert first, dev stops reconciling and pushing cannot repair it. ###
# ### ###
# ### Run the ordered runbook: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10 (steps D1-D8), operator ###
# ### present. Merging is step D3, not step one. ###
# ##############################################################################################
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
@@ -131,7 +145,24 @@ patches:
# via coredns -> Gateway VIP, and the LE-prod wildcard cert is publicly trusted so NO
# secretRef/caCert is needed. Recovery: restart bootstrap Gitea (192.168.2.103:3000) and
# revert this url (docs/05).
url: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
#
# *** THE STRAND. THIS URL IS THE MOST DANGEROUS LINE IN THE REPOSITORY. ***
# It is BOTH dev's GitOps source AND the operator's push target, and it is NOT tokenized —
# it cannot be: the `flux-system` root Kustomization that renders ./clusters/dev declares NO
# postBuild.substituteFrom, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` here would ship the LITERAL token and
# break the source outright (the L0 flux-postbuild-substitution check asserts exactly this).
# So it is a hand-maintained literal that must be moved in lockstep with BASE_DOMAIN below.
#
# It has been moved to dev's NEW suffix as part of the 2026-09-04 migration authoring. That
# makes this file the TARGET state, NOT a safe unattended merge: dev's root Kustomization
# (sync.yaml) reconciles ./clusters/dev from `main` every 10m, so MERGING THIS TO main WHILE
# DEV IS LIVE MIGRATES DEV UNATTENDED. If gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev does not already
# resolve and serve a valid cert at that instant, dev stops reconciling and CANNOT BE FIXED
# BY PUSHING — the broken thing is the path Flux uses to read pushes.
# ORDERING THAT AVOIDS IT (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10, steps D1-D3): suspend dev's root
# Kustomization or park this url on the bootstrap Gitea (http://192.168.2.132:3000/...) for
# the migration window, and only restore the in-cluster url after the new host is proven.
url: https://gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
ref:
branch: main
# --- dev-scoped cluster-vars (R-ENV-02) ---
@@ -148,33 +179,60 @@ patches:
- op: replace
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# --- DNS identity (R-DNS-01/02/03) -----------------------------------------------------
# DEV STAYS ON THE APEX. Restated explicitly even though it equals the base default, exactly
# like the LAN block and LONGHORN_DATA_PATH below: this is what the LIVE cluster is running.
# Every one of dev's public DNS records, its `*.home.keithjackson.dev` wildcard cert, its
# Keycloak issuer, every OIDC client redirect URI, kubectl SSO, and gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
# (which IS this repo's GitOps source) are all on this exact suffix RIGHT NOW. Prod moved to
# prod.home.keithjackson.dev instead (2026-09-04) — that alone ended the collision, so dev did
# not have to move. Relocating dev to dev.home.keithjackson.dev is phase 2 and is a migration,
# not a variable change: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
# ==========================================================================================
# DEV DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — DEV MOVES OFF THE APEX. **NOT YET APPLIED.**
# ==========================================================================================
# OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-04, superseding the interim split committed earlier the same day:
#
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (this knob; = the base default, restated)
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX — prod IS the apex, no `prod.` label,
# and therefore no apex CNAME layer at all)
#
# *** THIS VALUE IS AHEAD OF THE LIVE CLUSTER. *** The dev cluster is serving the APEX right
# now. Merging this file does not perform the migration — it DEFINES the target. The cutover is
# an ORDERED, OPERATOR-PRESENT runbook: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# WHY IT CANNOT BE A PLAIN VARIABLE FLIP — THE STRAND. `spec.url` of the GitRepository ~20
# lines above is https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/... . Dev's Gitea is BOTH dev's GitOps
# source AND the operator's push target. The moment BASE_DOMAIN moves, dev's Gitea HTTPRoute,
# DNS record and wildcard cert all move to gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev. If that host does
# not ALREADY resolve with a valid, Ready cert, dev stops reconciling — and it CANNOT BE FIXED
# BY PUSHING, because the thing that is broken is the path Flux uses to read pushes. Recovery
# is then hands-on (point the source at the bootstrap Gitea on 192.168.2.132:3000, or repair
# in-cluster by hand). §10 states the ordering that avoids it: publish and verify the new host
# FIRST, or park the source on the bootstrap Gitea for the window.
#
# ALSO MOVED BY THIS ONE LINE, all on a live cluster: the `*.` wildcard Certificate (a fresh
# ACME order), Keycloak's issuer URL and ~12 OIDC clients' redirect URIs, kubectl SSO (a k3s
# server flag => a rolling restart + every user re-issuing their kubeconfig), coredns-custom's
# split-horizon zone, Homepage's links, and 6 L2 chainsaw tests that hardcode the apex.
- op: replace
path: /data/BASE_DOMAIN
value: "home.keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS scope. MUST stay the zone apex: dev serves the home.keithjackson.dev APEX itself,
# and the Cloudflare provider selects zones with this value (a strict-subdomain filter dropped
# the parent zone — DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08). Same value the retired DNS_ZONE knob held.
value: "dev.home.keithjackson.dev"
# ExternalDNS scope. MUST stay the Cloudflare ZONE — NOT dev.home.keithjackson.dev. FINDING
# F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17): the Cloudflare provider uses this for ZONE SELECTION, so a
# strict-subdomain filter matches no zone and publishes NOTHING ("no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name"). Dev moving to a subdomain does NOT make narrowing safe — it makes it
# newly tempting, which is why this comment is here. Same value the retired DNS_ZONE knob held.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER
value: "keithjackson.dev"
# DO NOT CHANGE THIS VALUE. Dev's LIVE public records are registered in Cloudflare's TXT
# registry under owner `default` (the external-dns chart default, which is what both clusters
# silently shared until the 2026-09-04 incident). Dev's external-dns identifies its own records
# BY this string: any other value and it stops recognising every record it manages, then
# re-creates duplicates beside the orphaned originals. Prod is `prod` — distinct, which is the
# whole point. The base default is a non-colliding sentinel, so this line is load-bearing.
# OWNER ID: `dev` (was `default` until 2026-09-04). The old value was FORCED — dev's live apex
# records were already in Cloudflare's TXT registry under owner `default`, so renaming would
# have orphaned every one of them. THE MIGRATION DISSOLVES THAT CONSTRAINT: on the new suffix
# dev publishes a brand-new record set with no prior registry entries to recognise, so the id
# is chosen on its merits, and `default` has none — it is the value external-dns uses when you
# FORGET the flag, which is exactly how both clusters came to share it. Consequences, both
# deliberate:
# - dev's OLD apex records remain owned by `default`, which no environment now claims, so
# nothing deletes them implicitly. Retiring them is an explicit §10 step, and prod's first
# publish is gated on that retirement being CONFIRMED — not on two reconcile loops racing.
# - prod stays `prod` and must NEVER be given `default`, or prod would own the live dev
# cluster's apex records and sync-delete them. Prod inherits the apex NAMES, not its OWNER.
# dev != prod is the load-bearing invariant; the base default stays a non-colliding sentinel.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
value: "default"
value: "dev"
# --- dev LAN addressing (192.168.1.0/24 on the Proxmox LAN) -----------------------------
# EVERY knob in cluster-vars' "LAN addressing" block is restated here EXPLICITLY, even where it
# equals the base default. These values are what the LIVE dev cluster is running right now, so
@@ -183,7 +241,7 @@ patches:
#
# Split-horizon DNS target: the Cilium-L2 VIP of the `shared` Gateway on the Proxmox LAN
# (= CILIUM_LB_POOL_START, the pool's first address). coredns-custom answers
# *.home.keithjackson.dev with this so in-cluster OIDC clients reach Keycloak via the Gateway.
# *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev with this so in-cluster OIDC clients reach Keycloak via the Gateway.
- op: replace
path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
value: "192.168.1.53"
clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml
+66 -41
View File
@@ -129,14 +129,23 @@ patches:
#
# WHY THE IN-CLUSTER URL CANNOT BE USED YET (blocker found 2026-09-01, still true; the
# unusable value was `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git`).
# Two independent reasons, both consequences of the split-horizon design:
# 1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY. Gitea runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER. Prod syncing from it means prod's
# GitOps source lives inside the very cluster slated for decommission. Gitea must move to
# prod (or off-cluster) BEFORE dev is retired, or prod loses its source of truth.
# 2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS SENDS IT TO THE WRONG PLACE. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml
# answers the ENTIRE home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. On prod that is
# 192.168.2.20 — PROD's own gateway, where no Gitea is listening. Prod's Flux would resolve
# gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to itself and never reach a repository.
# REASONING UPDATED 2026-09-04 for the new suffix direction (prod = the apex, dev = dev.home.),
# which changes WHY the blocker holds but not THAT it holds:
# 1. SELF-HOSTING CIRCULARITY — still true, and now the only reason. The Gitea this repo is
# pushed to runs ON THE DEV CLUSTER. Prod syncing from it would put prod's GitOps source
# inside the very cluster slated for decommission. Gitea must move to prod (or off-cluster)
# BEFORE dev is retired, or prod loses its source of truth.
# NOTE the suffix change makes the two Giteas DIFFERENT HOSTS: dev's is now
# gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev and prod's is gitea.home.keithjackson.dev. Prod pointing at
# the apex name therefore means "prod's OWN Gitea", never dev's — which is what makes the
# cutover below a one-line change once prod actually runs Gitea.
# 2. SPLIT-HORIZON DNS — NO LONGER A BLOCKER, and the note is kept because the old reasoning is
# easy to re-derive incorrectly. platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml answers the whole
# ${BASE_DOMAIN} zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}; when prod's BASE_DOMAIN was `prod.home.` that meant
# prod resolved gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to PROD's gateway (192.168.2.20) where no Gitea
# listened — a misdirection. Now that prod IS the apex, resolving gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
# to prod's own Gateway is CORRECT: that is where prod's Gitea will be served from. What
# remains is purely reason 1 — the Gitea is not there YET.
#
# WHAT THE TEMPORARY SOURCE IS (stood up 2026-09-04 on explicit operator direction):
# bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh with HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132 — a podman container on the
@@ -202,28 +211,41 @@ patches:
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — the fix for the 2026-09-04 incident.
# PROD DNS IDENTITY (R-DNS-01/02/03) — PROD **IS** THE APEX.
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD SERVES ITS OWN SUBDOMAIN. Until 2026-09-04 every hostname was HARDCODED to
# home.keithjackson.dev in the base manifests, so prod was authored to serve the EXACT SAME
# public names as the live dev cluster out of the SAME Cloudflare zone. Two consequences, one
# of which already happened:
# OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-04, superseding the interim split committed earlier the same day
# (prod on `prod.home.` behind apex CNAMEs). The simpler target, and the one authored here:
#
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (dev carries the label; clusters/dev)
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX — this knob)
#
# There is NO `prod.` label and NO CNAME layer. `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` is prod's REAL
# name, so nothing has to alias anything: prod's Gitea is gitea.home.keithjackson.dev, its
# Keycloak keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev, and the wildcard cert is `*.home.keithjackson.dev`.
#
# BACKGROUND — WHY THE SUFFIXES HAD TO SPLIT AT ALL. Until 2026-09-04 every hostname was
# HARDCODED to home.keithjackson.dev in the base manifests, so prod was authored to serve the
# EXACT SAME public names as the live dev cluster out of the SAME Cloudflare zone. Two
# consequences, one of which already happened:
# 1. HAPPENED: prod's external-dns (policy: sync, owner id `default` — the same implicit
# default dev had) concluded it owned dev's records and DELETED EVERY ONE of them.
# 2. QUEUED BEHIND IT: platform-config would have requested a `*.home.keithjackson.dev`
# wildcard from letsencrypt-prod for a cert dev already holds, and both clusters would
# have raced each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records on that one zone.
# Moving prod to its own suffix dissolves both: the two clusters can no longer name the same
# record. This is what makes ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER: letsencrypt-prod above safe here.
#
# dev -> home.keithjackson.dev (UNCHANGED — dev is live; phase 2 moves it)
# prod -> prod.home.keithjackson.dev (this knob)
#
# CONSEQUENCE — prod's hostnames are NOT the apex names. Prod's Gitea is
# gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, its Keycloak keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and so
# on; the wildcard cert becomes `*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. The apex CNAMEs that make
# `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` point at prod are PHASE 2, deliberately not done here — they
# would take traffic off the live dev cluster. infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
# *** THE ORDERING CONSTRAINT THIS VALUE CREATES — READ BEFORE UNSUSPENDING ANYTHING. ***
# Prod now claims the very names the LIVE dev cluster is serving today. Both hazards above are
# therefore still armed until DEV HAS VACATED THE APEX. Prod's `platform` and its 10 downstream
# tiers are SUSPENDED for exactly this reason. The gate is not "review is done", it is:
# (a) dev is reconciling on *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev with a Ready wildcard cert, AND
# (b) dev's old apex A/CNAME records and their TXT registry entries are GONE from Cloudflare
# (verified against Cloudflare directly — a pfSense override is NOT evidence about public
# DNS; that mistake was made on 2026-09-04), AND
# (c) dev's old `*.home.keithjackson.dev` cert/Certificate is released, because prod ordering
# that same name set while dev's still exists counts against LE's duplicate-certificate
# limit (5 per week per identical name set).
# Full ordered runbook: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10. Unsuspending before (a)-(c) re-creates
# the 2026-09-04 incident with the roles reversed.
#
# [parity] MUST equal k3s_base_domain in infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml.
# The kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is an INSTALL-TIME k3s flag, not a manifest, so it is
@@ -231,30 +253,33 @@ patches:
# trusts a different Keycloak than the one prod actually runs.
- op: replace
path: /data/BASE_DOMAIN
value: "prod.home.keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #2 (independent of the owner id below): narrow ExternalDNS's name scope to prod's
# OWN subtree, so prod cannot create, update or delete any record outside it no matter what the
# TXT registry says. VERIFY ON FIRST RECONCILE — the Cloudflare provider uses this value for
# ZONE selection too, and on the version in use in 2026-08 a strict-subdomain filter dropped
# the parent zone ("no hosted zone matching record DNS Name"). If prod's external-dns logs no
# matching zone, it will create NOTHING — fail-closed, and it can still never delete dev's
# records. Fallback in that case: set this to "keithjackson.dev" (dev's value) and rely on
# EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID below, which is sufficient on its own.
value: "home.keithjackson.dev"
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER
# MUST be the Cloudflare ZONE, not prod's subdomain. FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG,
# 2026-08-17) proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE: ExternalDNS generated the
# record then skipped it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS Name", so prod would
# publish NOTHING. Isolation from dev does NOT come from this filter — it comes from
# (1) prod only requesting *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev hostnames, and
# (2) txtOwnerId: prod, so prod's registry never claims dev's `default`-owned records.
# MUST be the Cloudflare ZONE. Prod now serves the apex, so `home.keithjackson.dev` looks
# like a tighter, more honest filter than the zone — IT IS NOT, IT IS AN OUTAGE. FINDING
# F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) proved a STRICT SUBDOMAIN of the hosted zone drops the
# zone entirely: ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching
# record DNS Name", so prod publishes NOTHING. An agent narrowed this to
# prod.home.keithjackson.dev on 2026-09-04 and it was reverted in review; do not retry it.
# Isolation from dev does NOT come from this filter — it comes from
# (1) the two clusters requesting DISJOINT hostname sets (apex vs dev.home.), and
# (2) txtOwnerId: prod vs dev, so neither registry ever claims the other's records.
# That pairing is what the 2026-09-04 incident needed and this filter cannot provide.
value: "keithjackson.dev"
# SAFETY NET #1 — THE ACTUAL ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. Both clusters left this unset and so
# both inherited the chart default `default`; prod then treated dev's TXT-registry entries as
# its own and, under policy: sync, deleted the records behind them. This value MUST differ from
# dev's (`default`, pinned in clusters/dev — dev's live records are registered under it and
# cannot be renamed without orphaning them). `prod` is distinct, which is the entire fix.
# its own and, under policy: sync, deleted the records behind them.
#
# PROD MUST NOT BE GIVEN `default`, however tempting it now looks. Prod is taking over the apex
# NAMES, and dev's existing apex records are registered under owner `default` — so `default` is
# the one value that would let prod adopt them. It would also let prod SYNC-DELETE the ones no
# prod source claims, on a cluster dev is still serving. Prod inherits the apex names; it must
# never inherit the apex OWNER ID. `prod` keeps prod fail-safe: records owned by `default` are
# invisible to it, so an early unsuspend cannot destroy dev's DNS the way 2026-09-04 did — it
# simply fails to publish until those records are retired, which is the correct behaviour.
# dev is `dev` (clusters/dev, changed with dev's migration); the base default is a
# non-colliding sentinel. All three differ.
- op: replace
path: /data/EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
value: "prod"
infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md
+264 -92
View File
@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had (verified by a be
| `192.168.1.55` (crafty) | `platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.54` (UniFi VM) | `apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.9:9000` (S3 backup) | `platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml`, `apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,semaphore}-db.yaml` | reachable prod backup target |
| ~~`home.keithjackson.dev` (every hostname)~~ | ~~HTTPRoutes, Gateway, wildcard cert, coredns-custom, Keycloak realm, oauth2-proxy, Homepage, `catalog/`~~ | **CLOSED 2026-09-04 — see §10.** This one was not merely "would build wrong": it **already destroyed dev's public DNS**. `BASE_DOMAIN` was a declared-but-DEAD knob; it is now real, and prod serves `prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. |
| ~~`home.keithjackson.dev` (every hostname)~~ | ~~HTTPRoutes, Gateway, wildcard cert, coredns-custom, Keycloak realm, oauth2-proxy, Homepage, `catalog/`~~ | **CLOSED 2026-09-04 — see §10.** This one was not merely "would build wrong": it **already destroyed dev's public DNS**. `BASE_DOMAIN` was a declared-but-DEAD knob; it is now real. Prod's value was inverted the same day to the APEX `home.keithjackson.dev`, with dev moving to `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` — see §10a, which is authored but NOT yet applied. |
- [ ] **Tokenize each into a `cluster-vars` knob** with a base default, then set the value in *both*
overlays. Adding a knob before referencing `${KNOB}` is the sanctioned mechanism (see the
@@ -1283,12 +1283,20 @@ single-server-etcd window, and avoids a later member-add dance.
specifically.
- [ ] Monitoring and alerts live on prod.
- [ ] The conformance suite passes green **against the prod cluster**, not just dev (R-TEST-03).
Blocked on parameterizing the L2 tests that hardcode `home.keithjackson.dev` — see §10 phase 2.
- [ ] **Prod serves its own DNS/TLS identity** and dev's records are provably untouched (§10):
distinct `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID`, prod wildcard cert `*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev`, and
prod's own Keycloak realm + per-service client secrets.
Blocked on parameterizing the L2 tests that hardcode `home.keithjackson.dev` — see §10a
"The L2 tests hardcode the apex".
- [ ] **Prod serves the apex DNS/TLS identity** and dev's records are provably untouched (§10/§10a):
distinct `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` (`prod` vs `dev`), prod wildcard cert
`*.home.keithjackson.dev`, dev migrated to `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` with its old apex
records retired (§10a step D8), and prod's own Keycloak realm + per-service client secrets.
## 10. DNS/TLS environment split — **the 2026-09-04 incident, and phase 1 of the fix**
## 10. DNS/TLS environment split — **the 2026-09-04 incident, and the target architecture**
> **Current state (2026-09-04):** the target below is **AUTHORED, NOT APPLIED.** Prod's
> `platform` tier and its 10 downstream tiers are SUSPENDED. Dev is **live on the apex**. The
> ordered cutover is **§10a**, and merging the authored change to `main` is step **D3** of it,
> not step one — dev self-reconciles `main`, so a merge outside the runbook window executes
> the migration unattended.
### What happened
@@ -1320,43 +1328,82 @@ values; for DNS and TLS that promise was false, so `clusters/prod` was *authored
public identity. Two clusters that describe the same DNS name will fight over it no matter how the
DNS controller is configured.
### The architecture decision (operator)
### The architecture decision (operator) — **INVERTED 2026-09-04, this is the current target**
```
dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev
prod -> *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev gitea.prod.home.keithjackson.dev
apex -> CNAME <svc>.home.keithjackson.dev -> <svc>.prod.home.keithjackson.dev
dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev
prod -> *.home.keithjackson.dev gitea.home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX)
```
### PHASE 1 — **prod only. Dev did not move.** (this change)
**Prod *is* the apex. There is no `prod.` label and no CNAME layer at all** —
`<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` is prod's real name, not an alias for one. This **supersedes** the
interim split committed earlier the same day (`c8c1d29`), which put prod on
`*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev` behind apex CNAMEs pointing at it. That layer is deleted: fewer
moving parts, no CNAME chain to keep in step, and prod ends up on the names users already type.
`BASE_DOMAIN` is now real: every hostname in every Flux-reconciled manifest derives from it.
The cost of the inversion is that **dev must move**, and dev is the live cluster. The interim split
was chosen precisely because it moved only the unbuilt environment; this one does not have that
property, so the whole of §10's remaining risk now sits on dev's side, and it is sequenced below.
| | `BASE_DOMAIN` | `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` | `EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER` |
|---|---|---|---|
| base default | `home.keithjackson.dev` | `unset-see-cluster-vars` (non-colliding sentinel) | `keithjackson.dev` |
| **dev** | `home.keithjackson.dev` (**unchanged**) | `default` (**must not change**) | `keithjackson.dev` |
| **prod** | `prod.home.keithjackson.dev` | `prod` | `prod.home.keithjackson.dev` |
### The values, per environment
**Dev's effective hostname is deliberately still the apex `home.keithjackson.dev`.** Moving prod
alone ends the collision and unblocks prod, and it is the whole of the risk that had to be taken
while the operator is away. Dev's rendered output is **byte-identical** except for one added line,
`txtOwnerId: default`, which is the value dev's external-dns was already using implicitly — verified
by rendering all 12 `substituteFrom` paths through `kubectl kustomize | flux envsubst --strict` for
both overlays and diffing.
| | `BASE_DOMAIN` | `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` | `EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER` | Ansible `k3s_base_domain` |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| base default | `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` | `unset-see-cluster-vars` (non-colliding sentinel) | `keithjackson.dev` | `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` (role default) |
| **dev** | `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` | `dev` | `keithjackson.dev` | (inherits the role default) |
| **prod** | `home.keithjackson.dev` | `prod` | `keithjackson.dev` | `home.keithjackson.dev` (`group_vars/k3s_prod`) |
**Two independent guards now, either sufficient alone:**
`[parity]`: `k3s_base_domain` must equal the same cluster's `BASE_DOMAIN`. The kube-apiserver's
`oidc-issuer-url` is a k3s **server flag** in `/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml`, not a manifest, so Flux
post-build substitution can never reach it — hence one fact in two places. If they disagree the
apiserver validates tokens against a different Keycloak than the cluster runs: kubectl SSO fails
while the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working, so it presents as "SSO is broken", not as skew.
1. **`txtOwnerId`** — per-environment identity. A cluster only ever touches records it owns. This is
the direct fix for the incident. Dev **must** render exactly `default`: its live records are
already registered under that owner, and any other value would make dev's own external-dns stop
recognising them and re-create duplicates beside the orphans.
2. **`domainFilters`** — per-environment name scope. Prod cannot see a name outside its own subtree.
Defence in depth, added because the first guard is a single string in a single file.
**`EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER` is the Cloudflare ZONE for BOTH, and must stay that way.** FINDING
F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17): the Cloudflare provider uses this value for **zone selection** as
well as record matching, so a filter that is a strict subdomain of the hosted zone matches **no
zone** — external-dns generates the record and then skips it with *"no hosted zone matching record
DNS Name"*, publishing **nothing**. This has been "hardened" and reverted more than once. It is not
defence in depth; it is a total outage of DNS publication. Isolation comes from the two guards below,
which a domain filter cannot provide anyway: both environments live in the one zone regardless.
The base default for the owner id is a **non-colliding sentinel, deliberately not `default`**: a
future environment that forgets the knob must not silently inherit dev's identity — that is exactly
what happened here. With the sentinel such a cluster owns nothing, so it can delete nothing.
**The two guards that actually work:**
1. **`txtOwnerId`, per-environment identity** — a cluster only ever reconciles records its own owner
id claims in the TXT registry. This is the direct fix for the incident.
2. **Disjoint hostname sets** — after the migration the two clusters never describe the same record,
so there is nothing to fight over. *This guard does not exist during the migration window*, which
is the entire reason the ordering below is mandatory.
#### Why dev's owner id changed from `default` to `dev`
Until this migration dev **had** to render `default`: its live apex records were already registered
in Cloudflare's TXT registry under that owner, and renaming would have orphaned every one of them.
**The migration dissolves that constraint** — on `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` dev publishes an
entirely new record set with no prior registry entries to recognise, so the id is free and is chosen
on its merits. `default` has none: it is the value external-dns uses when you **forget** the flag,
which is exactly how both clusters came to share it, and an environment whose identity is the
forget-value can never be told apart from a misconfigured newcomer. Consequences, both deliberate:
- Dev's **old apex records stay owned by `default`**, which no environment now claims, so nothing
deletes them implicitly on some future reconcile. Retiring them is an explicit step (**D7**) and
prod's first publish is gated on that retirement being *confirmed* — not on two reconcile loops
racing each other.
- **Prod stays `prod` and must never be given `default`.** Prod is taking over the apex *names*, and
dev's existing apex records are registered under `default` — so `default` is the one value that
would let prod adopt them, and under `policy: sync` delete the ones no prod source claims, on a
cluster dev is still serving. That is the 2026-09-04 incident re-armed with the roles swapped.
Prod inherits the apex **names**; it must never inherit the apex **owner id**.
All three values differ, and the base default remains a sentinel so an environment that forgets the
knob owns nothing and can therefore delete nothing.
### PHASE 1 — prod tokenized and moved off dev's names (`c8c1d29`, done; suffix since inverted)
`BASE_DOMAIN` was a **dead knob** — declared in `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml` and referenced by
no reconciled manifest, because every hostname was a hardcoded literal. `c8c1d29` made it real (141
references across the reconciled set) and gave prod its own suffix. That work stands; only the
*value* prod holds has changed, from `prod.home.keithjackson.dev` to the apex.
### What could NOT be tokenized, and why
@@ -1365,70 +1412,195 @@ what happened here. With the sentinel such a cluster owns nothing, so it can del
Re-encrypting needs the operator's age key, rewrites the MAC over every value in the file, and
**cannot be verified by the offline render harness** (`kustomize` does not decrypt), so a mistake
would break Headlamp SSO on the live dev cluster with no pre-flight proof. Left as-is deliberately.
**Prod action required:** prod's Headlamp will otherwise authenticate against **dev's** Keycloak.
Prod needs its own copy of this Secret with `keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev` and a client
secret from prod's own realm — which it needs regardless, since every `*.sops.yaml` client secret
is per-realm.
**Both environments now need action:** dev's copy must move to `keycloak.dev.home.keithjackson.dev`
as part of step **D5**, and prod needs its own copy with `keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` and a
client secret from prod's own realm — which it needs regardless, since every `*.sops.yaml` client
secret is realm-scoped.
- **`oidc-issuer-url` in the kube-apiserver flags** (`roles/k3s_server/tasks/main.yml`) — a k3s
**server flag** in `/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml`, not a manifest, so Flux post-build substitution
can never reach it. Correctly tokenized on the **Ansible** side instead: new role default
`k3s_base_domain` (dev value) + derived `k3s_oidc_issuer_url`, overridden for prod in
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` — the same inventory seam as `k3s_data_dir`/`k3s_api_host`.
`[parity]`: `k3s_base_domain` **must** equal the same cluster's `BASE_DOMAIN`, or the apiserver
validates tokens against a different Keycloak than the cluster runs and kubectl SSO fails while the
cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working (so it looks like "SSO is broken", not like config skew).
server flag, not a manifest. Handled on the **Ansible** seam instead: role default
`k3s_base_domain` (dev's value) + derived `k3s_oidc_issuer_url`, overridden for prod in
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` — the same inventory seam as `k3s_data_dir`/`k3s_api_host`,
so a fourth prod server inherits it from group membership. Verified per host by a read-only probe
(`connection: local`, zero SSH, `changed=0`): all three dev servers resolve
`https://keycloak.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`, all three prod servers resolve
`https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`.
- **`spec.url` of dev's `GitRepository`** (`clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml`) — see the strand below.
It *cannot* be tokenized: the `flux-system` root Kustomization that renders `./clusters/dev`
declares no `postBuild.substituteFrom`, so `gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}` there would ship the **literal
token** and break the source outright (the L0 `flux-postbuild-substitution` check asserts exactly
this). It is a hand-maintained literal that must move in lockstep with `BASE_DOMAIN`.
### A pre-existing prod problem this incidentally FIXED
---
§4 recorded that prod nodes use **public** resolvers, so the kube-apiserver would resolve its OIDC
issuer publicly and get **dev's** Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster on the wrong LAN,
making prod kubectl SSO impossible, and requiring an `/etc/hosts` pin as a workaround. With prod on
its own subdomain the public record for `keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev` is published by
**prod's own** external-dns pointing at **prod's** Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20), so the public answer
and the split-horizon answer agree. **No `/etc/hosts` pin is needed.** This holds only once prod's
external-dns has actually published the record; until then use the break-glass cert kubeconfig.
## 10a. THE MIGRATION RUNBOOK — ordering is load-bearing
### Verify on prod's first reconcile
> **Prod's `platform` tier and its 10 downstream tiers are SUSPENDED and must stay suspended until
> step P1.** Nothing below is safe to run out of order, and nothing below should be run while the
> operator is away.
- [ ] **`domainFilters` zone selection.** The Cloudflare provider uses this value for *zone* lookup
as well as record matching, and in 2026-08 a strict-subdomain filter dropped the parent zone
("no hosted zone matching record DNS Name"). If prod's external-dns logs no matching zone it
will create **nothing** — fail-closed, never destructive. Fallback: set prod's
`EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER` back to `keithjackson.dev` and rely on `txtOwnerId`, which is
sufficient on its own.
- [ ] **Prod's wildcard cert is `*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev`** and solves DNS-01 without touching
dev's `_acme-challenge` records.
- [ ] **Dev's records are untouched** after prod's tiers are resumed. Confirm dev's TXT registry
entries still read owner `default` and that prod's read owner `prod`.
- [ ] **Prod's own Keycloak realm + per-service client secrets** exist (every `*.sops.yaml` client
secret is realm-scoped; prod cannot reuse dev's).
### The two ways this goes wrong
### PHASE 2 — dev migration + apex CNAMEs (**deferred, not done**)
**(1) BOTH CLUSTERS ON THE APEX — the 2026-09-04 incident, recreated.** If prod publishes
`*.home.keithjackson.dev` before dev has vacated it, two clusters describe the same records in the
same zone again. Distinct `txtOwnerId`s stop prod from *deleting* dev's records — that guard holds —
but they do not stop the second failure mode: both clusters requesting a `letsencrypt-prod` wildcard
for the **same name set** and racing each other's `_acme-challenge` TXT records, so neither reliably
solves DNS-01. **Rule: dev vacates the apex first, and the vacate is verified against Cloudflare
before prod is unsuspended.**
Deliberately not attempted here: dev is **live** (18 Longhorn volumes, working SSO) and it hosts the
Gitea that is currently this repo's GitOps source. Moving it is a migration, not a variable change.
Required, roughly in order:
**(2) THE STRAND — dev's GitOps source is the thing that moves.** `spec.url` of dev's
`GitRepository` is `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/...`, which is **both** dev's GitOps source
**and** the PM's push target. Flipping dev's `BASE_DOMAIN` moves Gitea's HTTPRoute, its public DNS
record and the wildcard cert covering it to `gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` all at once. If that
host does not already resolve and serve a valid, Ready cert at that instant, **dev stops reconciling
and cannot be fixed by pushing** — the broken thing *is* the path Flux uses to read pushes. Recovery
is then hands-on and needs LAN access to the cluster.
1. **`BASE_DOMAIN` → `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`** in `clusters/dev`, plus `k3s_base_domain` for the
dev inventory group.
2. **A new `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` wildcard cert** issued and Ready *before* cutover.
3. **Keycloak issuer change.** The realm's issuer URL is baked into every token; every OIDC client
(`grafana`, `gitea`, `nextcloud`, `semaphore`, `headlamp`, `crafty`, `pihole`, `jackett`,
`qbittorrent`, `radarr`, `sonarr`, and the `kubernetes` public client) needs its redirect URIs
updated in the same change, and the k3s apiserver `oidc-issuer-url` with it — which means a
**rolling k3s restart** on the dev servers.
4. **kubectl SSO re-issue** for every user (issuer changed).
5. **`gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev`** — this is the GitOps source URL in
`clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml`. Flux must be able to resolve and trust the new host *before*
the URL is switched, or dev stops reconciling and the change cannot be pushed to fix itself.
Sequence this last, and keep the bootstrap Gitea available as the recovery path (docs/05).
6. **`EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` for dev.** Once dev's names move, its existing `default`-owned
records are for names dev no longer serves; retire them deliberately rather than letting a
renamed owner orphan them.
7. **Apex CNAMEs** `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` → `<svc>.prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. This is what
actually **moves user traffic to prod**, and it must not land before prod serves those services.
8. **The L2 behavioural conformance tests hardcode `home.keithjackson.dev`** (`dns-exposure`,
`dns-internal-resolution`, `gateway-ingress-reachable`, `oidc-sso-grafana`, `sso-forward-auth`,
`trusted-tls`). They are test inputs, not reconciled manifests, so they were left alone in phase 1
— but they will fail against prod and must be parameterized before §9's "suite passes green
against the prod cluster" can be claimed.
**(2b) AND THE MERGE ITSELF IS THE TRIGGER.** `clusters/dev/sync.yaml` is a self-managing root
Kustomization reconciling `./clusters/dev` from **`main`** every 10 minutes, and prod tracks `main`
too. **A merge to `main` therefore *executes* this migration on the live dev cluster, unattended.**
The authored change is a *target*, not a deployment. **Do not merge these files to `main` outside the
runbook window.** Park them on a branch until the operator is at the keyboard and step **D1** has
been done.
### D — dev vacates the apex (operator present, in this order)
- [ ] **D0. Snapshot the escape routes before touching anything.** Confirm a working break-glass
**cert-based** admin kubeconfig for dev (not the OIDC one — OIDC breaks in D6). Confirm the
retained bootstrap Gitea can be started (`bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh`; dev's historical
recovery host was `192.168.2.103:3000`, prod's current bootstrap is `192.168.2.132:3000`).
Record dev's current Cloudflare record set (names + TXT registry owners) so D7 has a checklist
and so an accidental deletion is detectable.
- [ ] **D1. Break the automatic trigger.** Either `flux suspend kustomization flux-system -n
flux-system` on dev (stops the root from self-applying the merge), **or** re-point dev's
`GitRepository` url at the bootstrap Gitea for the window. Do this **before** the merge, not
after. This is what converts "merging strands dev" into "merging is inert until you say go".
- [ ] **D2. Publish and prove the new host set *while dev still serves the apex*.** The new names
must exist before anything depends on them:
- a `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` + `dev.home.keithjackson.dev` **wildcard Certificate issued
and `Ready`** (LE prod, DNS-01) — see the ACME note below before ordering it;
- public DNS for `gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` resolving to dev's Gateway VIP
(192.168.1.53), **checked against Cloudflare / a public resolver, never through the pfSense
override** — that mistake was made on 2026-09-04 and produced a false healthy reading;
- `curl -sS https://gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/api/v1/version` succeeding with a
publicly-trusted cert from a host on the dev LAN.
Until D2 is green, D3 is not safe.
- [ ] **D3. Merge the authored change to `main`** (`clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`,
`clusters/dev/`, `clusters/prod/`, the two Ansible files, `platform/externaldns`,
`catalog/render.py`). With D1 in place nothing moves yet.
- [ ] **D4. Release dev's reconciliation deliberately.** Resume the root Kustomization (or restore
the in-cluster url, now pointing at `gitea.dev.home.keithjackson.dev`) and watch
`flux get kustomizations -A` converge. Dev's Gateway listeners, HTTPRoutes, coredns-custom zone
and Homepage links all move here. Dev's external-dns publishes the new record set under owner
`dev`.
- [ ] **D5. Keycloak: issuer + every client.** Dev's realm issuer becomes
`https://keycloak.dev.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`. The issuer is baked into every
token, and **~12 OIDC clients** need their redirect URIs moved in the same change: `grafana`,
`gitea`, `nextcloud`, `semaphore`, `headlamp`, `crafty`, `pihole`, `jackett`, `qbittorrent`,
`radarr`, `sonarr`, plus the `kubernetes` public client. Most are reconciled from
`platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml` and move with D4; **headlamp's is the exception**
— its issuer/callback live in a SOPS-encrypted Secret and must be re-encrypted by hand.
- [ ] **D6. Rolling k3s restart + kubectl SSO re-issue.** `k3s_base_domain` now renders a different
`oidc-issuer-url` into `/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml`, so the `k3s_server` role is **no longer
a no-op on dev**: it rewrites the file and fires the Restart handler on all three servers. Run
it **one server at a time**, confirming `kubectl get nodes` between each. Every user's OIDC
kubeconfig is invalidated and must be re-issued; the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working
throughout, which is what makes this step recoverable. **Do not reboot nodes** — restart the
`k3s` service only.
- [ ] **D7. Retire dev's old apex records.** They are owned by `default`, which no environment now
claims, so nothing removes them automatically. Delete the `<svc>.home.keithjackson.dev` A
records, the apex record, **and their TXT registry entries** (`external-dns-*` TXT), plus any
stale `_acme-challenge.home.keithjackson.dev`. *Alternative, if you prefer external-dns to do
its own cleanup:* set dev's `EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` back to `default` for exactly one
reconcile after D4 — `policy: sync` will then garbage-collect the apex set it no longer has
sources for — and only then switch it to `dev`. That is two commits and needs watching; the
direct deletion is preferred because it is verifiable in one place.
- [ ] **D8. Verify the apex is EMPTY, against Cloudflare.** `dig +short <svc>.home.keithjackson.dev
@1.1.1.1` returns nothing for every service name, and no TXT registry entry for those names
remains. **This is the gate on the whole P sequence.** A pfSense/PiHole override is not
evidence about public DNS.
### P — prod takes the apex
- [ ] **P1. Only now unsuspend prod**, in dependency order: `flux resume kustomization platform`,
then the 10 downstream tiers. Confirm D8 first, in Cloudflare, not from a local resolver.
- [ ] **P2. Prod's external-dns publishes under owner `prod`.** Check the logs for a matching hosted
zone (F-DNS1 fail-closed mode: no zone selected ⇒ nothing created — which is safe, but means
the filter was narrowed against instruction). Confirm the new TXT registry entries read owner
`prod` and that no record owned by `dev` was touched.
- [ ] **P3. Prod's wildcard cert `*.home.keithjackson.dev` + `home.keithjackson.dev` is `Ready`** and
solved DNS-01 without colliding with any `_acme-challenge` dev still holds.
- [ ] **P4. Prod's kubectl SSO works without an `/etc/hosts` pin.** Prod nodes resolve
`keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev` through **public** upstreams (§4), so this only becomes true
once P2 has published that name at prod's Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20). Before then a prod node
resolving its own issuer reaches **dev**. Use the break-glass cert kubeconfig until P2 is done.
- [ ] **P5. Cut prod's GitOps source over** from the workstation bootstrap Gitea
(`http://192.168.2.132:3000/...`) to `https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/...` once prod runs
its own Gitea — the block in `clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml` owns that procedure. Note the
inversion **simplified** this: prod's apex Gitea name and dev's `gitea.dev.home...` are now
different hosts, so prod pointing at the apex means "prod's own Gitea", never dev's.
### ACME: the duplicate-certificate limit
Let's Encrypt rate-limits **duplicate certificates — 5 per week for an identical set of names.**
Prod's wildcard is `*.home.keithjackson.dev` + `home.keithjackson.dev`, which is **exactly the name
set dev holds today**. Every prod order therefore counts against the same bucket as dev's historical
renewals of that pair, and a retry loop during P3 can exhaust it and leave prod with **no trusted
cert for up to a week**. Mitigations:
- Order prod's cert **after** D8, so dev is no longer renewing the same pair.
- Let dev's old `*.home.keithjackson.dev` `Certificate`/Secret be **deleted** in D4/D7 rather than
left to renew in the background.
- Rehearse against **letsencrypt-staging** first (`ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER`) — staging has its own,
far looser limits — and only switch prod to `letsencrypt-prod` when the DNS-01 solve is proven.
- Do **not** delete-and-recreate prod's `Certificate` to "retry"; each recreation is a fresh order.
### The L2 tests hardcode the apex
Six behavioural (L2) chainsaw tests embed `home.keithjackson.dev` as a literal:
| test | file |
|---|---|
| `dns-exposure` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/dns-exposure/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `dns-internal-resolution` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/dns-internal-resolution/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `gateway-ingress-reachable` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/gateway-ingress-reachable/chainsaw-test.yaml` (+ `fixtures/app-and-probe.yaml`) |
| `oidc-sso-grafana` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/oidc-sso-grafana/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `sso-forward-auth` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/sso-forward-auth/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
| `trusted-tls` | `conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/trusted-tls/chainsaw-test.yaml` |
They are **test inputs, not reconciled manifests**, so they are deliberately left alone by the
authoring change: they are the only thing still asserting the apex, and while dev is live on the apex
they are *correct*. Under the new direction the literal happens to become right for **prod** and
wrong for **dev**, so they must be **parameterized per environment** (not merely edited) before
either §9's *"suite passes green against the prod cluster"* or a green L2 run against migrated dev
can be claimed. Until then, expect the dev L2 suite to fail between D4 and that parameterization —
a known, scheduled failure, not a regression.
The L1 *rendering* tests need no change: their goldens carry `${BASE_DOMAIN}` as a token, and the
literal hostnames in them come from each test's own fixture `ingressRoutes[].host`, which is
environment-independent by construction.
### Offline proof carried out for the authoring change (no cluster touched)
All 12 `substituteFrom` paths were rendered for **both** overlays through the real toolchain
(`kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <spec.path> | flux envsubst --strict`,
with each overlay's effective `cluster-vars` taken from `kubectl kustomize clusters/<env>`), before
and after the change.
- **Dev's diff is *only* the hostname move.** Proven by inverse substitution rather than by reading
the diff: applying `s/dev.home.keithjackson.dev/home.keithjackson.dev/` to the new render restores
the baseline **byte-for-byte** in all 12 paths, plus 2 declared `txtOwnerId: default → dev` lines.
145 changed line pairs, all classified: 143 hostname-move, 2 declared owner-id, **0 unexplained**,
and **0 bare-apex remnants**. The 2 paths with no change (`cilium`, `velero`) provably contain no
hostname at all (`grep -c keithjackson.dev` = 0).
- **Prod lands on the bare apex:** **0** occurrences of `prod.home.keithjackson.dev` and **0** of
`dev.home.keithjackson.dev` anywhere in prod's rendered output; 143 apex names.
- **Certs:** dev `*.dev.home.keithjackson.dev` + `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`; prod
`*.home.keithjackson.dev` + `home.keithjackson.dev`.
- **Positive controls** (the harness is provably not blind): perturbing an unrelated knob
(`GATEWAY_VIP`) surfaces 1 unexplained line; perturbing `BASE_DOMAIN` to a wrong value fails 10 of
12 paths; injecting a single un-moved hostname is caught by the independent bare-apex scan (which
the byte-identity check alone cannot see — which is why both exist).
- Gates: `ci/l0.sh`, `ci/l1.sh`, `ci/render-golden.sh`, `ci/lint.sh`,
`flux-postbuild-substitution/check.sh` (254 assertions), `catalog/render.py --selftest`,
`ci/spec-immutability.sh` — all **PASS**.
infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml
+37 -25
View File
@@ -293,35 +293,47 @@ node_baseline_dns_servers:
# k3s_base_domain, below). It reaches the issuer through the NODE resolver, i.e. through
# these PUBLIC upstreams — not through CoreDNS's split-horizon answer.
#
# THIS USED TO BE BROKEN, AND THE 2026-09-04 SUBDOMAIN SPLIT FIXED IT. While prod was
# authored to serve dev's hostnames, a prod node resolving keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
# publicly got DEV's Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster, on the wrong LAN, so
# kubectl OIDC SSO on prod could not work at all. Now prod's issuer is
# keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, and the public record for that name is published by
# PROD's own external-dns pointing at PROD's Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20). The public answer
# and the split-horizon answer therefore AGREE, and no /etc/hosts pin is needed.
#
# STILL TO VERIFY on prod bring-up (PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10): this holds only once prod's
# external-dns has actually published the record. Until then the issuer does not resolve
# from the nodes and kubectl SSO fails — the cert-based admin kubeconfig is the break-glass
# path, and it always works. Ordering, not a design gap.
# ORDERING HAZARD, NOT YET CLEARED. Prod's issuer is keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev — an APEX
# name, because prod IS the apex under the 2026-09-04 inversion (k3s_base_domain below).
# That is the name the LIVE DEV CLUSTER answers today, and its public A record currently
# points at DEV's Gateway VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster, on the wrong LAN. A prod
# node resolving its own issuer through these public upstreams therefore reaches dev until:
# (1) dev has migrated to *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev and RETIRED its apex records, and
# (2) PROD's own external-dns has published keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev at PROD's
# Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20).
# Only then do the public answer and the in-cluster split-horizon answer AGREE, and no
# /etc/hosts pin is needed. Until then kubectl OIDC SSO on prod cannot work; the cert-based
# admin kubeconfig is the break-glass path and always works. Ordering, not a design gap —
# the ordered steps are infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
node_baseline_dns_search: []
# --- platform hostname suffix, ANSIBLE SIDE (R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01) --------------------
# PROD SERVES ITS OWN SUBDOMAIN. [parity] MUST equal BASE_DOMAIN in clusters/prod/
# kustomization.yaml — the same one-fact-in-two-places contract as k3s_data_dir and
# k3s_api_host. The Flux side cannot supply this: the kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is a
# k3s server FLAG written to /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml, not a manifest, so
# postBuild.substituteFrom never sees it. Full rationale in
# roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml, where k3s_oidc_issuer_url is derived from this.
# PROD **IS** THE APEX. [parity] MUST equal BASE_DOMAIN in clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml —
# the same one-fact-in-two-places contract as k3s_data_dir and k3s_api_host. The Flux side
# cannot supply this: the kube-apiserver's oidc-issuer-url is a k3s server FLAG written to
# /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml, not a manifest, so postBuild.substituteFrom never sees it.
# Full rationale in roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml, where k3s_oidc_issuer_url derives.
#
# WHY PROD MOVED (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10): both clusters were authored to serve the
# SAME hostnames from the SAME Cloudflare zone, and on 2026-09-04 prod's external-dns
# deleted every one of dev's public records. Dev stays on home.keithjackson.dev (it is LIVE);
# prod takes prod.home.keithjackson.dev. Consequence here: prod's Keycloak issuer is
# https://keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab, so the `kubernetes` OIDC client
# in prod's OWN Keycloak realm is what prod's kubectl SSO authenticates against.
k3s_base_domain: "prod.home.keithjackson.dev"
# WHY THE SUFFIXES SPLIT (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10): both clusters were authored to serve
# the SAME hostnames from the SAME Cloudflare zone, and on 2026-09-04 prod's external-dns
# deleted every one of dev's public records.
#
# WHICH WAY ROUND — INVERTED 2026-09-04 by operator decision, superseding the interim split
# committed earlier the same day (prod on `prod.home.` behind apex CNAMEs). The simpler target:
# prod -> home.keithjackson.dev (THE APEX; this variable — no `prod.` label, no CNAMEs)
# dev -> dev.home.keithjackson.dev (roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml)
# So prod's Keycloak issuer is https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab, and the
# `kubernetes` OIDC client in PROD's OWN Keycloak realm is what prod's kubectl SSO authenticates
# against.
#
# ORDERING HAZARD SPECIFIC TO THIS VARIABLE. keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev is the name the LIVE
# dev cluster answers today, and prod's nodes resolve the issuer through PUBLIC upstreams (see
# node_baseline_dns_search above). So until dev has vacated the apex and PROD's external-dns has
# published that name at PROD's Gateway VIP (192.168.2.20), a prod node resolving its own issuer
# gets DEV's VIP (192.168.1.53) — the wrong cluster, on the wrong LAN. kubectl OIDC SSO on prod
# therefore does not work until §10's dev-vacate steps are complete; the cert-based admin
# kubeconfig is the break-glass path and always works. Ordering, not a design gap.
k3s_base_domain: "home.keithjackson.dev"
# --- Flux bootstrap: WHICH overlay this environment reconciles from (R-ENV-02) -----
# roles/flux_bootstrap defaults flux_bootstrap_env_path to `clusters/dev` (dev is LIVE
infra/ansible/roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml
+19 -8
View File
@@ -84,15 +84,26 @@ k3s_tls_sans: >-
# while the cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working — so it looks like "SSO is broken",
# not like a config skew. The break-glass cert kubeconfig is why this is recoverable.
#
# THE DEFAULT IS THE DEV VALUE, restated explicitly rather than left implicit — the same
# convention as k3s_data_dir above and cluster-vars' GATEWAY_VIP / LONGHORN_DATA_PATH: the
# base default is the known-good LIVE value, so dev's rendered config.yaml is byte-for-byte
# what it already is and the Restart handler does NOT fire on a re-run.
# THE DEFAULT IS THE DEV VALUE — the same convention as k3s_data_dir above and cluster-vars'
# GATEWAY_VIP / LONGHORN_DATA_PATH: the role default is dev's value and prod overrides it in
# inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml (the same inventory seam k3s_data_dir / k3s_api_host /
# kube_vip_address use, so a FOURTH prod server inherits it from group membership rather than
# from anyone remembering).
#
# PROD OVERRIDES IT in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — the same inventory seam
# k3s_data_dir / k3s_api_host / kube_vip_address use, so a FOURTH prod server inherits it
# from group membership rather than from anyone remembering.
k3s_base_domain: "home.keithjackson.dev"
# *** WHICH DEV VALUE — UPDATED 2026-09-04, AND IT IS AHEAD OF THE LIVE DEV CLUSTER. ***
# The operator inverted the suffix split: PROD is now the apex `home.keithjackson.dev` and DEV
# carries the label `dev.home.keithjackson.dev`. This default therefore moved from the apex to
# dev's subdomain, mirroring BASE_DOMAIN in clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml.
#
# CONSEQUENCE — this default no longer matches what the live dev nodes are running, so unlike
# every previous edit to this file A DEV RE-RUN IS NOT A NO-OP. Rendering config.yaml with the
# new issuer CHANGES the file, FIRES the Restart handler, and rolls k3s on all three dev
# servers, which also invalidates every user's OIDC kubeconfig (SSO must be re-issued). That is
# a deliberate step of the dev DNS migration, NOT a side effect to discover during unrelated
# work: DO NOT run the k3s_server role against dev until step D6 of
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10, and never while the operator is away. The break-glass
# cert-based admin kubeconfig keeps working throughout, which is what makes the step safe.
k3s_base_domain: "dev.home.keithjackson.dev"
# Derived, so the realm path is stated once. Override k3s_base_domain, not this.
k3s_oidc_issuer_url: "https://keycloak.{{ k3s_base_domain }}/realms/homelab"
platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml
+23 -14
View File
@@ -39,24 +39,33 @@ spec:
# garbage-collected them. `policy: sync` is correct and stays; what was missing was identity.
# Full write-up: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10.
#
# TWO INDEPENDENT GUARDS NOW, either of which alone prevents a recurrence:
# 1. txtOwnerId — per-environment identity; a cluster only ever touches records it owns.
# 2. domainFilters — per-environment name scope; prod cannot even see names outside its
# own subtree. Defence in depth, added after the incident.
# THE TWO GUARDS THAT ACTUALLY PREVENT A RECURRENCE — note that neither is domainFilters:
# 1. txtOwnerId — per-environment identity; a cluster only ever touches records it owns.
# 2. DISJOINT HOSTNAME SETS — the two environments serve different suffixes, so they never
# describe the same record in the first place. dev = *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev,
# prod = *.home.keithjackson.dev (prod IS the apex; operator decision 2026-09-04).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Which names this instance may manage at all. Cloudflare-provider caveat, empirically hit
# 2026-08: this value is used for ZONE selection as well as record matching, and a filter that is
# a strict subdomain of the zone dropped the parent zone entirely ("no hosted zone matching record
# DNS Name") — so DEV keeps the zone apex `keithjackson.dev`, which is also what dev serves the
# apex of. PROD narrows to `prod.home.keithjackson.dev`. If prod's first reconcile logs no
# matching zone, that caveat still applies: prod creates NOTHING (fail-closed, never destructive)
# and the fallback is to widen prod's EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER back to the zone apex, leaving
# txtOwnerId as the sole guard. See clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml.
# Which names this instance may manage at all. BOTH ENVIRONMENTS RENDER THE CLOUDFLARE **ZONE**
# `keithjackson.dev` HERE, and this is NOT an oversight to be tightened.
#
# FINDING F-DNS1 (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17): the Cloudflare provider uses this value for ZONE
# SELECTION as well as record matching, so a filter that is a STRICT SUBDOMAIN of the hosted zone
# matches NO zone — external-dns generates the record and then skips it with "no hosted zone
# matching record DNS Name", publishing NOTHING. This has been "improved" and reverted more than
# once (an agent narrowed prod to prod.home.keithjackson.dev on 2026-09-04; overridden in
# review). It is not defence in depth; it is a total outage of DNS publication. Isolation comes
# from the two guards above, which a domain filter cannot provide anyway — both environments live
# in the ONE zone regardless of what this says. See clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml.
domainFilters:
- "${EXTERNALDNS_DOMAIN_FILTER}"
# The TXT-registry owner id. MUST be distinct per environment — this is the knob whose absence
# caused the incident. Dev renders `default` (its live records are already registered under that
# owner; changing it would orphan them and duplicate every record). Prod renders `prod`.
# caused the incident. dev renders `dev`, prod renders `prod`, and the BASE default is a
# non-colliding sentinel so a new environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and can delete
# nothing. NOTHING renders `default` any more (the external-dns chart default, and the value both
# clusters silently shared): dev held it only because its live apex records were registered under
# it, and dev's move to *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev retired that constraint along with those
# records. Prod must NOT be given `default` even though it inherits the apex NAMES — that would
# hand prod ownership of dev's old apex records and let `policy: sync` below delete them.
txtOwnerId: "${EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID}"
policy: sync # create + update + delete records as services come and go — but ONLY
# records this owner id owns AND this domainFilter admits (see above).