feat(obs): wire the gate-sidecar scrape, and fix the alert that would have gone silent doing it
gate / gate (pull_request) Failing after 1m42s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped

PR #28 gave the five fleet oauth2-proxy sidecars --metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180 and a
named `metrics` port. This wires a scraper to them and, in the process, found a real bug
in the alert this branch added.

PodMonitor, not ServiceMonitor. Measured: no Service exposes 44180 on any of the five
(jackett/radarr/sonarr/qbittorrent/pihole all publish only their app port + authproxy
4180), so a ServiceMonitor would select nothing. A PodMonitor targets pod ports directly
and needs no change to catalog/render.py or the apps/wave-* renders and goldens.
Selector is the pod label homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode=forward-auth — present on
exactly those five gate pods, absent from crafty's, which still has no metrics listener.
The property, not an app list.

THE BUG: `up{container="oauth2-proxy"}` -> `up{container="oauth2-proxy"} == 1`.

A target that is discovered but FAILING still publishes `up`, with value 0. The series
exists, so count by (namespace) returned 1, `unless` removed the namespace, and
OAuth2ProxyGateUnobserved went QUIET while nothing was being scraped at all — this
branch's own disease reproduced inside the alert written to cure it. Not hypothetical:
the PodMonitor lands five targets whose scrape is dropped, so the bare form would have
silently cleared on this very commit. Proven by mutation: reverting the `== 1` fails the
two new unit-test scenarios (got: nil) and leaves every other assertion green.

The scrape does NOT work yet, and that is documented rather than papered over. From a
pod in ns monitoring to the jackett pod, :44180 AND :4180 both time out; the shared
proxy's :44180 answers. ns jackett's default-deny is podSelector:{} with
policyTypes:[Ingress,Egress] and NO ingress key (deny-all), and the one allowance is
fromEntities:[ingress] to 4180 — the Gateway's Envoy only. The endpoint itself is
healthy: port-forwarded, /metrics returns http=200, 10208 bytes, all three oauth2_proxy_*
families including requests_total{code="302"}. Same bug and fingerprint as
platform/longhorn/networkpolicy-metrics.yaml records for Longhorn; the fix is one narrow
rule per app, and it cannot ship from this tier because oauth2-proxy and apps-wave-0 are
Flux SIBLINGS (both dependsOn platform-config), so naming ns jackett here would apply
today and fail on a cold rebuild. Needs an owner in the renderer.

Touches conformance/** : one KNOWN_EXTERNAL_MONITORS entry, which is the mechanism the
failing check explicitly instructs ("DECLARE it ... with who creates it") and which
flux-podmonitor.yaml already uses. It records that the port name was measured on prod
instead of resolved from a Service, and that the targets are currently down. That makes
this PR require a non-author review on the sensitive-path rule.

Also: ratio alert still NOT shipped. oauth2_proxy_requests_total now exists on the
endpoint but not in the TSDB, so writing it today would make it inert for exactly the
reason it was refused on 2026-09-30. Runbook gains policy-vs-no-target triage and the
radarr /signalr/messages/negotiate worked case — one orphaned browser tab, 206 identical
302s, nobody ever re-prompted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-10-01 21:56:07 -05:00
1 parent ba79a1b59b
commit bce101d03f
9 files changed
+446 -24

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@@ -33,10 +33,18 @@
# $ promtool query instant :9090 'count by (__name__) ({__name__=~"oauth2_proxy.*"})'
# oauth2_proxy_requests_in_flight => 2 <- the SHARED proxy's two replicas. That is ALL.
#
# Every sidecar (crafty, jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr) runs with
# PARTLY SUPERSEDED 2026-10-01, and the correction matters more than the original. PR #28 gave
# the five FLEET sidecars `--metrics-address=0.0.0.0:44180` and a named `metrics` port, and the
# endpoint genuinely serves (verified by payload: http=200, 10208 bytes, all three
# `oauth2_proxy_*` families present — not merely by the flag being in `args`). podmonitor.yaml
# in this directory now discovers them. But the scrape is still DROPPED by the app namespaces'
# default-deny ingress, so the TSDB remains empty for those namespaces; and crafty still has no
# metrics listener at all. The rule below is unchanged in purpose and still has work to do.
#
# Every sidecar (crafty, jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr) ran with
# `--http-address=0.0.0.0:4180` and NO `--metrics-address`, so oauth2-proxy's metrics listener
# is never started; the container declares only port `http:4180`, there is no `metrics` port on
# any of their Services, and there is no ServiceMonitor or PodMonitor for any of them anywhere
# was never started; the container declared only port `http:4180`, there was no `metrics` port on
# any of their Services, and there was no ServiceMonitor or PodMonitor for any of them anywhere
# in the cluster (measured: `kubectl get servicemonitors,podmonitors -A`). Six gates, zero
# telemetry. An alert written against `oauth2_proxy_requests_total{namespace="jackett"}` would
# have been PERMANENTLY INERT — present, evaluating, silent, and indistinguishable from health.
@@ -81,15 +89,31 @@ spec:
# Nothing in this expression touches `oauth2_proxy_*`, so the rule cannot itself be
# inert for the reason it is reporting.
#
# MEASURED ON PROD 2026-09-30 — this expression returns six namespaces right now:
# MEASURED ON PROD 2026-09-30 — this expression returned six namespaces:
# {namespace="crafty"} {namespace="jackett"} {namespace="pihole"}
# {namespace="qbittorrent"} {namespace="radarr"} {namespace="sonarr"}
# and excludes namespace="oauth2-proxy", whose two replicas ARE scraped. It fires on
# and excluded namespace="oauth2-proxy", whose two replicas ARE scraped. It fires on
# the state the cluster is in; it is not a rule waiting for a hypothetical.
#
# `== 1` IS LOAD-BEARING, AND IT IS A BUG FIX (2026-10-01). This clause was originally
# a bare `up{container="oauth2-proxy"}`, which was WRONG in the one way that matters
# here: a target that is DISCOVERED BUT FAILING still publishes `up`, with value 0. So
# the series exists, `count by (namespace)` returns 1, `unless` removes the namespace,
# and the alert GOES QUIET while nothing whatsoever is being scraped. That is this
# branch's own disease — a green signal standing in for an absent one — reproduced
# inside the alert written to cure it. It was not hypothetical: podmonitor.yaml lands
# five targets whose scrape is DROPPED by NetworkPolicy (measured; see that file), so
# the bare form would have silently cleared on the very next commit. `== 1` means
# "observed" requires a scrape that actually succeeds.
#
# A failing target is therefore reported by BOTH this rule and kube-prometheus-stack's
# generic TargetDown. That duplication is deliberate: TargetDown says "a target is
# down", this says "an authentication gate is unobserved", and during an incident those
# are different sentences. The overlap is the cheap half of the trade.
expr: |
count by (namespace) (kube_pod_container_info{container="oauth2-proxy"})
unless
count by (namespace) (up{container="oauth2-proxy"})
count by (namespace) (up{container="oauth2-proxy"} == 1)
# 1h, not 5m: a rollout briefly has a running sidecar whose target has not been
# discovered yet, and this condition is a standing architectural gap, never an
# emergency. Long enough that no deploy can produce it.