feat(backup): prod shares dev's MinIO — plus the path tenancy that makes it survivable
Operator ruling: "the S3 backup location is the same as Dev." Prod's
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is now http://192.168.1.9:9000 and the TBD-PROD-* placeholder
is retired. Set EXPLICITLY rather than by omitting the op — an omitted op would
inherit the same value silently, and a shared backup target must be visible in
the overlay that owns it.
SHARING THE ENDPOINT WAS NOT SAFE AS AUTHORED. Nothing about the backup PATHS
was per-environment, and enabling prod against dev's MinIO would have been the
2026-09-04 external-dns incident again, in a worse place:
VELERO — bucket `velero`, NO prefix, and both clusters run schedules named
`daily` / `daily-resources-only`. Velero SYNCS backups it finds in its BSL
into itself as Backup CRs and GARBAGE-COLLECTS them at TTL, so prod would
have adopted dev's backups and then deleted them on schedule.
CNPG — the worse one. destinationPath `s3://cnpg` with CNPG appending
serverName, which defaults to the CLUSTER NAME. Both environments have
keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db, so prod's Postgres would archive
WAL into the EXACT prefix dev's does. Two servers interleaving WAL into one
Barman stream CORRUPTS THE CHAIN and destroys PITR — and dev's restore is
PROVEN (R-STATE-03). Sharing an endpoint is fine; sharing a path is not.
Two knobs, authored once, environments differing only by scoped overrides
(R-ENV-02):
VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX dev "" | prod "prod"
CNPG_BACKUP_PATH dev "s3://cnpg" | prod "s3://cnpg/prod"
THE BASE VALUES ARE DEV'S CURRENT LAYOUT ON PURPOSE. Dev's existing backups live
at the bucket root and at s3://cnpg; giving dev a prefix would ORPHAN the very
backups its proven restore depends on — the same reasoning that keeps dev's
EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID at `default`. Prod has no history to preserve.
*** PROD STILL HAS NO BACKUP COVERAGE — the endpoint is not reachable. ***
Measured from a throwaway pod INSIDE the prod cluster (the workstation proves
nothing about pod egress, and a workstation-side reading has already misled this
project once): curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live → connection timed
out after 15s. pfSense does not route prod's pod network to the dev LAN's MinIO.
OPERATOR ACTION REQUIRED. velero stays suspended; note apps-wave-0 applies GREEN
regardless — the token IS defined so strict substitution succeeds — while every
write fails at RUNTIME. A green apps-wave-0 does not mean backups work.
New `standup.sh s3check` step probes the endpoint from a throwaway in-cluster
pod and fails closed, with `--s3-endpoint <url>` to test a CANDIDATE before
authoring it into cluster-vars. That is how the unreachability above was
established rather than assumed.
VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. flux-postbuild-substitution 254 -> 260 assertions,
and neither new knob appears in the dead-knob advisory list, so both are really
consumed. Rendered both overlays: all three CNPG destinationPaths and Velero's
prefix carry the tokens; dev resolves to its existing layout, prod to the nested
paths.
DELIVERY: prod reconciles the bootstrap Gitea's main at c8c1d29. This branch also
carries the DNS inversion, which must NOT reach prod. Delivering needs a
c8c1d29-based branch with only these commits — no urgency while the routing is
still closed.
Refs R-STATE-03, R-ENV-02, R-IDP-05.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed
1 parent
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commit
b80e8eef82
8 files changed
+172
-19
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@@ -79,7 +79,11 @@ spec:
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backup:
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retentionPolicy: "30d"
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barmanObjectStore:
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destinationPath: s3://cnpg
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# PER-ENVIRONMENT PATH (cluster-vars). CNPG appends serverName, which defaults to the CLUSTER
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# NAME — and both environments have a `nextcloud-db`. Sharing one MinIO with a shared path
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# would interleave two Postgres servers' WAL into ONE Barman stream, corrupting the chain and
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# destroying PITR for both. Dev keeps `s3://cnpg` (its existing, PROVEN backups); prod nests.
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destinationPath: ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}
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endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
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s3Credentials:
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accessKeyId:
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@@ -80,7 +80,11 @@ spec:
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backup:
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retentionPolicy: "30d"
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barmanObjectStore:
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destinationPath: s3://cnpg
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# PER-ENVIRONMENT PATH (cluster-vars). CNPG appends serverName, which defaults to the CLUSTER
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# NAME — and both environments have a `semaphore-db`. Sharing one MinIO with a shared path
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# would interleave two Postgres servers' WAL into ONE Barman stream, corrupting the chain and
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# destroying PITR for both. Dev keeps `s3://cnpg` (its existing, PROVEN backups); prod nests.
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destinationPath: ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}
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endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
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s3Credentials:
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accessKeyId:
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+53
-4
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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# USAGE
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# bootstrap/standup.sh --kubeconfig <path> --expect-server <url> [--confirm-destructive] <step...>
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#
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# steps: preflight crds unwedge externaldns resume verify (or: all)
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# steps: preflight crds unwedge externaldns s3check resume verify (or: all)
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#
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# --expect-server is REQUIRED and is compared against the live API server before ANY command runs.
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# Pointing this at the wrong cluster is the one mistake with unbounded blast radius: dev is live and
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@@ -29,13 +29,14 @@
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set -euo pipefail
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- args
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KUBECONFIG_ARG="" EXPECT_SERVER="" CONFIRM_DESTRUCTIVE=0
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KUBECONFIG_ARG="" EXPECT_SERVER="" CONFIRM_DESTRUCTIVE=0 S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE=""
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STEPS=()
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while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
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case "$1" in
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--kubeconfig) KUBECONFIG_ARG="${2:?--kubeconfig needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
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--expect-server) EXPECT_SERVER="${2:?--expect-server needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
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--confirm-destructive) CONFIRM_DESTRUCTIVE=1; shift ;;
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--s3-endpoint) S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE="${2:?--s3-endpoint needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
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-h|--help) sed -n '2,30p' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
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-*) echo "ERROR: unknown flag '$1'" >&2; exit 2 ;;
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*) STEPS+=("$1"); shift ;;
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@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ done
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[ -n "${KUBECONFIG_ARG}" ] || { echo "ERROR: --kubeconfig is required." >&2; exit 2; }
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[ -n "${EXPECT_SERVER}" ] || { echo "ERROR: --expect-server is required (safety guard)." >&2; exit 2; }
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[ "${#STEPS[@]}" -gt 0 ] || { echo "ERROR: no step given. One of: preflight crds unwedge externaldns resume verify all" >&2; exit 2; }
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[ "${#STEPS[@]}" -gt 0 ] || { echo "ERROR: no step given. One of: preflight crds unwedge externaldns s3check resume verify all" >&2; exit 2; }
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script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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repo_root="$(git -C "${script_dir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || (cd "${script_dir}/.." && pwd))"
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@@ -391,6 +392,53 @@ step_externaldns() {
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Any change to a name outside it, or to a TXT entry owned by another cluster, is a REGRESSION."
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}
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step_s3check() {
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say "S3 BACKUP ENDPOINT — reachability FROM INSIDE THE CLUSTER"
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# Velero runs in-cluster, so the only reachability that counts is the pods' own. Probing from the
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# workstation proves nothing either way: it sits on a different side of pfSense than the pod
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# network, and a healthy result there has already misled this project once.
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local ep live; live="$(cvar S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT)"
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info "live S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT = ${live:-<unset>}"
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if [ -n "${S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE}" ]; then
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# Probe a CANDIDATE endpoint before adopting it. The whole point is to find out whether a proposed
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# backup target is reachable from this cluster's pods BEFORE authoring it into cluster-vars —
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# otherwise the first evidence is silently-missing backups.
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ep="${S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE}"
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info "probing CANDIDATE endpoint from --s3-endpoint: ${ep}"
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else
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ep="${live}"
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fi
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case "${ep}" in
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""|TBD-*) die "no usable endpoint to probe (live='${live}'). Pass --s3-endpoint <url> to test a candidate." ;;
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esac
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local ns=velero pod=s3check-$$
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kubectl get ns "${ns}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || ns=default
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info "probing from a throwaway pod in namespace '${ns}'"
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# --restart=Never + explicit delete in a trap: a probe must never leave a pod behind on a cluster.
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trap 'kubectl -n "${ns}" delete pod "${pod}" --ignore-not-found --wait=false >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' RETURN
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if kubectl -n "${ns}" run "${pod}" --restart=Never --image=curlimages/curl:8.11.1 --command --quiet \
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-- curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 15 "${ep}/minio/health/live" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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local i=0 phase=""
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while [ "$i" -lt 90 ]; do
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phase="$(kubectl -n "${ns}" get pod "${pod}" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
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case "${phase}" in Succeeded|Failed) break ;; esac
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sleep 5; i=$((i+5))
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done
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local out; out="$(kubectl -n "${ns}" logs "${pod}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
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info "pod phase=${phase:-unknown} response=${out:-<none>}"
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case "${out}" in
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200|2??) info "REACHABLE: ${ep} answered from inside the cluster." ;;
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*) warn "NOT REACHABLE from inside the cluster (phase=${phase}, body='${out}').
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Velero would install cleanly and then fail every backup at RUNTIME — a tier that looks healthy
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while no backup exists. Fix routing, or give this environment its own endpoint, before
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resuming velero." ;;
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esac
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else
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warn "could not create the probe pod (admission policy? image pull?). Reachability UNKNOWN."
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fi
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}
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step_resume() {
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say "RESUME TIERS (dependency order)"
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local n s3; s3="$(cvar S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT)"
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@@ -467,13 +515,14 @@ step_verify() {
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for s in "${STEPS[@]}"; do
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case "$s" in
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preflight) step_preflight ;;
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s3check) step_s3check ;;
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crds) step_crds ;;
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unwedge) step_unwedge ;;
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externaldns) step_externaldns ;;
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resume) step_resume ;;
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verify) step_verify ;;
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all) step_preflight; step_crds; step_unwedge; step_externaldns; step_resume; step_verify ;;
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*) die "unknown step '$s' (preflight crds unwedge externaldns resume verify all)" ;;
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*) die "unknown step '$s' (preflight crds unwedge externaldns s3check resume verify all)" ;;
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esac
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done
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@@ -212,6 +212,28 @@ data:
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VELERO_BACKUP_SCHEDULE: "0 3 * * *" # cron; overlays may differ
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VELERO_RETENTION: "168h" # dev short | prod long
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# BACKUP TENANCY — the two knobs that keep two clusters sharing ONE MinIO from destroying each
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# other's backups. Added 2026-09-05 when the operator ruled prod uses the SAME endpoint as dev.
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#
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# Sharing an endpoint is fine. Sharing a PATH is not, and nothing here was per-environment before:
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#
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# VELERO — bucket `velero`, no prefix, and BOTH clusters run schedules named `daily` and
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# `daily-resources-only`. Each cluster's Velero SYNCS backups it finds in the BSL into
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# itself as Backup CRs and GARBAGE-COLLECTS them when their TTL expires. Prod would
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# therefore adopt dev's backups and delete them on schedule.
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# CNPG — destinationPath `s3://cnpg` with CNPG appending serverName, which defaults to the
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# CLUSTER NAME. Both environments have `keycloak-db`, `nextcloud-db`, `semaphore-db`,
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# so prod's Postgres would archive WAL into the exact prefix dev's does. Two servers
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# interleaving WAL into one Barman stream CORRUPTS THE CHAIN and destroys PITR — and
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# dev's DR restore is PROVEN (R-STATE-03). This is the worst of the two.
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#
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# THE BASE VALUES ARE DEV'S CURRENT LAYOUT ON PURPOSE, and must stay that way: dev's existing
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# backups live at the bucket root / at `s3://cnpg`. Giving dev a prefix would ORPHAN the very
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# backups its proven restore depends on — the same reason dev's EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID stays
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# `default`. Prod, which has no history to preserve, takes the namespaced paths.
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VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX: "" # dev: bucket root (existing layout) | prod: "prod"
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CNPG_BACKUP_PATH: "s3://cnpg" # dev: bucket root (existing layout) | prod: "s3://cnpg/prod"
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# --- placement ---
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PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_KEY: "kubernetes.io/os" # base no-op selector; prod may pin roles
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PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_VALUE: "linux"
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@@ -383,10 +383,38 @@ patches:
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- op: replace
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path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
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value: "192.168.2.22"
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# Off-cluster DR target. Dev's versitygw/MinIO (192.168.1.9:9000) sits on the DEV side of the
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# network — a prod backup written there is not off-cluster DR and would mix two environments'
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# PITR streams in one bucket. Operator supplies the prod endpoint (full URL incl. scheme+port).
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# OFF-CLUSTER DR TARGET — operator ruling 2026-09-05: "the S3 backup location is the same as
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# Dev." Prod therefore points at the on-Proxmox MinIO, and the TBD placeholder is retired.
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# Stated EXPLICITLY rather than omitting the op: an omitted op would inherit the same value
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# silently, and a shared backup target is exactly the kind of decision that must be visible
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# in the overlay that owns it.
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# *** NOT YET REACHABLE — velero and the CNPG backups CANNOT be enabled on prod today. ***
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# Measured 2026-09-05 from a throwaway pod INSIDE the prod cluster (not from the workstation,
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# which proves nothing about pod egress): `curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live`
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# → connection timed out after 15s. pfSense does not route prod's pod network to the dev LAN's
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# MinIO. Until that routing exists, Velero and CNPG would install cleanly and fail every
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# backup at RUNTIME — a tier that reports healthy while no backup exists.
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# Re-test with: bootstrap/standup.sh ... --s3-endpoint http://192.168.1.9:9000 s3check
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#
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# SHARING THE ENDPOINT IS SAFE ONLY BECAUSE OF THE TWO PATH KNOBS BELOW. Nothing about the
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# paths was per-environment before this change: Velero used one unprefixed bucket, and every
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# CNPG Cluster used `s3://cnpg` with serverName defaulting to the CLUSTER NAME — and both
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# environments have keycloak-db / nextcloud-db / semaphore-db. Enabling prod against dev's
|
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# MinIO without these knobs would (a) let prod adopt and TTL-delete dev's Velero backups and
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# (b) interleave two Postgres servers' WAL into one Barman stream, CORRUPTING dev's chain and
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# destroying the PITR that R-STATE-03 proved. See clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml.
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- op: replace
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path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
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value: "TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT"
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value: "http://192.168.1.9:9000"
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# Prod's Velero objects nest under `prod/`; dev keeps the bucket root where its backups already
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# are (renaming dev's path would orphan the backups its proven restore depends on).
|
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- op: replace
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path: /data/VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX
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value: "prod"
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# Prod's Barman objects nest under s3://cnpg/prod/<cluster>/; dev keeps s3://cnpg/<cluster>/.
|
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- op: replace
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path: /data/CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
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value: "s3://cnpg/prod"
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# TODO(WS-INFRA, Phase 7): pin prod node placement once the bare-metal role labels exist.
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+44
-8
@@ -261,16 +261,52 @@ subtle because the *apex* appears to work: dev's `*.home.keithjackson.dev` wildc
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## Blockers
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### 1. `S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT` is an intentional placeholder — operator decision required
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### 1. Backups: endpoint DECIDED, but prod cannot reach it — **prod has no backup coverage**
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Prod sets `TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT` on purpose: base defaults are the **dev** values, so an
|
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omitted override would make prod silently inherit dev's address (`http://192.168.1.9:9000`), which
|
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prod cannot reach anyway. A loud placeholder beats a silent wrong answer.
|
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**Operator ruling 2026-09-05: "the S3 backup location is the same as Dev."** Prod's
|
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`S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT` is now `http://192.168.1.9:9000`, and the `TBD-PROD-*` placeholder is retired.
|
||||
|
||||
It is consumed by **`velero` and `apps-wave-0`**. `velero` is skipped by C5. **`apps-wave-0` still
|
||||
applies** — the token *is* defined, so strict substitution succeeds — but anything writing to that
|
||||
endpoint fails at **runtime**, not at apply time. **A green `apps-wave-0` does not mean backups
|
||||
work.** Until a real prod endpoint is set, treat prod as having **no** backup coverage.
|
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**It is not reachable from prod.** Measured from a throwaway pod **inside the prod cluster** — not
|
||||
from the workstation, which proves nothing about pod egress:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live → connection timed out after 15s
|
||||
```
|
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|
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pfSense does not route prod's pod network to the dev LAN's MinIO. **Operator action required.**
|
||||
Re-test with `standup.sh --s3-endpoint http://192.168.1.9:9000 s3check` — it fails closed and says so.
|
||||
|
||||
Until that routing exists, `velero` stays suspended and **`apps-wave-0` still applies GREEN** — the
|
||||
token *is* defined, so strict substitution succeeds — while every write to that endpoint fails at
|
||||
**runtime**. A green `apps-wave-0` does not mean backups work. **Treat prod as having no backup
|
||||
coverage.**
|
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|
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#### Sharing one MinIO is only safe because of two new knobs
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing about the backup *paths* was per-environment before 2026-09-05. Enabling prod against dev's
|
||||
MinIO without these would have been the external-dns incident again, in a worse place:
|
||||
|
||||
| | before | after |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Velero | `bucket: velero`, **no prefix**, both clusters run schedules named `daily` | `prefix: ${VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX}` — dev `""`, prod `prod` |
|
||||
| CNPG | `destinationPath: s3://cnpg`, serverName defaults to the **Cluster name** | `${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}` — dev `s3://cnpg`, prod `s3://cnpg/prod` |
|
||||
|
||||
- **Velero** syncs backups it finds in its BSL into itself as `Backup` CRs and **garbage-collects them
|
||||
when their TTL expires**. Prod would have adopted dev's backups and deleted them on schedule.
|
||||
- **CNPG is the worse one.** Both environments have `keycloak-db`, `nextcloud-db` and `semaphore-db`,
|
||||
so prod's Postgres would archive WAL into the *exact prefix* dev's does. Two servers interleaving
|
||||
WAL into one Barman stream **corrupts the chain and destroys PITR** — and dev's restore is
|
||||
**proven** (R-STATE-03).
|
||||
|
||||
**The base values are dev's current layout on purpose and must stay that way.** Dev's existing
|
||||
backups live at the bucket root and at `s3://cnpg`; giving dev a prefix would **orphan the very
|
||||
backups its proven restore depends on** — the same reasoning that keeps dev's
|
||||
`EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID` at `default`. Prod has no history to preserve, so it takes the nested paths.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Delivery note.** Prod reconciles the bootstrap Gitea's `main` at `c8c1d29`. This change sits on a
|
||||
> later branch that also carries the DNS inversion, which must **not** reach prod (it would move prod
|
||||
> to the apex and collide with dev). Delivering it needs a `c8c1d29`-based branch carrying only these
|
||||
> commits. No urgency: velero cannot be enabled until the routing above is fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Prod is on `prod.home.keithjackson.dev`, not the apex
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +45,11 @@ spec:
|
||||
backup:
|
||||
retentionPolicy: "30d" # keep 30 days of base backups + WAL (PITR window); prunes older
|
||||
barmanObjectStore:
|
||||
destinationPath: s3://cnpg
|
||||
# PER-ENVIRONMENT PATH (cluster-vars). CNPG appends serverName, which defaults to the CLUSTER
|
||||
# NAME — and both environments have a `keycloak-db`. Sharing one MinIO with a shared path
|
||||
# would interleave two Postgres servers' WAL into ONE Barman stream, corrupting the chain and
|
||||
# destroying PITR for both. Dev keeps `s3://cnpg` (its existing, PROVEN backups); prod nests.
|
||||
destinationPath: ${CNPG_BACKUP_PATH}
|
||||
endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
|
||||
s3Credentials:
|
||||
accessKeyId:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ spec:
|
||||
- name: default
|
||||
provider: aws
|
||||
bucket: velero
|
||||
# PER-ENVIRONMENT PREFIX (cluster-vars). Empty on dev = the bucket root it already uses;
|
||||
# `prod` on prod. Without it both clusters share one BackupStorageLocation — and Velero
|
||||
# SYNCS backups it finds there into itself as Backup CRs and GARBAGE-COLLECTS them when
|
||||
# their TTL expires, so prod would adopt and then delete dev's backups. Both clusters also
|
||||
# run schedules named `daily`/`daily-resources-only`, so even the object keys would collide.
|
||||
prefix: ${VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX}
|
||||
default: true
|
||||
config:
|
||||
region: us-east-1 # placeholder; MinIO ignores it (S3 clients require one)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user