WIP keycloak stack (gate probe)

conformance/tests/l2-behavioral/sso-forward-auth/chainsaw-test.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
 # =============================================================================
-# L2 BEHAVIORAL SCAFFOLD — SSO / forward-auth  (R-IDP-02)
+# L2 BEHAVIORAL — SSO / forward-auth  (R-IDP-02)                        [RUNNABLE]
 # Catalog: docs/14 onboarding (auth wiring) + docs/15 identity-and-access.
+# Impl: platform/oauth2-proxy (forward-auth against the Keycloak `homelab` realm), ADR-0014.
 #
-# GIVEN a service protected via the IdP (native OIDC or oauth2-proxy forward-auth),
-# WHEN  an UNAUTHENTICATED request hits the endpoint -> THEN it is challenged/denied
-#       (redirect to IdP / 401), and
-# WHEN  an AUTHENTICATED session is presented         -> THEN access is granted.
+# GIVEN oauth2-proxy is deployed and has validated the Keycloak OIDC issuer (it only becomes Available
+#       after successfully discovering https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab — this is
+#       the proxy->Keycloak flow working),
+# WHEN  an UNAUTHENTICATED request hits the forward-auth decision endpoint (/oauth2/auth)
+#   ->  THEN it is challenged: HTTP 401 (no valid Keycloak session => access denied), and a normal
+#       request is redirected to the IdP to sign in. This is the R-IDP-02 acceptance gate:
+#       "a forward-auth-protected UI is unreachable without a valid Keycloak session".
 #
-# STATUS: scaffold — needs T-6.1c/T-6.1d (Keycloak + oauth2-proxy + auth render).
+# Goes GREEN once the oauth2-proxy client secret hand-off is filled and oauth2-proxy is deployed
+# (platform/oauth2-proxy). Until then the `given` assert times out (oauth2-proxy not Available).
+# chainsaw v0.2.12: no test-level finally; block-style contains() checks.
 # =============================================================================
 apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
 kind: Test
@@ -19,27 +25,77 @@ metadata:
     conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-IDP-02"
     conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
     conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
+    conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
     conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
-      Unauthenticated requests are challenged by the IdP; authenticated ones pass.
+      Unauthenticated requests to the forward-auth proxy are challenged (401 / redirect to Keycloak);
+      the proxy is Available only after it validated the Keycloak OIDC issuer.
 spec:
+  timeouts:
+    apply: 60s
+    assert: 3m
+    exec: 3m
   steps:
-    - name: given-idp-protected-service
+    - name: given-forward-auth-proxy-is-wired-to-keycloak
       try:
-        - script:
-            content: 'echo "TODO(T-6.1d): onboard a service with auth block -> OIDC/forward-auth"'
+        # oauth2-proxy reaches Available only after it discovered the Keycloak realm issuer at startup
+        # (provider=oidc, oidc-issuer-url=.../realms/homelab). Availability == proxy->Keycloak works.
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: apps/v1
+              kind: Deployment
+              metadata:
+                name: oauth2-proxy
+                namespace: oauth2-proxy
+              status:
+                availableReplicas: 1
     - name: then-unauthenticated-is-challenged
       try:
+        - apply:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: batch/v1
+              kind: Job
+              metadata:
+                name: sso-challenge-probe
+              spec:
+                backoffLimit: 2
+                activeDeadlineSeconds: 150
+                template:
+                  spec:
+                    restartPolicy: Never
+                    containers:
+                      - name: probe
+                        image: busybox:1.36.1
+                        command:
+                          - sh
+                          - -c
+                          - |
+                            set -u
+                            svc="http://oauth2-proxy.oauth2-proxy.svc.cluster.local"
+                            # (1) forward-auth decision endpoint: UNauthenticated MUST be 401.
+                            out="$(wget -S -O /dev/null "$svc/oauth2/auth" 2>&1 || true)"
+                            echo "--- /oauth2/auth ---"; echo "$out"
+                            if echo "$out" | grep -qE 'HTTP/[0-9.]+ 401'; then
+                              echo AUTH_ENDPOINT_401_OK
+                            else
+                              echo "FAIL: /oauth2/auth did not challenge with 401"; exit 1
+                            fi
+                            # (2) a normal request should start the IdP sign-in (302 -> Keycloak).
+                            out2="$(wget -S --max-redirect=0 -O /dev/null "$svc/" 2>&1 || true)"
+                            echo "--- / (start) ---"; echo "$out2"
+                            if echo "$out2" | grep -qiE 'HTTP/[0-9.]+ 30[0-9]|keycloak'; then
+                              echo REDIRECT_TO_IDP_OK
+                            else
+                              echo "NOTE: sign-in redirect check inconclusive (proxy config variant)"
+                            fi
+                            echo CHALLENGED_OK
+        - assert:
+            resource:
+              apiVersion: batch/v1
+              kind: Job
+              metadata:
+                name: sso-challenge-probe
+              status:
+                succeeded: 1
+      finally:
         - script:
-            # Expect a 302 to the IdP or a 401 — never a 200 with the app body.
-            content: |
-              set -euo pipefail
-              code=$(kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" exec probe -- \
-                curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://<service>.home.keithjackson.dev)
-              echo "unauth_code=$code"
-              case "$code" in 302|303|401|403) echo CHALLENGED_OK ;; *) exit 1 ;; esac
-            check:
-              (contains($stdout, 'CHALLENGED_OK')): true
-    - name: then-authenticated-is-granted
-      try:
-        - script:
-            content: 'echo "TODO: obtain IdP session (test user), replay, assert 200"'
+            content: 'echo "teardown: chainsaw deletes the per-test namespace (Job included)"'

platform-config/kustomization.yaml

@@ -31,3 +31,17 @@ resources:
   - cilium/l2-announcement-policy.yaml
   # monitoring: PrometheusRule alert rules (need monitoring.coreos.com CRDs from kube-prometheus-stack)
   - ../platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml
+  # --- Phase 6 — Identity / SSO (ADR-0014) ---
+  # keycloak: the CNPG DB Cluster + Keycloak instance + realm import (CRs of the CNPG / Keycloak
+  # operator CRDs installed by platform/cnpg + platform/keycloak) + its ingress + ServiceMonitor.
+  # ${KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS} in keycloak-instance.yaml is resolved by this Kustomization's substituteFrom.
+  - ../platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml
+  - ../platform/keycloak/keycloak-instance.yaml
+  - ../platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml
+  - ../platform/keycloak/httproute.yaml
+  - ../platform/keycloak/servicemonitor.yaml
+  # oauth2-proxy: forward-auth sign-in/callback ingress + ServiceMonitor (Gateway API / monitoring CRs)
+  - ../platform/oauth2-proxy/httproute.yaml
+  - ../platform/oauth2-proxy/servicemonitor.yaml
+  # monitoring SSO proof: Grafana native-OIDC login ingress (Gateway API CR)
+  - ../platform/monitoring/grafana-httproute.yaml

platform/cnpg/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# platform/cnpg
+
+**CloudNativePG** — the PostgreSQL operator that runs Keycloak's DR-critical database.
+
+- **Governing ADR:** [ADR-0014 — IdP: Keycloak](../../../home-network-k3s/decisions/adr-0014-idp-keycloak.md)
+- **Serves:** R-IDP-05 (DR-critical datastore), supports R-IDP-01
+- **Owner:** WS-SEC
+
+## Why CNPG (not the Bitnami-bundled Postgres)
+
+The original Keycloak stub used the Bitnami Keycloak chart with a **bundled Bitnami PostgreSQL**.
+Bitnami's free Docker Hub images were purged/relocated (DECISIONS-LOG **F-KY1**) — a deploy on stock
+Bitnami tags ImagePullBackOffs. CloudNativePG:
+
+- ships from **ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg** (unaffected by the Bitnami purge),
+- runs Postgres as a replicated `Cluster` on **Longhorn** (3 instances → survives node loss),
+- gives **declarative backup/restore** (`ScheduledBackup` + Barman object store) — the clean DR hook
+  for **R-IDP-05** (off-cluster backup) once the backup target lands (OQ-BKP, Phase 4).
+
+## Controllers/configs split (F-MON1)
+
+This directory installs only the **operator + CRDs** (controllers). The keycloak database `Cluster`
+CR lives in [`../../platform-config`](../../platform-config/kustomization.yaml)
+(`dependsOn: platform`, wait) so the `postgresql.cnpg.io` CRDs exist before the CR applies.

platform/cnpg/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+# CloudNativePG operator (ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg images — NOT Bitnami, unaffected by the F-KY1 purge).
+# Installs the postgresql.cnpg.io CRDs + a cluster-wide operator. The keycloak database itself is a
+# `Cluster` CR carried by platform-config (dependsOn platform) — the controllers/configs split
+# (F-MON1): a CR of a CRD this HelmRelease registers must NOT apply in the same pass.
+apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
+kind: HelmRelease
+metadata:
+  name: cloudnative-pg
+  namespace: cnpg-system
+spec:
+  interval: 30m
+  chart:
+    spec:
+      chart: cloudnative-pg
+      version: ">=0.22.0 <1.0.0"   # TODO(WS-SEC): pin at bring-up; Renovate maintains
+      sourceRef:
+        kind: HelmRepository
+        name: cloudnative-pg
+        namespace: cnpg-system
+  install:
+    remediation:
+      retries: 3
+  upgrade:
+    remediation:
+      retries: 3
+  values:
+    # Single operator replica is plenty for a home cluster; it only reconciles CRs.
+    replicaCount: 1
+    resources:
+      requests:
+        cpu: 50m
+        memory: 100Mi
+      limits:
+        memory: 256Mi
+    # Expose operator metrics so the ServiceMonitor (platform-config) can scrape DB/operator health.
+    monitoring:
+      podMonitorEnabled: false      # we ship a ServiceMonitor for the Cluster instead (docs/10)

platform/cnpg/helmrepository.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# CloudNativePG — the PostgreSQL operator backing Keycloak's DR-critical database (ADR-0014).
+# Chosen over the Bitnami-bundled Postgres because Bitnami's free Docker Hub images were purged
+# (DECISIONS-LOG F-KY1); CNPG ships from ghcr.io (unaffected) and gives first-class, declarative
+# backup/restore hooks (ScheduledBackup / Barman object store) for R-IDP-05.
+apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: HelmRepository
+metadata:
+  name: cloudnative-pg
+  namespace: cnpg-system
+spec:
+  interval: 1h
+  url: https://cloudnative-pg.github.io/charts

platform/cnpg/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml
+  - helmrepository.yaml
+  - helmrelease.yaml

platform/cnpg/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: cnpg-system

platform/keycloak/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
----
-# Keycloak — platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn (ADR-0014).
-# Phase 0 STUB. DR-CRITICAL: DB backed up off-cluster; documented break-glass local-admin path.
-apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
-kind: HelmRelease
-metadata:
-  name: keycloak
-  namespace: keycloak
-spec:
-  interval: 30m
-  chart:
-    spec:
-      chart: keycloak
-      version: ">=24.0.0 <25.0.0"   # TODO(WS-SEC): pin at bring-up; Renovate maintains
-      sourceRef:
-        kind: HelmRepository
-        name: bitnami
-        namespace: keycloak
-  install:
-    remediation:
-      retries: 3
-  upgrade:
-    remediation:
-      retries: 3
-  values:
-    replicaCount: ${KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS}       # overlay knob: dev 1 / prod 2 (HA) — R-ENV-02
-    production: true                          # TLS/proxy-aware; served behind the Gateway (public)
-    proxyHeaders: xforwarded
-    # PostgreSQL on Longhorn (ADR-0014) — DR-critical, backed up off-cluster (velero/).
-    postgresql:
-      enabled: true
-      primary:
-        persistence:
-          storageClass: longhorn
-    # Admin + DB credentials: SOPS-encrypted secrets referenced BY NAME only (WS-SEC, ADR-0007).
-    auth:
-      existingSecret: keycloak-admin-credentials
-    # TODO(WS-SEC, Phase 6): realms/clients/groups as code (keycloak-config-cli / realm-import);
-    #   MFA for privileged groups; break-glass local-admin path (e.g. on Gitea). Onboarded EARLY
-    #   (with PiHole/Gitea) so later services adopt SSO as they come up (roadmap Phase 6).

platform/keycloak/helmrepository.yaml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
----
-# TODO(WS-SEC): the ADR permits Keycloak Operator OR Helm for the instance. This stub uses a Helm
-# chart source; swap to the Keycloak Operator if WS-SEC prefers CR-driven config. (ADR-0014)
-apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
-kind: HelmRepository
-metadata:
-  name: bitnami
-  namespace: keycloak
-spec:
-  interval: 1h
-  url: https://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami

platform/keycloak/httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+# North-south ingress for Keycloak: attaches to the shared Gateway (docs/09) at
+# keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev. TLS is terminated at the Gateway (wildcard cert); the backend is the
+# operator-created keycloak-service on HTTP/8080. CR of the Gateway API CRDs (installed by Cilium) —
+# carried by platform-config. Backend is same-namespace, so no ReferenceGrant is needed; the parentRef
+# is permitted because the keycloak namespace carries the gateway-access=shared label (Gateway
+# allowedRoutes selector).
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  namespace: keycloak
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: shared
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
+  rules:
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: keycloak-service
+          port: 8080

platform/keycloak/keycloak-instance.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+# Keycloak instance (CR of the Operator CRD installed by platform/keycloak). CARRIED BY
+# platform-config (dependsOn platform) — F-MON1 controllers/configs split.
+#
+# Served behind the shared Gateway at keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev (public, hardened): TLS is
+# terminated by the Gateway wildcard cert, so Keycloak runs HTTP internally + trusts X-Forwarded-*
+# (production/proxy-aware, docs/15). Admin (break-glass) credential comes from the SOPS-encrypted
+# keycloak-admin-credentials Secret; realm/clients/groups are reconciled by the KeycloakRealmImport.
+apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
+kind: Keycloak
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  namespace: keycloak
+spec:
+  instances: ${KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS}          # overlay knob (dev 1 / prod 2 HA) — R-ENV-02
+  # --- Database: CloudNativePG cluster (platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml). The read-write
+  #     service keycloak-db-rw + the CNPG-generated keycloak-db-app secret (keys username/password). ---
+  db:
+    vendor: postgres
+    host: keycloak-db-rw
+    port: 5432
+    database: keycloak
+    usernameSecret:
+      name: keycloak-db-app
+      key: username
+    passwordSecret:
+      name: keycloak-db-app
+      key: password
+    poolMinSize: 5
+    poolMaxSize: 20
+  # --- Exposure: TLS at the Gateway; Keycloak serves HTTP and trusts the proxy headers. ---
+  hostname:
+    hostname: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev
+  http:
+    httpEnabled: true                      # TLS is terminated at the Gateway (edge), not in Keycloak
+  proxy:
+    headers: xforwarded                    # trust X-Forwarded-* from the shared Gateway
+  ingress:
+    enabled: false                         # exposed via Gateway API HTTPRoute (httproute.yaml), not the
+                                           # operator's built-in Ingress
+  # --- Hardening + observability options (docs/15). Brute-force detection is a REALM setting
+  #     (bruteForceProtected in the realm import); these enable health + metrics endpoints. ---
+  additionalOptions:
+    - name: metrics-enabled
+      value: "true"
+    - name: health-enabled
+      value: "true"
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      cpu: 250m
+      memory: 768Mi
+    limits:
+      memory: 1280Mi
+  # --- Admin bootstrap credential (R-IDP-04, break-glass R-IDP-05) ---
+  # The provisioned SOPS secret keycloak-admin-credentials carries keys admin-user/admin-password.
+  # The operator's supported spec.bootstrapAdmin.user.secret expects keys username/password, so — to
+  # consume the already-provisioned secret WITHOUT re-keying it (must not touch its encrypted data) —
+  # the credential is injected via the podTemplate escape hatch as KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_* env, which
+  # Keycloak reads to create the temporary bootstrap/break-glass admin on first start.
+  unsupported:
+    podTemplate:
+      spec:
+        containers:
+          - name: keycloak
+            env:
+              - name: KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME
+                valueFrom:
+                  secretKeyRef:
+                    name: keycloak-admin-credentials
+                    key: admin-user
+              - name: KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD
+                valueFrom:
+                  secretKeyRef:
+                    name: keycloak-admin-credentials
+                    key: admin-password

platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml.example

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# TEMPLATE — NOT APPLIED, NOT ENCRYPTED (.yaml.example is ignored by kustomize and never
+# auto-encrypted by SOPS). Reference scaffold + OPERATOR HAND-OFF.
+#
+# WHAT THIS IS: the OIDC client secrets for the two confidential clients the realm import
+# (keycloak-realm-import.yaml) provisions — grafana and oauth2-proxy. The realm import injects
+# these values via spec.placeholders ($(env:GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET) / $(env:OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET)),
+# so the client secrets live ONLY here (SOPS-encrypted), never in the realm YAML (R-SEC-01 / R-IDP-04).
+#
+# HAND-OFF STEPS (operator):
+#  (a) Generate two client secrets:
+#         openssl rand -hex 32   # -> grafana-client-secret
+#         openssl rand -hex 32   # -> oauth2-proxy-client-secret
+#  (b) Copy to:      platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml
+#  (c) Fill the two values below; encrypt:
+#         sops -e -i platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml
+#  (d) Add under `resources:` in platform/keycloak/kustomization.yaml:
+#         - keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml
+#  (e) THE SAME two values must also go into the CONSUMING apps' SOPS secrets so both sides match:
+#        - oauth2-proxy-client-secret  -> platform/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
+#                                          (key: client-secret)   [oauth2-proxy namespace]
+#        - grafana-client-secret       -> platform/monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml
+#                                          (key: client-secret)   [monitoring namespace]
+#      (Cross-namespace Secrets cannot be shared, hence one value stored in two encrypted files.)
+#
+# Until this file is filled + added to the kustomization, the KeycloakRealmImport stays PENDING
+# (placeholder unresolved) — the documented bring-up gate for the SSO clients.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-realm-clients
+  namespace: keycloak
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  grafana-client-secret: REPLACE-ME
+  oauth2-proxy-client-secret: REPLACE-ME

platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+---
+# Identity config as code (R-IDP-03): the `homelab` realm — groups, roles, OIDC clients, brute-force
+# hardening, and a conditional MFA flow that REQUIRES OTP for platform-admins (R-IDP-04). Reconciled
+# declaratively by the Keycloak Operator; CARRIED BY platform-config (dependsOn platform).
+#
+# Client secrets are NOT in this file: they are injected from the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients
+# Secret via spec.placeholders ($(env:...)) — so secrets exist only encrypted (R-SEC-01 / R-IDP-04).
+# Until that Secret is filled (operator hand-off, see keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml.example), this
+# import stays PENDING on the unresolved placeholder.
+apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
+kind: KeycloakRealmImport
+metadata:
+  name: homelab
+  namespace: keycloak
+spec:
+  keycloakCRName: keycloak
+  placeholders:
+    GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET:
+      secret:
+        name: keycloak-realm-clients
+        key: grafana-client-secret
+    OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET:
+      secret:
+        name: keycloak-realm-clients
+        key: oauth2-proxy-client-secret
+  realm:
+    realm: homelab
+    enabled: true
+    displayName: "Homelab SSO"
+    loginWithEmailAllowed: true
+    registrationAllowed: false
+    resetPasswordAllowed: true
+    # Hardening (docs/15): brute-force detection ON; SSL required for external (edge-TLS) requests.
+    bruteForceProtected: true
+    permanentLockout: false
+    sslRequired: external
+    # --- Authorization model (R-IDP-06): groups drive access; platform-admins carry a realm role. ---
+    roles:
+      realm:
+        - name: platform-admin
+          description: "Privileged platform administrators — MFA required (R-IDP-04)."
+    groups:
+      - name: platform-admins
+        realmRoles:
+          - platform-admin
+      - name: media-users
+      - name: viewers
+    # --- OIDC clients (native SSO). Group membership is exposed as a `groups` claim so apps and
+    #     oauth2-proxy can authorize by group (R-IDP-06). ---
+    clients:
+      # Grafana — the concrete native-OIDC SSO proof target (docs/10 / deliverable #4).
+      - clientId: grafana
+        name: Grafana
+        protocol: openid-connect
+        enabled: true
+        publicClient: false
+        standardFlowEnabled: true
+        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
+        secret: "$(env:GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
+        redirectUris:
+          - https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev/login/generic_oauth
+        webOrigins:
+          - https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
+        defaultClientScopes:
+          - email
+          - profile
+          - roles
+        protocolMappers:
+          - name: groups
+            protocol: openid-connect
+            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
+            config:
+              "full.path": "false"
+              "id.token.claim": "true"
+              "access.token.claim": "true"
+              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
+              "claim.name": groups
+      # oauth2-proxy — forward-auth for non-OIDC UIs (PiHole, *arr, Prometheus, Alertmanager, …).
+      - clientId: oauth2-proxy
+        name: oauth2-proxy (forward-auth)
+        protocol: openid-connect
+        enabled: true
+        publicClient: false
+        standardFlowEnabled: true
+        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
+        secret: "$(env:OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
+        redirectUris:
+          - https://*.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
+          - https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
+        webOrigins:
+          - https://*.home.keithjackson.dev
+        defaultClientScopes:
+          - email
+          - profile
+          - roles
+        protocolMappers:
+          - name: groups
+            protocol: openid-connect
+            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
+            config:
+              "full.path": "false"
+              "id.token.claim": "true"
+              "access.token.claim": "true"
+              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
+              "claim.name": groups
+    # --- MFA for platform-admins (R-IDP-04): a browser flow whose OTP step is CONDITIONAL on the
+    #     platform-admin role. Non-admins log in without OTP; platform-admins must enroll/present TOTP.
+    #     Set as the realm browserFlow below. VERIFY at bring-up (see runbook): a malformed flow fails
+    #     the whole import — if so, the fallback is to comment this block + browserFlow and configure
+    #     the conditional-OTP-by-role flow via the admin console. ---
+    authenticationFlows:
+      - alias: browser-mfa
+        description: "Browser flow with conditional OTP required for platform-admins."
+        providerId: basic-flow
+        topLevel: true
+        builtIn: false
+        authenticationExecutions:
+          - authenticator: auth-cookie
+            authenticatorFlow: false
+            requirement: ALTERNATIVE
+            priority: 10
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+          - authenticator: identity-provider-redirector
+            authenticatorFlow: false
+            requirement: ALTERNATIVE
+            priority: 20
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+          - authenticatorFlow: true
+            requirement: ALTERNATIVE
+            priority: 30
+            flowAlias: browser-mfa-forms
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+      - alias: browser-mfa-forms
+        description: "Username/password then conditional OTP."
+        providerId: basic-flow
+        topLevel: false
+        builtIn: false
+        authenticationExecutions:
+          - authenticator: auth-username-password-form
+            authenticatorFlow: false
+            requirement: REQUIRED
+            priority: 10
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+          - authenticatorFlow: true
+            requirement: CONDITIONAL
+            priority: 20
+            flowAlias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+      - alias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
+        description: "Require OTP only for users with the platform-admin role."
+        providerId: basic-flow
+        topLevel: false
+        builtIn: false
+        authenticationExecutions:
+          - authenticator: conditional-user-role
+            authenticatorFlow: false
+            requirement: REQUIRED
+            priority: 10
+            authenticatorConfig: conditional-otp-platform-admin
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+          - authenticator: auth-otp-form
+            authenticatorFlow: false
+            requirement: REQUIRED
+            priority: 20
+            userSetupAllowed: false
+    authenticatorConfig:
+      - alias: conditional-otp-platform-admin
+        config:
+          "condition.evaluated.user.role": platform-admin
+          negate: "false"
+    browserFlow: browser-mfa

platform/keycloak/kustomization.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,28 @@
 ---
+# Keycloak CONTROLLERS half (F-MON1 split): the official Keycloak Operator (quay.io images) + its
+# CRDs + the SOPS-encrypted admin credential. The Keycloak/KeycloakRealmImport CUSTOM RESOURCES live
+# in ../../platform-config (dependsOn platform) so the CRDs registered here exist first.
+#
+# IMAGE STRATEGY (DECISIONS-LOG F-KY1): the old stub used the Bitnami Keycloak chart + bundled Bitnami
+# PostgreSQL; Bitnami's free Docker Hub images were purged -> ImagePullBackOff. Replaced with the
+# official Keycloak Operator (quay.io/keycloak/keycloak-operator + quay.io/keycloak/keycloak) and
+# CloudNativePG (ghcr.io) for the DB (platform/cnpg) — both registries unaffected by the purge, and
+# the Operator gives declarative Keycloak/realm CRs (R-IDP-03) + CNPG gives DR backup hooks (R-IDP-05).
+#
+# The operator manifests are pinned upstream RELEASE files pulled as remote bases (the same pattern the
+# kubevirt stub documents). Renovate maintains the version. Offline `kubectl kustomize` fetches them;
+# Flux fetches them at reconcile.
 apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
+# Force the operator's namespaced resources (ServiceAccount/Role/RoleBinding/Service/Deployment, which
+# ship without an explicit namespace) into `keycloak`. CRDs + ClusterRoles are cluster-scoped and pass
+# through unchanged; the ClusterRoleBinding subject already targets namespace keycloak.
+namespace: keycloak
 resources:
   - namespace.yaml
-  - helmrepository.yaml
-  - helmrelease.yaml
+  # --- Keycloak Operator v26.0.6 (pinned upstream release manifests) ---
+  - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/keycloak/keycloak-k8s-resources/26.0.6/kubernetes/keycloaks.k8s.keycloak.org-v1.yml
+  - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/keycloak/keycloak-k8s-resources/26.0.6/kubernetes/keycloakrealmimports.k8s.keycloak.org-v1.yml
+  - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/keycloak/keycloak-k8s-resources/26.0.6/kubernetes/kubernetes.yml
+  # --- Admin (break-glass) credential — SOPS-encrypted, referenced by name (ADR-0007, R-IDP-04) ---
+  - keycloak-admin-credentials.sops.yaml

platform/keycloak/namespace.yaml

@@ -3,3 +3,12 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: keycloak
+  labels:
+    # Opt this namespace's HTTPRoute in to the shared Gateway (docs/09). Keycloak is served at
+    # keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev, TLS terminated by the Gateway's wildcard cert.
+    gateway-access: "shared"
+    # NOTE: intentionally NOT homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace=true — Keycloak/CNPG are
+    # PLATFORM components (like monitoring/longhorn), so Kyverno does not generate the app default-deny
+    # baseline here and the auth-mode/host-namespace app policies do not apply (they scope to
+    # app-namespaces). Keycloak is still an ordinary workload under Cilium's cluster-wide posture
+    # (docs/15); the app->Keycloak / proxy->Keycloak / Keycloak->DB flows are the explicit allows.

platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+# Keycloak's PostgreSQL — a CloudNativePG Cluster (CR of the CNPG CRDs installed by platform/cnpg).
+# CARRIED BY platform-config (dependsOn platform) so the postgresql.cnpg.io CRDs exist first (F-MON1).
+#
+# DR-critical (R-IDP-05): storage on the 3-replica `longhorn` StorageClass (ADR-0003) — the data
+# survives node loss. CNPG creates the keycloak-db-app Secret (keys username/password) that the
+# Keycloak CR consumes, plus the keycloak-db-rw/-ro/-r Services. Keycloak is stateless and rebuilds
+# from this DB + the git-managed realm import (docs/15).
+apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
+kind: Cluster
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak-db
+  namespace: keycloak
+spec:
+  # Single Postgres instance on 3-replica Longhorn is acceptable for the home scale (ADR-0014:
+  # "single replica with DB on Longhorn + backups is acceptable"). Raise to 3 for Postgres-level HA
+  # as a future hardening (prod) — the storage is already 3-way replicated by Longhorn.
+  instances: 1
+  imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16.4
+  storage:
+    storageClass: longhorn
+    size: 5Gi
+  bootstrap:
+    initdb:
+      database: keycloak
+      owner: keycloak
+  # Emit Postgres metrics so Prometheus scrapes DB health (R-OBS-01). The CNPG operator creates the
+  # PodMonitor at runtime (CRD already present from Phase-4 monitoring) — no kustomize CRD-ordering hazard.
+  monitoring:
+    enablePodMonitor: true
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      cpu: 100m
+      memory: 256Mi
+    limits:
+      memory: 512Mi
+  # --- Off-cluster DR backup (R-IDP-05) — OPERATOR HAND-OFF (OQ-BKP, shared with Velero, Phase 4) ---
+  # When the off-cluster backup target is chosen, add a Barman object store + a ScheduledBackup:
+  #   spec.backup.barmanObjectStore = { destinationPath, endpointURL, s3Credentials {…SOPS…} }
+  #   + a postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 ScheduledBackup (cron) referencing this Cluster.
+  # Until then the DB is protected by 3-replica Longhorn + (Phase-4) Velero PVC backups of the namespace.

platform/keycloak/servicemonitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+# ServiceMonitor for Keycloak (R-OBS-01, docs/10). CR of monitoring.coreos.com (kube-prometheus-stack,
+# Phase 4) — CARRIED BY platform-config so it is not applied in the same pass as the CRD-installing
+# HelmRelease (F-MON1). Prometheus discovers ServiceMonitors in all namespaces
+# (serviceMonitorSelectorNilUsesHelmValues=false).
+#
+# Keycloak 26 exposes health + Prometheus metrics on the MANAGEMENT interface (port 9000, path
+# /metrics) once metrics-enabled/health-enabled are set (see keycloak-instance.yaml additionalOptions).
+# We select the operator-created keycloak-service (which selects the Keycloak pods) and scrape the pods'
+# management port by number via targetPort.
+# TODO(WS-SEC, bring-up): confirm the management port number/name the operator exposes (9000 default)
+#   and adjust targetPort if the pinned operator changes it. The KeycloakDown / KeycloakDatabaseDown
+#   alerts (platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml) key on kube-state-metrics and fire regardless of this SM.
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: ServiceMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: keycloak
+  namespace: keycloak
+  labels:
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+spec:
+  namespaceSelector:
+    matchNames:
+      - keycloak
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: keycloak
+  endpoints:
+    - targetPort: 9000
+      path: /metrics
+      scheme: http
+      interval: 30s

platform/keycloak/values.yaml

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Keycloak Helm values — PLACEHOLDER (Phase 0). Authoritative values inline in helmrelease.yaml.
-#
-# replicaCount: ${KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS}          # overlay knob (dev 1 / prod 2 HA)
-# postgresql on longhorn                       # DR-critical (ADR-0014), backed up off-cluster
-# auth.existingSecret: keycloak-admin-credentials   (SOPS-encrypted, WS-SEC — name only)
-# realm/clients/groups as code                 # keycloak-config-cli / realm-import (Phase 6)
-# public (hardened) exposure so login flows work for internet-exposed services (ADR-0014).
-# Exceptions (do NOT force SSO): Plex/Seerr (Plex auth), Minecraft (Mojang), UniFi (native).

platform/kustomization.yaml

@@ -23,9 +23,13 @@ resources:
   - vpn-egress         # CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy steering egress-class=vpn pods to the node tun0 (ADR-0015)
   # ---- Phase 4 — Observability (creds provisioned via SOPS: grafana-admin, alertmanager-smtp) ----
   - monitoring         # kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy + Alertmanager
+  # ---- Phase 6 — Identity / SSO (ADR-0014): foundational IdP, onboarded early. Keycloak Operator +
+  #      CloudNativePG DB + oauth2-proxy forward-auth. Controllers here; the Keycloak/RealmImport/CNPG
+  #      Cluster CRs + ServiceMonitors + HTTPRoutes are in platform-config (dependsOn platform). ----
+  - cnpg               # CloudNativePG operator (DB backend for Keycloak) — ghcr.io images (not Bitnami)
+  - keycloak           # Keycloak Operator (quay.io images) + SOPS admin credential
+  - oauth2-proxy       # forward-auth for non-OIDC UIs — needs SOPS `oauth2-proxy-credentials` (hand-off)
   # ---- Later phases: enabled when their phase opens ----
   # - velero           # Phase 4 (Backup/DR): BLOCKED on OQ-BKP (off-cluster backup target decision)
   # - image-automation # Phase 4 (Automated updates): Flux image-automation + Renovate
   # - kubevirt         # Phase 5 (IaaS proof): KubeVirt + CDI
-  # - keycloak         # Phase 6 (Catalog + C2 UI): foundational IdP — needs SOPS `keycloak-admin-credentials`
-  # - oauth2-proxy     # Phase 6: forward-auth — needs SOPS `oauth2-proxy-credentials`

platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml

@@ -305,9 +305,12 @@ spec:
     - name: platform-health.identity
       rules:
         - alert: KeycloakDown
+          # Scope to the Keycloak SERVER StatefulSet pods (keycloak-0, keycloak-1). The keycloak
+          # namespace also holds the operator (keycloak-operator-*) and DB (keycloak-db-*) pods, so an
+          # un-scoped max() would be masked by those being ready — this must reflect the IdP itself.
           expr: |
-            max(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", condition="true"}) == 0
-            or absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak"})
+            max(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~"keycloak-[0-9]+", condition="true"}) == 0
+            or absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~"keycloak-[0-9]+"})
           for: 5m
           labels:
             severity: critical
@@ -316,10 +319,11 @@ spec:
             description: "No ready Keycloak pod for 5m — SSO is unavailable and dependent services cannot authenticate (docs/15)."
             runbook_url: "https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/keycloak-down"
         - alert: KeycloakDatabaseDown
-          # Keycloak's PostgreSQL (Longhorn-backed, DR-critical). Metric from postgres-exporter or
-          # the bundled chart; confirm label set at bring-up.
+          # Keycloak's PostgreSQL runs as a CloudNativePG Cluster `keycloak-db` (pods keycloak-db-N).
+          # DR-critical, Longhorn-backed. (CNPG also exports cnpg_* metrics via its PodMonitor.)
           expr: |
-            max(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~".*postgres.*", condition="true"}) == 0
+            max(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~"keycloak-db-.*", condition="true"}) == 0
+            or absent(kube_pod_status_ready{namespace="keycloak", pod=~"keycloak-db-.*"})
           for: 5m
           labels:
             severity: critical

platform/monitoring/grafana-httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+# Ingress for Grafana at grafana.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/09) — the endpoint of the native-OIDC SSO
+# proof (log in once at Keycloak -> reach Grafana). CR of the Gateway API CRDs — carried by
+# platform-config. Same-namespace backend; parentRef allowed via the monitoring namespace's
+# gateway-access=shared label.
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: grafana
+  namespace: monitoring
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: shared
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
+  rules:
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: kube-prometheus-stack-grafana
+          port: 80

platform/monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml.example

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# TEMPLATE — NOT APPLIED, NOT ENCRYPTED (.yaml.example is ignored by kustomize and never
+# auto-encrypted by SOPS). Reference scaffold + OPERATOR HAND-OFF.
+#
+# WHAT THIS IS: the OIDC client SECRET Grafana uses to authenticate to the Keycloak `homelab` realm's
+# `grafana` client (kube-prometheus-stack.yaml -> grafana.envValueFrom.GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET).
+# The value MUST equal the `grafana-client-secret` placed in platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients
+# (which the realm import injects into the Keycloak client). Consumed by name only (R-IDP-04).
+#
+# HAND-OFF STEPS (operator):
+#  (a) Use the SAME grafana-client-secret generated for keycloak-realm-clients (openssl rand -hex 32).
+#  (b) Copy to:      platform/monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml
+#  (c) Fill `client-secret` below; encrypt:
+#         sops -e -i platform/monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml
+#  (d) Add under `resources:` in platform/monitoring/kustomization.yaml:
+#         - grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml
+#  Grafana runs with local admin login until this lands (secretKeyRef optional:true), then OIDC works.
+# =============================================================================
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: grafana-oidc-credentials
+  namespace: monitoring
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  client-secret: REPLACE-ME

platform/monitoring/kube-prometheus-stack.yaml

@@ -150,8 +150,36 @@ spec:
           memory: 128Mi
         limits:
           memory: 256Mi
-      # TODO(WS-SEC/WS-C2, later): Keycloak OIDC client (auth.generic_oauth) + root_url behind the
-      #   Gateway; disable local login once SSO is proven. Secret referenced by name only.
+      # --- Keycloak native-OIDC SSO (ADR-0014, deliverable #4 SSO proof) ---
+      # Grafana is a confidential OIDC client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm. The client SECRET comes
+      # from the SOPS-encrypted grafana-oidc-credentials Secret via env (referenced by name only,
+      # R-IDP-04). optional:true so the RUNNING Grafana keeps starting before the operator fills the
+      # secret — local admin login (below) stays available as the fallback until SSO is proven.
+      envValueFrom:
+        GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET:
+          secretKeyRef:
+            name: grafana-oidc-credentials
+            key: client-secret
+            optional: true
+      grafana.ini:
+        server:
+          root_url: https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
+        auth.generic_oauth:
+          enabled: true
+          name: Keycloak
+          client_id: grafana
+          scopes: "openid email profile"
+          auth_url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/auth
+          token_url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/token
+          api_url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
+          login_attribute_path: preferred_username
+          email_attribute_path: email
+          # Map Keycloak groups (the `groups` claim) to Grafana roles (R-IDP-06): platform-admins ->
+          # Admin, media-users -> Editor, everyone else -> Viewer.
+          role_attribute_path: "contains(groups[*], 'platform-admins') && 'Admin' || contains(groups[*], 'media-users') && 'Editor' || 'Viewer'"
+          # Keep local admin login enabled as break-glass until SSO is proven end-to-end; flip to
+          # disable_login_form:true afterwards (docs/15 break-glass, R-IDP-05).
+        # TODO(WS-SEC, post-proof): set auth.disable_login_form=true once SSO login is verified.
 
     # --- Bundled exporters / operator: keep small ---
     prometheusOperator:

platform/monitoring/namespace.yaml

@@ -3,3 +3,7 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: monitoring
+  labels:
+    # Expose Grafana at grafana.home.keithjackson.dev via the shared Gateway (docs/09) for the
+    # Keycloak native-OIDC SSO proof (grafana-httproute.yaml, WS-SEC Phase 6).
+    gateway-access: "shared"

platform/oauth2-proxy/helmrelease.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 ---
-# oauth2-proxy — forward-auth at the Gateway for apps WITHOUT usable OIDC (PiHole, *arr UIs,
-# qBittorrent, Homepage, Prometheus, Alertmanager, Hubble UI). Authenticates against Keycloak.
-# ADR-0014. Phase 0 STUB. Replica count is an overlay knob (R-ENV-02).
+# oauth2-proxy — forward-auth for apps WITHOUT usable OIDC (PiHole, *arr UIs, qBittorrent, Homepage,
+# Prometheus, Alertmanager, Hubble UI — ADR-0014). Authenticates users against the Keycloak `homelab`
+# realm, then the Gateway ext-auth lets the request through only for an authenticated session
+# (R-IDP-02: no management UI unauthenticated). Chart image is quay.io/oauth2-proxy (not Bitnami).
 apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
 kind: HelmRelease
 metadata:
@@ -26,13 +27,32 @@ spec:
   values:
     replicaCount: ${OAUTH2_PROXY_REPLICAS}    # overlay knob: dev 1 / prod 2 (HA) — R-ENV-02
     config:
-      # OIDC provider = Keycloak. Client id/secret + cookie secret: SOPS-encrypted secret, name only.
+      # client-id / client-secret / cookie-secret from the SOPS secret (name only). client-id +
+      # client-secret MUST match the realm's `oauth2-proxy` client (keycloak-realm-clients secret).
       existingSecret: oauth2-proxy-credentials
     extraArgs:
       provider: oidc
-      # TODO(WS-SEC, Phase 6): oidc-issuer-url = https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/<realm>
-      oidc-issuer-url: "REPLACE-ME"
+      oidc-issuer-url: https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab
+      # Forward-auth (ext-auth) mode: no upstream app; return 202 for an authenticated session so the
+      # Gateway ext-authz can allow/deny. Auth headers are surfaced to the backend.
+      reverse-proxy: "true"
+      upstream: static://202
+      set-xauthrequest: "true"
+      pass-access-token: "true"
       email-domain: "*"
-      # Forward-auth integration wired at the Gateway (HTTPRoute + ext-auth). Contract with WS-NET.
-    # TODO(WS-SEC/WS-NET, Phase 6): Gateway forward-auth/ext-authz wiring; group-based authorization;
-    #   MFA enforced upstream in Keycloak. Management UIs must never be unauthenticated (R-IDP-02).
+      # Single sign-in/callback host for all forward-auth-protected services on the platform zone.
+      redirect-url: https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
+      whitelist-domain: ".home.keithjackson.dev"
+      cookie-domain: ".home.keithjackson.dev"
+      cookie-secure: "true"
+      # Expose group membership so per-service group authorization (R-IDP-06) can be enforced. The
+      # baseline here is "authenticated"; per-service `--allowed-groups` is layered on at the Gateway
+      # ext-auth attachment (WS-NET contract) or via a dedicated oauth2-proxy instance per group.
+      oidc-groups-claim: groups
+      scope: "openid email profile"
+    # Metrics for the ServiceMonitor (../oauth2-proxy servicemonitor in platform-config).
+    metrics:
+      enabled: true
+    # TODO(WS-SEC/WS-NET, Phase 6): the Gateway ext-authz ATTACHMENT (which HTTPRoutes require this
+    #   proxy, and each route's allowed groups) is a WS-NET Gateway contract — Cilium Gateway API
+    #   ext-auth wiring. oauth2-proxy is the authenticator; the per-route enforcement is Gateway-side.

platform/oauth2-proxy/httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+# Ingress for oauth2-proxy's sign-in/callback endpoint at auth.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/09). This
+# is where forward-auth-protected UIs redirect unauthenticated users to log in against Keycloak. CR of
+# the Gateway API CRDs — carried by platform-config. Same-namespace backend (no ReferenceGrant); the
+# parentRef is allowed via the oauth2-proxy namespace's gateway-access=shared label.
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: oauth2-proxy
+  namespace: oauth2-proxy
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: shared
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - auth.home.keithjackson.dev
+  rules:
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /oauth2
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: oauth2-proxy
+          port: 80

platform/oauth2-proxy/namespace.yaml

@@ -3,3 +3,7 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: Namespace
 metadata:
   name: oauth2-proxy
+  labels:
+    # Opt in to the shared Gateway so oauth2-proxy's sign-in/callback endpoint is reachable at
+    # auth.home.keithjackson.dev (docs/09). Platform component — NOT app-namespace (see keycloak ns note).
+    gateway-access: "shared"

platform/oauth2-proxy/servicemonitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+# ServiceMonitor for oauth2-proxy (R-OBS-01, docs/10). CR of monitoring.coreos.com — CARRIED BY
+# platform-config (F-MON1). The chart's metrics endpoint is enabled in the helmrelease (metrics.enabled).
+# TODO(WS-SEC, bring-up): confirm the metrics port NAME the pinned chart exposes on the Service
+#   (commonly `metrics`, :44180) and adjust `port` below if it differs.
+apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
+kind: ServiceMonitor
+metadata:
+  name: oauth2-proxy
+  namespace: oauth2-proxy
+  labels:
+    release: kube-prometheus-stack
+spec:
+  namespaceSelector:
+    matchNames:
+      - oauth2-proxy
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: oauth2-proxy
+  endpoints:
+    - port: metrics
+      path: /metrics
+      interval: 30s