feat(backup): prod shares dev's MinIO — plus the path tenancy that makes it survivable
Operator ruling: "the S3 backup location is the same as Dev." Prod's
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is now http://192.168.1.9:9000 and the TBD-PROD-* placeholder
is retired. Set EXPLICITLY rather than by omitting the op — an omitted op would
inherit the same value silently, and a shared backup target must be visible in
the overlay that owns it.
SHARING THE ENDPOINT WAS NOT SAFE AS AUTHORED. Nothing about the backup PATHS
was per-environment, and enabling prod against dev's MinIO would have been the
2026-09-04 external-dns incident again, in a worse place:
VELERO — bucket `velero`, NO prefix, and both clusters run schedules named
`daily` / `daily-resources-only`. Velero SYNCS backups it finds in its BSL
into itself as Backup CRs and GARBAGE-COLLECTS them at TTL, so prod would
have adopted dev's backups and then deleted them on schedule.
CNPG — the worse one. destinationPath `s3://cnpg` with CNPG appending
serverName, which defaults to the CLUSTER NAME. Both environments have
keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db, so prod's Postgres would archive
WAL into the EXACT prefix dev's does. Two servers interleaving WAL into one
Barman stream CORRUPTS THE CHAIN and destroys PITR — and dev's restore is
PROVEN (R-STATE-03). Sharing an endpoint is fine; sharing a path is not.
Two knobs, authored once, environments differing only by scoped overrides
(R-ENV-02):
VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX dev "" | prod "prod"
CNPG_BACKUP_PATH dev "s3://cnpg" | prod "s3://cnpg/prod"
THE BASE VALUES ARE DEV'S CURRENT LAYOUT ON PURPOSE. Dev's existing backups live
at the bucket root and at s3://cnpg; giving dev a prefix would ORPHAN the very
backups its proven restore depends on — the same reasoning that keeps dev's
EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID at `default`. Prod has no history to preserve.
*** PROD STILL HAS NO BACKUP COVERAGE — the endpoint is not reachable. ***
Measured from a throwaway pod INSIDE the prod cluster (the workstation proves
nothing about pod egress, and a workstation-side reading has already misled this
project once): curl http://192.168.1.9:9000/minio/health/live → connection timed
out after 15s. pfSense does not route prod's pod network to the dev LAN's MinIO.
OPERATOR ACTION REQUIRED. velero stays suspended; note apps-wave-0 applies GREEN
regardless — the token IS defined so strict substitution succeeds — while every
write fails at RUNTIME. A green apps-wave-0 does not mean backups work.
New `standup.sh s3check` step probes the endpoint from a throwaway in-cluster
pod and fails closed, with `--s3-endpoint <url>` to test a CANDIDATE before
authoring it into cluster-vars. That is how the unreachability above was
established rather than assumed.
VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. flux-postbuild-substitution 254 -> 260 assertions,
and neither new knob appears in the dead-knob advisory list, so both are really
consumed. Rendered both overlays: all three CNPG destinationPaths and Velero's
prefix carry the tokens; dev resolves to its existing layout, prod to the nested
paths.
DELIVERY: prod reconciles the bootstrap Gitea's main at c8c1d29. This branch also
carries the DNS inversion, which must NOT reach prod. Delivering needs a
c8c1d29-based branch with only these commits — no urgency while the routing is
still closed.
Refs R-STATE-03, R-ENV-02, R-IDP-05.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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-4
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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# USAGE
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# bootstrap/standup.sh --kubeconfig <path> --expect-server <url> [--confirm-destructive] <step...>
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#
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# steps: preflight crds unwedge externaldns resume verify (or: all)
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# steps: preflight crds unwedge externaldns s3check resume verify (or: all)
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#
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# --expect-server is REQUIRED and is compared against the live API server before ANY command runs.
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# Pointing this at the wrong cluster is the one mistake with unbounded blast radius: dev is live and
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@@ -29,13 +29,14 @@
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set -euo pipefail
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- args
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KUBECONFIG_ARG="" EXPECT_SERVER="" CONFIRM_DESTRUCTIVE=0
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KUBECONFIG_ARG="" EXPECT_SERVER="" CONFIRM_DESTRUCTIVE=0 S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE=""
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STEPS=()
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while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
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case "$1" in
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--kubeconfig) KUBECONFIG_ARG="${2:?--kubeconfig needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
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--expect-server) EXPECT_SERVER="${2:?--expect-server needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
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--confirm-destructive) CONFIRM_DESTRUCTIVE=1; shift ;;
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--s3-endpoint) S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE="${2:?--s3-endpoint needs a value}"; shift 2 ;;
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-h|--help) sed -n '2,30p' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
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-*) echo "ERROR: unknown flag '$1'" >&2; exit 2 ;;
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*) STEPS+=("$1"); shift ;;
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@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ done
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[ -n "${KUBECONFIG_ARG}" ] || { echo "ERROR: --kubeconfig is required." >&2; exit 2; }
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[ -n "${EXPECT_SERVER}" ] || { echo "ERROR: --expect-server is required (safety guard)." >&2; exit 2; }
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[ "${#STEPS[@]}" -gt 0 ] || { echo "ERROR: no step given. One of: preflight crds unwedge externaldns resume verify all" >&2; exit 2; }
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[ "${#STEPS[@]}" -gt 0 ] || { echo "ERROR: no step given. One of: preflight crds unwedge externaldns s3check resume verify all" >&2; exit 2; }
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script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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repo_root="$(git -C "${script_dir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || (cd "${script_dir}/.." && pwd))"
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@@ -391,6 +392,53 @@ step_externaldns() {
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Any change to a name outside it, or to a TXT entry owned by another cluster, is a REGRESSION."
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}
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step_s3check() {
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say "S3 BACKUP ENDPOINT — reachability FROM INSIDE THE CLUSTER"
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# Velero runs in-cluster, so the only reachability that counts is the pods' own. Probing from the
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# workstation proves nothing either way: it sits on a different side of pfSense than the pod
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# network, and a healthy result there has already misled this project once.
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local ep live; live="$(cvar S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT)"
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info "live S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT = ${live:-<unset>}"
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if [ -n "${S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE}" ]; then
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# Probe a CANDIDATE endpoint before adopting it. The whole point is to find out whether a proposed
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# backup target is reachable from this cluster's pods BEFORE authoring it into cluster-vars —
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# otherwise the first evidence is silently-missing backups.
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ep="${S3_ENDPOINT_OVERRIDE}"
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info "probing CANDIDATE endpoint from --s3-endpoint: ${ep}"
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else
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ep="${live}"
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fi
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case "${ep}" in
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""|TBD-*) die "no usable endpoint to probe (live='${live}'). Pass --s3-endpoint <url> to test a candidate." ;;
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esac
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local ns=velero pod=s3check-$$
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kubectl get ns "${ns}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || ns=default
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info "probing from a throwaway pod in namespace '${ns}'"
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# --restart=Never + explicit delete in a trap: a probe must never leave a pod behind on a cluster.
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trap 'kubectl -n "${ns}" delete pod "${pod}" --ignore-not-found --wait=false >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' RETURN
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if kubectl -n "${ns}" run "${pod}" --restart=Never --image=curlimages/curl:8.11.1 --command --quiet \
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-- curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 15 "${ep}/minio/health/live" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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local i=0 phase=""
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while [ "$i" -lt 90 ]; do
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phase="$(kubectl -n "${ns}" get pod "${pod}" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
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case "${phase}" in Succeeded|Failed) break ;; esac
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sleep 5; i=$((i+5))
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done
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local out; out="$(kubectl -n "${ns}" logs "${pod}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
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info "pod phase=${phase:-unknown} response=${out:-<none>}"
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case "${out}" in
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200|2??) info "REACHABLE: ${ep} answered from inside the cluster." ;;
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*) warn "NOT REACHABLE from inside the cluster (phase=${phase}, body='${out}').
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Velero would install cleanly and then fail every backup at RUNTIME — a tier that looks healthy
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while no backup exists. Fix routing, or give this environment its own endpoint, before
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resuming velero." ;;
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esac
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else
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warn "could not create the probe pod (admission policy? image pull?). Reachability UNKNOWN."
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fi
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}
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step_resume() {
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say "RESUME TIERS (dependency order)"
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local n s3; s3="$(cvar S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT)"
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@@ -467,13 +515,14 @@ step_verify() {
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for s in "${STEPS[@]}"; do
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case "$s" in
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preflight) step_preflight ;;
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s3check) step_s3check ;;
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crds) step_crds ;;
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unwedge) step_unwedge ;;
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externaldns) step_externaldns ;;
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resume) step_resume ;;
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verify) step_verify ;;
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all) step_preflight; step_crds; step_unwedge; step_externaldns; step_resume; step_verify ;;
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*) die "unknown step '$s' (preflight crds unwedge externaldns resume verify all)" ;;
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*) die "unknown step '$s' (preflight crds unwedge externaldns s3check resume verify all)" ;;
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esac
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done
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