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Merge pull request 'Phase 7 (prod) opened — prep only: T-7.1 checklist, R-ENV-02 tokenization, node_health, CI false-green fix' (#4) from docs/phase-7-open-prod-node-1 into main

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DECISIONS-LOG.md
+246
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@@ -1250,3 +1250,249 @@ fresh agent should read this entry + `infra/PHASE1-STATUS.md` + `docs/plans/` an
4. **Remaining Phase-6 onboarding** — see DESIGN-waves.md / `catalog/` (services rendered-but-not-onboarded).
5. **Vendor platform/kubevirt** remote bases proactively (same flake class as #8).
6. **Human action**: finish Headlamp login = complete TOTP enrollment in the browser.
---
## 2026-08-31 — **PHASE 7 OPENED (prep only)**: first prod node on the bench
The operator added the first **production** node and opened roadmap Phase 7. This entry records the
opening, the state of the hardware, the operator's three decisions, and the blockers that stand
between "a node exists" and "prod reconciles from `clusters/prod`".
### Governance — Phase 7 entry gate, recorded not waived
`roadmap/phases.md` gates Phase 7 on **two** conditions: *"Phases 1–6 proven in dev/test; operator
declares prod hardware ready."* The operator has declared hardware ready. **The first condition is
not met** — conformance is 37/51, and the uncovered set includes **R-ENV-01/02/03**, the exact
requirements prod provisioning serves. We proceed with *prep only* on that basis, with no prod
install until the §7 repo blockers close and the gate is green. This is an accepted, explicit risk,
not an oversight.
### Node 1 as-found (`192.168.2.10`, verified by SSH 2026-08-31)
Not blank — imaged and reachable. **HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Desktop Mini** (matches the spec's `3× mini-PC
bare metal`), i7-9700T 8c/8t, **31 GiB RAM**, Debian 13 trixie / kernel 6.12, hostname already
`k3s-prod-1`, `k3s` user reachable with the `home_network` key, VT-x + `/dev/kvm` present
(KubeVirt-capable), k3s not installed. Firmware HP R21 Ver. 02.26.00.
**One 477 GB SATA SSD** (`C400-MTFDDAC512M` — a ~2011-era Micron/Crucial consumer drive) carrying
everything: `/` 30G, `/var` 12G, swap, and `/srv` 433G. No second device. Dev, by contrast, runs two
dedicated data disks per node (Longhorn + a dedicated SSD for etcd, added after HDD contention
starved etcd WAL fsync).
### Operator decisions (2026-08-31)
1. **Phase 7 opens, prep work only** — repo work and node baselining now; no k3s install until the
parameterization blockers land and the gate is green.
2. **Wait for all three nodes before `cluster-init`** — prod comes up as spec-conformant 3-node HA
embedded etcd on day one; no single-server-etcd window, no later member-add.
3. **Check drive health before choosing the disk layout** — a 15-year-old consumer SSD is not an
obvious home for prod state.
### Findings — prod would build WRONG today
1. **R-ENV-02 is violated in the base (the headline blocker).** The overlay model promises dev and
prod differ *only* by `cluster-vars` values. In fact dev LAN addresses are hardcoded into base
manifests: `k8sServiceHost: 192.168.1.50` (`platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml:50` + the
`values.yaml` mirror), the Cilium LB pool `192.168.1.53-.60`
(`platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml`), crafty `.55`, the UniFi VM `.54`, and three S3 backup
endpoints at `192.168.1.9:9000`. **Prod is on `192.168.2.x` — none of these follow.** Fix is to
tokenize each into a `cluster-vars` knob and set it in both overlays; the `postBuild.substituteFrom`
seam already exists on every relevant Kustomization. Note `platform/cilium/values.yaml` is only a
*reference mirror* — the authoritative pair is the HelmRelease (Flux) and the Ansible j2 template
(already parameterized), so the Ansible side needs no change.
2. **`clusters/prod` never sets `GATEWAY_VIP`** → it would inherit the base default `10.73.0.240`,
an address on the **retired libvirt network**. `cluster-vars`' own comment flags this as owed
"when hardware is built".
3. **Sudo on node 1 requires a password** — every Ansible playbook fails at its first `become`.
**Operator ruling: prod does NOT get NOPASSWD sudo** (my initial recommendation to mirror dev was
rejected, correctly — dev's passwordless sudo is a convenience that should not propagate to
prod). Instead prod uses Ansible `become` with an **ansible-vault-encrypted**
`ansible_become_password` in `inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml`, mirroring the existing
`hypervisor` and `proxmox_hosts` groups; the decrypting passphrase stays outside the repo at
`~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass`. Plays still run unattended, no plaintext secret in git,
and prod keeps a real sudo boundary.
4. **`node_baseline` device defaults are virtio** (`/dev/vdb`, `/dev/vdc`) and do not exist on bare
metal; the role makes a filesystem on a *block device*, so a single-disk node needs either a
second drive, `/dev/sda5`, or a repartition. Prod `group_vars` must override.
5. **Single upstream resolver on node 1** (`192.168.2.1`) — the same SPOF class that broke
containerd pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev. The fix is **stranded unmerged** on
`fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream`.
### RESOLVED BY OPERATOR — status comes from the repository, not the task board
I raised an escalation here: `AGENTS.md` §11 designates `agents/task-board.md` as the one surface
agents may edit, yet `ci/spec-immutability.sh` fails the merge gate on **any** spec-repo dirt with no
path exception, and committing the board there moves spec `HEAD` off `ci/SPEC_PIN` — which also
fails. Editing the board as instructed blocks every merge. That is why the board still reads
all-`todo` after six delivered phases.
**Operator ruling (2026-08-31): the task board is not the status surface. The repository is.**
Status of each requirement/spec is to be *derived from the state of the repo* — what is authored,
what is reconciled, what has a green requirement-tagged test — not from a hand-maintained board.
Consequences, adopted:
- The spec board is left alone. It is a historical seed, not a live surface. No agent edits it, and
no `SPEC_PIN` churn is spent keeping it current.
- `ci/spec-immutability.sh` keeps its full strictness — **no path exception was added**. Weakening
an R-TEST-06 gate to make a bookkeeping file writable would have been a defect, not a fix.
- The **repo-derived spec status report** becomes the artifact of record, alongside the existing
requirement-coverage report and this log. Coverage already answers "does a tagged test exist";
the status view must also answer "is this requirement actually *implemented and reconciled* in
the repo as it stands".
### Next steps
1. **Operator:** configure NOPASSWD sudo on `k3s-prod-1`, then capture `smartctl -a /dev/sda`
(commands in `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §5). The disk decision waits on that output.
2. **Land the R-ENV-02 tokenization** — the critical path for prod reconciling at all. Dev overlay
must set every new knob to today's exact value so live dev sees zero drift (`make -C ci render-golden`).
3. **Complete `clusters/prod`** — `GATEWAY_VIP`, the L2 pool, and the prod backup target.
4. **Land the two stranded fix branches** (`fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream`,
`fix/act-runner-dind-readiness`) — the DNS one now matters for prod too.
5. Resolve the task-board escalation above.
6. Nodes 2 and 3 through `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §1–§5 as they arrive.
---
## 2026-08-31 — CI is the enforcement point; the LOCAL gate produced a FALSE GREEN
**Operator directive: "Conformance and gates are enforced at the gitea runner and CI/CD level.
Use it."** Adopted. The authority on whether a change is mergeable is the Gitea Actions run, not a
local `make -C ci gate`. Local runs are a fast pre-check only.
This was proven immediately and expensively. Branch `docs/phase-7-open-prod-node-1`:
- **Local** `make -C ci gate` → `no changed files vs base; empty touched-requirement set` →
**MERGE GATE: PASS**.
- **CI**, same commit (`a1fb31a`, task 200) → 17 touched requirements correctly computed →
`REQUIRE: FAILED — required requirement(s) uncovered: ['R-SEC-01','R-SEC-02','R-TEST-06']` →
**MERGE GATE: BLOCKED**.
The local run resolved an empty diff base and therefore checked nothing, reporting green. **A local
false green is the most dangerous failure mode this project has** — it hid real coverage debt from
the PM and would have hidden it from any future agent. `ci/touched-requirements.sh` base-ref
resolution is being fixed so local agrees with CI, or announces loudly that it cannot determine a
base. An honest noisy skip beats a quiet false pass (`ci/README.md` exit-code contract).
The gate itself was RIGHT: we authored a vaulted-secret flow (R-SEC-01) and status tooling that
reasons about spec immutability (R-TEST-06) while those requirements had **no covering test at
all**. Tests are being authored rather than the rule being narrowed.
**How to read CI from a workstation** (the API paths are non-obvious, so recording them):
```bash
CRED=$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev\n\n' | git credential fill)
# list recent runs (id | workflow | branch | status | sha):
curl -sk -u "$U:$P" "$B/api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl/actions/tasks?limit=10"
# fetch a task's log — NOTE the job-id/task-id OFFSET: task N is at jobs/(N+5)/logs on this instance
curl -sk -u "$U:$P" "$B/api/v1/repos/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl/actions/jobs/205/logs"
```
`.../actions/runs/<run>/jobs` is 404 on this Gitea version; use `actions/tasks` + `actions/jobs/<id>/logs`.
### OPERATOR ATTESTATIONS (2026-08-31) — capability vs. automated proof
The operator states, and this log records as fact:
1. **DR is PROVEN** — Velero backups to the Proxmox server, restore demonstrated. R-STATE-03's
capability is delivered and in operational use.
2. **Cluster resilience is PROVEN at the dev-cluster level** — node loss / rebuild demonstrated.
It is slow because Longhorn storage is on HDD (etcd is the exception, on its dedicated SSD),
which is a performance property, not a correctness gap.
**Distinguish capability from automated proof.** The new repo-derived status report flags
`R-STATE-03` as a safety-critical requirement whose L3 test body asserts nothing. That finding
stands and is NOT contradicted by the attestation above — it is **test debt, not capability debt**.
The system does the thing; the suite does not yet assert that it does. Per the project's own
definition of done, only a green requirement-tagged test is acceptance — so the remaining work is
to make `dr-restore/chainsaw-test.yaml` and the node-loss test actually assert the behaviour the
operator has already demonstrated, and let the runner enforce it. Recording the attestation here
does not close the requirement, and the gate must not be softened to make it appear closed.
---
## 2026-09-01 — Phase-7 prep session complete. **PM HANDOFF.**
Everything below is on branch `docs/phase-7-open-prod-node-1` / **PR #4**, 13 commits, the
enforced Gitea gate **green**. Nothing has been installed on prod hardware. `main` is untouched
until the operator merges.
### Delivered
1. **Phase 7 opened (prep only)** with the entry-gate shortfall recorded, not waived.
2. **T-7.1 checklist** (`infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md`) written against the real hardware.
3. **R-ENV-02 tokenization** — 6 `cluster-vars` knobs; prod would otherwise have come up
announcing DEV addresses. Dev proven byte-identical.
4. **Prod Ansible**: inventory, vaulted `become` (prod gets NO passwordless sudo), and
**target-group parameterisation** so prod reuses the roles unchanged.
5. **`node_health` role** — read-only, portable dev+prod, run against both.
6. **Repo-derived spec status report** (`run.sh --status`).
7. **CI false-green killed** + L0 static tests for R-SEC-01/02 and R-TEST-06.
8. **dind readiness fix**; **DNS resilience re-authored** for the current stack.
9. **`dr-restore` now asserts** — safety-critical scaffolds 0.
### Numbers
Coverage 37/51 → **40/51**. Executable tests 32 → **36**. Scaffold-only 5 → **4**.
Safety-critical without an executable L3 1 → **0**. **PROVEN: 0 — still not derivable**, by
design; proof-of-pass is not recoverable from repo state, so a green-run ledger is the only
thing that ever closes a requirement.
### Corrections made during the session (recorded so they are not re-litigated)
- **NOPASSWD sudo on prod: REJECTED** by the operator. Prod uses vaulted `become`. My original
checklist copied dev's convenience onto prod; that was wrong.
- **The "`$i` envsubst bug" was FALSE.** An assessment claimed Flux envsubst ate bare `$i`,
making the dind cert-wait bound a no-op. Running the real `flux envsubst` disproved it: bare
`$VAR` passes through; only `${VAR}` expands — matching this repo's own contract in
`clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml`, itself written after empirical probing. **No escaping was
applied**; `$${i}` would have been an active regression (correct only on the envsubst path —
on a plain `kustomize build`, `sh` reads `$$` as its PID). Agent reports are not evidence;
the tool is.
- **The stranded DNS branch was NOT landed.** Its netplan mechanism no longer exists on Debian
13; landing it would have broken `node-baseline.yml` on every node.
### Near-misses worth remembering
- A YAML **comment** nearly broke every merge in the repo: Flux envsubst runs over comments too,
so a braced name with punctuation is a fatal parse error that fails the whole `apps-wave-1`
Kustomization.
- `roles/cilium`, `cluster_verify`, `flux_bootstrap` all hardcoded `.cache/dev.kubeconfig` — the
file `dev.sh` exports as `$KUBECONFIG`. The moment prod became targetable, a prod run would
have silently overwritten it and left the operator's `kubectl` answering from **prod**.
- Prod's `GATEWAY_VIP` outside the LB pool would have brought the Gateway up on `.21` while
split-horizon DNS answered `.20` — blackholing in-cluster SSO while reporting healthy.
### BLOCKED ON THE OPERATOR — nothing else moves without these
1. **Create `inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml`** (`ansible_become_password`). The
passphrase file already exists. This gates SMART, the packages-only baseline, and every
future prod play.
2. **Drive health decision** — run `smartctl -a /dev/sda` once `smartmontools` lands via
`node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages`. Prod state on an unmeasured
~2011 consumer SSD is the open risk.
3. **Prod's second DNS upstream** — `192.168.2.1` is both gateway and only IPv4 resolver.
4. **Prod backup target** — `S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT` is still `TBD-PROD-*`; dev's versitygw is on
the far side of the pfSense boundary.
5. **`UNIFI_L4_VIP` / `CRAFTY_L4_VIP`** — allocatable from `.20-.30`, not invented here.
6. **Merge PR #4.**
### Known, documented, NOT fixed
- `roles/flux_bootstrap` shells to `bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh` with a hardcoded
`--path=clusters/dev` — retargeting prod needs a `bootstrap/` change.
- Prod has no VPN egress group (needs its own vaulted PIA credentials).
- **`dr-restore` is AUTHORED, NEVER EXECUTED** (`conformance.home.k3s/never-executed`). It is
destructive; converting it to proven needs an operator maintenance-window run. The log must
show `DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK`, **not** `DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK` — green but
proving nothing.
- `dind` → native sidecar `initContainer` with a `docker info` startupProbe (NOT a bare
tcpSocket probe) is the right shape on k3s 1.36; deferred so a merge-gate failure is
unambiguous.
- **Non-ECC RAM — RISK ACCEPTED by the operator (2026-09-01), not an open item.** `node_health`
correctly reports ECC status as unknowable (no EDAC controller bound). Operator rationale:
this is a 3-node k3s homelab, not enterprise k8s; corruption on one node is outweighed by the
other two and results in node ejection. That holds for the dominant failure mode — etcd raft
(per-entry CRC + boltdb page checksums, quorum of 2 survives) and Longhorn (3 replicas, hard
anti-affinity, rebuild from healthy peers) both detect a *divergent* node and eject/rebuild it.
The residual it does not cover is corruption introduced *upstream* of replication: bytes
corrupted before the checksum is computed replicate faithfully to all three replicas, so
quorum sees no disagreement. Low probability, and the mitigation (ECC hardware) is out of
scope for this platform. **Do not re-litigate.** The one thing that operationalises the
operator's own argument is Longhorn's `snapshotDataIntegrity`, which is currently left at the
chart default rather than set explicitly — see the follow-up in `platform/longhorn/`.
- L2/L3 conformance still SKIPs in CI (`docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md`); it needs
the trigger-credential decision — a scoped in-cluster SA, never a broad kubeconfig in CI.
apps/vms/unifi/30-virtualmachine.yaml
+10 -4
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@@ -89,7 +89,13 @@ spec:
# userDataSecretRef only if needed). qemu-guest-agent gives the KubeVirt AgentConnected
# signal (proves cloud-init ran); install-uos resolves the latest UOS linux-x64 build from
# Ubiquiti's PUBLIC firmware API (no auth) and installs it non-interactively (UI on :11443).
# NOTE: apps-vms has NO postBuild.substituteFrom, so shell ${...} below is NOT envsubst'd.
# NOTE: apps-vms NOW carries postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars (needed for
# ${UNIFI_L4_VIP} in 50-service-l4.yaml), so Flux envsubst DOES run over this userData.
# Every shell brace-expansion below is therefore escaped as $${...}, which envsubst emits
# as a literal ${...} — verified with `flux envsubst`. Bare $VAR and $(...) are left alone
# by envsubst and need no escaping. NEVER write an unescaped ${...} here, and never write
# ${ARR[0]} even escaped-adjacent: envsubst hard-fails on `[` ("missing closing brace")
# and would break the whole apps-vms apply.
userData: |-
#cloud-config
hostname: unifi
@@ -103,11 +109,11 @@ spec:
content: |
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
if [ -z "${UOS_URL:-}" ]; then
if [ -z "$${UOS_URL:-}" ]; then
UOS_URL="$(curl -fsSL https://fw-update.ui.com/api/firmware-latest | jq -r '._embedded.firmware|map(select(.product=="unifi-os-server" and .platform=="linux-x64"))|sort_by(.version_major,.version_minor,.version_patch)|last._links.data.href')"
fi
[ -n "${UOS_URL}" ] && [ "${UOS_URL}" != "null" ] || { echo "no UOS URL"; exit 1; }
t="$(mktemp)"; echo "downloading ${UOS_URL}"; curl -fL --retry 5 --retry-delay 10 -o "$t" "$UOS_URL"; chmod +x "$t"; echo "installing"; yes | "$t"; echo "done"
[ -n "$${UOS_URL}" ] && [ "$${UOS_URL}" != "null" ] || { echo "no UOS URL"; exit 1; }
t="$(mktemp)"; echo "downloading $${UOS_URL}"; curl -fL --retry 5 --retry-delay 10 -o "$t" "$UOS_URL"; chmod +x "$t"; echo "installing"; yes | "$t"; echo "done"
runcmd:
- [ systemctl, enable, --now, qemu-guest-agent ]
- [ systemctl, enable, --now, podman.socket ]
apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml
+11 -7
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@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@
# CANNOT express: raw TCP on non-HTTP ports (8080 inform, 6789), UDP at all (3478 STUN, 10001
# discovery), or the device-facing protocols that never speak HTTP. UniFi device ADOPTION rides
# exactly those L4 ports. So the controller is exposed as a type=LoadBalancer Service whose VIP
# is pulled from the CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool` (192.168.1.53-.60) and ARP-announced
# on the flat LAN by the existing CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy `default-l2` — the SAME L2/LB-IPAM
# is pulled from the CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool` (dev 192.168.1.53-.60 — the
# CILIUM_LB_POOL_START/STOP cluster-vars knobs) and ARP-announced on the flat LAN by the existing
# CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy `default-l2` — the SAME L2/LB-IPAM
# machinery the Gateway ingress VIP already uses (platform-config/cilium/*). No new Cilium config
# is required; these Services just consume the pool.
#
@@ -23,8 +24,11 @@
# into the guest. externalTrafficPolicy: Local preserves the LAN client source IP and keeps the
# VIP pinned to the node running the VM (also what L2 announcement does).
#
# FLAG: confirm 192.168.1.54 is free, inside default-pool, and reserved in tofu (the Gateway
# already holds one pool IP, typically .53). Adjust if it collides.
# VIP: ${UNIFI_L4_VIP} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev 192.168.1.54, confirmed free, inside
# default-pool and reserved in tofu — the Gateway already holds the pool's first IP, dev .53).
# Substituted by the `apps-vms` Flux Kustomization, which carries postBuild.substituteFrom for
# exactly this token; every shell ${...} in 30-virtualmachine.yaml's cloud-init is escaped as $${...}
# accordingly. A new environment MUST set UNIFI_L4_VIP to a free address in ITS pool.
#
# REUSABLE PATTERN (the deferred `minecraft` :25565/L4 problem is the same shape): expose an
# L4-only workload as a Cilium LoadBalancer on a pinned, L2-announced VIP with a per-app sharing
@@ -39,8 +43,8 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: unifi
annotations:
lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: "unifi"
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "192.168.1.54"
# external-dns (source: service) publishes A unifi.home.keithjackson.dev -> 192.168.1.54.
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "${UNIFI_L4_VIP}"
# external-dns (source: service) publishes A unifi.home.keithjackson.dev -> the pinned VIP.
# This is the browser + device target; UI is https://unifi.home.keithjackson.dev:11443.
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: "unifi.home.keithjackson.dev"
spec:
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: unifi
annotations:
lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: "unifi" # same key + same IP => shares the VIP with -tcp
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "192.168.1.54"
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "${UNIFI_L4_VIP}"
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
apps/wave-0/nextcloud-db.yaml
+3 -1
View File
@@ -74,11 +74,13 @@ spec:
# (defaults to the Cluster name), so objects land under s3://cnpg/nextcloud-db/. Path-style HTTP.
# Credentials: the scoped key from the in-namespace SOPS Secret nextcloud-db-backup-credentials
# (same-ns only), kept in sync with platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.
# endpointURL is ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000),
# substituted by the `apps-wave-0` Flux Kustomization. Prod supplies its own off-cluster target.
backup:
retentionPolicy: "30d"
barmanObjectStore:
destinationPath: s3://cnpg
endpointURL: http://192.168.1.9:9000
endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: nextcloud-db-backup-credentials
apps/wave-0/semaphore-db.yaml
+3 -1
View File
@@ -75,11 +75,13 @@ spec:
# (defaults to the Cluster name), so objects land under s3://cnpg/semaphore-db/. Path-style HTTP.
# Credentials: the scoped key from the in-namespace SOPS Secret semaphore-db-backup-credentials
# (same-ns only), kept in sync with platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.
# endpointURL is ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000),
# substituted by the `apps-wave-0` Flux Kustomization. Prod supplies its own off-cluster target.
backup:
retentionPolicy: "30d"
barmanObjectStore:
destinationPath: s3://cnpg
endpointURL: http://192.168.1.9:9000
endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: semaphore-db-backup-credentials
apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml
+74 -5
View File
@@ -103,21 +103,65 @@ spec:
# ---- act_runner: registers with Gitea, dispatches jobs to the DinD daemon ----
- name: runner
image: gitea/act_runner:0.2.11
# Wait for the DinD sidecar to publish its TLS client certs into the shared
# emptyDir before starting the daemon — act_runner reads /certs/client/ca.pem at
# startup and hard-exits if it is missing (a startup race against the sidecar).
# Then exec the image's normal entrypoint (/sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh), which
# registers-from-env on first boot and runs `act_runner daemon`.
# TWO-STAGE BOUNDED WAIT on the DinD sidecar, then exec the image's normal
# entrypoint (/sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh), which registers-from-env on first
# boot and runs `act_runner daemon`.
#
# STAGE 1 — the certs must EXIST: act_runner reads /certs/client/ca.pem at startup
# and hard-exits if it is missing (a startup race against the sidecar).
# STAGE 2 — the daemon must actually ACCEPT a connection: the cert FILE appearing is
# necessary but NOT sufficient. dockerd writes the certs and only THEN begins
# listening on :2376, so a runner that proceeds on the file alone still hard-exits
# with "cannot ping the docker daemon at tcp://localhost:2376" — observed
# crashlooping 11 times in ~8 minutes on a fresh pod after a node bounce.
# Both loops are bounded (60 x 1s) and exit 1 on timeout, so a genuinely dead sidecar
# surfaces as a CrashLoopBackOff with a clear message instead of hanging forever.
#
# ENVSUBST SAFETY — the BARE $i / $j below are CORRECT. Do not "tidy" them into the
# braced form or the double-dollar form; both are wrong here, for different reasons.
# clusters/base/apps-wave-1.yaml carries postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so
# Flux envsubst runs over this ENTIRE manifest — YAML comments very much included.
# Its contract (drone/envsubst; the same one spelled out in clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml,
# and re-verified against this exact file with `flux envsubst`, flux v2.4.0) is:
# - A bare $name is NOT a reference to envsubst: it passes through untouched, and
# that holds even when the name IS set in cluster-vars. So $i and $j reach the
# cluster verbatim and both 60s bounds below are real, enforced bounds.
# - $((i + 1)) is likewise untouched: "(" cannot begin a variable name.
# - A BRACED dollar-name IS a reference and gets replaced — with the empty string
# when the name is unset. One of those here would make a bound read [ "" -ge 60 ],
# which errors, short-circuits the &&, and silently turns the wait UNBOUNDED.
# - A DOUBLE-dollar braced name is envsubst's escape and survives as the braced
# form — still wrong for us, because on any path where envsubst does NOT run
# (a plain `kustomize build` or `kubectl apply -k` of this directory) the shell
# reads that leading double-dollar as its own PID, so a bound would compare a
# string like 1234{i} against 60. The bare form is the only spelling that is
# correct on BOTH paths.
# - A braced name containing punctuation is a HARD ERROR ("unable to parse variable
# name") that fails this whole Kustomization — and this Kustomization gates every
# merge in the repo. So never write one anywhere in this file, INCLUDING in a
# comment. That is why this note names the three forms in words rather than
# showing them: an earlier draft of it spelled them out literally and broke
# `flux envsubst` on the file. (Same trap the indexed-expansion warning in
# clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml describes.)
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- |
# Stage 1: the sidecar's TLS client certs must appear in the shared emptyDir.
i=0
until [ -f /certs/client/ca.pem ]; do
i=$((i + 1))
[ "$i" -ge 60 ] && { echo "dind certs never appeared" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "waiting for dind TLS certs ($i)"; sleep 1
done
# Stage 2: dockerd must actually accept a connection on :2376. busybox nc in this
# Alpine-based image (gitea/act_runner:0.2.11) supports -z (scan) and -w (timeout).
j=0
until nc -z -w1 127.0.0.1 2376; do
j=$((j + 1))
[ "$j" -ge 60 ] && { echo "dind daemon never accepted a connection on 2376" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "waiting for dind daemon on :2376 ($j)"; sleep 1
done
exec /sbin/tini -- /opt/act/run.sh
env:
- name: GITEA_INSTANCE_URL
@@ -155,6 +199,31 @@ spec:
limits:
memory: 512Mi
# ---- Docker-in-Docker: the job executor daemon (privileged) ----
#
# FOLLOW-UP (deliberately NOT bundled into the readiness fix above — own change):
# Convert this container into a NATIVE SIDECAR and delete both shell wait-loops.
# k3s is now v1.36, where sidecar containers are GA, so kubelet can enforce the
# ordering that the loops above hand-roll — which also removes the envsubst hazard
# from this file entirely (no shell, no $i/$j, nothing to escape or mis-escape).
# Shape to build:
# 1. Move this whole container into `initContainers:` as the FIRST entry.
# 2. Add `restartPolicy: Always` to it. That single field is what makes an
# initContainer a sidecar: it starts before the regular containers, keeps
# running alongside them, and is terminated after them.
# 3. Give it a `startupProbe` that succeeds only when dockerd accepts a TLS
# connection — e.g. `exec` a `docker -H tcp://127.0.0.1:2376 --tlsverify
# --tlscacert /certs/client/ca.pem --tlscert /certs/client/cert.pem
# --tlskey /certs/client/key.pem info`. Do NOT use a bare `tcpSocket` probe:
# it would re-open the same "port accepting but TLS/certs not ready" gap that
# Stage 1 above exists to close. `periodSeconds: 1` + `failureThreshold: 60`
# preserves today's 60s cap.
# 4. kubelet then holds the `runner` container until that startupProbe passes, so
# `runner` can drop its `command:` override completely and run the image's
# default entrypoint.
# Why it is a separate change: this Deployment is the ENFORCED MERGE GATE for this
# entire repository. If the conversion is wrong, nothing can merge — so it must land
# alone, where the failure is unambiguous and not entangled with anything else, and
# only after a real workflow run has been observed green on the converted pod.
- name: dind
image: docker:27-dind
securityContext:
ci/Makefile
+5 -1
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ touched: ## Print the touched-requirement subset for the current branch vs main
@"$(CI_DIR)touched-requirements.sh"
test: ## Run ci/ script unit tests (no cluster; e.g. touched-requirements content scan)
@for t in "$(CI_DIR)"tests/*.test.sh; do echo "== $$t"; bash "$$t"; done
@rc=0; for t in "$(CI_DIR)"tests/*.test.sh; do \
echo "== $$t"; bash "$$t" || rc=1; \
done; \
if [ $$rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "ci/tests: FAILED" >&2; else echo "ci/tests: all suites passed"; fi; \
exit $$rc
versions: ## Print pinned tool versions (R-TEST-02)
@cat "$(CI_DIR)versions.env"
ci/README.md
+45 -5
View File
@@ -20,17 +20,54 @@ Individual stages:
```bash
make -C ci lint # yaml/lint (no cluster; live now)
make -C ci l0 # ServiceDefinition schema + Kyverno (no cluster; live now)
make -C ci l0 # schema + Kyverno + L0 static conformance (no cluster; live now)
make -C ci l1 # L1 rendering checks (no cluster; live now)
make -C ci conformance # L2/L3 in-cluster Chainsaw Job (SKIPS unless CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true)
make -C ci test # unit tests for these scripts themselves (ci/tests/*.test.sh)
```
The `l0` stage has three sub-stages: ServiceDefinition schema validation, the Kyverno policy gate
(`kyverno test`), and **`conformance/run.sh --layer l0`** — the whole-repo L0 invariants a
per-resource policy cannot express (secret hygiene across every tracked file, least-privilege RBAC,
spec-immutability enforcement). See `conformance/tests/README.md`.
## Exit-code contract
Every stage script uses: **`0` = pass · `1` = fail (blocks merge) · `3` = SKIPPED** (cluster-gated
with no cluster, or an unwired seam / missing tool). A `3` is **never** counted as green — that is how
the gate stays honest in Phase 0 (no fake green).
### The touched-requirement subset can also be *undeterminable* (exit 3)
`touched-requirements.sh` is the input to the R-TEST-03 decision. It resolves a diff base in this
order, **verifying each candidate exists** before using it:
```
BASE_REF (explicit) > GITHUB_BASE_REF (Actions PR runs) > origin/main > main
```
If no candidate resolves, if there is no merge base, if the diff command fails, or if **HEAD is not
ahead of the base** (you are sitting on `main`, or the branch is already merged), it prints a loud
banner, writes **nothing** to stdout, and exits **3** — plus a machine-readable reason code
(`on-base` / `no-base` / `diff-failed`) to `$TOUCHED_REASON_FILE` when that variable names a path.
**Why this is not cosmetic.** Every one of those conditions used to degrade *silently* to an empty
touched set and exit 0. An empty set means `conformance/run.sh` is invoked with no `--requirements`,
which means its coverage `--require` gate never runs — so on 2026-08-31 the local gate printed
`MERGE GATE: PASS` having checked nothing, while CI (correct base, 17 touched requirements) BLOCKED
on real coverage debt. There is no silent narrowing left: the `HEAD~1` last resort and the two-dot
diff fallback are both gone. Locked down by `ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh`.
`gate.sh` turns exit 3 into an **UNDECIDED** merge decision, never a pass:
| reason | headline | exit |
|---|---|---|
| `on-base` | `MERGE GATE: NOT APPLICABLE — no branch under gate` | 0 (a push-to-`main` CI run legitimately lands here; it just must not read as "my branch is green") |
| `no-base`, `diff-failed` | `MERGE GATE: BLOCKED` | 1 (the environment cannot support a merge decision; refusing to decide must not look like deciding yes) |
A stage that needs the subset (`l0.sh`, `l1.sh`) still runs its FULL layer as a superset sanity net
in that case — nothing goes untested — and says plainly that the *scoped* check did not happen.
## Reproducibility (R-TEST-02)
- **Version-pinned:** all tool versions live in [`versions.env`](versions.env) — the single source of
@@ -43,16 +80,19 @@ the gate stays honest in Phase 0 (no fake green).
```
ci/
Makefile targets: lint · l0 · l1 · conformance · gate · touched · tools · versions
Makefile targets: lint · l0 · l1 · conformance · gate · touched · test · tools · versions
versions.env PINNED tool versions (R-TEST-02) — single source of truth
lib.sh shared helpers: logging, tool checks, cluster detection, artifact paths
yamllint.yaml lint config for the yaml/lint stage
lint.sh Stage: yaml/lint
l0.sh Stage: ServiceDefinition schema validation + Kyverno L0 policy gate
l0.sh Stage: schema validation + Kyverno L0 gate + L0 static conformance
l1.sh Stage: L1 rendering checks (Chainsaw L1 via the conformance runner)
conformance.sh Stage: L2/L3 in-cluster Chainsaw Job (trigger + collect)
touched-requirements.sh compute the R-* subset a change touches (drives the R-TEST-03 filter)
touched-requirements.sh compute the R-* subset a change touches (drives the R-TEST-03 filter);
exits 3 LOUDLY rather than guessing when the diff base is unreliable
gate.sh run all stages + the merge decision (the single command)
tests/*.test.sh unit tests for these scripts (`make -C ci test`), run against
throwaway git repos via the REPO_ROOT override — no network, no cluster
README.md this file
```
@@ -67,7 +107,7 @@ below are this workstream's **assumptions** — flagged for the PM to verify at
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ServiceDefinition schema validator | WS-GITOPS · **T-0.3** (`schemas/`) | `SCHEMA_VALIDATE_CMD` | `schemas/validate.sh` | `validate.sh catalog/*.yaml` → exit 0/1; `--version` supported |
| Kyverno L0 policies + tests | WS-TEST · **T-0.5** (`platform/kyverno/`) | `KYVERNO_POLICY_DIR` | `platform/kyverno` | contains `kyverno-test.yaml` files discoverable by `kyverno test <dir>` |
| Conformance runner (Chainsaw) | WS-TEST · **T-0.4** (`conformance/`) | `CONFORMANCE_CMD` | `conformance/run.sh` | `run.sh --layer <l1\|l2,l3> [--requirements R-A,R-B] [--trigger in-cluster-job] --junit <file> --coverage <dir>` |
| Conformance runner (Chainsaw) | WS-TEST · **T-0.4** (`conformance/`) | `CONFORMANCE_CMD` | `conformance/run.sh` | `run.sh --layer <l0\|l1\|l2,l3> [--requirements R-A,R-B]`; artifacts land in `conformance/_artifacts/` |
| Catalog (ServiceDefinitions) | WS-APPS | `CATALOG_DIR` | `catalog` | `*.yaml` ServiceDefinition files |
Artifact locations (git-ignored): JUnit → `results/junit/*.xml`; coverage → `reports/coverage/**`.
ci/gate.sh
+56 -8
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,32 @@ echo >&2
log "==== gate decision ===="
BLOCK=0
# --- R-TEST-03 input: the touched-requirement subset --------------------------
# Computed ONCE here. ci/touched-requirements.sh exits 3 when it cannot establish a
# reliable diff base; that used to degrade to an empty set, which silently disabled the
# coverage `--require` gate and let the gate print "MERGE GATE: PASS" having checked
# nothing (the 2026-08-31 local false green). An undeterminable subset is now surfaced
# as an UNDECIDED merge decision, never as a pass.
_reason_file="$(mktemp)"
# NOTE: command substitution, NOT `mapfile < <(...)` — process substitution does not
# propagate the child's exit status, and the whole point here is to SEE the exit 3.
TOUCHED_OUT="$(TOUCHED_REASON_FILE="$_reason_file" "${CI_DIR}/touched-requirements.sh")"
TOUCHED_RC=$?
TOUCHED_REASON="$(cat "$_reason_file" 2>/dev/null || true)"
rm -f "$_reason_file"
TOUCHED=()
[ -n "$TOUCHED_OUT" ] && mapfile -t TOUCHED <<< "$TOUCHED_OUT"
UNDECIDED=0
if [ "$TOUCHED_RC" -eq 3 ]; then
UNDECIDED=1
echo >&2
err "R-TEST-03 DECISION INPUT MISSING: the touched-requirement subset could not be"
err " determined (${TOUCHED_REASON:-unknown}). The scoped coverage gate did NOT run."
summary "- **R-TEST-03 subset UNDETERMINED** (\`${TOUCHED_REASON:-unknown}\`) — the scoped coverage gate did not run."
elif [ "${#TOUCHED[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
log "touched requirements: ${TOUCHED[*]}"
fi
# spec-immutability (R-TEST-06): a FAIL always blocks (the spec was modified/drifted).
# A skip means the spec repo wasn't available to verify — surfaced, not green.
case "${OUTCOME[spec-immutability]}" in
@@ -77,9 +103,11 @@ case "${OUTCOME[conformance]}" in
skip)
if cluster_available; then
err "conformance: skipped despite CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true -> blocks merge"; BLOCK=1
elif [ "$UNDECIDED" -eq 1 ]; then
warn "conformance L2/L3 UNVERIFIED, and the touched subset is unknown — nothing certified."
else
mapfile -t reqs < <("${CI_DIR}/touched-requirements.sh" || true)
if [ "${#reqs[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
if [ "${#TOUCHED[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
reqs=("${TOUCHED[@]}")
warn "conformance L2/L3 UNVERIFIED for touched requirements: ${reqs[*]}"
warn " (no cluster — Phase 0). These are NOT certified green."
summary "- **UNVERIFIED (no cluster):** ${reqs[*]}"
@@ -93,15 +121,35 @@ case "${OUTCOME[conformance]}" in
fi ;;
esac
# An UNDECIDED subset is never a pass. Two outcomes, by reason:
# on-base -> this checkout has no branch commits to gate (you are on main, or the
# branch is already merged; a push-to-main CI run lands here). Legitimate,
# so the job is not failed — but the headline says NOT APPLICABLE, never
# PASS, so nobody reads it as "my branch is green".
# anything -> the environment cannot support a merge decision (no base ref, broken
# else diff). Refusing to decide must not look like deciding yes: BLOCK.
if [ "$UNDECIDED" -eq 1 ] && [ "$TOUCHED_REASON" != "on-base" ]; then
err "cannot compute the R-TEST-03 subset (${TOUCHED_REASON:-unknown}) -> blocks merge"
BLOCK=1
fi
echo >&2
if [ "$BLOCK" -eq 0 ]; then
ok "MERGE GATE: PASS (touched-requirement subset green for the layers that can run)"
summary ""
summary "**Result: PASS** — L0/L1 green. L2/L3 status per cluster availability above."
exit 0
else
if [ "$BLOCK" -ne 0 ]; then
err "MERGE GATE: BLOCKED"
summary ""
summary "**Result: BLOCKED** — see failures above."
exit 1
elif [ "$UNDECIDED" -eq 1 ]; then
warn "MERGE GATE: NOT APPLICABLE — no branch under gate (${TOUCHED_REASON})."
warn " The stages above ran and did not fail, but NO touched-requirement subset was"
warn " checked. This is NOT a green branch: check out the branch you mean to gate"
warn " (or set BASE_REF) and run it again."
summary ""
summary "**Result: NOT APPLICABLE** — no branch under gate (\`${TOUCHED_REASON}\`); the R-TEST-03 subset was not checked."
exit 0
else
ok "MERGE GATE: PASS (touched-requirement subset green for the layers that can run)"
summary ""
summary "**Result: PASS** — L0/L1 green. L2/L3 status per cluster availability above."
exit 0
fi
ci/l0.sh
+27
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
# Stage 3 L0 : `kyverno test` over platform/kyverno/ — default-deny baseline
# present, no plaintext secrets, required labels/egress-class,
# ServiceDefinition schema conformance (owner: T-0.5, ADR-0011).
# Stage 3b L0 : conformance/run.sh --layer l0 — the WHOLE-REPO L0 invariants that
# a per-resource policy cannot express (secret hygiene across every
# tracked file, least-privilege RBAC, spec-immutability enforcement).
#
# Integration seams are env-overridable (see ci/lib.sh + README). When an owning
# subtree is still a placeholder, this reports SKIPPED (exit 3) for that sub-stage
@@ -73,6 +76,30 @@ else
rm -rf "$l0_render"
fi
# ---- Stage 3b: L0 STATIC conformance checks ---------------------------------
# docs/14's L0 row is "manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants", which is wider
# than what Kyverno alone can express over single resources: whole-repo invariants
# (no plaintext secrets anywhere in git, least-privilege RBAC across every tracked
# binding, the spec-immutability gate's own behaviour) live in the conformance
# harness's tests/l0-static subtree and run with no cluster. This stage executes them
# through the same single-command runner CI and a laptop both use (R-TEST-02).
log "Stage: L0 static conformance checks (${CONFORMANCE_CMD} --layer l0)"
if ! entrypoint_ready "$CONFORMANCE_CMD"; then
skip "conformance runner not present at '${CONFORMANCE_CMD}' — UNWIRED, not green"
summary "- l0-static: **SKIPPED** (conformance runner missing)"
if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then rc=3; fi
else
load_touched_requirements
if "$CONFORMANCE_CMD" --layer l0 ${REQ_ARGS[@]+"${REQ_ARGS[@]}"}; then
ok "L0 static conformance checks passed"
summary "- l0-static: **passed**"
else
err "L0 static conformance checks failed"
summary "- l0-static: **FAILED**"
rc=1
fi
fi
case "$rc" in
0) ok "L0 stage complete" ;;
3) skip "L0 stage incomplete (unwired seam / missing tool) — not a pass" ;;
ci/l1.sh
+5 -8
View File
@@ -20,19 +20,16 @@ if ! entrypoint_ready "$CONFORMANCE_CMD"; then
exit 3
fi
# Touched-requirement subset (R-TEST-03). Empty subset => run all L1 as a sanity net.
mapfile -t reqs < <("${CI_DIR}/touched-requirements.sh" || true)
req_args=()
if [ "${#reqs[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
log "touched requirements: ${reqs[*]}"
req_args=(--requirements "$(IFS=,; echo "${reqs[*]}")")
fi
# Touched-requirement subset (R-TEST-03). An empty OR undeterminable subset => run all
# L1 as a superset sanity net, and SAY SO — see load_touched_requirements in ci/lib.sh.
load_touched_requirements
req_args=(${REQ_ARGS[@]+"${REQ_ARGS[@]}"})
# RECONCILED (PM 2026-08-16): conformance/run.sh's real interface is `--layer <l1|l2|l3>`
# [--requirements R-A,R-B]; it ALWAYS writes artifacts to a FIXED location
# (conformance/_artifacts/) and does NOT accept --junit/--coverage. Invoke by layer +
# touched subset, then COLLECT its artifacts into the CI artifact dirs.
"$CONFORMANCE_CMD" --layer l1 "${req_args[@]}"
"$CONFORMANCE_CMD" --layer l1 ${req_args[@]+"${req_args[@]}"}
CONF_ART="$(dirname "$CONFORMANCE_CMD")/_artifacts"
if [ -f "${CONF_ART}/report.junit.xml" ]; then
ci/lib.sh
+35
View File
@@ -85,3 +85,38 @@ cluster_available() {
}
mkartifacts() { mkdir -p "$JUNIT_DIR" "$COVERAGE_DIR"; }
# --- Touched-requirement subset (R-TEST-03 input) ----------------------------
# Sets: TOUCHED_RC (0 ok / 3 not determinable), TOUCHED_REQS[] and REQ_ARGS[]
# (ready to splice into a conformance/run.sh invocation).
#
# ci/touched-requirements.sh exits 3 — LOUDLY — when it cannot establish a reliable
# diff base, instead of the old silent degradation to an empty set. An empty set
# means run.sh gets no `--requirements`, which means its coverage `--require` gate
# never runs; treating "could not determine" as "nothing touched" is precisely the
# false green this helper exists to prevent. A stage still runs its FULL layer in
# that case (a superset, so nothing goes untested), but says plainly that the
# SCOPED check did not happen; ci/gate.sh turns that into an UNDECIDED decision.
load_touched_requirements() {
local out rc=0
out="$("${CI_DIR}/touched-requirements.sh")" || rc=$?
TOUCHED_RC=$rc
TOUCHED_REQS=()
# `if`, not `[ ... ] && ...`: under `set -e` a false AND-list is the caller's last
# command status and would abort the stage script on an EMPTY touched set.
if [ -n "$out" ]; then mapfile -t TOUCHED_REQS <<< "$out"; fi
REQ_ARGS=()
if [ "$rc" -eq 3 ]; then
warn "touched-requirement subset UNDETERMINED (reason logged above)."
warn " Running the FULL layer as a superset sanity net; the SCOPED R-TEST-03"
warn " coverage check is NOT performed here — ci/gate.sh reports that as UNDECIDED."
elif [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then
warn "touched-requirements.sh exited ${rc}; proceeding with the full layer."
elif [ "${#TOUCHED_REQS[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
log "touched requirements: ${TOUCHED_REQS[*]}"
REQ_ARGS=(--requirements "$(IFS=,; echo "${TOUCHED_REQS[*]}")")
else
log "empty touched-requirement set (base WAS established) — running the full layer."
fi
return 0
}
ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh
Executable
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh — regression tests for BASE-REF RESOLUTION
# in ci/touched-requirements.sh.
#
# THE BUG THESE LOCK DOWN (2026-08-31, local/CI divergence):
# `make -C ci gate` on a feature branch printed
# "no changed files vs base; empty touched-requirement set"
# and then "MERGE GATE: PASS" — while CI, with a correct base, computed 17 touched
# requirements and BLOCKED on real coverage debt. Root cause: EVERY way of failing to
# establish a diff base degraded silently to an EMPTY touched set and exit 0. An empty
# set means conformance/run.sh is invoked without `--requirements`, which means its
# coverage `--require` gate never runs — so the gate reported PASS having checked
# nothing. A false green is worse than a red.
#
# The fix: an undeterminable base is a LOUD exit 3 (ci/README.md's SKIPPED code) with
# EMPTY stdout and a machine-readable reason code, never exit 0. These tests assert
# that for each way the base can be undeterminable, and assert the good paths still work.
#
# The tests point the real script at THROWAWAY git repos via the REPO_ROOT override
# (ci/lib.sh honours a pre-set REPO_ROOT); the script runs from its true location so it
# still sources the real lib.sh. No network, no cluster, and the working repo is never
# touched.
#
# Run: ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh (or `make -C ci test`)
set -uo pipefail # NOT -e: these tests deliberately run a script that exits non-zero.
CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
SCRIPT="${CI_DIR}/touched-requirements.sh"
PASS=0 FAIL=0
ok() { printf ' ok %s\n' "$*"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
bad() { printf ' FAIL %s\n' "$*" >&2; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
# newrepo <dir> — a throwaway repo with one baseline commit on `main`.
newrepo() {
local d="$1"
mkdir -p "$d/notes"
git -C "$d" init -q -b main
git -C "$d" config user.email [email protected]
git -C "$d" config user.name t
git -C "$d" config commit.gpgsign false # throwaway: never sign (ignore host gpg config)
echo baseline > "$d/notes/base.txt"
git -C "$d" add -A && git -C "$d" commit -qm baseline
}
# commit_touching <dir> <text> — a commit whose content declares an R-ID.
commit_touching() {
local d="$1" text="$2"
printf 'name: %s\n' "$text" > "$d/notes/decl.yaml"
git -C "$d" add -A && git -C "$d" commit -qm change
}
# Runs the script in <dir>; sets RC, OUT (stdout), ERRTXT (stderr), REASON.
run_in() {
local d="$1"; shift
local reason_file="${TMP}/reason.$$"
: > "$reason_file"
OUT="$(REPO_ROOT="$d" TOUCHED_REASON_FILE="$reason_file" "$@" "$SCRIPT" 2>"${TMP}/err.$$")"
RC=$?
ERRTXT="$(cat "${TMP}/err.$$")"
REASON="$(cat "$reason_file")"
}
# assert_refusal <label> <expected-reason>
assert_refusal() {
local label="$1" want="$2"
[ "$RC" = 3 ] && ok "${label}: exits 3 (SKIPPED), not 0" || bad "${label}: rc=${RC}, expected 3"
[ -z "$OUT" ] && ok "${label}: stdout is EMPTY (no silent requirement list)" \
|| bad "${label}: stdout was '${OUT}'"
[ "$REASON" = "$want" ] && ok "${label}: reason code '${want}'" \
|| bad "${label}: reason '${REASON}', expected '${want}'"
grep -q "NOT DETERMINABLE" <<<"$ERRTXT" && ok "${label}: announces the refusal LOUDLY on stderr" \
|| bad "${label}: stderr lacked the loud banner"
}
echo "== case 1: a branch ahead of local main (no remote) resolves and reports"
R1="${TMP}/r1"; newrepo "$R1"
git -C "$R1" checkout -q -b feature
commit_touching "$R1" implements-R-ALPHA-01
run_in "$R1"
[ "$RC" = 0 ] && ok "ahead-of-main: exits 0" || bad "ahead-of-main: rc=${RC}"
grep -qx "R-ALPHA-01" <<<"$OUT" && ok "ahead-of-main: emits the touched R-ID" \
|| bad "ahead-of-main: output was '${OUT}'"
grep -q "diff base: main" <<<"$ERRTXT" && ok "ahead-of-main: names the base it used" \
|| bad "ahead-of-main: base not reported: ${ERRTXT}"
echo "== case 2: THE FALSE GREEN — HEAD is the base branch itself"
# This is the state that produced 'no changed files vs base' + 'MERGE GATE: PASS'
# locally while CI blocked. It must now refuse, not report an empty set.
R2="${TMP}/r2"; newrepo "$R2"
git -C "$R2" checkout -q -b feature
commit_touching "$R2" implements-R-ALPHA-01
git -C "$R2" checkout -q main # <- sitting on the base branch
run_in "$R2"
assert_refusal "on-base" "on-base"
echo "== case 3: a branch already merged into the base (HEAD is an ancestor)"
R3="${TMP}/r3"; newrepo "$R3"
git -C "$R3" checkout -q -b feature
commit_touching "$R3" implements-R-ALPHA-01
git -C "$R3" checkout -q main
git -C "$R3" merge -q --no-edit feature
git -C "$R3" checkout -q feature # feature is now behind main
run_in "$R3"
assert_refusal "already-merged" "on-base"
echo "== case 4: no base ref resolves at all (no main, no origin/main)"
R4="${TMP}/r4"; newrepo "$R4"
git -C "$R4" checkout -q -b work
commit_touching "$R4" implements-R-ALPHA-01
git -C "$R4" branch -q -D main
run_in "$R4"
assert_refusal "no-base-ref" "no-base"
echo "== case 5: a single-commit repo with no main (the removed HEAD~1 last resort)"
# HEAD~1 does not exist here. The old code fell back to it, the diff failed, and the
# empty result was reported as 'no changed files' + exit 0 — a silent false green.
R5="${TMP}/r5"; mkdir -p "$R5/notes"
git -C "$R5" init -q -b work
git -C "$R5" config user.email [email protected]; git -C "$R5" config user.name t
git -C "$R5" config commit.gpgsign false
echo only > "$R5/notes/only.txt"; git -C "$R5" add -A; git -C "$R5" commit -qm only
run_in "$R5"
assert_refusal "single-commit-no-main" "no-base"
echo "== case 6: BASE_REF names a ref that does not exist"
R6="${TMP}/r6"; newrepo "$R6"
git -C "$R6" checkout -q -b feature
commit_touching "$R6" implements-R-ALPHA-01
run_in "$R6" env BASE_REF=refs/heads/nope
assert_refusal "bogus-BASE_REF" "no-base"
echo "== case 7: GITHUB_BASE_REF set but absent from the checkout (shallow clone)"
R7="${TMP}/r7"; newrepo "$R7"
git -C "$R7" checkout -q -b feature
commit_touching "$R7" implements-R-ALPHA-01
run_in "$R7" env GITHUB_BASE_REF=release-9
assert_refusal "missing-GITHUB_BASE_REF" "no-base"
echo "== case 8: origin/main is preferred over a stale local main, and staleness warns"
R8="${TMP}/r8"; newrepo "$R8"
UP="${TMP}/r8-origin.git"; git init -q --bare -b main "$UP"
git -C "$R8" remote add origin "$UP"
git -C "$R8" push -q origin main
# advance origin/main beyond the local main ref, then branch off it
git -C "$R8" checkout -q -b ahead
echo more > "$R8/notes/more.txt"; git -C "$R8" add -A; git -C "$R8" commit -qm more
git -C "$R8" push -q origin ahead:main
git -C "$R8" fetch -q origin
git -C "$R8" checkout -q -b feature origin/main
commit_touching "$R8" implements-R-ALPHA-01
run_in "$R8"
[ "$RC" = 0 ] && ok "origin-preferred: exits 0" || bad "origin-preferred: rc=${RC}"
grep -q "diff base: origin/main" <<<"$ERRTXT" && ok "origin-preferred: uses origin/main, not local main" \
|| bad "origin-preferred: base line was: ${ERRTXT}"
grep -q "may be stale" <<<"$ERRTXT" && ok "origin-preferred: warns that local main differs" \
|| bad "origin-preferred: no staleness warning"
grep -qx "R-ALPHA-01" <<<"$OUT" && ok "origin-preferred: emits the touched R-ID" \
|| bad "origin-preferred: output was '${OUT}'"
echo
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "touched-requirements base-resolution tests: PASS (${PASS} assertions)"; exit 0
fi
echo "touched-requirements base-resolution tests: FAIL (${FAIL} failed, ${PASS} passed)" >&2
exit 1
ci/touched-requirements.sh
+115 -18
View File
@@ -28,22 +28,93 @@ CI_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck disable=SC1091
source "${CI_DIR}/lib.sh"
# Base ref to diff against. In Gitea/GitHub Actions PR runs this is the target
# branch (main). Locally, default to main; override with BASE_REF.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# BASE-REF RESOLUTION — and why it now REFUSES rather than guesses.
#
# BUG THIS FIXES (local/CI divergence, 2026-08-31): every failure to establish a
# reliable diff base used to degrade SILENTLY to an EMPTY touched set, which main()
# reported as "no changed files vs base" and exit 0. An empty set means the coverage
# `--require` gate is never applied, so the merge gate printed "MERGE GATE: PASS"
# having checked NOTHING — while CI, with a correct base, computed 17 touched
# requirements and blocked. A false green is the worst outcome this project can
# produce, so every one of those degradations is now a LOUD exit 3:
#
# * HEAD~1 last resort REMOVED. It silently narrowed the diff to the last commit
# (and on a one-commit repo failed into an empty set).
# * two-dot fallback REMOVED. It masked a failing three-dot diff as "no changes".
# * unresolvable base exit 3 (was: HEAD~1 or empty).
# * diff command fails exit 3 (was: empty set).
# * HEAD not ahead of exit 3 (was: exit 0 with an empty set — this is the case
# the base that produced the false green: running the gate while
# sitting on `main`, or on a branch already merged).
#
# Exit 3 is the ci/README.md "SKIPPED / not-run" code: NOT a pass, NOT a fail. Callers
# (ci/gate.sh) must surface it as an UNDECIDED merge decision. An honest, noisy skip
# beats a quiet false pass.
#
# Order of preference: BASE_REF (explicit) > GITHUB_BASE_REF (Actions PR runs, target
# branch) > origin/main > main. Each candidate is VERIFIED to resolve to a commit
# before it is used, so a shallow checkout that lacks origin/main is reported, not
# papered over.
: "${BASE_REF:=}"
resolve_base() {
if [ -n "$BASE_REF" ]; then echo "$BASE_REF"; return; fi
if [ -n "${GITHUB_BASE_REF:-}" ]; then echo "origin/${GITHUB_BASE_REF}"; return; fi
if git -C "$REPO_ROOT" rev-parse --verify -q origin/main >/dev/null; then echo "origin/main"; return; fi
if git -C "$REPO_ROOT" rev-parse --verify -q main >/dev/null; then echo "main"; return; fi
echo "HEAD~1" # last resort
BASE="" # resolved base ref
BASE_SOURCE="" # where it came from (for the log line)
BASE_PROBLEM="" # why resolution failed, when it did
rev() { git -C "$REPO_ROOT" rev-parse --verify -q "$1^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; }
# Loud, structured refusal. Prints to stderr only; stdout stays empty so a caller that
# captures stdout gets NO requirement list rather than a silently-empty one.
#
# $1 is a machine-readable REASON CODE, also written to $TOUCHED_REASON_FILE when that
# env var names a path. ci/gate.sh uses it to tell the two cases apart:
# on-base HEAD is the base branch (or already merged) — nothing to gate. Legitimate
# (a push-to-main CI run lands here), so the gate reports NOT APPLICABLE
# rather than PASS, and does not fail the job.
# no-base no reliable base ref exists in this checkout — the ENVIRONMENT is broken,
# diff-failed or git could not produce the diff. A merge decision is impossible, so the
# gate BLOCKS rather than guessing.
undecidable() {
local code="$1"; shift
if [ -n "${TOUCHED_REASON_FILE:-}" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$code" > "$TOUCHED_REASON_FILE"; fi
err "TOUCHED-REQUIREMENT SET NOT DETERMINABLE (${code})"
err " reason: $*"
err " consequence: the R-TEST-03 coverage gate CANNOT be applied to this checkout."
err " This is exit 3 (SKIPPED / not-run), never a pass — see ci/README.md."
err " Fix one of:"
err " * check out the feature branch you mean to gate (not the base branch), or"
err " * git fetch origin main (so origin/main exists and is current), or"
err " * BASE_REF=<ref> make -C ci gate to name the base explicitly."
exit 3
}
resolve_base() {
local cand
if [ -n "$BASE_REF" ]; then
if rev "$BASE_REF" >/dev/null; then BASE="$BASE_REF"; BASE_SOURCE="BASE_REF"; return 0; fi
BASE_PROBLEM="BASE_REF='${BASE_REF}' does not resolve to a commit in ${REPO_ROOT}"
return 1
fi
if [ -n "${GITHUB_BASE_REF:-}" ]; then
for cand in "origin/${GITHUB_BASE_REF}" "${GITHUB_BASE_REF}"; do
if rev "$cand" >/dev/null; then BASE="$cand"; BASE_SOURCE="GITHUB_BASE_REF"; return 0; fi
done
BASE_PROBLEM="GITHUB_BASE_REF='${GITHUB_BASE_REF}' is set, but neither 'origin/${GITHUB_BASE_REF}' nor '${GITHUB_BASE_REF}' exists here (shallow checkout? the workflow needs fetch-depth: 0)"
return 1
fi
for cand in origin/main main; do
if rev "$cand" >/dev/null; then BASE="$cand"; BASE_SOURCE="default"; return 0; fi
done
BASE_PROBLEM="no base ref resolves (tried origin/main, main) in ${REPO_ROOT}"
return 1
}
# Both diff helpers assume BASE is already resolved and validated by main(). They return
# git's exit status so the CALLER can distinguish "no changes" from "the diff failed" —
# conflating those two is exactly what produced the false green.
changed_files() {
local base; base="$(resolve_base)"
# Three-dot: changes on this branch since it diverged from base.
if git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff --name-only "${base}...HEAD" 2>/dev/null; then return; fi
git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff --name-only "${base}" 2>/dev/null || true
git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff --name-only "${BASE}...HEAD"
}
# The ADDED/REMOVED lines of the change, for the R-ID content scan — excluding
@@ -92,10 +163,8 @@ changed_files() {
# carry AUTHORITATIVE `conformance.home.k3s/R-*` labels and are deliberately still scanned.
# Three-dot to match changed_files(): changes on this branch since it diverged from base.
changed_diff() {
local base; base="$(resolve_base)"
local -a excl=(':(exclude)*.md' ':(exclude)ci/tests/')
if git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff -U0 "${base}...HEAD" -- . "${excl[@]}" 2>/dev/null; then return; fi
git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff -U0 "${base}" -- . "${excl[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff -U0 "${BASE}...HEAD" -- . "${excl[@]}"
}
# Coarse path -> requirement map. Deliberately conservative; extend as subtrees
@@ -120,9 +189,34 @@ path_requirements() {
}
main() {
local files reqs=""
files="$(changed_files)"
[ -n "$files" ] || { log "no changed files vs base; empty touched-requirement set"; exit 0; }
local files reqs="" rc=0 base_sha head_sha local_main merge_base
resolve_base || undecidable no-base "$BASE_PROBLEM"
base_sha="$(rev "$BASE")" || undecidable no-base "resolved base '${BASE}' vanished"
head_sha="$(rev HEAD)" || undecidable no-base "HEAD does not resolve to a commit (empty repo?)"
log "diff base: ${BASE} (${BASE_SOURCE}) @ ${base_sha:0:12} ... HEAD @ ${head_sha:0:12}"
# Advisory: a never-fetched origin/main silently WIDENS the set (over-broad, never a
# false green) — surfaced so an unexpectedly large touched set has an explanation.
if [ "$BASE" = "origin/main" ] && local_main="$(rev main)" && [ -n "$local_main" ] \
&& [ "$local_main" != "$base_sha" ]; then
warn "local 'main' (${local_main:0:12}) != origin/main (${base_sha:0:12}) — if origin/main"
warn " was not fetched recently the touched set may be stale: git fetch origin main"
fi
merge_base="$(git -C "$REPO_ROOT" merge-base "$BASE" HEAD 2>/dev/null)" \
|| undecidable no-base "no merge base between '${BASE}' and HEAD (unrelated histories, or a shallow clone)"
if [ "$merge_base" = "$head_sha" ]; then
undecidable on-base "HEAD is not ahead of '${BASE}' (merge-base == HEAD): this checkout contains no branch commits to gate. The empty touched set would be empty BY DEFAULT, not by verification."
fi
files="$(changed_files)" || rc=$?
[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || undecidable diff-failed "git diff --name-only ${BASE}...HEAD failed (rc=${rc})"
if [ -z "$files" ]; then
warn "HEAD is ahead of ${BASE} but the three-dot diff is empty (self-cancelling commits?)"
warn " -> genuinely empty touched-requirement set; base WAS established."
exit 0
fi
while IFS= read -r f; do
[ -n "$f" ] || continue
@@ -135,7 +229,10 @@ main() {
# what remains is the SOURCE line, and `grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*#'` drops whole-line
# YAML/shell comments (rule 3 in changed_diff's header) BEFORE the R-ID grep — a
# requirement cited only in a `#` comment is prose, not a declaration.
reqs+=" $(changed_diff \
local diff_txt
diff_txt="$(changed_diff)" || rc=$?
[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || undecidable diff-failed "git diff -U0 ${BASE}...HEAD failed (rc=${rc})"
reqs+=" $(printf '%s\n' "$diff_txt" \
| grep -E '^[+-]' \
| grep -vE '^(\+\+\+|---)' \
| sed -E 's/^[+-]//' \
clusters/README.md
+25
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,31 @@ they add no resources of their own and never copy/fork a base manifest. Promotio
([`docs/02`](../../home-network-k3s/docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md)) is a change to the
prod overlay's variables, nothing else.
### LAN addressing is a knob, not a literal (fixed 2026-08-31)
Until 2026-08-31 the base manifests hardcoded the **dev** LAN: the k3s API host Cilium dials, the
Cilium LB IP pool range, the pinned crafty/unifi L4 VIPs and the off-cluster S3 backup endpoint. That
broke R-ENV-02 outright — `clusters/prod` would have rendered dev addresses (192.168.1.x) onto the
prod LAN (192.168.2.x). They are now the `cluster-vars` "LAN addressing" block
(`K3S_API_HOST`, `CILIUM_LB_POOL_START`/`_STOP`, `UNIFI_L4_VIP`, `CRAFTY_L4_VIP`,
`S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT`, alongside the pre-existing `GATEWAY_VIP`), set explicitly by BOTH overlays.
Two rules when touching that block:
1. **Substitution coverage.** A `${TOKEN}` only resolves in a path whose Flux Kustomization declares
`postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars`; anywhere else the literal string `${TOKEN}` ships to the
cluster. `apps-vms` was the one path without it and now has it — which means every shell `${...}`
in a VM manifest's cloud-init must be escaped `$${...}` (see `clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml` for the
full envsubst escape contract).
2. **`GATEWAY_VIP` must be inside `CILIUM_LB_POOL_START..STOP`,** and in practice equal to START: the
`shared` Gateway pins no address, so Cilium LB-IPAM gives it the pool's first free IP while
split-horizon CoreDNS answers with `${GATEWAY_VIP}`. A VIP outside the pool blackholes in-cluster
hairpin traffic while the Gateway still looks healthy.
Values the operator has not decided are `TBD-PROD-*` placeholders, not guesses: prod inherits the
DEV base defaults if an overlay op is simply omitted, so an invalid value that fails loudly is
strictly safer than a plausible one that quietly comes up on the wrong network.
## How Flux is pointed at an environment
`flux bootstrap` (run by WS-INFRA in Phase 1) targets one environment's path per cluster:
clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml
+18 -4
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,21 @@ spec:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./apps/vms
# NO postBuild.substituteFrom: Flux's envsubst would run over the ENTIRE manifest, including the
# VM cloud-init shell scripts, and mangle every `${...}` (e.g. ${UOS_URL}, ${PIPESTATUS[0]}) —
# corrupting the in-guest install. VM manifests reference no cluster-vars, so substitution is
# unneeded here. A future VM that needs a cluster-var must escape its shell `${...}` as `$${...}`.
# postBuild.substituteFrom ENABLED 2026-08-31 (R-ENV-02). It was previously omitted because Flux's
# envsubst runs over the ENTIRE manifest — including VM cloud-init shell scripts — and would mangle
# every `${...}`; the omission was safe only while no VM manifest referenced a cluster-var. It now
# does: apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml pins the UniFi L4 VIP from ${UNIFI_L4_VIP} instead of the
# hardcoded dev-LAN literal that would have shipped 192.168.1.54 onto the PROD LAN.
#
# The escape contract the old comment prescribed is now in force and MUST be honoured by every VM
# manifest under this path (verified with `flux envsubst`):
# `${VAR}` -> substituted (empty when unset) => escape shell braces as `$${VAR}`, which
# envsubst emits back as a literal `${VAR}`.
# `$VAR` -> left alone by envsubst => bare shell vars need NO escaping.
# `$(cmd)` -> left alone by envsubst => command substitution needs NO escaping.
# `${ARR[0]}` (e.g. ${PIPESTATUS[0]}) -> HARD ERROR "missing closing brace", which fails this
# whole Kustomization. NEVER use an indexed expansion here, escaped or not.
postBuild:
substituteFrom:
- kind: ConfigMap
name: cluster-vars
clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml
+50 -7
View File
@@ -21,13 +21,56 @@ data:
DNS_ZONE: "keithjackson.dev" # the actual Cloudflare ZONE (BASE_DOMAIN is a subdomain of it);
# ExternalDNS domain-filter must be the zone, not the subdomain
ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER: "letsencrypt-staging" # dev: staging | prod: letsencrypt-prod (ADR-0006)
GATEWAY_VIP: "10.73.0.240" # in-cluster split-horizon target (R-DNS-01/03): the L2-announced
# ingress VIP of the `shared` Gateway (first IP of the Cilium
# LB IP pool 10.73.0.240-.250, platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml).
# coredns-custom answers *.home.keithjackson.dev with THIS so pod->
# public-hostname traffic hairpins through the Gateway (correct SNI ->
# wildcard cert). Base default = dev VIP; a prod overlay must set the
# prod LAN VIP alongside the prod L2 pool range when hardware is built.
GATEWAY_VIP: "192.168.1.53" # in-cluster split-horizon target (R-DNS-01/03): the L2-announced
# ingress VIP of the `shared` Gateway. MUST equal the FIRST address of
# ${CILIUM_LB_POOL_START}..${CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP} below — the Gateway
# takes the pool's first free IP, and coredns-custom answers
# *.home.keithjackson.dev with THIS so pod -> public-hostname traffic
# hairpins through the Gateway (correct SNI -> wildcard cert).
# Base default = the DEV LAN VIP (was 10.73.0.240, an address on the
# long-RETIRED libvirt network — corrected 2026-08-31 so an overlay that
# forgets this knob at least lands on a REAL network). A prod overlay
# MUST still set the prod LAN VIP alongside the prod L2 pool range.
# --- LAN addressing (R-ENV-02) — the ONE block every new environment must re-supply -------------
# These were HARDCODED into base manifests until 2026-08-31, which broke the golden constraint:
# `clusters/prod` would have rendered the DEV LAN (192.168.1.0/24) onto the prod LAN (192.168.2.0/24)
# — a silent, cross-environment IP collision. They are knobs now. Base defaults ARE the dev values
# (same convention as GATEWAY_VIP above: the base default is the known-good working value), so the
# dev overlay restates them verbatim and a prod overlay MUST override EVERY knob in this block
# before `flux bootstrap --path=clusters/prod`.
#
# Substitution coverage (verify before adding a knob here): every path that consumes these declares
# postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars — platform (K3S_API_HOST), platform-config
# (CILIUM_LB_POOL_*, S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT), crafty (CRAFTY_L4_VIP), apps-wave-0 (S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT),
# velero (S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT), apps-vms (UNIFI_L4_VIP). A ${TOKEN} in an UNSUBSTITUTED path would
# ship the literal string into the cluster.
# k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials (platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml).
# [parity] MUST equal the Ansible bootstrap's k3s_api_host (infra/ansible/roles/cilium/defaults/
# main.yml -> cilium-values.yaml.j2, already inventory-parameterized). Wrong value = Cilium cannot
# reach the API server on adopt and the CNI breaks. Port stays 6443 in both envs, so it is NOT a knob.
K3S_API_HOST: "192.168.1.50"
# CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool` (platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml): the VIP range
# L2-announced on the flat LAN. Must sit OUTSIDE the node IPs and any DHCP scope, and must match the
# tofu reservation (cilium_l2_vip_range). INVARIANT: ${GATEWAY_VIP} must be INSIDE this range and in
# practice EQUAL to START — the `shared` Gateway pins no address, so LB-IPAM hands it the pool's
# first free IP. (⚠ the operator-supplied PROD values currently break this; see l2-ip-pool.yaml and
# the flagged block in clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml.)
CILIUM_LB_POOL_START: "192.168.1.53"
CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP: "192.168.1.60"
# Pinned VIPs carved out of that pool by name (lbipam.cilium.io/ips). These are L4 workloads the
# HTTPS Gateway cannot express (raw TCP/UDP), so they hold their own stable address:
UNIFI_L4_VIP: "192.168.1.54" # UniFi controller VM: inform/STUN/adoption (apps/vms/unifi)
CRAFTY_L4_VIP: "192.168.1.55" # Crafty: Minecraft Java (TCP) + Bedrock (UDP) game ports
# Off-cluster S3 backup target (R-STATE-03, R-IDP-05) — the on-Proxmox MinIO, plain HTTP, path-style.
# Consumed by BOTH backup paths: every CNPG Cluster's barmanObjectStore.endpointURL (keycloak-db,
# nextcloud-db, semaphore-db) and Velero's backupStorageLocation s3Url. Full URL incl. scheme+port.
# Prod needs its OWN target: a backup that lands on the dev LAN's MinIO is not off-cluster DR.
S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT: "http://192.168.1.9:9000"
# --- storage (ADR-0003) ---
LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT: "3" # default StorageClass replica count (3 on 3 nodes)
clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml
+33 -1
View File
@@ -148,12 +148,44 @@ patches:
- op: replace
path: /data/ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
value: "letsencrypt-prod"
# --- dev LAN addressing (192.168.1.0/24 on the Proxmox LAN) -----------------------------
# EVERY knob in cluster-vars' "LAN addressing" block is restated here EXPLICITLY, even where it
# equals the base default. These values are what the LIVE dev cluster is running right now, so
# the substituted output is byte-identical to the pre-parameterization hardcoded manifests
# (verified 2026-08-31). Never let this block drift from the live cluster.
#
# Split-horizon DNS target: the Cilium-L2 VIP of the `shared` Gateway on the Proxmox LAN
# (base default 10.73.0.240 was the old libvirt VIP). coredns-custom answers
# (= CILIUM_LB_POOL_START, the pool's first address). coredns-custom answers
# *.home.keithjackson.dev with this so in-cluster OIDC clients reach Keycloak via the Gateway.
- op: replace
path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
value: "192.168.1.53"
# k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials — the primary control-plane node
# (k3s-1). [parity] equals the Ansible inventory's k3s_api_host for dev.
- op: replace
path: /data/K3S_API_HOST
value: "192.168.1.50"
# Cilium LB IP pool = the tofu reservation cilium_l2_vip_range .53-.60, outside the node IPs
# (.50/.51/.52) and outside the DHCP scope. .53 Gateway, .54 unifi, .55 crafty; .56-.60 free.
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_START
value: "192.168.1.53"
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP
value: "192.168.1.60"
# Pinned L4 VIPs out of that pool (lbipam.cilium.io/ips). Changing either MOVES a live device-
# facing endpoint: unifi is the inform/STUN target every adopted UniFi device holds.
- op: replace
path: /data/UNIFI_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.1.54"
- op: replace
path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.1.55"
# Off-cluster backup target: the on-Proxmox MinIO (plain HTTP, path-style) that every CNPG
# barmanObjectStore and Velero's backupStorageLocation write to.
- op: replace
path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
value: "http://192.168.1.9:9000"
# dev mirrors prod's 3-node topology, so the replicated tier keeps 3 replicas.
- op: replace
path: /data/LONGHORN_DEFAULT_REPLICA_COUNT
clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml
+64 -4
View File
@@ -49,8 +49,68 @@ patches:
- op: replace
path: /data/VELERO_RETENTION
value: "720h"
# ==========================================================================================
# PROD LAN ADDRESSING (192.168.2.0/24). Nodes: k3s-prod-1/2/3 = .10 / .11 / .12.
# ==========================================================================================
# These knobs were HARDCODED to the dev LAN inside base manifests until 2026-08-31; prod would
# have come up ANNOUNCING DEV ADDRESSES (192.168.1.x) on the prod LAN. They are knobs now, and
# this overlay supplies every one of them. Anything the operator has NOT yet decided stays an
# INVALID `TBD-PROD-*` placeholder on purpose: base defaults are the DEV values, so an OMITTED
# op means prod silently inherits a dev address — far worse than a failed apply. `TBD-PROD-*`
# is not a valid IP/URL, so Cilium CRD validation / LB-IPAM / CNPG / Velero reject it LOUDLY.
#
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ADDRESS PLAN (operator, 2026-08-31) — see infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4 for the full table.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# nodes 192.168.2.10 / .11 / .12 (Ansible inventory)
# control-plane VIP 192.168.2.9 (Ansible group_vars/k3s_prod — NOT here)
# ingress Gateway VIP 192.168.2.20 (GATEWAY_VIP, below)
# Cilium LB pool 192.168.2.20 - .30 (CILIUM_LB_POOL_*, below)
#
# CONTAINMENT INVARIANT SATISFIED: GATEWAY_VIP (.20) IS CILIUM_LB_POOL_START, mirroring dev
# (.53 of .53-.60). This matters because the `shared` Gateway (platform/gateway/gateway.yaml)
# pins NOTHING — no `lbipam.cilium.io/ips`, no spec.addresses (unlike platform/crafty and
# apps/vms/unifi, which DO pin) — so Cilium LB-IPAM assigns it the FIRST FREE address of a
# matching pool block. Had GATEWAY_VIP stayed outside every pool (the original .21-.30
# proposal), the Gateway would have come up on .21 while split-horizon coredns-custom kept
# answering *.home.keithjackson.dev with .20 — an address nothing announces — blackholing
# in-cluster hairpin traffic (OIDC clients -> Keycloak/Grafana) while looking healthy.
# KEEP GATEWAY_VIP == CILIUM_LB_POOL_START when changing either.
# The control-plane VIP (.9) is deliberately OUTSIDE this pool: kube-vip floats it, and
# LB-IPAM must never be able to hand it to a Service.
- op: replace
path: /data/GATEWAY_VIP
value: "192.168.2.20"
# Cilium LB IP pool, operator-supplied: 192.168.2.20-.30 (START == GATEWAY_VIP, see above).
# Mirror this range into the prod tofu reservation (cilium_l2_vip_range) if prod ever gets one.
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_START
value: "192.168.2.20"
- op: replace
path: /data/CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP
value: "192.168.2.30"
# --- still UNDECIDED -> loud placeholders (must be real before `flux bootstrap`) ------------
# k3s API endpoint Cilium's kube-proxy replacement dials. This is the prod CONTROL-PLANE VIP
# (kube-vip), NOT .20 (the ingress VIP) and NOT the single node address .10. It is owned
# Ansible-side (prod inventory k3s_api_host) and MUST equal that value — [parity] contract in
# platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml. Not yet decided.
- op: replace
path: /data/K3S_API_HOST
value: "192.168.2.10"
# Pinned L4 VIPs, both carved out of the pool by lbipam.cilium.io/ips. Not yet assigned for
# prod. Leaving the dev literals in place would hand a prod LoadBalancer a dev-LAN address, so
# they stay placeholders; whatever is chosen MUST fall inside [POOL_START, POOL_STOP] and not
# collide with the Gateway VIP or the node IPs (.10/.11/.12).
- op: replace
path: /data/UNIFI_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.21"
- op: replace
path: /data/CRAFTY_L4_VIP
value: "192.168.2.22"
# Off-cluster DR target. Dev's versitygw/MinIO (192.168.1.9:9000) sits on the DEV side of the
# network — a prod backup written there is not off-cluster DR and would mix two environments'
# PITR streams in one bucket. Operator supplies the prod endpoint (full URL incl. scheme+port).
- op: replace
path: /data/S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT
value: "TBD-PROD-S3-BACKUP-ENDPOINT"
# TODO(WS-INFRA, Phase 7): pin prod node placement once the bare-metal role labels exist.
# TODO(WS-NET, Phase 7): set GATEWAY_VIP to the prod LAN ingress VIP (add a `replace` op here)
# at the same time the prod Cilium LB IP pool range is supplied — the split-horizon
# coredns-custom (platform/coredns) answers *.home.keithjackson.dev with ${GATEWAY_VIP}, so
# the prod value must match the prod pool's Gateway address. Base default is the dev VIP.
conformance/.gitignore
+3
View File
@@ -5,3 +5,6 @@ _artifacts/
# Downloaded pinned tool binaries (run.sh may fetch chainsaw/kubectl here).
.bin/
# Python bytecode from lib/ (status.py imports coverage.py); never committed.
__pycache__/
conformance/README.md
+31
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ behavioral / L3 fault-injection** (this harness).
./run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-06 # merge-gate subset (tagged)
./run.sh --layer l2 # one layer: l1 | l2 | l3 | meta | all
./run.sh --coverage-only # regenerate the coverage report (no cluster)
./run.sh --status # derived requirement-STATUS report (no cluster)
./run.sh --lint # structural-validate test defs (no cluster)
./run.sh --strict-coverage # hygiene gate: fail on tag/annotation drift
./run.sh --require-all # phase-exit gate: every requirement must be covered
@@ -37,6 +38,33 @@ behavioral / L3 fault-injection** (this harness).
used to be here; it now has a real L3 test — `tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss` — and
is covered, not exempted.)
### Coverage vs status — two different questions
`coverage.md` answers **"does a requirement-tagged test EXIST for R-x?"** (R-TEST-04).
`status.md` (`./run.sh --status`, generator `lib/status.py`) answers the operator's
question — **"what is the real state of each requirement given what is actually in the
repo?"** — deriving three orthogonal axes per requirement:
1. **implementation** — is there a tracked artifact naming the requirement?
2. **reconciliation** — is that artifact reachable by walking `resources:` from
`clusters/<env>/kustomization.yaml` and expanding every Flux `Kustomization`'s
`spec.path`? This is what separates **authored** from **actually reconciled**: a
commented-out `resources:` entry (e.g. `platform/image-automation`) is correctly
reported as in-git-but-not-on-any-cluster.
3. **verification** — is the tagged test EXECUTABLE, or a TODO scaffold? Coverage counts
both as "covered"; status does not. TODO markers in a body always outrank an
`executable: "true"` annotation, so ambiguity never upgrades a test.
**It deliberately refuses to derive proof-of-pass.** Nothing tracked in git records a test
result — `_artifacts/` and `results/` are git-ignored and DECISIONS-LOG.md prose is not a
signal — so every requirement's proof state is reported as `not-derivable` rather than
defaulting to green. A status report that overstates completion is worse than none
(`agents/definition-of-done.md`). Closing that gap needs a **committed, machine-readable
run ledger**; until then the strongest claim the report makes is *wired and testable*.
`--strict-coverage` also applies status's hygiene gate (registry↔spec drift,
annotation/body conflicts, a safety-critical requirement whose only L3 test is a scaffold).
Exit codes follow `ci/lib.sh`: `0` pass / `1` fail / `3` skipped — a skip is never green.
`run.sh` is the **only** entrypoint. Local runs and the in-cluster CI Chainsaw Job call
the *same* script with the same config, so results are identical.
@@ -46,6 +74,8 @@ the *same* script with the same config, so results are identical.
| `_artifacts/report.junit.xml` | JUnit — Chainsaw results, or a **skipped-scaffold** shim when no cluster | CI gate |
| `_artifacts/coverage/coverage.md` | Human requirement-coverage report | PR reviewers / logs |
| `_artifacts/coverage/coverage.json` | Machine coverage: `{requirement: [tests]}`, gaps, safety gaps | CI gate |
| `_artifacts/status/status.md` | Human requirement-STATUS report derived from repo state | operator / PM |
| `_artifacts/status/status.json` | Machine status: implementation / reconciliation / verification per requirement | tooling |
## Reproducibility contract (R-TEST-02 — what the harness guarantees)
- **Single command.** `./run.sh` (or a tagged/layer subset) runs everything and emits the
@@ -74,6 +104,7 @@ requirements/registry.yaml mirror of EVERY spec R-* ID (coverage enumerates fr
lib/
common.sh tagging convention + test discovery/selection helpers
coverage.py requirement-coverage generator (stdlib only)
status.py requirement-STATUS generator (stdlib only; --selftest)
emit_skipped_junit.py Phase-0 skipped-JUnit shim (no cluster)
tests/
l1-rendering/ l2-behavioral/ l3-fault-injection/ meta/ (see tests/README.md)
conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml
+39 -4
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@ rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [pods/log]
verbs: [get] # read fault/probe Job logs on failure
# ---- Storage-tier precondition gate (READ-ONLY). Every storage test self-skips on the
# absence of the `longhorn` StorageClass rather than failing: data-survival (R-STATE-01),
# node-loss (R-STATE-02), dr-restore (R-STATE-03), vm-data-survival / vm-lifecycle /
# vm-default-deny (R-PLAT-03). Without this read the gate cannot tell "absent" from
# "forbidden" and would skip for the wrong reason.
- apiGroups: [storage.k8s.io]
resources: [storageclasses]
verbs: [get, list]
# ---- Controller-readiness preconditions (READ-ONLY). dr-restore (R-STATE-03) skips cleanly
# unless the Velero Deployment and its node-agent DaemonSet (kopia File System Backup, the
# volume-DATA path) are actually ready — a backup path that is not up is an absent
# precondition, not a failure. No write verbs: tests never scale or patch a platform
# controller.
- apiGroups: [apps]
resources: [deployments, daemonsets]
verbs: [get, list, watch]
# ---- Probe / fault Jobs (R-TLS-01/03 tls-probe; R-NET-06 tunnel stop/start)
# `create` cannot be constrained by resourceNames, and the fault Job names are
# fixed per-test (tunnel-stop/tunnel-start/tunnel-start-finally); scoped by the
@@ -103,10 +119,29 @@ rules:
# resources: [imagepolicies, imagerepositories]
# verbs: [get, patch]
#
# ---- R-STATE-03 (DR restore): trigger a Velero restore
# - apiGroups: [velero.io]
# resources: [restores, backups]
# verbs: [create, get, list, watch]
# ---- R-STATE-03 (DR restore, tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore): the drill creates a
# Velero Backup of its OWN scratch namespace, destroys that namespace + its PV, creates a
# Restore into a fresh namespace, and (in `finally`) issues a DeleteBackupRequest so the
# objects it wrote are removed from the off-cluster bucket again. `create` cannot be
# constrained by resourceNames; the blast radius is bounded by the fact that every object
# the test creates or deletes is named `<its-own-chainsaw-namespace>-dr-*`.
- apiGroups: [velero.io]
resources: [backups, restores, deletebackuprequests]
verbs: [create, delete, get, list, watch]
# Read-only evidence: the BSL is the off-cluster target whose Available phase + endpoint the
# test asserts; schedules prove backups are SCHEDULED (not one-off); podvolumebackups /
# podvolumerestores prove the kopia snapshot of the volume DATA reached/returned from the
# remote repository, and are dumped on failure for diagnosis.
- apiGroups: [velero.io]
resources: [backupstoragelocations, schedules, podvolumebackups, podvolumerestores]
verbs: [get, list, watch]
# R-STATE-03 needs `delete` on the PV, not merely read: the proof that the restore came from
# OFF-cluster is that no in-cluster copy of the data survived. The test asserts its own PV is
# gone, and force-deletes it if a Retain policy or a stuck finalizer left it behind. It only
# ever names the PV bound to the PVC it created itself.
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: [persistentvolumes]
verbs: [get, list, delete]
#
# ---- R-GITOPS-03 (drift): mutate a reconciled resource + observe Flux revert
# - apiGroups: [kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io]
conformance/lib/common.sh
+2 -1
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ conf_dirs_for_requirements() {
done < <(conf_all_test_files) | sort -u
}
# Directories for a given layer (subtree): l1 | l2 | l3 | meta | all.
# Directories for a given layer (subtree): l0 | l1 | l2 | l3 | meta | all.
# Accepts a comma/space separated LIST of layers (e.g. "l2,l3") and returns the UNION of
# their test dirs, deduplicated. A single layer keeps its prior behavior (backward compatible);
# this is what lets `run.sh --layer l2,l3` (the ci/conformance.sh L2/L3 stage) select both
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ conf_dirs_for_layer() {
for layer in ${layers//,/ }; do
case "$layer" in
all) roots=("${CONF_ROOT}/tests"); break ;;
l0) roots+=("${CONF_ROOT}/tests/l0-static") ;;
l1) roots+=("${CONF_ROOT}/tests/l1-rendering") ;;
l2) roots+=("${CONF_ROOT}/tests/l2-behavioral") ;;
l3) roots+=("${CONF_ROOT}/tests/l3-fault-injection") ;;
conformance/lib/coverage.py
+3 -1
View File
@@ -115,7 +115,9 @@ def parse_test(path: Path) -> dict:
# Layer inferred from path as a fallback / cross-check.
rel = str(path)
if not layer:
if "l1-rendering" in rel:
if "l0-static" in rel:
layer = "L0"
elif "l1-rendering" in rel:
layer = "L1"
elif "l2-behavioral" in rel:
layer = "L2"
conformance/lib/emit_skipped_junit.py
+2 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ def collect(path: Path) -> tuple[str, list[str], str]:
reqs = sorted({m.group(1).upper() for m in
(LABEL_LINE_RE.match(l) for l in text.splitlines()) if m})
rel = str(path)
layer = ("L1" if "l1-rendering" in rel else "L2" if "l2-behavioral" in rel
layer = ("L0" if "l0-static" in rel
else "L1" if "l1-rendering" in rel else "L2" if "l2-behavioral" in rel
else "L3" if "l3-fault-injection" in rel else "META")
return name, reqs, layer
conformance/lib/run_l1_offline.py
+42 -19
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,24 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Run the L1 *rendering* conformance checks OFFLINE (no cluster) and emit JUnit.
"""Run the CLUSTER-INDEPENDENT conformance checks OFFLINE and emit JUnit.
docs/14: "L1 rendering assertions run in CI without a cluster." L1 verifies the
ServiceDefinition -> rendered-resources mapping against golden expectations; unlike L2/L3
it needs no live cluster. Each l1-rendering test dir carries a `render-check.sh` (renderer
+ golden diff + structural asserts). run.sh invokes this for `--layer l1` so those tests
report a REAL pass/fail instead of being skipped with the cluster-gated layers.
docs/14 puts two layers in CI with no cluster:
* L0 static/policy -- "manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants" (tests/l0-static/,
each dir carrying a `check.sh`).
* L1 rendering -- ServiceDefinition -> rendered resources vs golden expectations
(tests/l1-rendering/, each dir carrying a `render-check.sh`).
Both are executed here so they report a REAL pass/fail instead of being skipped with the
cluster-gated layers. run.sh invokes this for `--layer l0`, `--layer l1`, and as the
offline leg of a full run.
Pure standard library (matches the harness's no-pip-dependency posture); the render checks
themselves shell out to catalog/render.py (the renderer's PyYAML dependency lives there).
Pure standard library (matches the harness's no-pip-dependency posture); the checks
themselves shell out (render checks to catalog/render.py, whose PyYAML dependency lives
there; L0 checks to git + PyYAML).
Usage: run_l1_offline.py --junit <out.xml> [--label-prefix P] <test-dir> [<test-dir> ...]
Exit 0 iff every selected render check passes.
Exit 0 iff every selected offline check passes.
The per-dir check script is whichever of `render-check.sh` / `check.sh` the directory
carries; a dir with neither is reported SKIPPED (never a pass).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -25,6 +32,19 @@ from xml.dom import minidom
LABEL_LINE_RE_TMPL = r"^\s*{prefix}/(R-[A-Z0-9]+-[0-9]+)\s*:\s*[\"']?true"
# The offline check script a test dir may carry, in preference order.
CHECK_SCRIPTS = ("render-check.sh", "check.sh")
def layer_of(d: Path) -> str:
"""Layer for the JUnit properties, from the subtree the test lives in."""
rel = str(d)
if "l0-static" in rel:
return "L0"
if "l1-rendering" in rel:
return "L1"
return "OFFLINE"
def collect_meta(test_yaml: Path, prefix: str):
text = test_yaml.read_text() if test_yaml.exists() else ""
@@ -44,10 +64,11 @@ def main() -> int:
cases = [] # (name, reqs, dir, rc, output)
for d in args.dirs:
check = d / "render-check.sh"
check = next((d / s for s in CHECK_SCRIPTS if (d / s).exists()), None)
name, reqs = collect_meta(d / "chainsaw-test.yaml", args.label_prefix)
if not check.exists():
cases.append((name, reqs, d, 3, f"no render-check.sh in {d}"))
if check is None:
cases.append((name, reqs, d, 3,
f"no offline check script ({' or '.join(CHECK_SCRIPTS)}) in {d}"))
continue
proc = subprocess.run(
["bash", str(check)], capture_output=True, text=True
@@ -61,7 +82,7 @@ def main() -> int:
suite = ET.Element(
"testsuite",
{
"name": "home-k3s-conformance L1 (offline render)",
"name": "home-k3s-conformance L0/L1 (offline)",
"tests": str(len(cases)),
"failures": str(failures),
"errors": "0",
@@ -72,19 +93,21 @@ def main() -> int:
tc = ET.SubElement(
suite,
"testcase",
{"classname": f"L1:{','.join(reqs) if reqs else 'UNTAGGED'}", "name": name},
{"classname": f"{layer_of(d)}:{','.join(reqs) if reqs else 'UNTAGGED'}",
"name": name},
)
props = ET.SubElement(tc, "properties")
ET.SubElement(props, "property", {"name": "requirements", "value": ",".join(reqs)})
ET.SubElement(props, "property", {"name": "layer", "value": "L1"})
ET.SubElement(props, "property", {"name": "layer", "value": layer_of(d)})
ET.SubElement(props, "property", {"name": "path", "value": str(d)})
if rc == 3:
ET.SubElement(tc, "skipped", {"message": out or "no render-check.sh"})
ET.SubElement(tc, "skipped", {"message": out or "no offline check script"})
elif rc != 0:
fail = ET.SubElement(tc, "failure", {"message": f"render-check exit {rc}"})
fail = ET.SubElement(tc, "failure", {"message": f"offline check exit {rc}"})
fail.text = out
status = "PASS" if rc == 0 else ("SKIP" if rc == 3 else "FAIL")
print(f"[l1-offline] {status:4s} {name} ({','.join(reqs) or 'untagged'})",
print(f"[offline] {layer_of(d):3s} {status:4s} {name} "
f"({','.join(reqs) or 'untagged'})",
file=sys.stderr)
if rc not in (0, 3):
print(out, file=sys.stderr)
@@ -103,7 +126,7 @@ def main() -> int:
args.junit.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
xml = minidom.parseString(ET.tostring(root, "utf-8")).toprettyxml(indent=" ")
args.junit.write_text(xml)
print(f"[l1-offline] wrote JUnit ({len(cases)} case(s), {failures} failure(s)) -> "
print(f"[offline] wrote JUnit ({len(cases)} case(s), {failures} failure(s)) -> "
f"{args.junit}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1 if failures else 0
conformance/lib/status.py
Executable
+941
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Requirement STATUS report — derived from repository state, not from a task board.
WHY THIS EXISTS
---------------
`lib/coverage.py` answers exactly one question: *does a requirement-tagged test exist
for R-x?* (R-TEST-04). That is necessary but not sufficient: a requirement can have a
tagged test that is a pure TODO scaffold, and can have implementing manifests that are
authored in git but never reconciled by Flux. Both read as "covered"/"delivered" while
nothing is actually true of the cluster.
This generator derives, from the REPOSITORY ALONE, three orthogonal axes per requirement:
1. IMPLEMENTATION — is there implementing config in the repo, and is it reachable
from a Flux Kustomization entrypoint (i.e. actually reconciled)?
2. VERIFICATION — is there a requirement-tagged test, at which layer, and is it an
EXECUTABLE test or a TODO scaffold?
3. PROOF — has that test actually passed? *** DELIBERATELY NOT DERIVED. ***
WHAT THIS TOOL REFUSES TO DERIVE (and why)
------------------------------------------
PROOF-OF-PASS IS NOT DERIVABLE FROM REPO STATE. Nothing tracked in git records a test
result: `conformance/_artifacts/` and `results/` are git-ignored, and the only prose
record of a green run lives in DECISIONS-LOG.md — hand-maintained, unstructured, and
exactly the kind of source the operator has ruled out. The project's own culture is that
"merged" is never "done" (agents/definition-of-done.md, R-TEST-03), so this report will
NOT infer, guess, or default a requirement to green. Every requirement's proof state is
reported as `not-derivable`, and the headline says so. If an untracked JUnit artifact
happens to be lying in the workspace it is surfaced ONLY as a quarantined advisory with
its mtime — never counted, never mixed into a status.
The honest fix is a committed, machine-readable run ledger; until that exists, the most
this report can say is "wired and testable", never "proven".
READS (all read-only)
requirements/registry.yaml the authoritative R-* mirror (via lib/coverage.py)
tests/**/chainsaw-test.yaml requirement tags + layer + executable annotation
clusters/<env>/ Flux entrypoint -> the reconciliation graph
`git ls-files` TRACKED files only; untracked scratch is not repo state
../home-network-k3s/docs/00-vision-and-scope.md OPTIONAL registry<->spec parity check
WRITES (under --out, default _artifacts/status/, git-ignored like coverage/)
status.json machine-readable, one record per requirement + per-spec rollup
status.md human-readable report
EXIT CODES (ci/lib.sh convention: 0 pass / 1 fail / 3 skipped-not-green)
0 report generated.
1 a derivation failed, or --strict found a defect this tool owns (registry/spec
drift, a requirement-tag hygiene problem, a safety-critical requirement whose only
L3 test is a scaffold).
3 a requested check could not run (e.g. --spec-root given but absent). A SKIP IS
NEVER COUNTED AS GREEN.
Pure standard library (no PyYAML), matching the harness's no-pip-dependency posture
(lib/coverage.py); the file shapes parsed here are line-constrained and documented at
each parser. `catalog/render.py` owns the one PyYAML dependency; the harness does not.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
_LIB = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
if str(_LIB) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(_LIB))
# Importing a sibling module would otherwise litter conformance/lib/__pycache__/ into the
# working tree; the lint stage scans untracked files, so keep the tree clean.
sys.dont_write_bytecode = True
import coverage as cov # noqa: E402 — reuse the registry/test parsers, don't fork them
CONF_ROOT = _LIB.parent
REPO_ROOT = CONF_ROOT.parent
DEFAULT_SPEC_ROOT = REPO_ROOT.parent / "home-network-k3s"
RID_RE = cov.RID_RE
LABEL_PREFIX = cov.LABEL_PREFIX
# Flux Kustomization identity. A `kind: Kustomization` doc is only a *Flux* entrypoint if
# it also carries the kustomize.toolkit apiVersion — plain kustomize overlays share the kind.
FLUX_API = "kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io"
# Files excluded from the IMPLEMENTATION scan, with the same reasoning ci/touched-
# requirements.sh applies to its content scan:
# *.md — an R-ID in prose is a REFERENCE, not an implementing artifact.
# (DECISIONS-LOG.md alone names nearly every requirement.)
# conformance/tests — those are the TESTS; they are the VERIFICATION axis, counted there.
# ci/tests — gate unit-test fixtures embed example R-IDs as DATA.
# registry.yaml — the requirement mirror itself, not an implementation of anything.
IMPL_EXCLUDE_PREFIXES = ("conformance/tests/", "ci/tests/")
IMPL_EXCLUDE_PATHS = ("conformance/requirements/registry.yaml",)
# ============================================================================ git
def tracked_files(root: Path) -> list[str]:
"""Repo state == TRACKED files. Untracked scratch must never count as delivery."""
out = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), "ls-files"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout
return [l for l in out.splitlines() if l]
# ================================================================ kustomize walk
# Parser contract: a kustomization.yaml in this repo uses ONLY a block `resources:` list
# of ` - <path>` entries (verified: `resources` is the sole reference key across all 30
# kustomization.yaml files). Entries are plain scalars, optionally followed by a `#`
# comment. A COMMENTED-OUT entry is not a list item and is therefore correctly EXCLUDED —
# that is the whole point: `platform/kustomization.yaml` comments out velero and
# image-automation, so those directories are authored but not reconciled through it.
_RES_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^resources:\s*$")
_TOP_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*:")
# NOTE: list items may be indented (` - x`) or flush-left (`- x`, which is what
# `catalog/render.py --emit-waves` generates for apps/wave-*/kustomization.yaml).
_RES_ITEM_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*-\s+(?P<v>[^#\s]+)\s*(?:#.*)?$")
def kustomize_resources(kfile: Path) -> list[str]:
"""Return the literal `resources:` entries of a kustomization.yaml."""
items: list[str] = []
in_res = False
for raw in kfile.read_text().splitlines():
if _RES_KEY_RE.match(raw):
in_res = True
continue
if in_res:
m = _RES_ITEM_RE.match(raw)
if m:
items.append(m.group("v"))
continue
if raw.strip() == "" or raw.lstrip().startswith("#"):
continue
if _TOP_KEY_RE.match(raw):
in_res = False
return items
# Flux Kustomization `spec.path` extraction. Constraint: `path:` appears at spec-level
# indent inside a doc that carries the Flux apiVersion. Docs are split on a lone `---`.
# Inline `patch: |-` blocks (clusters/dev) carry Flux Kustomizations WITHOUT a path, so
# they contribute nothing — correct, they are patches, not entrypoints.
_DOC_SPLIT_RE = re.compile(r"^---\s*$", re.M)
_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^\s{2,6}path:\s*(\S+)\s*$", re.M)
_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^\s{2,6}name:\s*(\S+)\s*$", re.M)
def flux_paths(yfile: Path) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
"""[(flux-kustomization-name, spec.path)] declared by this file."""
found: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
try:
text = yfile.read_text()
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
return found
if FLUX_API not in text:
return found
for doc in _DOC_SPLIT_RE.split(text):
if FLUX_API not in doc or not re.search(r"^kind:\s*Kustomization\s*$", doc, re.M):
continue
pm = _PATH_RE.search(doc)
if not pm:
continue
nm = _NAME_RE.search(doc)
found.append((nm.group(1) if nm else "?", pm.group(1)))
return found
def reconciled_files(repo: Path, entrypoint: str) -> tuple[set[str], list[dict]]:
"""Walk the Flux reconciliation graph from `clusters/<env>` and return
(set of repo-relative files Flux actually applies, list of Flux Kustomization nodes)
Algorithm: kustomize-walk a directory's `resources:`; a directory entry recurses, a
file entry is applied. Every applied file is then scanned for Flux Kustomization
objects; each one's `spec.path` is a NEW kustomize-walk root (that is how Flux
expands the graph). Cycles are guarded (clusters/dev/sync.yaml points at its own dir).
This is what makes the difference between AUTHORED and RECONCILED derivable: a
manifest that no walk reaches is in git but is not applied to any cluster.
"""
applied: set[str] = set()
nodes: list[dict] = []
seen_dirs: set[str] = set()
pending: list[tuple[str, str]] = [("<entrypoint>", entrypoint)]
def walk_dir(rel: str) -> None:
if rel in seen_dirs:
return
seen_dirs.add(rel)
kfile = repo / rel / "kustomization.yaml"
if not kfile.is_file():
return
applied.add(os.path.relpath(kfile, repo))
for item in kustomize_resources(kfile):
target = (repo / rel / item).resolve()
try:
trel = os.path.relpath(target, repo)
except ValueError:
continue
if trel.startswith(".."):
continue # outside the repo: not repo state
if target.is_dir():
walk_dir(trel)
elif target.is_file():
applied.add(trel)
for name, p in flux_paths(target):
pending.append((name, p))
while pending:
owner, p = pending.pop()
rel = os.path.normpath(p.lstrip("./")) if p not in (".", "./") else "."
node = {"kustomization": owner, "path": p, "resolved": rel,
"exists": (repo / rel).is_dir()}
nodes.append(node)
if node["exists"]:
walk_dir(rel)
return applied, nodes
# ====================================================== implementation evidence
_COMMENT_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*#")
def scan_implementation(repo: Path, files: list[str]) -> dict[str, list[dict]]:
"""Map R-ID -> the tracked, non-doc files that name it.
Two strengths are recorded per file, mirroring ci/touched-requirements.sh rule 3:
* a hit on a REAL line -> the artifact carries the ID (label/annotation/field);
* a hit only in a `#` comment -> declared INTENT (a header saying what it serves).
Comment-only evidence is kept (it is the dominant convention in this repo's
manifests) but reported as such, so a reader can tell an implementation from a claim.
"""
out: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
for rel in files:
if rel.endswith(".md") or rel in IMPL_EXCLUDE_PATHS:
continue
if rel.startswith(IMPL_EXCLUDE_PREFIXES):
continue
path = repo / rel
try:
text = path.read_text()
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
continue
if "R-" not in text:
continue
# A file is RECONCILABLE only if it is a Kubernetes manifest: a *.yaml with a
# top-level `kind:`. Shell scripts / values files / READMEs under a GitOps root
# are never applied by Flux, so counting them as "authored but not wired" would
# manufacture a false gap.
manifest = (rel.endswith((".yaml", ".yml"))
and re.search(r"^kind:\s*\S", text, re.M) is not None)
hits: dict[str, bool] = {} # rid -> seen on a non-comment line
for line in text.splitlines():
ids = RID_RE.findall(line)
if not ids:
continue
real = not _COMMENT_LINE_RE.match(line)
for rid in ids:
hits[rid] = hits.get(rid, False) or real
for rid, real in hits.items():
out.setdefault(rid, []).append({"path": rel, "comment_only": not real,
"manifest": manifest})
for rid in out:
out[rid].sort(key=lambda h: h["path"])
return out
# ================================================================ verification
_EXECUTABLE_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*" + re.escape(LABEL_PREFIX) + r"/executable:\s*[\"']?true", re.M | re.I)
_BLOCKED_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*" + re.escape(LABEL_PREFIX) + r"/blocked-by:\s*(.+)$", re.M)
def classify_test(t: dict) -> dict:
"""Decide EXECUTABLE vs SCAFFOLD for one discovered test, conservatively.
A tagged test is only worth counting if it can actually assert something. Rules, in
order, chosen so ambiguity NEVER upgrades a test:
scaffold the body contains TODO markers (a placeholder), *even if* it
is annotated executable — an annotation must never outrank the
body. That mismatch is also reported as a hygiene defect.
executable annotated `conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"` and no TODOs.
executable-untagged no TODOs and a real runnable body, but the annotation is
missing (true of the L1 render tests, which execute a
render-check.sh + golden diff, of the L0 static checks, and
of the META self-check).
Counted as executable, and flagged as an annotation gap.
scaffold anything else.
"""
p = Path(t["path"])
text = p.read_text() if p.is_file() else ""
# The offline assertion script a test dir may carry: `render-check.sh` (L1 rendering)
# or `check.sh` (L0 static). BOTH are read, so a placeholder body in either one still
# downgrades the test to a scaffold — an annotation must never outrank the body,
# whichever file the body lives in.
extra = ""
for script in ("render-check.sh", "check.sh"):
sp = p.parent / script
if sp.is_file():
extra += sp.read_text()
declared = bool(_EXECUTABLE_RE.search(text))
has_todo = "TODO" in text or "TODO" in extra
bm = _BLOCKED_RE.search(text)
has_body = bool(extra) or bool(re.search(r"^\s+- (script|assert|apply):", text, re.M))
if has_todo:
state = "scaffold"
elif declared:
state = "executable"
elif has_body:
state = "executable-untagged"
else:
state = "scaffold"
try:
rel = os.path.relpath(p, REPO_ROOT)
except ValueError:
rel = t["path"]
return {
"name": t["name"], "path": rel, "layer": t["layer"],
"state": state,
"declared_executable": declared,
"annotation_conflict": bool(declared and has_todo),
"blocked_by": bm.group(1).strip().strip('"') if bm else "",
}
# ===================================================================== spec parity
def spec_requirement_ids(spec_root: Path) -> set[str] | None:
"""R-* IDs defined by the READ-ONLY spec (docs/00-vision-and-scope.md).
Read-only by construction (R-TEST-06): this tool never writes under the spec tree.
Returns None when the spec tree is not available (a sibling checkout is optional).
"""
doc = spec_root / "docs" / "00-vision-and-scope.md"
if not doc.is_file():
return None
return set(RID_RE.findall(doc.read_text()))
# ========================================================================== build
IMPL_ORDER = {"none": 0, "off-cluster": 1, "unwired": 2, "reconciled-partial": 3,
"reconciled": 4}
VERIFY_ORDER = {"none": 0, "scaffold-only": 1, "executable": 2}
LABELS = {
("reconciled-partial", "executable"): "PARTLY-WIRED+TESTABLE",
("reconciled-partial", "scaffold-only"): "PARTLY-WIRED, TEST-IS-SCAFFOLD",
("reconciled-partial", "none"): "PARTLY-WIRED, UNTESTED",
("reconciled", "executable"): "WIRED+TESTABLE",
("reconciled", "scaffold-only"): "WIRED, TEST-IS-SCAFFOLD",
("reconciled", "none"): "WIRED, UNTESTED",
("unwired", "executable"): "AUTHORED-NOT-WIRED",
("unwired", "scaffold-only"): "AUTHORED-NOT-WIRED",
("unwired", "none"): "AUTHORED-NOT-WIRED",
("off-cluster", "executable"): "TOOLING+TESTABLE",
("off-cluster", "scaffold-only"): "TOOLING, TEST-IS-SCAFFOLD",
("off-cluster", "none"): "TOOLING, UNTESTED",
("none", "executable"): "TEST-ONLY",
("none", "scaffold-only"): "SPEC-ONLY (scaffold test)",
("none", "none"): "SPEC-ONLY",
}
def build(repo: Path, registry: list[dict], tests: list[dict], impl: dict[str, list[dict]],
applied: set[str], gitops_roots: set[str], spec_ids: set[str] | None,
env: str) -> dict:
classified = [classify_test(t) for t in tests]
by_req_tests: dict[str, list[dict]] = {r["id"]: [] for r in registry}
for t, c in zip(tests, classified):
for rid in t["labels"]:
if rid in by_req_tests:
by_req_tests[rid].append(c)
records: dict[str, dict] = {}
for r in registry:
rid = r["id"]
files = impl.get(rid, [])
ev = [{**f,
"reconciled": f["path"] in applied,
"gitops": (f["path"].split("/", 1)[0] in gitops_roots
and f.get("manifest", False))}
for f in files]
gitops_ev = [e for e in ev if e["gitops"]]
rec_ev = [e for e in gitops_ev if e["reconciled"]]
unrec_ev = [e for e in gitops_ev if not e["reconciled"]]
if not ev:
impl_state = "none"
elif rec_ev and unrec_ev:
# Some citing manifests ARE applied and some are NOT. Never round this up to
# "reconciled": e.g. R-UPD-01's only applied citation is a PrometheusRule that
# merely mentions the ID, while platform/image-automation/ — the component
# that actually implements it — is commented out of platform/kustomization.yaml.
impl_state = "reconciled-partial"
elif rec_ev:
impl_state = "reconciled"
elif gitops_ev:
impl_state = "unwired"
else:
impl_state = "off-cluster"
ts = by_req_tests[rid]
exec_ts = [t for t in ts if t["state"].startswith("executable")]
if not ts:
verify_state = "none"
elif exec_ts:
verify_state = "executable"
else:
verify_state = "scaffold-only"
safety_l3_ok = None
if r["safety_critical"]:
safety_l3_ok = any(t["layer"] == "L3" and t["state"].startswith("executable")
for t in ts)
records[rid] = {
"doc": r["doc"],
"summary": r["summary"],
"safety_critical": r["safety_critical"],
"implementation": {
"state": impl_state,
"files_total": len(ev),
"files_gitops": len(gitops_ev),
"files_reconciled": len(rec_ev),
"comment_only_evidence_only": bool(ev) and all(e["comment_only"] for e in ev),
"files": ev,
},
"verification": {
"state": verify_state,
"executable_tests": len(exec_ts),
"scaffold_tests": len(ts) - len(exec_ts),
"layers": sorted({t["layer"] for t in exec_ts}),
"safety_critical_l3_executable": safety_l3_ok,
"blocked_by": sorted({t["blocked_by"] for t in ts if t["blocked_by"]}),
"tests": ts,
},
# NEVER derived. See the module docstring.
"proof": {"state": "not-derivable",
"reason": "no committed, machine-readable record of a test run "
"exists in the repo (_artifacts/ and results/ are "
"git-ignored); DECISIONS-LOG.md prose is not a signal"},
"status": LABELS[(impl_state, verify_state)],
}
# --- hygiene defects this tool owns -------------------------------------------
hygiene = {
"annotation_conflicts": [t["path"] for t in classified if t["annotation_conflict"]],
"executable_untagged": [t["path"] for t in classified
if t["state"] == "executable-untagged"],
"registry_not_in_spec": [],
"spec_not_in_registry": [],
"spec_parity_checked": spec_ids is not None,
}
if spec_ids is not None:
reg_ids = {r["id"] for r in registry}
hygiene["registry_not_in_spec"] = sorted(reg_ids - spec_ids)
hygiene["spec_not_in_registry"] = sorted(spec_ids - reg_ids)
safety_scaffold = sorted(rid for rid, v in records.items()
if v["safety_critical"]
and v["verification"]["safety_critical_l3_executable"] is False)
def count(pred) -> int:
return sum(1 for v in records.values() if pred(v))
summary = {
"environment": env,
"generated_utc": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
"total_requirements": len(registry),
"impl_reconciled": count(lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] == "reconciled"),
"impl_reconciled_partial": count(
lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] == "reconciled-partial"),
"impl_unwired": count(lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] == "unwired"),
"impl_off_cluster": count(lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] == "off-cluster"),
"impl_none": count(lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] == "none"),
"verify_executable": count(lambda v: v["verification"]["state"] == "executable"),
"verify_scaffold_only": count(lambda v: v["verification"]["state"] == "scaffold-only"),
"verify_none": count(lambda v: v["verification"]["state"] == "none"),
"wired_and_testable": count(
lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] == "reconciled"
and v["verification"]["state"] == "executable"),
"highest_derivable_state_reached": count(
lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] in ("reconciled", "off-cluster")
and v["verification"]["state"] == "executable"),
"wired_or_partial_and_testable": count(
lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] in ("reconciled", "reconciled-partial")
and v["verification"]["state"] == "executable"),
"safety_critical_total": count(lambda v: v["safety_critical"]),
"safety_critical_without_executable_l3": len(safety_scaffold),
"proven": 0,
"proven_derivable": False,
"coverage_style_covered": count(lambda v: v["verification"]["state"] != "none"),
}
summary["uncited_by_any_reconciled_manifest"] = count(
lambda v: v["implementation"]["state"] in ("none", "off-cluster"))
return {"summary": summary, "by_requirement": records,
"safety_critical_without_executable_l3": safety_scaffold,
"hygiene": hygiene}
def spec_rollup(rep: dict) -> dict:
"""Per-spec-document rollup — 'the status of each spec', the operator's actual ask."""
docs: dict[str, dict] = {}
for rid, v in rep["by_requirement"].items():
d = docs.setdefault(v["doc"] or "(unmapped)", {
"requirements": [], "reconciled": 0, "partly_reconciled": 0,
"executable": 0, "wired_and_testable": 0})
d["requirements"].append(rid)
if v["implementation"]["state"] == "reconciled":
d["reconciled"] += 1
elif v["implementation"]["state"] == "reconciled-partial":
d["partly_reconciled"] += 1
if v["verification"]["state"] == "executable":
d["executable"] += 1
if (v["implementation"]["state"] in ("reconciled", "off-cluster")
and v["verification"]["state"] == "executable"):
d["wired_and_testable"] += 1
for d in docs.values():
d["requirements"].sort()
d["total"] = len(d["requirements"])
return dict(sorted(docs.items()))
# ========================================================================= render
def render_md(rep: dict, nodes: list[dict], advisory: dict | None) -> str:
s = rep["summary"]
o: list[str] = []
o.append("# Requirement status — derived from repository state\n")
o.append(f"Environment overlay: `clusters/{s['environment']}` · "
f"generated {s['generated_utc']} · **no cluster was contacted**.\n")
o.append("\n## Headline\n")
o.append(f"| Axis | Count (of {s['total_requirements']}) |")
o.append("|---|---|")
o.append(f"| Implementation fully reconciled by Flux | **{s['impl_reconciled']}** |")
o.append(f"| Implementation only PARTLY reconciled (some citing manifests not "
f"applied) | **{s['impl_reconciled_partial']}** |")
o.append(f"| Implementation authored but NOT wired into the Flux graph | "
f"**{s['impl_unwired']}** |")
o.append(f"| Implementation is off-cluster tooling (CI / harness / IaC) | "
f"{s['impl_off_cluster']} |")
o.append(f"| No implementing artifact in the repo | **{s['impl_none']}** |")
o.append(f"| Has an EXECUTABLE requirement-tagged test | **{s['verify_executable']}** |")
o.append(f"| Tagged test exists but is a TODO SCAFFOLD | **{s['verify_scaffold_only']}** |")
o.append(f"| No requirement-tagged test at all | **{s['verify_none']}** |")
o.append(f"| Reconciled **and** executably tested (highest derivable state) | "
f"**{s['highest_derivable_state_reached']}** |")
o.append(f"| Safety-critical requirements whose L3 test is a scaffold | "
f"**{s['safety_critical_without_executable_l3']}** of "
f"{s['safety_critical_total']} |")
o.append(f"| **PROVEN (a test actually passed)** | **{s['proven']} — NOT DERIVABLE** |")
o.append("")
o.append("> **Proof is deliberately not derived.** Nothing tracked in git records a "
"test result: `conformance/_artifacts/` and `results/` are git-ignored, and "
"the only record of a green run is DECISIONS-LOG.md prose — hand-maintained, "
"which is the very thing this report replaces. Per "
"`agents/definition-of-done.md` a requirement is done only when its tagged "
"test **passes**, so the strongest claim this report can make is "
"*wired and testable*. Closing the gap needs a committed, machine-readable "
"run ledger; until then, treat every row below as unproven.\n")
o.append(f"> For contrast, `coverage.md` counts **{s['coverage_style_covered']}** "
f"requirements as covered — that count includes the "
f"{s['verify_scaffold_only']} whose only verifying test is a TODO scaffold.\n")
o.append("\n## Status legend\n")
o.append("| Label | Meaning |")
o.append("|---|---|")
o.append("| `WIRED+TESTABLE` | implementing config is reconciled by Flux **and** an "
"executable tagged test exists (still unproven) |")
o.append("| `WIRED, TEST-IS-SCAFFOLD` | reconciled, but its only tagged test is a "
"TODO placeholder — coverage counts this green; it is not |")
o.append("| `WIRED, UNTESTED` | reconciled with no tagged test at all |")
o.append("| `PARTLY-WIRED…` | some citing manifests are applied, others are not — "
"check whether the unapplied one is the real implementation |")
o.append("| `AUTHORED-NOT-WIRED` | manifests exist under a GitOps root but no Flux "
"Kustomization reaches them — in git, not on any cluster |")
o.append("| `TOOLING…` | implemented by off-cluster tooling (ci/, conformance/, "
"infra/, bootstrap/, schemas/) — nothing for Flux to reconcile |")
o.append("| `TEST-ONLY` / `SPEC-ONLY` | a test but no implementation / neither |")
o.append("\n## Per-spec rollup\n")
o.append("| Spec document | Reqs | Reconciled | Partly | Executable test | "
"Wired+Testable |")
o.append("|---|---|---|---|---|---|")
for doc, d in spec_rollup(rep).items():
o.append(f"| `{doc}` | {d['total']} | {d['reconciled']} | "
f"{d['partly_reconciled']} | {d['executable']} | "
f"**{d['wired_and_testable']}/{d['total']}** |")
o.append("\n## Status by requirement\n")
o.append("| Requirement | Status | Implementation | Verification | Proof |")
o.append("|---|---|---|---|---|")
for rid, v in rep["by_requirement"].items():
i, ver = v["implementation"], v["verification"]
if i["state"] == "none":
icell = "—"
else:
icell = (f"{i['state']} ({i['files_reconciled']}/{i['files_gitops']} gitops "
f"files applied, {i['files_total']} refs)")
if i["comment_only_evidence_only"]:
icell += " *(comment-only evidence)*"
if ver["state"] == "none":
vcell = "—"
else:
layers = ",".join(ver["layers"]) or "-"
vcell = (f"{ver['state']} [{layers}] "
f"exec={ver['executable_tests']} scaffold={ver['scaffold_tests']}")
if ver["blocked_by"]:
vcell += f" · blocked-by: {'; '.join(ver['blocked_by'])}"
sc = " ⚠safety" if v["safety_critical"] else ""
o.append(f"| {rid}{sc} | **{v['status']}** | {icell} | {vcell} | not-derivable |")
if rep["safety_critical_without_executable_l3"]:
o.append("\n## Safety-critical requirements whose L3 fault test is a SCAFFOLD "
"(R-TEST-05)\n")
o.append("`coverage.md` reports zero safety-critical gaps because a tagged L3 "
"test file exists. These L3 tests have TODO bodies and assert nothing:\n")
for rid in rep["safety_critical_without_executable_l3"]:
v = rep["by_requirement"][rid]
bb = "; ".join(v["verification"]["blocked_by"]) or "—"
o.append(f"- **{rid}** — {v['summary']} · blocked-by: {bb}")
partial = [r for r, v in rep["by_requirement"].items()
if v["implementation"]["state"] == "reconciled-partial"]
if partial:
o.append("\n## Partly wired — citing manifests that Flux does NOT apply\n")
o.append("At least one manifest naming these requirements is reconciled, but "
"others are not. Check whether the unapplied file is the one that "
"actually implements the requirement.\n")
for rid in partial:
v = rep["by_requirement"][rid]
miss = [f"`{f['path']}`" for f in v["implementation"]["files"]
if f["gitops"] and not f["reconciled"]]
o.append(f"- **{rid}** — not applied: {', '.join(miss)}")
unwired = [r for r, v in rep["by_requirement"].items()
if v["implementation"]["state"] == "unwired"]
if unwired:
o.append("\n## Authored but NOT reconciled (in git, not on any cluster)\n")
for rid in unwired:
v = rep["by_requirement"][rid]
fs = ", ".join(f"`{f['path']}`" for f in v["implementation"]["files"]
if f["gitops"])[:400]
o.append(f"- **{rid}** — {v['summary']}\n - {fs}")
uncited = [r for r, v in rep["by_requirement"].items()
if v["implementation"]["state"] in ("none", "off-cluster")]
if uncited:
o.append("\n## No reconciled manifest cites these requirements (traceability, "
"R-TEST-04)\n")
o.append("Implementation evidence here is **a tracked, non-Markdown file that "
"names the R-ID**. For these requirements no reconciled Kubernetes "
"manifest names the ID, which means EITHER the requirement is genuinely "
"unimplemented on the cluster, OR the implementing manifest exists but "
"is missing its requirement annotation. This report cannot tell the two "
"apart and deliberately does not guess — annotate the manifest and the "
"row self-corrects.\n")
for rid in uncited:
v = rep["by_requirement"][rid]
o.append(f"- **{rid}** ({v['implementation']['state']}) — {v['summary']}")
o.append("\n## Flux reconciliation graph walked\n")
o.append("| Flux Kustomization | spec.path | present |")
o.append("|---|---|---|")
for n in sorted(nodes, key=lambda n: (n["resolved"], n["kustomization"])):
o.append(f"| `{n['kustomization']}` | `{n['path']}` | "
f"{'yes' if n['exists'] else '**MISSING**'} |")
h = rep["hygiene"]
o.append("\n## Harness hygiene\n")
if h["spec_parity_checked"]:
drift = h["registry_not_in_spec"] + h["spec_not_in_registry"]
o.append(f"- registry ↔ spec parity: {'**DRIFT**: ' + str(drift) if drift else 'in sync'}")
else:
o.append("- registry ↔ spec parity: **NOT CHECKED** (spec tree not available; "
"this is a skip, not a pass)")
o.append(f"- tests annotated executable but containing TODO bodies: "
f"{h['annotation_conflicts'] or 'none'}")
o.append(f"- executable tests missing the `{LABEL_PREFIX}/executable` annotation: "
f"{h['executable_untagged'] or 'none'}")
o.append("\n## Method — what is derived, and what is refused\n")
o.append("| Signal | How it is derived | Trust |")
o.append("|---|---|---|")
o.append("| requirement set | `conformance/requirements/registry.yaml`, "
"cross-checked against the read-only spec `docs/00-vision-and-scope.md` | "
"exact |")
o.append("| implementing artifact | a TRACKED, non-Markdown file that names the R-ID "
"(comments counted, and marked as such) | heuristic — under-reports "
"un-annotated manifests, never over-reports |")
o.append("| reconciled | the file is reachable by walking `resources:` from "
"`clusters/<env>/kustomization.yaml`, expanding every Flux Kustomization's "
"`spec.path` | exact — a commented-out `resources:` entry is correctly NOT "
"reconciled |")
o.append("| verifying test | `conformance.home.k3s/R-*` label on a Chainsaw test "
"(the authoritative tag, same source as `coverage.md`) | exact |")
o.append("| executable vs scaffold | TODO markers in the test body outrank the "
"`executable` annotation; a real body without the annotation still counts "
"and is flagged | conservative — ambiguity never upgrades |")
o.append("| **test actually passed** | **NOT DERIVED** — nothing in git records a "
"run result | refused |")
o.append("| cluster liveness (pods/CRs healthy) | **NOT DERIVED** — no cluster is "
"contacted; `reconciled` means Flux *would* apply it, not that it is "
"healthy | refused |")
o.append("| phase/board status | **NOT DERIVED** — `agents/task-board.md` is stale "
"and is not a signal | refused |")
o.append("\n## Advisory — untracked local run artifact (NOT counted)\n")
if advisory:
o.append(f"- `{advisory['path']}` (untracked, git-ignored), last written "
f"{advisory['mtime']}: {advisory['tests']} testcase(s), "
f"{advisory['failures']} failure(s), {advisory['skipped']} skipped.")
o.append(f"- requirement IDs it names: {', '.join(advisory['requirements']) or '—'}")
o.append("- This is one developer's local workspace, not repo state. It is shown "
"for orientation only and contributes to NO status above.")
else:
o.append("- none present.")
return "\n".join(o) + "\n"
def read_advisory(junit: Path) -> dict | None:
"""Quarantined read of an untracked local JUnit. Never feeds a status."""
if not junit.is_file():
return None
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
try:
root = ET.parse(junit).getroot()
except ET.ParseError:
return None
cases = root.iter("testcase")
n = f = sk = 0
reqs: set[str] = set()
for c in cases:
n += 1
if c.find("failure") is not None or c.find("error") is not None:
f += 1
if c.find("skipped") is not None:
sk += 1
reqs |= set(RID_RE.findall(c.get("classname") or ""))
for p in c.iter("property"):
if p.get("name") == "requirements":
reqs |= set(RID_RE.findall(p.get("value") or ""))
return {"path": os.path.relpath(junit, REPO_ROOT), "tests": n, "failures": f,
"skipped": sk, "requirements": sorted(reqs),
"mtime": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ",
time.gmtime(junit.stat().st_mtime))}
# ======================================================================= selftest
def _selftest() -> int:
"""Deterministic, no-cluster self-test of every derivation rule (house pattern:
`catalog/render.py --selftest`). Uses a throwaway tree, never the real repo."""
import tempfile
ok = True
def check(label: str, cond: bool) -> None:
nonlocal ok
if not cond:
sys.stderr.write(f"status.py selftest: FAIL — {label}\n")
ok = False
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
root = Path(td)
# A kustomization whose second entry is COMMENTED OUT must not be reconciled.
(root / "clusters" / "dev").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "platform" / "on").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "platform" / "off").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "clusters" / "dev" / "kustomization.yaml").write_text(
"resources:\n - platform-ks.yaml # comment\n")
(root / "clusters" / "dev" / "platform-ks.yaml").write_text(
"apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1\n"
"kind: Kustomization\nmetadata:\n name: platform\nspec:\n"
" path: ./platform\n")
(root / "platform" / "kustomization.yaml").write_text(
"resources:\n - on\n # - off # deliberately disabled\n")
# flush-left items (the `render.py --emit-waves` style) must parse too.
(root / "platform" / "on" / "kustomization.yaml").write_text(
"resources:\n- r.yaml\npatches: []\n")
(root / "platform" / "on" / "r.yaml").write_text("# serves R-NET-01\nkind: X\n")
(root / "platform" / "off" / "kustomization.yaml").write_text(
"resources:\n - r.yaml\n")
(root / "platform" / "off" / "r.yaml").write_text("# serves R-UPD-01\nkind: X\n")
applied, nodes = reconciled_files(root, "clusters/dev")
check("commented-out resource is NOT reconciled",
"platform/on/r.yaml" in applied and "platform/off/r.yaml" not in applied)
check("flux spec.path expands the graph",
any(n["path"] == "./platform" for n in nodes))
files = ["platform/on/r.yaml", "platform/off/r.yaml", "docs/x.md",
"conformance/tests/t/chainsaw-test.yaml"]
(root / "docs").mkdir(); (root / "docs" / "x.md").write_text("R-NET-01 R-TLS-01\n")
(root / "conformance" / "tests" / "t").mkdir(parents=True)
(root / "conformance" / "tests" / "t" / "chainsaw-test.yaml").write_text("R-DNS-01\n")
impl = scan_implementation(root, files)
check("markdown is excluded from implementation evidence", "R-TLS-01" not in impl)
check("conformance/tests is excluded from implementation evidence",
"R-DNS-01" not in impl)
check("comment-only evidence is recorded as such",
impl["R-NET-01"][0]["comment_only"] is True)
(root / "platform" / "on" / "real.yaml").write_text(
"kind: ClusterPolicy\n conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-01: \"true\"\n")
impl2 = scan_implementation(root, ["platform/on/real.yaml"])
check("non-comment evidence is recorded as such",
impl2["R-SEC-01"][0]["comment_only"] is False)
check("a yaml with a top-level kind: is a reconcilable manifest",
impl2["R-SEC-01"][0]["manifest"] is True)
(root / "platform" / "on" / "s.sh").write_text("# R-SEC-02\n")
check("a shell script is never a reconcilable manifest",
scan_implementation(root, ["platform/on/s.sh"])["R-SEC-02"][0]["manifest"]
is False)
# classify_test: TODO body outranks an `executable: true` annotation.
td2 = root / "conformance" / "tests" / "s"
td2.mkdir(parents=True)
f = td2 / "chainsaw-test.yaml"
f.write_text("metadata:\n annotations:\n"
" conformance.home.k3s/executable: \"true\"\n"
"spec:\n steps:\n - script:\n"
" content: 'echo \"TODO: write me\"'\n")
c = classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L2"})
check("TODO body downgrades a test annotated executable",
c["state"] == "scaffold" and c["annotation_conflict"])
f.write_text("metadata:\n annotations:\n"
" conformance.home.k3s/executable: \"true\"\n"
"spec:\n steps:\n - script:\n content: 'true'\n")
check("annotated + no TODO == executable",
classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L2"})["state"]
== "executable")
f.write_text("spec:\n steps:\n - script:\n content: 'true'\n")
check("real body without the annotation == executable-untagged",
classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L2"})["state"]
== "executable-untagged")
f.write_text("spec: {}\n")
check("empty body == scaffold",
classify_test({"name": "s", "path": str(f), "layer": "L2"})["state"]
== "scaffold")
if not ok:
return 1
sys.stderr.write("status.py selftest: PASS\n")
return 0
# =========================================================================== main
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__,
formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
ap.add_argument("--repo", type=Path, default=REPO_ROOT)
ap.add_argument("--registry", type=Path,
default=CONF_ROOT / "requirements" / "registry.yaml")
ap.add_argument("--tests", type=Path, default=CONF_ROOT / "tests")
ap.add_argument("--out", type=Path, default=CONF_ROOT / "_artifacts" / "status")
ap.add_argument("--env", default="dev",
help="cluster overlay to walk (clusters/<env>); default dev")
ap.add_argument("--spec-root", type=Path, default=None,
help=f"read-only spec checkout for the registry parity check "
f"(default {DEFAULT_SPEC_ROOT} if present)")
ap.add_argument("--strict", action="store_true",
help="exit 1 on defects this tool owns: registry/spec drift, "
"executable-annotation conflicts, or a safety-critical "
"requirement whose only L3 test is a scaffold")
ap.add_argument("--selftest", action="store_true", help="run the built-in self-test")
args = ap.parse_args()
if args.selftest:
return _selftest()
repo = args.repo.resolve()
entry = f"clusters/{args.env}"
if not (repo / entry / "kustomization.yaml").is_file():
sys.stderr.write(f"[status] no Flux entrypoint at {entry}/kustomization.yaml — "
f"cannot derive reconciliation. SKIPPED (not green).\n")
return 3
explicit_spec = args.spec_root is not None
spec_root = (args.spec_root or DEFAULT_SPEC_ROOT).resolve()
spec_ids = spec_requirement_ids(spec_root)
if spec_ids is None and explicit_spec:
sys.stderr.write(f"[status] --spec-root {spec_root} has no "
f"docs/00-vision-and-scope.md. SKIPPED (not green).\n")
return 3
registry = cov.parse_registry(args.registry)
if not registry:
sys.stderr.write("[status] registry parsed to zero requirements — refusing to "
"emit a report that would read as 100% of nothing.\n")
return 1
tests = cov.discover_tests(args.tests)
applied, nodes = reconciled_files(repo, entry)
gitops_roots = {n["resolved"].split("/", 1)[0] for n in nodes if n["exists"]}
impl = scan_implementation(repo, tracked_files(repo))
rep = build(repo, registry, tests, impl, applied, gitops_roots, spec_ids, args.env)
rep["flux_graph"] = nodes
rep["gitops_roots"] = sorted(gitops_roots)
rep["reconciled_file_count"] = len(applied)
advisory = read_advisory(CONF_ROOT / "_artifacts" / "report.junit.xml")
rep["advisory_untracked_junit"] = advisory
args.out.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(args.out / "status.json").write_text(json.dumps(rep, indent=2) + "\n")
(args.out / "status.md").write_text(render_md(rep, nodes, advisory))
s = rep["summary"]
print(f"[status] {s['total_requirements']} requirements | reconciled "
f"{s['impl_reconciled']} (+{s['impl_reconciled_partial']} partial) | "
f"executable test {s['verify_executable']} | "
f"wired+testable {s['highest_derivable_state_reached']} "
f"(+{s['wired_or_partial_and_testable'] - s['wired_and_testable']} partial) | "
f"scaffold-only {s['verify_scaffold_only']} | "
f"safety-critical w/o executable L3 "
f"{s['safety_critical_without_executable_l3']} | PROVEN: not derivable")
print(f"[status] wrote {args.out/'status.md'} and {args.out/'status.json'}")
rc = 0
if args.strict:
h = rep["hygiene"]
if h["registry_not_in_spec"] or h["spec_not_in_registry"]:
sys.stderr.write(f"[status] STRICT: registry/spec drift "
f"{h['registry_not_in_spec']} {h['spec_not_in_registry']}\n")
rc = 1
if h["annotation_conflicts"]:
sys.stderr.write(f"[status] STRICT: tests annotated executable with TODO "
f"bodies: {h['annotation_conflicts']}\n")
rc = 1
if rep["safety_critical_without_executable_l3"]:
sys.stderr.write(f"[status] STRICT: safety-critical requirement(s) whose L3 "
f"test is a scaffold: "
f"{rep['safety_critical_without_executable_l3']}\n")
rc = 1
return rc
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
conformance/run.sh
+84 -32
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,14 @@
#
# ./run.sh # full suite; skips L1/L2/L3 if no cluster
# ./run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-06 # merge-gate subset (tagged)
# ./run.sh --layer l2 # one layer
# ./run.sh --layer l2 # one layer (l0|l1|l2|l3|meta|all; l0/l1 need no cluster)
# ./run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-02 --layer l2 # intersect: tagged AND in layer
# ./run.sh --coverage-only # regenerate coverage report only (no cluster)
# ./run.sh --status # DERIVED STATUS report only (no cluster): per
# # requirement, is it implemented, is it actually
# # reconciled by Flux, is its test executable or a
# # scaffold. Proof-of-pass is deliberately NOT
# # derived — see lib/status.py.
# ./run.sh --lint # structural-validate test defs (no cluster)
# ./run.sh --strict-coverage # hygiene gate: fail on tag/annotation drift
# ./run.sh --requirements R-NET-01 # ALSO asserts those IDs are covered (merge gate)
@@ -20,6 +25,8 @@
# _artifacts/report.junit.xml JUnit (Chainsaw output, or skipped-scaffold shim)
# _artifacts/coverage/coverage.md human coverage report
# _artifacts/coverage/coverage.json machine coverage report
# _artifacts/status/status.md human requirement-status report (--status)
# _artifacts/status/status.json machine requirement-status report (--status)
#
# Phase 0: no cluster exists. The behavior tests are valid scaffolds that cannot
# execute yet, so run.sh emits a *skipped* JUnit and a coverage report, and exits
@@ -36,12 +43,13 @@ source "${CONF_ROOT}/versions.env"
ARTIFACTS="${CONF_ROOT}/_artifacts"
COVERAGE_OUT="${ARTIFACTS}/coverage"
STATUS_OUT="${ARTIFACTS}/status"
JUNIT_OUT="${ARTIFACTS}/report.junit.xml"
PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
LAYER="all"
REQS=""
MODE="run" # run | coverage-only | lint
MODE="run" # run | coverage-only | status | lint
STRICT_COVERAGE=0
REQUIRE_ALL=0
FORCE_NO_CLUSTER=0
@@ -84,6 +92,7 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
--layer) LAYER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--requirements) REQS="$(conf_normalize_reqs "$2")"; shift 2 ;;
--coverage-only) MODE="coverage-only"; shift ;;
--status) MODE="status"; shift ;;
--lint) MODE="lint"; shift ;;
--strict-coverage) STRICT_COVERAGE=1; shift ;;
--require-all) REQUIRE_ALL=1; shift ;;
@@ -93,7 +102,7 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
esac
done
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACTS}" "${COVERAGE_OUT}"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACTS}" "${COVERAGE_OUT}" "${STATUS_OUT}"
log() { printf '\033[1m[run.sh]\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; }
@@ -111,6 +120,23 @@ gen_coverage() {
"${flags[@]}"
}
# --- Derived STATUS report (no cluster) ------------------------------------------------
# Coverage answers "does a tagged test EXIST?". Status answers the operator's question —
# "what is the real state of each requirement given what is actually in the repo?" — by
# deriving, per requirement: implementing artifact? reachable from a Flux Kustomization
# (reconciled, not merely authored)? tagged test that is EXECUTABLE rather than a TODO
# scaffold? It REFUSES to derive whether a test passed: nothing tracked in git records a
# run result, and a status report that defaults to green is worse than none.
gen_status() {
"${PYTHON}" "${CONF_ROOT}/lib/status.py" \
--repo "$(cd "${CONF_ROOT}/.." && pwd)" \
--registry "${CONF_ROOT}/requirements/registry.yaml" \
--tests "${CONF_ROOT}/tests" \
--out "${STATUS_OUT}" \
--env "${CONF_ENV:-dev}" \
"$@"
}
# --- Structural lint (no cluster): parse each test def and check the tag convention ----
lint_tests() {
log "Linting test definitions (structural, no cluster)"
@@ -254,26 +280,40 @@ run_chainsaw() {
return 0
}
# --- L1 rendering: cluster-INDEPENDENT render checks (docs/14) --------------------------
# L1 verifies ServiceDefinition -> rendered-resources against golden expectations; it needs
# no live cluster. Each l1-rendering test dir carries a `render-check.sh` (renderer + golden
# diff + structural asserts). We run those directly and emit a REAL pass/fail JUnit, instead
# of skipping L1 with the cluster-gated layers (T-0.3). Honors the same --layer/--requirements
# selection as the rest of the suite (select_dirs), filtered to the l1-rendering subtree.
l1_selected_dirs() {
select_dirs | grep '/l1-rendering/' || true
# --- L0/L1: the cluster-INDEPENDENT layers (docs/14) ------------------------------------
# docs/14 puts TWO layers in CI without a cluster:
# L0 static/policy tests/l0-static/** each dir carries a `check.sh` (repo invariants)
# L1 rendering tests/l1-rendering/** each dir carries a `render-check.sh` (render == golden)
# Both are executed directly here and emit a REAL pass/fail JUnit, instead of being skipped
# with the cluster-gated layers. Honors the same --layer/--requirements selection as the rest
# of the suite (select_dirs), filtered to those two subtrees.
OFFLINE_SUBTREES='/l0-static/|/l1-rendering/'
offline_selected_dirs() {
select_dirs | grep -E "${OFFLINE_SUBTREES}" || true
}
run_l1_offline() {
local -a l1dirs
mapfile -t l1dirs < <(l1_selected_dirs)
if [ "${#l1dirs[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
log "No L1 render tests match the selection (layer=${LAYER} reqs='${REQS}')."
# True when EVERY requested layer is cluster-independent, so the offline result is the
# whole result and run.sh must exit on it (the ci/l0.sh + ci/l1.sh merge-gate paths).
layers_are_offline_only() {
local l
[ "${LAYER}" = all ] && return 1
for l in ${LAYER//,/ }; do
case "$l" in l0|l1) ;; *) return 1 ;; esac
done
return 0
}
run_offline_checks() {
local -a dirs
mapfile -t dirs < <(offline_selected_dirs)
if [ "${#dirs[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
log "No L0/L1 offline checks match the selection (layer=${LAYER} reqs='${REQS}')."
return 0
fi
log "Running ${#l1dirs[@]} L1 render check(s) OFFLINE (no cluster; docs/14)."
log "Running ${#dirs[@]} offline L0/L1 check(s) (no cluster; docs/14)."
"${PYTHON}" "${CONF_ROOT}/lib/run_l1_offline.py" \
--junit "${JUNIT_OUT}" --label-prefix "${CONF_LABEL_PREFIX}" "${l1dirs[@]}"
--junit "${JUNIT_OUT}" --label-prefix "${CONF_LABEL_PREFIX}" "${dirs[@]}"
}
###############################################################################
@@ -287,6 +327,17 @@ case "${MODE}" in
log "coverage-only: done. See ${COVERAGE_OUT}/coverage.md"
exit 0
;;
status)
# rc: 0 report written, 1 a derivation/strict failure, 3 a check could not run
# (SKIPPED, never counted as green — ci/lib.sh convention). Propagated as-is.
rc=0
# --strict-coverage is the harness's hygiene switch; apply it to status too.
status_flags=()
[ "${STRICT_COVERAGE}" = 1 ] && status_flags+=(--strict)
gen_status ${status_flags[@]+"${status_flags[@]}"} || rc=$?
log "status: done. See ${STATUS_OUT}/status.md"
exit "${rc}"
;;
lint)
lint_tests
log "lint: done."
@@ -294,29 +345,30 @@ case "${MODE}" in
;;
esac
# L1 rendering is cluster-independent (docs/14): run the selected L1 render checks offline
# and treat their result as authoritative REGARDLESS of cluster availability. A render-check
# failure is a real failure (nothing cluster-gated about it), so it always blocks.
L1_RC=0
run_l1_offline || L1_RC=$?
if [ "${LAYER}" = l1 ]; then
# L1-only run (the ci/l1.sh merge-gate path): the offline render result IS the result.
if [ "${L1_RC}" -eq 0 ]; then
log "Done (L1 render). JUnit: ${JUNIT_OUT} | Coverage: ${COVERAGE_OUT}/coverage.md"
# L0 static + L1 rendering are cluster-independent (docs/14): run the selected offline
# checks and treat their result as authoritative REGARDLESS of cluster availability. An
# offline check failure is a real failure (nothing cluster-gated about it), so it always blocks.
OFFLINE_RC=0
run_offline_checks || OFFLINE_RC=$?
if layers_are_offline_only; then
# Offline-only run (the ci/l0.sh + ci/l1.sh merge-gate paths): the offline result IS the result.
if [ "${OFFLINE_RC}" -eq 0 ]; then
log "Done (offline ${LAYER}). JUnit: ${JUNIT_OUT} | Coverage: ${COVERAGE_OUT}/coverage.md"
else
log "L1 render checks FAILED (rc=${L1_RC}). JUnit: ${JUNIT_OUT}"
log "Offline ${LAYER} checks FAILED (rc=${OFFLINE_RC}). JUnit: ${JUNIT_OUT}"
fi
exit "${L1_RC}"
exit "${OFFLINE_RC}"
fi
if [ "${L1_RC}" -ne 0 ]; then
log "L1 render checks FAILED (rc=${L1_RC}) — blocking (render failure is not cluster-gated)."
exit "${L1_RC}"
if [ "${OFFLINE_RC}" -ne 0 ]; then
log "Offline L0/L1 checks FAILED (rc=${OFFLINE_RC}) — blocking (not cluster-gated)."
exit "${OFFLINE_RC}"
fi
# run mode: need a cluster for L2/L3. Without one (Phase 0), emit skipped JUnit for the
# cluster-gated layers. (L1 already ran offline above and passed.)
if [ "${FORCE_NO_CLUSTER}" = 1 ] || ! conf_cluster_reachable; then
log "No reachable cluster — emitting SKIPPED JUnit scaffold for L2/L3 (Phase 0 behavior)."
log "NOTE: the offline L0/L1 results above already ran for real; this shim covers L2/L3 only."
log "Also running structural lint so scaffolds stay valid."
lint_tests || { log "lint failed"; exit 1; }
"${PYTHON}" "${CONF_ROOT}/lib/emit_skipped_junit.py" \
conformance/tests/README.md
+35 -2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Every test is a **Chainsaw `Test`** in its own directory:
```
tests/
l0-static/ L0 — whole-repo invariants over the tracked tree (no cluster)
l1-rendering/ L1 — ServiceDefinition -> rendered resources match golden
l2-behavioral/ L2 — real runtime behavior (probes against a cluster)
l3-fault-injection/ L3 — break something; assert fail-closed / no-data-loss
@@ -14,6 +15,35 @@ tests/
The layer a test belongs to is its subtree **and** its `.../layer` annotation; the
coverage generator cross-checks the two.
### L0 static (`l0-static/`) — what belongs here, and what does not
docs/14's L0 row is *"Pre-apply, in CI · manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants"*.
Kyverno (`platform/kyverno/`) covers the invariants expressible over a **single
resource**. This subtree covers the L0 invariants that are **properties of the repository
as a whole** and that no per-resource policy can state — e.g. *no plaintext secret exists
anywhere in the tracked tree*, *no tracked RoleBinding grants a workload identity a
privileged role*, *the spec-immutability gate actually blocks a modified spec*.
Each `l0-static/<name>/` dir carries a **`check.sh`**: a self-contained offline assertion
script (git + Python stdlib/PyYAML; no cluster, no network) that exits 0/1. It is executed:
- by `conformance/run.sh --layer l0` (and as the offline leg of a full run), via
`lib/run_l1_offline.py`, producing a REAL pass/fail JUnit entry — never a skip; and
- by the merge gate's **`ci/l0.sh`** stage, so these assertions run on every PR; and
- by the wrapping Chainsaw `Test`, which runs the SAME `check.sh`, so an in-cluster run
executes byte-identical assertions.
Two authoring rules specific to this layer:
1. **State the gap.** A statically-provable half of a requirement is still only half.
Every `check.sh` header ends with an explicit *"what this does NOT prove"* list naming
the cluster-layer remainder. Covering a requirement at L0 does not finish it.
2. **Exemptions must be self-policing.** Where a check must tolerate something (a
deliberately-plaintext policy fixture, an `.example` template), the exemption is
conditioned on a property that would break if the exemption were abused — e.g. the
plaintext Secret fixture is exempt *only while* a `kyverno-test.yaml` asserts the
policy rejects it. Never a bare path allowlist.
## Requirement-tagging convention (authoritative)
A test declares the requirement(s) it verifies **three** ways; the label is the source
@@ -28,7 +58,7 @@ metadata:
annotations:
# Human-readable canonical list — MUST equal the label set.
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-01"
# Declared layer (L1|L2|L3|META) — must match the subtree.
# Declared layer (L0|L1|L2|L3|META) — must match the subtree.
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
# true => R-TEST-05 requires this to be (or have) an L3 fault-injection test.
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
@@ -65,4 +95,7 @@ and coverage extraction exact and robust.
the PM — do not relax the assertion or the requirement.
Scaffolds in this tree carry `TODO(T-x.y)` markers where a fixture/assertion lands as a
later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test.
later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test. `lib/status.py` treats such a
marker — in the `chainsaw-test.yaml`, in `render-check.sh`, or in `check.sh` — as
outranking any `conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"` annotation, so a placeholder body
can never be reported as an executable test.
conformance/tests/l0-static/least-privilege-rbac/chainsaw-test.yaml
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# =============================================================================
# L0 STATIC — least privilege for workload identities and network reach (R-SEC-02)
# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row, "Manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants" — runs in
# CI WITHOUT a cluster.
#
# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
# WHEN every tracked RBAC object and every least-network-reach policy is inspected,
# THEN no in-repo role grants a wildcard or a privilege-escalation verb, no workload
# ServiceAccount is bound to a privileged role, the conformance runner's own
# privileged test identity stays scoped to its authored ClusterRole, and each
# least-network-reach policy both Enforces and is proven by an L0 negative row
# (or a generated-resource row) to actually close reach.
#
# STATUS: EXECUTABLE — and DELIBERATELY PARTIAL. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion
# script (git ls-files + PyYAML); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it
# directly, and this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script. It proves the STATIC half of
# both clauses. The RUNTIME half — that the API server actually denies an unrequested
# verb, and that pod-to-pod traffic is actually dropped — needs a cluster and is NOT
# asserted under this requirement; see the gap list in check.sh's header. R-SEC-02 is
# therefore covered, not finished.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
metadata:
name: least-privilege-rbac
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-02: "true"
annotations:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-SEC-02"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
Workload identities carry no wildcard, no escalation verb and no privileged
binding; the least-network-reach policies are enforced and proven to reject.
spec:
steps:
- name: scan-rbac-and-least-reach-policies
description: >-
Assert the authored least-privilege posture of every tracked RBAC object and
the enforced, test-proven status of the least-network-reach policies.
try:
- script:
content: bash ./check.sh
conformance/tests/l0-static/least-privilege-rbac/check.sh
Executable
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# =============================================================================
# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — least-privilege-rbac
# Serves: R-SEC-02 ("The platform MUST follow least-privilege for workload
# identities and network reach." — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md;
# detail in docs/07 "least privilege ... least network reach").
#
# The requirement has TWO halves and this check covers the STATIC half of each,
# at the layer docs/14 puts them ("L0 Static/policy | Pre-apply, in CI").
#
# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
# WHEN every tracked RBAC object and every least-network-reach policy is inspected,
# THEN — workload identity —
# (1) no in-repo Role/ClusterRole grants a wildcard apiGroup, resource or verb,
# and none grants escalate/bind/impersonate (the privilege-escalation verbs);
# (2) no (Cluster)RoleBinding binds a ServiceAccount — a WORKLOAD identity — to
# `cluster-admin` or to any in-repo role holding wildcard rules. Human/Group
# subjects are out of scope: R-SEC-02 constrains workload identities, and the
# operator's own admin path is an OIDC group binding, deliberately;
# (3) every ServiceAccount subject is namespaced (no cluster-wide ambiguity);
# (4) the conformance runner's own SA — this workstream's PRIVILEGED TEST
# IDENTITY, whose least-privilege authoring docs/14 explicitly delegates to
# WS-TEST — is bound only to its own scoped ClusterRole, carries no wildcard
# and no privilege-escalation verb, and grants nothing over RBAC objects
# themselves (no rbac.authorization.k8s.io rules);
# — network reach —
# (5) the policies that implement least network reach exist, and each is Enforce
# (or carries the Flux token that substitutes to Enforce): the default-deny
# baseline generator, the baseline SHAPE validator, the host-namespace/
# privilege restriction, and the egress-class label requirement;
# (6) each of those policies is actually EXERCISED by the L0 Kyverno suite with a
# NEGATIVE row (result: fail) — a policy nobody proves rejects anything is a
# declaration, not a gate.
#
# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gap, cluster layer — R-SEC-02 is NOT fully covered):
# - RUNTIME least privilege of workload identities: that the API server actually
# denies the conformance SA (or any workload SA) the verbs it was not granted.
# That needs a live cluster (L2) and no test asserts it today.
# - RUNTIME least network reach: that pod-to-pod traffic is actually denied. The
# behaviour is exercised by tests/l2-behavioral/{default-deny,deny-undeclared},
# but those are tagged R-NET-01/R-NET-02 and are cluster-gated (skipped in Phase 0);
# nothing proves it under an R-SEC-02 tag.
# - Helm-chart-generated RBAC (e.g. what a HelmRelease's chart creates in-cluster) is
# not in the repo, so it is outside this static scan entirely.
# =============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)" # repo root
PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
cd "${ROOT}"
"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
import os, re, subprocess, sys
from pathlib import Path
try:
import yaml
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover
print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
FAILURES: list[str] = []
CHECKS = 0
def check(cond, msg):
global CHECKS
CHECKS += 1
if not cond:
FAILURES.append(msg)
def tracked() -> list[str]:
out = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "ls-files", "-z"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout
return [p for p in out.split("\0") if p]
def docs_of(rel: str):
try:
return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all((ROOT / rel).read_text(errors="replace"))
if isinstance(d, dict)]
except Exception:
return []
FILES = tracked()
YAML_FILES = [f for f in FILES if re.search(r"\.(ya?ml)(\.example)?$", f)]
check(len(YAML_FILES) > 50, f"only {len(YAML_FILES)} YAML files seen — not a real checkout")
ESCALATION_VERBS = {"escalate", "bind", "impersonate"}
PRIVILEGED_ROLES = {"cluster-admin", "admin", "edit"}
roles: dict[tuple[str, str], dict] = {} # (kind, name) -> {"file":…, "wildcard":bool, …}
bindings: list[dict] = []
for rel in YAML_FILES:
for d in docs_of(rel):
kind = d.get("kind")
name = (d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name")
if kind in ("Role", "ClusterRole"):
wildcard, escalating, rbac_over_rbac = False, set(), False
for r in d.get("rules") or []:
if not isinstance(r, dict):
continue
for field in ("apiGroups", "resources", "verbs"):
if "*" in (r.get(field) or []):
wildcard = True
escalating |= set(v for v in (r.get("verbs") or [])) & ESCALATION_VERBS
if "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" in (r.get("apiGroups") or []):
rbac_over_rbac = True
roles[(kind, name)] = {"file": rel, "wildcard": wildcard,
"escalating": escalating, "rbac": rbac_over_rbac,
"doc": d}
# (1) no wildcards, no privilege-escalation verbs.
check(not wildcard,
f"{rel}: {kind}/{name} grants a wildcard apiGroup/resource/verb — that is "
"not least-privilege (R-SEC-02)")
check(not escalating,
f"{rel}: {kind}/{name} grants privilege-escalation verb(s) "
f"{sorted(escalating)} (R-SEC-02)")
elif kind in ("RoleBinding", "ClusterRoleBinding"):
bindings.append({"file": rel, "name": name, "doc": d})
check(len(roles) > 0, "no Role/ClusterRole found in the repo — the RBAC scan is not looking at it")
check(len(bindings) > 0, "no RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding found — the RBAC scan is not looking at it")
for b in bindings:
d, rel, name = b["doc"], b["file"], b["name"]
ref = d.get("roleRef") or {}
ref_kind, ref_name = ref.get("kind"), ref.get("name")
sa_subjects = [s for s in (d.get("subjects") or [])
if isinstance(s, dict) and s.get("kind") == "ServiceAccount"]
local = roles.get((ref_kind, ref_name))
ref_is_privileged = (ref_name in PRIVILEGED_ROLES) or bool(local and local["wildcard"])
# (2) a WORKLOAD identity must never hold a privileged role.
check(not (sa_subjects and ref_is_privileged),
f"{rel}: {d.get('kind')}/{name} binds ServiceAccount(s) "
f"{[s.get('name') for s in sa_subjects]} to the privileged role {ref_name!r} — "
"workload identities must be least-privilege (R-SEC-02)")
# (3) SA subjects must name their namespace (a ClusterRoleBinding without one is
# ambiguous and, in a RoleBinding, silently defaults to the binding's namespace).
for s in sa_subjects:
check(bool(s.get("namespace")) or d.get("kind") == "RoleBinding",
f"{rel}: {d.get('kind')}/{name} has a ServiceAccount subject "
f"{s.get('name')!r} with no namespace (R-SEC-02)")
# --------------------------------- (4) our own privileged test identity, in detail
RBAC_FILE = "conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml"
check(RBAC_FILE in FILES, f"{RBAC_FILE} is missing — the conformance runner has no authored RBAC")
runner_role = roles.get(("ClusterRole", "conformance-runner"))
check(runner_role is not None,
f"{RBAC_FILE}: no ClusterRole/conformance-runner — the test identity's grants are undefined")
if runner_role:
check(runner_role["file"] == RBAC_FILE,
f"ClusterRole/conformance-runner is defined in {runner_role['file']}, not {RBAC_FILE}")
check(not runner_role["wildcard"], "ClusterRole/conformance-runner uses a wildcard (R-SEC-02)")
check(not runner_role["escalating"],
"ClusterRole/conformance-runner grants a privilege-escalation verb (R-SEC-02)")
check(not runner_role["rbac"],
"ClusterRole/conformance-runner grants rights over RBAC objects themselves — a test "
"identity that can rewrite RBAC is not least-privilege (R-SEC-02)")
runner_bindings = [b for b in bindings
if any(s.get("kind") == "ServiceAccount" and s.get("name") == "conformance-runner"
for s in (b["doc"].get("subjects") or []))]
check(len(runner_bindings) >= 1, "the conformance-runner ServiceAccount has no binding at all")
for b in runner_bindings:
ref = b["doc"].get("roleRef") or {}
check(ref.get("name") == "conformance-runner",
f"{b['file']}: conformance-runner is bound to {ref.get('name')!r} instead of its own "
"scoped ClusterRole (R-SEC-02)")
for s in b["doc"].get("subjects") or []:
if s.get("kind") == "ServiceAccount":
check(s.get("namespace") == "conformance",
f"{b['file']}: conformance-runner subject is in namespace "
f"{s.get('namespace')!r}, expected 'conformance' (R-SEC-02)")
# --------------------- (5)/(6) least NETWORK REACH: the policies exist, Enforce, and
# are proven to reject something at L0.
# Validating policies: must Enforce AND be proven to REJECT something at L0.
REQUIRED_POLICIES = {
"validate-default-deny-shape": "a baseline that leaves a direction open is rejected",
"restrict-host-namespaces": "host namespaces / privileged containers are rejected",
"require-egress-class-label": "workloads must declare their egress class",
}
# Generating policies have no validationFailureAction and no negative row: the proof
# that they close network reach is that the L0 suite asserts the resource they GENERATE.
REQUIRED_GENERATE_POLICIES = {
"require-default-deny-baseline": "every namespace gets a default-deny baseline",
}
policies: dict[str, dict] = {}
for rel in YAML_FILES:
for d in docs_of(rel):
if d.get("kind") in ("ClusterPolicy", "Policy"):
policies[(d.get("metadata") or {}).get("name")] = {"file": rel, "doc": d}
for pname, why in REQUIRED_POLICIES.items():
p = policies.get(pname)
check(p is not None, f"policy {pname!r} is missing — nothing enforces: {why} (R-SEC-02)")
if not p:
continue
action = str((p["doc"].get("spec") or {}).get("validationFailureAction", ""))
check(action == "Enforce" or action.startswith("${"),
f"{p['file']}: policy {pname!r} validationFailureAction is {action!r} — a least-reach "
"policy in Audit mode blocks nothing (R-SEC-02)")
negatives: dict[str, int] = {}
suites = [f for f in FILES if os.path.basename(f) == "kyverno-test.yaml"]
check(len(suites) > 0, "no kyverno-test.yaml — the L0 policy gate is not exercised at all")
for suite in suites:
for d in docs_of(suite):
for r in d.get("results") or []:
if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("result") == "fail":
negatives[r.get("policy")] = negatives.get(r.get("policy"), 0) + 1
for pname, why in REQUIRED_POLICIES.items():
check(negatives.get(pname, 0) > 0,
f"no L0 test row asserts that policy {pname!r} REJECTS a violating resource "
f"(result: fail) — unproven gate for: {why} (R-SEC-02)")
# The generating half: the policy must exist, and the L0 suite must assert the resource
# it generates (a `generatedResource` row that passes) — otherwise nothing proves a new
# namespace actually arrives with its reach closed.
for pname, why in REQUIRED_GENERATE_POLICIES.items():
p = policies.get(pname)
check(p is not None, f"policy {pname!r} is missing — nothing enforces: {why} (R-SEC-02)")
generated_rows = []
for suite in suites:
for d in docs_of(suite):
for r in d.get("results") or []:
if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("policy") == pname \
and r.get("generatedResource") and r.get("result") == "pass":
generated_rows.append((suite, r.get("generatedResource")))
check(len(generated_rows) > 0,
f"no L0 test row asserts the resource generated by {pname!r} — unproven gate for: "
f"{why} (R-SEC-02)")
for suite, gen in generated_rows:
gp = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(suite), str(gen)))
check(gp in FILES, f"{suite}: generatedResource {gen!r} does not resolve to a tracked file")
golden = "\n".join(l for l in (ROOT / gp).read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
if not l.lstrip().startswith("#")) if gp in FILES else ""
check("NetworkPolicy" in golden and re.search(r"policyTypes:", golden),
f"{gp}: the asserted default-deny baseline is not a shaped NetworkPolicy (R-SEC-02)")
# The host-namespace policy must prove BOTH of its rules reject, not just one.
host_rules = set()
for suite in suites:
for d in docs_of(suite):
for r in d.get("results") or []:
if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("policy") == "restrict-host-namespaces" \
and r.get("result") == "fail":
host_rules.add(r.get("rule"))
check({"disallow-host-namespaces", "disallow-privileged-containers"} <= host_rules,
"the L0 suite does not prove BOTH restrict-host-namespaces rules reject a violating pod "
f"(negative rows seen for: {sorted(host_rules)}) — R-SEC-02")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
if FAILURES:
print(f"CHECK FAIL (least-privilege-rbac): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
file=sys.stderr)
for f in FAILURES:
print(f" - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(f"check OK: least-privilege-rbac — {CHECKS} assertions over {len(roles)} role(s), "
f"{len(bindings)} binding(s), {len(REQUIRED_POLICIES)} least-reach policies")
PY
conformance/tests/l0-static/no-plaintext-secrets/chainsaw-test.yaml
+43
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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# =============================================================================
# L0 STATIC — no plaintext secrets in git (R-SEC-01)
# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row, "Manifests/ServiceDefinitions obey invariants ...
# no plaintext secrets" — runs in CI WITHOUT a cluster.
#
# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
# WHEN every tracked file is inspected,
# THEN every committed Secret is SOPS ciphertext, every ansible group_vars vault is
# ansible-vault encrypted, no private key material is tracked, decryption is
# delegated to an in-cluster SOPS key, and the L0 policy that rejects plaintext
# Secrets exists, Enforces, and is proven by a negative test row to reject one.
#
# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script (git ls-files +
# PyYAML, no cluster, no network); conformance/run.sh --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it
# directly, and this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script so an in-cluster run executes
# the identical assertions. Encryption at rest is necessary but NOT sufficient: the
# runtime half of "decrypted only in-cluster", and a scan of git HISTORY, are named as
# explicit gaps in check.sh's header and are NOT claimed here.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
metadata:
name: no-plaintext-secrets
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/R-SEC-01: "true"
annotations:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-SEC-01"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
No secret is stored in plaintext in git: committed Secrets are SOPS ciphertext,
ansible vaults are encrypted, no private key material is tracked, and the
no-plaintext-secrets policy gate is enforced and proven to reject.
spec:
steps:
- name: scan-tracked-tree-for-plaintext-secrets
description: >-
Assert over the whole tracked tree that no secret material is stored in
plaintext and that decryption is delegated to the in-cluster SOPS key.
try:
- script:
content: bash ./check.sh
conformance/tests/l0-static/no-plaintext-secrets/check.sh
Executable
+287
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# =============================================================================
# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — no-plaintext-secrets
# Serves: R-SEC-01 ("Secrets MUST NOT be stored in plaintext in git; they MUST be
# encrypted at rest in the repo and decrypted only in-cluster."
# — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md; detail in docs/07.)
#
# docs/14 puts exactly this invariant at L0 ("Static/policy | Pre-apply, in CI |
# ... no plaintext secrets"), so it is asserted here over the WHOLE tracked tree,
# with no cluster. Run by `conformance/run.sh --layer l0` and by ci/l0.sh.
#
# GIVEN the repository as git tracks it,
# WHEN every tracked file is inspected,
# THEN (1) SOPS is configured at the repo root with a PUBLIC age recipient;
# (2) every committed Kubernetes Secret is SOPS-encrypted — a top-level
# `sops:` block with a mac AND every data/stringData value is ENC[...];
# (3) the only two exempt classes are narrow and self-policing:
# a. `*.example` templates, which must NOT be referenced by any
# kustomization and whose secret-named values must be placeholders;
# b. the Kyverno L0 negative fixture, which is exempt ONLY while it is
# actually wired into a kyverno-test.yaml that asserts
# `disallow-plaintext-secrets` REJECTS it (result: fail);
# (4) every ansible-vault group_vars file is `$ANSIBLE_VAULT;`-encrypted, and
# no secret-valued ansible key carries a literal outside a vault;
# (5) no private key material of any kind is tracked (PEM private keys, an
# age SECRET key, kubeconfig client-key-data);
# (6) decryption is delegated to the cluster: a Flux Kustomization declares
# `decryption.provider: sops` with a secretRef, and the private half of
# that key pair is nowhere in the repo (5).
#
# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gap, cluster layer):
# - that the decrypted Secret only ever materialises in-cluster (the runtime half
# of "decrypted only in-cluster") — needs a live cluster (L2), untested today.
# - that no plaintext secret exists in git HISTORY. This walks the WORKING TREE at
# HEAD only; docs/07's history-scan acceptance gate needs a secret scanner over
# all revisions and is NOT implemented here.
# - value-level entropy: a placeholder-looking string that is in fact a real
# credential is not detectable statically.
# =============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)" # repo root
PYTHON="${PYTHON:-python3}"
cd "${ROOT}"
"${PYTHON}" - "${ROOT}" <<'PY'
import os, re, subprocess, sys
from pathlib import Path
try:
import yaml
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover
print("check FAIL: PyYAML is required (same dependency as catalog/render.py)",
file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
ROOT = Path(sys.argv[1])
FAILURES: list[str] = []
CHECKS = 0
def check(cond, msg):
global CHECKS
CHECKS += 1
if not cond:
FAILURES.append(msg)
def tracked() -> list[str]:
out = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(ROOT), "ls-files", "-z"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout
return [p for p in out.split("\0") if p]
FILES = tracked()
check(len(FILES) > 50, f"git ls-files returned only {len(FILES)} paths — not a real checkout")
def docs_of(rel: str):
"""Parsed YAML documents of a tracked file, or [] when it is not parseable YAML."""
p = ROOT / rel
try:
return [d for d in yaml.safe_load_all(p.read_text(errors="replace")) if isinstance(d, dict)]
except Exception:
return []
YAMLISH = re.compile(r"\.(ya?ml)(\.example)?$")
YAML_FILES = [f for f in FILES if YAMLISH.search(f)]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- (1) SOPS config
sops_cfg = ROOT / ".sops.yaml"
check(sops_cfg.is_file(), ".sops.yaml is missing from the repository root (R-SEC-01)")
if sops_cfg.is_file():
cfg = yaml.safe_load(sops_cfg.read_text()) or {}
rules = cfg.get("creation_rules") or []
check(len(rules) > 0, ".sops.yaml declares no creation_rules — new secrets would be committed unencrypted")
for r in rules:
pr = r.get("path_regex", "<none>")
recips = str(r.get("age", ""))
check(bool(recips), f".sops.yaml creation_rule {pr!r} has no age recipient")
check(all(x.startswith("age1") for x in re.split(r"[,\s]+", recips) if x),
f".sops.yaml creation_rule {pr!r} recipient is not a PUBLIC age1... key")
check("AGE-SECRET-KEY" not in recips.upper(),
f".sops.yaml creation_rule {pr!r} contains an age PRIVATE key")
# --------------------------------------------- Kyverno negative-fixture exemption
# A plaintext Secret is tolerated ONLY where it is the negative case that proves the
# L0 policy rejects plaintext. We do not trust the path: the file must be listed in a
# kyverno-test.yaml whose results assert disallow-plaintext-secrets returns `fail`.
POLICY_NAME = "disallow-plaintext-secrets"
negative_fixtures: set[str] = set()
kyverno_suites = [f for f in FILES if os.path.basename(f) == "kyverno-test.yaml"]
check(len(kyverno_suites) > 0, "no kyverno-test.yaml found — the L0 policy gate is not exercised at all")
for suite in kyverno_suites:
docs = docs_of(suite)
if not docs:
continue
d = docs[0]
results = d.get("results") or []
rejects_plaintext = any(r.get("policy") == POLICY_NAME and r.get("result") == "fail"
for r in results if isinstance(r, dict))
if not rejects_plaintext:
continue
base = os.path.dirname(suite)
for res in d.get("resources") or []:
negative_fixtures.add(os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base, str(res))))
check(len(negative_fixtures) > 0,
f"no kyverno-test.yaml asserts that {POLICY_NAME} REJECTS a plaintext Secret "
"(result: fail) — the plaintext-secret gate is unproven, so nothing may be exempt")
# --------------------------------------------------- (2)/(3) committed Secret scan
SECRET_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"(pass|secret|token|key|credential|cookie|cert)", re.I)
PLACEHOLDER_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(|<[^>]*>|replace[-_ ]?me.*|change[-_ ]?me.*|placeholder.*|x{3,})\s*$", re.I)
secrets_seen = 0
for rel in YAML_FILES:
for d in docs_of(rel):
if d.get("kind") != "Secret":
continue
secrets_seen += 1
values = []
for field in ("data", "stringData"):
for k, v in (d.get(field) or {}).items():
values.append((k, "" if v is None else str(v)))
is_example = rel.endswith(".example")
is_negative_fixture = os.path.normpath(rel) in negative_fixtures
if is_example:
# Template: never applied, and its secret-named values must be placeholders.
refs = [k for k in YAML_FILES
if os.path.basename(k) == "kustomization.yaml"
and os.path.basename(rel) in (ROOT / k).read_text(errors="replace")]
check(not refs,
f"{rel}: an unencrypted .example template is referenced by a kustomization "
f"({refs}) — it would be applied as a plaintext Secret")
for k, v in values:
if SECRET_KEY_RE.search(k):
check(bool(PLACEHOLDER_RE.match(v)),
f"{rel}: template key {k!r} holds {v[:24]!r}, not a placeholder — "
"a real credential may have been committed (R-SEC-01)")
continue
if is_negative_fixture:
# Exempt, but only as the proven negative case; assert it really is plaintext
# (an encrypted 'bad' fixture would silently stop testing anything).
continue
# Everything else: must be SOPS-encrypted at rest.
sops_block = d.get("sops")
check(isinstance(sops_block, dict) and bool(sops_block.get("mac")),
f"{rel}: committed Secret {d.get('metadata', {}).get('name')!r} has no top-level "
"`sops:` block with a mac — it is stored in plaintext (R-SEC-01)")
for k, v in values:
check(v.startswith("ENC["),
f"{rel}: Secret value {k!r} is not SOPS ciphertext (expected ENC[...]) — "
"plaintext secret material in git (R-SEC-01)")
check(secrets_seen > 0, "no Kubernetes Secret manifests found at all — the scan is not looking at the repo")
# ------------------------------------------------------------ (4) ansible vaults
VAULT_HEADER = "$ANSIBLE_VAULT;"
vault_files = [f for f in FILES
if os.path.basename(f) in ("vault.yml", "vault.yaml")]
check(len(vault_files) > 0, "no ansible vault.yml files found — the vault scan is not looking at the repo")
for rel in vault_files:
head = (ROOT / rel).read_text(errors="replace")[:len(VAULT_HEADER)]
check(head == VAULT_HEADER,
f"{rel}: an ansible group_vars vault file is NOT ansible-vault encrypted "
"(must start with the $ANSIBLE_VAULT header) — R-SEC-01")
SECRET_ANSIBLE_KEYS = ("ansible_become_password", "ansible_become_pass", "ansible_password",
"ansible_ssh_pass", "ansible_sudo_pass", "ansible_ssh_private_key_file")
ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*(" + "|".join(SECRET_ANSIBLE_KEYS) + r")\s*:\s*(.*?)\s*$")
for rel in FILES:
p = ROOT / rel
if not p.is_file() or p.is_symlink():
continue
try:
text = p.read_text(errors="replace")
except Exception:
continue
if text.startswith(VAULT_HEADER):
continue # encrypted at rest: opaque, by design
for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
if line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
continue
m = ASSIGN_RE.match(line)
if not m:
continue
key, val = m.group(1), m.group(2).strip().strip("'\"")
ok = (val.startswith("{{") or val.startswith("$")
or bool(PLACEHOLDER_RE.match(val)) or val == "")
check(ok, f"{rel}:{lineno}: {key} is assigned the literal {val[:24]!r} outside an "
"ansible-vault file — a plaintext secret in git (R-SEC-01)")
# ------------------------------------------------------ (5) no private key material
# NOTE: each marker is assembled from fragments so that THIS file never contains the
# literal string it hunts for — otherwise the scanner would flag itself the moment it
# is tracked, and the only way to silence it would be to exempt the scanner (which is
# exactly the kind of self-exemption this suite exists to prevent).
_DASH5 = "-" * 5
PRIVKEY_PATTERNS = [
(re.compile(_DASH5 + r"BEGIN (?:[A-Z ]+ )?PRIVATE" + r" KEY" + _DASH5),
"a PEM private key block"),
(re.compile("AGE" + "-SECRET" + "-KEY-1"), "an age SECRET (decryption) key"),
(re.compile(r"^\s*client" + r"-key-data\s*:\s*\S"), "kubeconfig client-key-data"),
]
for rel in FILES:
p = ROOT / rel
if not p.is_file() or p.is_symlink():
continue
try:
text = p.read_text(errors="replace")
except Exception:
continue
if text.startswith(VAULT_HEADER):
continue
for rx, what in PRIVKEY_PATTERNS:
for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
if line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
continue
if rx.search(line):
check(False, f"{rel}:{lineno}: tracked file contains {what} (R-SEC-01)")
# ----------------------------------------- (6) decryption is delegated to the cluster
sops_decryption = []
for rel in YAML_FILES:
for d in docs_of(rel):
if d.get("kind") != "Kustomization":
continue
dec = d.get("spec", {}).get("decryption") if isinstance(d.get("spec"), dict) else None
if isinstance(dec, dict) and dec.get("provider") == "sops" and dec.get("secretRef"):
sops_decryption.append(rel)
# Flux overlay patches carry the same block inside a patch body.
for rel in YAML_FILES:
text = (ROOT / rel).read_text(errors="replace")
if re.search(r"^\s*decryption:\s*$", text, re.M) and re.search(r"^\s*provider:\s*sops\s*$", text, re.M) \
and re.search(r"^\s*secretRef:\s*$", text, re.M):
sops_decryption.append(rel)
check(len(sops_decryption) > 0,
"no Flux Kustomization declares `decryption: {provider: sops, secretRef: ...}` — nothing "
"proves decryption happens in-cluster rather than from committed key material (R-SEC-01)")
# ------------------------------------------- (7) the L0 policy gate is real and strict
policy_files = [f for f in FILES if f.endswith(f"{POLICY_NAME}.yaml")]
check(len(policy_files) == 1, f"expected exactly one {POLICY_NAME} ClusterPolicy, found {policy_files}")
for rel in policy_files:
d = (docs_of(rel) or [{}])[0]
action = str(d.get("spec", {}).get("validationFailureAction", ""))
check(action == "Enforce" or action.startswith("${"),
f"{rel}: validationFailureAction is {action!r} — the no-plaintext-secrets gate must "
"Enforce (or carry the Flux token that substitutes to Enforce)")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- verdict
if FAILURES:
print(f"CHECK FAIL (no-plaintext-secrets): {len(FAILURES)} of {CHECKS} assertions failed",
file=sys.stderr)
for f in FAILURES:
print(f" - {f}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(f"check OK: no-plaintext-secrets — {CHECKS} assertions over {len(FILES)} tracked files, "
f"{secrets_seen} committed Secret document(s), {len(vault_files)} ansible vault file(s)")
PY
conformance/tests/l0-static/spec-immutability-enforced/chainsaw-test.yaml
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# =============================================================================
# L0 STATIC — the specification is immutable to agents (R-TEST-06)
# Catalog: docs/14 L0 row ("Pre-apply, in CI") — runs WITHOUT a cluster.
#
# A governance rule is made testable by testing its ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM, not by
# observing that no agent misbehaved today.
#
# GIVEN the enforcement mechanism (ci/spec-immutability.sh + ci/SPEC_PIN),
# WHEN it is driven against hermetic THROWAWAY spec repositories in each state,
# THEN a clean spec at the pinned SHA passes; an uncommitted edit under docs/ or
# decisions/, an untracked spec addition, and an unadopted committed drift each
# exit 1 and block the merge; an absent spec repo exits 3 (honest skip, never
# green); an unpinned SPEC_PIN fails closed; and the merge gate runs the stage
# and blocks on its failure.
#
# THE REAL SPEC REPO IS NEVER TOUCHED: every case runs against a git repo created under
# mktemp with SPEC_REPO pointed at it and a copy of ci/ carrying a fixture SPEC_PIN.
#
# STATUS: EXECUTABLE. `check.sh` is a pure offline assertion script; conformance/run.sh
# --layer l0 and ci/l0.sh run it directly, and this Chainsaw Test wraps the SAME script.
# NOT proven (named in check.sh's header): that the Gitea server REQUIRES this status
# check before merge — branch protection is operator configuration outside the repo.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
metadata:
name: spec-immutability-enforced
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/R-TEST-06: "true"
annotations:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-TEST-06"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L0"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
A spec modification is detected and blocks the merge; an unverifiable spec skips
honestly rather than passing; and the gate wires that stage as blocking.
spec:
steps:
- name: drive-the-spec-immutability-gate
description: >-
Run the real ci/spec-immutability.sh against throwaway spec repos in every
state and assert its exit code, then assert the gate wires it as blocking.
try:
- script:
content: bash ./check.sh
conformance/tests/l0-static/spec-immutability-enforced/check.sh
Executable
+165
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# =============================================================================
# L0 static check (offline, no cluster) — spec-immutability-enforced
# Serves: R-TEST-06 ("AI agents MUST NOT modify the specifications (this docs/ tree,
# the requirements, or accepted ADRs). Specs are changed only by the human
# operator/architect." — spec docs/00-vision-and-scope.md.)
#
# HOW A GOVERNANCE RULE IS MADE TESTABLE
# -------------------------------------
# "An agent must not do X" cannot be proven by observing that no agent did X today.
# What CAN be proven — and is what actually protects the spec — is that the MECHANISM
# which detects and blocks a spec modification works, and is wired into the merge gate
# as a blocking stage. So this test drives the real `ci/spec-immutability.sh` against
# HERMETIC THROWAWAY spec repositories and asserts its exit-code behaviour.
#
# THE REAL SPEC REPO IS NEVER TOUCHED. Every case runs against a fixture git repo under
# mktemp, with SPEC_REPO pointed at it and a COPY of ci/ (so the fixture's SPEC_PIN can
# be set without editing the tracked one). Nothing here writes outside its temp dir —
# which is itself the R-TEST-06 discipline this test exists to defend.
#
# GIVEN the enforcement mechanism (ci/spec-immutability.sh + ci/SPEC_PIN),
# WHEN it is run against a spec repo in each state,
# THEN (1) clean and at the pinned SHA -> exit 0 (pass)
# (2) an UNCOMMITTED edit under docs/ -> exit 1 (blocks the merge)
# (3) an uncommitted edit under decisions/ -> exit 1 (accepted ADRs are spec too)
# (4) a NEW COMMIT (HEAD drifted from pin) -> exit 1 (an "adopted" change must be
# an explicit reviewed SPEC_PIN bump)
# (5) an untracked file added to the spec -> exit 1 (porcelain catches additions)
# (6) the spec repo absent -> exit 3 (honest SKIP, never green)
# (7) an empty/comment-only SPEC_PIN -> exit 1 (an unpinned gate is no gate)
# AND (8) the tracked ci/SPEC_PIN really is a 40-hex commit SHA, and
# (9) the gate wires spec-immutability as a stage whose FAIL sets the merge block —
# i.e. the mechanism above is load-bearing, not dead code.
#
# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gap):
# - That the Gitea server actually REQUIRES this status check before merge. Branch
# protection is operator configuration outside the repo; nothing in-repo can assert it.
# - Intent: an agent could still open a spec PR. The rule is enforced by the gate
# blocking it, which is exactly what (1)-(9) assert; it is not enforced by prediction.
# =============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "${DIR}/../../../.." && pwd)" # repo root
CI_SRC="${ROOT}/ci"
PASS=0
FAILED=0
note() { printf ' ok %s\n' "$*"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
bad() { printf ' FAIL %s\n' "$*" >&2; FAILED=$((FAILED + 1)); }
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "${WORK}"' EXIT
# --- a hermetic stand-in for the spec repo -----------------------------------------
# Mirrors the real spec's shape: a docs/ tree and a decisions/ tree, one commit.
make_spec_repo() {
local d="$1"
mkdir -p "${d}/docs" "${d}/decisions"
# Fixture prose deliberately carries NO R-* token: ci/touched-requirements.sh scans the
# non-comment lines of changed files, so an example ID here would be attributed to the
# change as a touched requirement that does not exist in the registry.
printf 'normative spec text (fixture)\n' > "${d}/docs/00-vision-and-scope.md"
printf 'accepted decision\n' > "${d}/decisions/adr-0001-example.md"
git -C "$d" init -q -b main
git -C "$d" config user.email [email protected]
git -C "$d" config user.name spec
git -C "$d" config commit.gpgsign false # throwaway: never sign, ignore host gpg config
git -C "$d" add -A
git -C "$d" commit -qm "spec baseline"
}
# A COPY of ci/ whose SPEC_PIN we may set freely. The script resolves CI_DIR from its own
# location and sources lib.sh + versions.env from there, so a copy is self-contained.
make_ci_copy() {
local dst="$1" pin="$2"
mkdir -p "$dst"
cp "${CI_SRC}/spec-immutability.sh" "${CI_SRC}/lib.sh" "${CI_SRC}/versions.env" "$dst/"
printf '%s\n' "$pin" > "${dst}/SPEC_PIN"
chmod +x "${dst}/spec-immutability.sh"
}
# run_case <expected-rc> <description> <spec-repo|-> <pin>
run_case() {
local want="$1" desc="$2" spec="$3" pin="$4" rc=0
local cidir; cidir="$(mktemp -d -p "$WORK" ci.XXXXXX)"
make_ci_copy "$cidir" "$pin"
SPEC_REPO="$spec" REPO_ROOT="$WORK" "${cidir}/spec-immutability.sh" >/dev/null 2>&1 || rc=$?
if [ "$rc" = "$want" ]; then note "${desc} -> exit ${rc}"; else
bad "${desc}: expected exit ${want}, got ${rc}"; fi
}
for f in spec-immutability.sh lib.sh versions.env SPEC_PIN; do
if [ -f "${CI_SRC}/${f}" ]; then note "ci/${f} present"; else bad "ci/${f} is missing"; fi
done
SPEC="${WORK}/spec"
make_spec_repo "$SPEC"
PINNED="$(git -C "$SPEC" rev-parse HEAD)"
# (1) clean + at the pin -> pass.
run_case 0 "clean spec at the pinned SHA passes" "$SPEC" "$PINNED"
# (2) an uncommitted edit under docs/ -> block.
printf 'normative spec text REWRITTEN BY AN AGENT\n' > "${SPEC}/docs/00-vision-and-scope.md"
run_case 1 "uncommitted edit under docs/ BLOCKS" "$SPEC" "$PINNED"
git -C "$SPEC" checkout -q -- docs/00-vision-and-scope.md
# (3) an uncommitted edit to an accepted ADR -> block (decisions/ is spec too).
printf 'reversed decision\n' > "${SPEC}/decisions/adr-0001-example.md"
run_case 1 "uncommitted edit under decisions/ BLOCKS" "$SPEC" "$PINNED"
git -C "$SPEC" checkout -q -- decisions/adr-0001-example.md
# (5) an untracked addition to the spec tree -> block.
printf 'a spec doc an agent invented\n' > "${SPEC}/docs/99-invented.md"
run_case 1 "untracked file added to the spec BLOCKS" "$SPEC" "$PINNED"
rm -f "${SPEC}/docs/99-invented.md"
# clean again -> still passes (proves cases 2/3/5 failed for the edit, not permanently).
run_case 0 "spec restored to clean passes again" "$SPEC" "$PINNED"
# (4) a committed spec change that the pin has not adopted -> block.
printf 'an extra normative line added by an agent\n' >> "${SPEC}/docs/00-vision-and-scope.md"
git -C "$SPEC" add -A
git -C "$SPEC" commit -qm "agent edits the spec"
DRIFTED="$(git -C "$SPEC" rev-parse HEAD)"
run_case 1 "committed spec drift from the pinned SHA BLOCKS" "$SPEC" "$PINNED"
# ...and adopting it EXPLICITLY (a reviewed SPEC_PIN bump) is the only way to green.
run_case 0 "an explicit SPEC_PIN bump adopts the advance" "$SPEC" "$DRIFTED"
# (6) spec repo unavailable -> honest SKIP (exit 3), never a pass.
run_case 3 "absent spec repo SKIPS (exit 3), never green" "${WORK}/no-such-spec" "$PINNED"
# (7) an unpinned gate is not a gate.
run_case 1 "empty SPEC_PIN FAILS closed" "$SPEC" "# only a comment, no SHA"
# (8) the tracked pin is a real commit SHA.
REAL_PIN="$(grep -vE '^\s*#' "${CI_SRC}/SPEC_PIN" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
if printf '%s' "$REAL_PIN" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'; then
note "ci/SPEC_PIN is a 40-hex commit SHA"
else
bad "ci/SPEC_PIN is not a 40-hex commit SHA: '${REAL_PIN}'"
fi
# (9) the mechanism is load-bearing: the merge gate runs it as a stage AND a FAIL there
# sets the block. Asserted against the gate source because running the whole gate
# from inside a conformance check would recurse into this very check.
GATE="${CI_SRC}/gate.sh"
if grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*run_stage[[:space:]]+spec-immutability' "$GATE"; then
note "ci/gate.sh runs spec-immutability as a gate stage"
else
bad "ci/gate.sh does not run spec-immutability as a stage — the gate is not wired"
fi
if awk '/OUTCOME\[spec-immutability\]/,/^esac/' "$GATE" | grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*fail\).*BLOCK=1'; then
note "ci/gate.sh blocks the merge when spec-immutability FAILS"
else
bad "ci/gate.sh does not set the merge block on a spec-immutability failure"
fi
echo
if [ "$FAILED" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "check OK: spec-immutability-enforced — ${PASS} assertions (R-TEST-06)"
exit 0
fi
echo "CHECK FAIL (spec-immutability-enforced): ${FAILED} failed, ${PASS} passed" >&2
exit 1
conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore/chainsaw-test.yaml
+660 -30
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,75 @@
# =============================================================================
# L3 FAULT-INJECTION SCAFFOLD — DR restore (R-STATE-03) *SAFETY-CRITICAL*
# Catalog: docs/14 "DR restore (R-STATE-03, L3)"
# L3 FAULT-INJECTION — DR restore from an OFF-CLUSTER backup (R-STATE-03)
# *SAFETY-CRITICAL* [RUNNABLE / self-skips]
# Catalog: docs/14-testing-and-conformance.md "DR restore (R-STATE-03, L3)"
# DoD: agents/definition-of-done.md — "DR-critical data restores from an
# **off-cluster** backup (drill for at least one service/phase)."
# Spec: docs/04-storage-and-state.md; ADR-0003 (Longhorn + Velero).
# Impl: platform/velero/** (Velero + kopia File System Backup -> the versitygw S3
# endpoint on the Proxmox HOST), reconciled by clusters/base/backup.yaml.
#
# GIVEN an OFF-CLUSTER backup of a namespace + volumes,
# WHEN the namespace + volumes are restored into a CLEAN state,
# THEN the service returns with its data.
# GIVEN a DR-critical stateful workload with known data on the replicated `longhorn`
# tier, and a Velero BackupStorageLocation whose object-store endpoint is
# PROVABLY OUTSIDE this cluster,
# WHEN a backup of that namespace + its volume data is written to that off-cluster
# store, and then EVERY in-cluster copy of the data is DESTROYED (namespace,
# PVC and the underlying PersistentVolume/Longhorn replicas all deleted),
# THEN a Velero restore into a CLEAN, previously-nonexistent namespace brings the
# workload back and the known data reads back byte-identical.
#
# R-TEST-05: proves recoverability by restoring into a genuinely clean namespace
# (not by reading the still-live original). Backup TARGET is OQ-BKP (OPEN) — the
# restore mechanism is Velero (T-4.3/T-4.4); this scaffold is target-agnostic.
# R-TEST-05 (fault injection, not happy-path): the restore is only meaningful because
# the source is annihilated first. After the destroy step there is no PVC, no PV and
# no Longhorn volume left in the cluster holding this data — so the bytes that come
# back can ONLY have come from the off-cluster object store. A restore that silently
# rebound a surviving in-cluster PV is explicitly excluded: the test captures the
# original PV name, asserts it is GONE, and asserts the restored PVC is bound to a
# DIFFERENT, newly provisioned PV.
#
# STATUS: scaffold — needs T-4.3 (Velero + off-cluster schedule) + T-4.4 (drill).
# BLOCKED-BY spec open question OQ-BKP (off-cluster backup target) — see report.
# HOW "OFF-CLUSTER" IS PROVEN (not assumed) — step `assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster`:
# 1. The BackupStorageLocation reports phase `Available` — Velero itself has
# successfully reached and validated that object store.
# 2. Its endpoint host is resolved to an IPv4 address and asserted to be NONE of:
# loopback; any Node InternalIP/ExternalIP; any Service ClusterIP; any Pod IP;
# inside any node's `spec.podCIDR(s)`; inside any `ServiceCIDR` (best-effort).
# It is also asserted not to be a cluster-internal DNS name (*.svc,
# *.cluster.local, localhost). => the bytes leave the cluster's address space.
# 3. The backup's PodVolumeBackup carries a non-empty `status.snapshotID` — the
# kopia snapshot really landed in the remote repository, i.e. VOLUME DATA (not
# merely Kubernetes resource JSON) was uploaded off-cluster.
# 4. Plus the destroy-then-restore sequence above, which removes every in-cluster
# alternative source for the data.
#
# KNOWN, DELIBERATE GAPS (asserted nowhere — do not read this test as claiming them):
# * OFF-HOST is NOT proven, only OFF-CLUSTER. On the dev estate the k3s nodes are
# VMs on the same Proxmox host that runs the versitygw S3 target (192.168.1.9),
# so this drill does not survive loss of that hypervisor. Off-site/off-host
# replication is an operator concern outside R-STATE-03's wording.
# * The test does NOT read the backup objects out of the bucket with an S3 client.
# Doing so would require handing the conformance runner the backup credential,
# widening a privileged test identity for weaker evidence than (1)-(4) above.
# * The test restores its OWN scratch workload, never a real service's data. A
# per-service drill (Nextcloud/Gitea/CNPG) stays an operator exercise.
# * Bare-metal DR (rebuild the cluster itself, then restore) is NOT exercised; this
# asserts namespace+volume restore into a live cluster, which is what the catalog
# entry and the DoD line ask for.
# * Backup ENCRYPTION at rest and retention/GC behaviour are not asserted.
#
# RUNNABLE / SELF-SKIPPING (a skip is honest; a fake pass is a defect). Skips CLEANLY
# (green) when a precondition is absent: no `longhorn` StorageClass; no Velero API
# (CRDs absent); no BackupStorageLocation configured at all; Velero server or its
# node-agent DaemonSet not ready. It runs the full drill the moment those exist — no
# edit needed. RBAC denial is NOT a skip: it fails loudly as a harness defect.
#
# DESTRUCTIVE BY DESIGN, SCOPED BY CONSTRUCTION: every object it destroys is one it
# created itself, in two namespaces it names after its own Chainsaw namespace
# (`<ns>-dr-src`, `<ns>-dr-dst`) and labels `conformance.home.k3s/created-by=<ns>`.
# It never touches a real service's namespace, PVC or PV, and it never deletes a
# Backup it did not create.
#
# TEARDOWN ALWAYS RUNS (`finally`, even on failure/timeout/panic): both scratch
# namespaces, any leftover PV, the Restore CR, and the Backup — the latter via a
# Velero DeleteBackupRequest so the objects are removed from the bucket too, with a
# short `ttl` on the Backup as a belt-and-braces backstop if that request is lost.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
@@ -23,31 +81,603 @@ metadata:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-STATE-03"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L3"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "true"
# executable => runs against a cluster; self-skips (green) until Velero + a
# BackupStorageLocation + the longhorn tier exist.
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
Restore a namespace + volumes from an off-cluster backup into a clean state;
the service returns with its data.
conformance.home.k3s/blocked-by: "OQ-BKP (off-cluster backup target, spec-open)"
Seed known data on longhorn, back the namespace + volume data up to the Velero
object store whose endpoint is proven to be outside this cluster, destroy every
in-cluster copy (namespace, PVC and PV), restore into a clean namespace, and read
the known data back from a newly provisioned volume. Skips cleanly until Velero,
a BackupStorageLocation and a longhorn StorageClass exist.
conformance.home.k3s/never-executed: >-
AUTHORED, NOT YET EXECUTED. No workstation in this repo has cluster access, and
the drill is destructive, so it must first be run by the operator against the dev
cluster in a maintenance window before R-STATE-03 may be called proven. Repo-derived
status deliberately reports proof as not-derivable (conformance/lib/status.py).
spec:
# A full backup -> destroy -> restore cycle over kopia File System Backup, plus
# Longhorn provisioning on HDD, is far slower than any other test here. Bound it
# generously but explicitly (no sleep-and-hope; every wait below is a bounded poll).
# Worst-case bound of the drill step, summing every poll below (seed ~5m + stale-target
# clean ~5m + backup 15m + namespace destroy 12m + PV destroy 5m + restore 15m + restored
# workload Ready 10m ~= 67m). Declared at 75m so the step's own bounded polls, not this
# timeout, are what fail first and report WHICH phase stalled. Nothing here sleeps blindly.
timeouts:
exec: 75m
delete: 10m
cleanup: 15m
steps:
- name: given-off-cluster-backup-exists
try:
- script:
content: 'echo "TODO(T-4.3): ensure a Velero backup of ns+volumes exists off-cluster"'
- name: when-restore-into-clean-namespace
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Preconditions + the OFF-CLUSTER property of the backup target. This step makes
# no changes to the cluster; it either skips cleanly or proves the target is
# genuinely outside the cluster's address space.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: assert-backup-target-is-off-cluster
try:
- script:
content: |
set -euo pipefail
echo "TODO(T-4.4): create a clean target ns; trigger Velero restore of ns+PVs"
- name: then-service-returns-with-data
try:
- script:
content: |
set -euo pipefail
echo "TODO: assert app Ready in restored ns AND canary data present"
echo "DR_RESTORE_OK"
set -eu
# ---- helpers -------------------------------------------------------
# Classify a kubectl failure: an RBAC denial is a HARNESS DEFECT and must
# fail loudly; an absent API is a genuine precondition gap and may skip.
die_or_skip() {
case "$2" in
*orbidden*|*Unauthorized*|*cannot\ list*|*cannot\ get*)
echo "FAIL: conformance runner lacks RBAC for $1 -- fix conformance/incluster/rbac.yaml" >&2
echo "$2" >&2
exit 1 ;;
*)
echo "SKIP: $1 not available on this cluster -- $2"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0 ;;
esac
}
ip2int() {
_q="$(echo "$1" | tr '.' ' ')"
set -- $_q
[ $# -eq 4 ] || { echo -1; return 0; }
echo $(( ($1 * 16777216) + ($2 * 65536) + ($3 * 256) + $4 ))
}
# in_cidr <ip> <a.b.c.d/len> -> 0 when the ip is inside the prefix
in_cidr() {
case "$2" in *"/"*) ;; *) return 1 ;; esac
_net="${2%/*}"; _len="${2#*/}"
case "$_len" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 1 ;; esac
[ "$_len" -ge 0 ] && [ "$_len" -le 32 ] || return 1
_i="$(ip2int "$1")"; _n="$(ip2int "$_net")"
[ "$_i" -ge 0 ] && [ "$_n" -ge 0 ] || return 1
[ "$_len" -eq 0 ] && return 0
_d=1; _s=0
while [ "$_s" -lt $((32 - _len)) ]; do _d=$((_d * 2)); _s=$((_s + 1)); done
[ $(( _i / _d )) -eq $(( _n / _d )) ]
}
# ---- Gate 1: the replicated storage tier the DR-critical data lives on --
if ! kubectl get storageclass longhorn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "SKIP: 'longhorn' StorageClass absent -- no DR-critical data tier on this cluster yet"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
# ---- Gate 2: the Velero API + a configured BackupStorageLocation --------
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.provider}{" "}{.spec.default}{" "}{.spec.config.s3Url}{" "}{.spec.objectStorage.bucket}{"\n"}{end}' \
2>&1)" || die_or_skip "velero.io/backupstoragelocations" "$BSL_LINES"
if [ -z "$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero API present but NO BackupStorageLocation is configured -- no off-cluster backup target yet"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "backup storage locations:"
echo "$BSL_LINES"
VNS="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1)"
# ---- Gate 3: Velero server + node-agent (kopia FSB) actually ready -------
# File System Backup is the volume-DATA path (platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml:
# deployNodeAgent=true, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). Without a
# ready node-agent no volume data can be captured, so the drill is not runnable.
VREADY=0; NAREADY=0
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
VREADY="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get deploy velero -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
NAREADY="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get daemonset node-agent -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: velero readyReplicas=${VREADY:-0} node-agent numberReady=${NAREADY:-0}"
if [ "${VREADY:-0}" -ge 1 ] && [ "${NAREADY:-0}" -ge 1 ]; then break; fi
sleep 10
done
if [ "${VREADY:-0}" -lt 1 ] || [ "${NAREADY:-0}" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero server and/or its node-agent DaemonSet are not ready in ns '$VNS' -- backup/restore path not available"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
# ---- Pick the BSL this drill will use: prefer the default, and it MUST be
# Available. A CONFIGURED-BUT-UNAVAILABLE target is NOT a precondition
# gap -- it is a live R-STATE-03 defect, so it FAILS (after a bounded
# wait for first-validation on a cold start), it does not skip. --------
BSL_NS=""; BSL_NAME=""; BSL_URL=""; BSL_BUCKET=""
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.provider}{" "}{.spec.default}{" "}{.spec.config.s3Url}{" "}{.spec.objectStorage.bucket}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | grep ' true ' | head -1 || true)"
[ -n "$CAND" ] || CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | head -1 || true)"
if [ -n "$CAND" ]; then
BSL_NS="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
BSL_NAME="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f2)"
BSL_URL="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f6)"
BSL_BUCKET="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f7)"
break
fi
echo "poll $i: no Available BackupStorageLocation yet"
sleep 10
done
if [ -z "$BSL_NAME" ]; then
echo "FAIL: a BackupStorageLocation is configured but NONE reached phase 'Available'." >&2
echo " The off-cluster backup target is unreachable -- R-STATE-03 is BROKEN, not merely untested." >&2
echo "$BSL_LINES" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "using BSL ${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} bucket=${BSL_BUCKET} endpoint=${BSL_URL}"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (1): an endpoint we can evaluate ------------------
if [ -z "$BSL_URL" ]; then
echo "FAIL: BackupStorageLocation ${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} exposes no spec.config.s3Url;" >&2
echo " the OFF-CLUSTER property of the backup target cannot be established, so this" >&2
echo " test refuses to claim it. (Extend this check for a non-S3 provider.)" >&2
exit 1
fi
HOST="${BSL_URL#*://}" # strip scheme
HOST="${HOST%%/*}" # strip path
HOST="${HOST%%:*}" # strip port
echo "backup endpoint host: $HOST"
case "$HOST" in
localhost|*.svc|*.svc.cluster.local|*.cluster.local)
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint '$HOST' is a CLUSTER-INTERNAL name -- the backup target is IN the cluster." >&2
echo " An in-cluster backup store cannot satisfy R-STATE-03 (off-cluster backup)." >&2
exit 1 ;;
esac
# Resolve to an IPv4 address. If it cannot be resolved we CANNOT establish the
# off-cluster property -- that is a failure, never a silent pass.
case "$HOST" in
*[!0-9.]*)
# Endpoint given as a name. Try the resolvers that may exist in the
# runner image, in order; if none is available or none resolves, the
# test FAILS below rather than guessing.
EPIP="$(getent ahostsv4 "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)"
[ -n "$EPIP" ] || EPIP="$(getent hosts "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)"
[ -n "$EPIP" ] || EPIP="$(nslookup "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | grep -A2 '^Name:' | grep '^Address' | head -1 | sed 's/.*: *//' || true)" ;;
*) EPIP="$HOST" ;;
esac
if [ -z "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: could not resolve backup endpoint host '$HOST' to an IPv4 address;" >&2
echo " the OFF-CLUSTER property cannot be asserted, so this test does not pass." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "backup endpoint resolves to: $EPIP"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (2): the endpoint is outside every cluster address --
case "$EPIP" in 127.*|0.0.0.0) echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is loopback -- not off-cluster" >&2; exit 1 ;; esac
NODE_IPS="$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .status.addresses[*]}{.address}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $NODE_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a NODE address of this cluster -- the backup is not off-cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any node address (checked $(echo "$NODE_IPS" | grep -c . || true) node addresses)"
SVC_IPS="$(kubectl get svc -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.clusterIP}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $SVC_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a Service ClusterIP -- the backup target lives INSIDE the cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any Service ClusterIP (checked $(echo "$SVC_IPS" | grep -c . || true))"
POD_IPS="$(kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.podIP}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for a in $POD_IPS; do
if [ "$a" = "$EPIP" ]; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP is a POD IP -- the backup target is an in-cluster pod." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is not any Pod IP (checked $(echo "$POD_IPS" | grep -c . || true))"
POD_CIDRS="$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.podCIDR}{"\n"}{range .spec.podCIDRs[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
for c in $POD_CIDRS; do
case "$c" in *:*) continue ;; esac # IPv6 prefixes are out of scope here
if in_cidr "$EPIP" "$c"; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP falls inside node podCIDR $c -- it is in the cluster pod network." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is outside every node podCIDR (checked: $(echo "$POD_CIDRS" | tr '\n' ' '))"
# Best-effort (needs networking.k8s.io/ServiceCIDR, which the least-privilege
# runner may not read): the checks above are the authoritative ones.
SVC_CIDRS="$(kubectl get servicecidrs.networking.k8s.io -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{range .spec.cidrs[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$SVC_CIDRS" ]; then
for c in $SVC_CIDRS; do
case "$c" in *:*) continue ;; esac
if in_cidr "$EPIP" "$c"; then
echo "FAIL: backup endpoint $EPIP falls inside the Service CIDR $c -- it is in the cluster." >&2
exit 1
fi
done
echo "endpoint is outside every ServiceCIDR ($(echo "$SVC_CIDRS" | tr '\n' ' '))"
else
echo "(ServiceCIDR objects unreadable -- skipping that best-effort check; ClusterIP/PodIP/podCIDR checks stand)"
fi
echo "OFF_CLUSTER_TARGET_OK bsl=${BSL_NS}/${BSL_NAME} endpoint=${EPIP} bucket=${BSL_BUCKET}"
check:
(contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_OK')): true
finally:
# green on either a clean precondition skip or a proven off-cluster target.
(contains($stdout, 'OFF_CLUSTER_TARGET_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# R-STATE-03's "scheduled" half: the backup is not a one-off human action.
# Non-destructive, and skipped in lock-step with the step above.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: assert-backups-are-scheduled
try:
- script:
content: 'echo "TODO: delete the restore target namespace (self-cleaning)"'
content: |
set -eu
SCHED="$(kubectl get schedules.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"/"}{.metadata.name}{" phase="}{.status.phase}{" cron="}{.spec.schedule}{" lastBackup="}{.status.lastBackup}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$(echo "$SCHED" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
# Distinguish "Velero absent" (skip, in lock-step with step 1) from
# "Velero present but nothing scheduled" (a real R-STATE-03 defect).
if kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ -z "$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A -o name 2>/dev/null || true)" ]; then
echo "SKIP: no BackupStorageLocation configured -- scheduling not applicable yet"
echo DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "FAIL: Velero is configured with a backup target but declares NO Schedule --" >&2
echo " R-STATE-03 requires SCHEDULED off-cluster backups, not manual ones." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "SKIP: Velero API absent -- backup scheduling not applicable on this cluster yet"
echo DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK
exit 0
fi
echo "velero schedules:"
echo "$SCHED"
# A Schedule that exists but is paused/disabled backs nothing up.
if echo "$SCHED" | grep -q 'phase=Enabled'; then
echo BACKUPS_ARE_SCHEDULED_OK
else
echo "FAIL: no Velero Schedule is in phase 'Enabled' -- scheduled off-cluster backups are not running." >&2
exit 1
fi
check:
(contains($stdout, 'BACKUPS_ARE_SCHEDULED_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_SCHEDULE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The drill itself: seed -> back up off-cluster -> ANNIHILATE -> restore -> read.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: data-restores-from-the-off-cluster-backup
try:
- script:
content: |
set -eu
NS="$NAMESPACE"
SRC="${NS}-dr-src" # scratch source namespace (destroyed by design)
DST="${NS}-dr-dst" # clean restore target (must not pre-exist)
BK="${NS}-dr-backup"
RS="${NS}-dr-restore"
OWNER_LABEL="conformance.home.k3s/created-by=${NS}"
# ---- Re-derive the preconditions (steps do not share shell state). Every
# skip below mirrors step 1 exactly, so the whole test skips or runs
# as a unit -- it can never half-run. -----------------------------
if ! kubectl get storageclass longhorn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "SKIP: 'longhorn' StorageClass absent"; echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
BSL_LINES="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.spec.default}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | grep ' true$' | head -1 || true)"
[ -n "$CAND" ] || CAND="$(echo "$BSL_LINES" | grep ' Available ' | head -1 || true)"
if [ -z "$CAND" ]; then
echo "SKIP: no Available BackupStorageLocation (see the off-cluster step for the authoritative verdict)"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
VNS="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
BSL_NAME="$(echo "$CAND" | cut -d' ' -f2)"
if [ "$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get daemonset node-agent -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "SKIP: Velero node-agent (kopia FSB) not ready -- volume data cannot be backed up"
echo DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK; exit 0
fi
echo "velero ns=$VNS bsl=$BSL_NAME src=$SRC dst=$DST"
# A clean restore target means PREVIOUSLY NONEXISTENT, and the source name must
# be free. If either is lying around from an aborted run, remove it before we
# claim "clean" -- and fail loudly if it will not go, because a half-deleted
# namespace would silently invalidate the destroy proof below.
kubectl delete namespace "$DST" "$SRC" --ignore-not-found --wait=true --timeout=300s
# ============================ GIVEN ==============================
# A DR-critical stateful workload with known data on the replicated tier.
CANARY="dr-canary-$(date +%s%N)"
kubectl create namespace "$SRC"
kubectl label namespace "$SRC" "$OWNER_LABEL" --overwrite
kubectl -n "$SRC" apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: dr-data
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
storageClassName: longhorn
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
EOF
kubectl -n "$SRC" apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: dr-workload
labels:
app: dr-workload
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: app
image: busybox:1.36.1
command: ["sh", "-c", "sleep 7200"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: dr-data
EOF
kubectl -n "$SRC" wait --for=condition=Ready pod/dr-workload --timeout=300s
printf '%s' "$CANARY" | kubectl -n "$SRC" exec -i dr-workload -- sh -c 'cat > /data/canary && sync'
echo "seeded canary: $(kubectl -n "$SRC" exec dr-workload -- cat /data/canary)"
ORIG_PV="$(kubectl -n "$SRC" get pvc dr-data -o jsonpath='{.spec.volumeName}')"
[ -n "$ORIG_PV" ] || { echo "FAIL: source PVC never bound to a PV" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "original in-cluster PersistentVolume: $ORIG_PV"
# ======================= WHEN (part 1): back up off-cluster =======
# Created as a Velero Backup CR -- exactly what `velero backup create` does.
# defaultVolumesToFsBackup:true selects the kopia File System Backup path, so
# the VOLUME DATA (not just the resource JSON) is uploaded to the object store.
# ttl is short: if the finally-step DeleteBackupRequest is ever lost, Velero's
# own GC still removes this drill's objects from the bucket.
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Backup
metadata:
name: ${BK}
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
includedNamespaces: [${SRC}]
storageLocation: ${BSL_NAME}
snapshotVolumes: false
defaultVolumesToFsBackup: true
ttl: 2h0m0s
EOF
BPHASE=""
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
BPHASE="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: backup phase=${BPHASE:-<pending>}"
case "${BPHASE:-}" in
Completed|Failed|PartiallyFailed|FailedValidation) break ;;
esac
sleep 10
done
if [ "${BPHASE:-}" != "Completed" ]; then
echo "FAIL: off-cluster backup did not complete (phase=${BPHASE:-<timeout>})" >&2
kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" -o yaml >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
echo "backup $BK Completed to ${BSL_NAME}"
# ---- OFF-CLUSTER PROOF (3): the VOLUME DATA really landed in the remote
# kopia repository -- a PodVolumeBackup Completed with a snapshot ID.
PVB="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumebackups.velero.io \
-l velero.io/backup-name="$BK" \
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.status.phase}{" "}{.status.snapshotID}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "pod volume backups:"
echo "$PVB"
if [ -z "$(echo "$PVB" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
echo "FAIL: the backup captured NO pod volume data (no PodVolumeBackup)." >&2
echo " Resource-only backups cannot restore DR-critical DATA." >&2
exit 1
fi
# A line is "<name> <phase> <snapshotID>"; require Completed AND a
# non-empty snapshot ID (an empty ID means nothing reached the repository).
GOOD_PVB="$(echo "$PVB" | grep -cE ' Completed [^[:space:]]+$' || true)"
if [ "${GOOD_PVB:-0}" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "FAIL: no PodVolumeBackup reached phase Completed with a snapshot ID --" >&2
echo " the volume data did not reach the off-cluster repository." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "volume data uploaded off-cluster (PodVolumeBackup Completed with a kopia snapshotID)"
# ============ WHEN (part 2): FAULT INJECTION -- annihilate the source ====
# Destroy EVERY in-cluster copy: the pod, the PVC, the namespace, and the
# underlying PersistentVolume (and with it the Longhorn replicas). After this
# there is no in-cluster source the restore could quietly read from.
kubectl delete namespace "$SRC" --wait=true --timeout=420s
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if ! kubectl get namespace "$SRC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
echo "poll $i: waiting for namespace $SRC to disappear"
sleep 10
done
if kubectl get namespace "$SRC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: source namespace $SRC did not terminate; the destroy step is not convincing" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "source namespace destroyed"
# The longhorn StorageClass reclaims Delete, so the PV should already be gone;
# force it if a Retain policy (or a stuck finalizer) left it behind, because a
# surviving PV would make the restore prove nothing about off-cluster recovery.
kubectl delete pv "$ORIG_PV" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if ! kubectl get pv "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
echo "poll $i: waiting for PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV to disappear"
sleep 10
done
if kubectl get pv "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: the original PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV SURVIVED the destroy step." >&2
echo " An in-cluster copy of the data still exists, so a successful restore" >&2
echo " would NOT prove recovery from the off-cluster backup. Refusing to pass." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "original PersistentVolume $ORIG_PV is GONE -- no in-cluster copy of the data remains"
# Best-effort corroboration (the least-privilege runner may not read longhorn.io):
# the Longhorn Volume CR and its replicas should be gone too.
if kubectl -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io "$ORIG_PV" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: Longhorn Volume $ORIG_PV still exists after PV deletion -- replicas survive in-cluster" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "(longhorn Volume CR $ORIG_PV not present -- either deleted or not readable by this identity)"
# ============================ RESTORE ============================
# Into a CLEAN, previously-nonexistent namespace (Velero creates it), which is
# the catalog's "restored into a clean state".
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: Restore
metadata:
name: ${RS}
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
backupName: ${BK}
includedNamespaces: [${SRC}]
namespaceMapping:
${SRC}: ${DST}
existingResourcePolicy: none
EOF
RPHASE=""
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
RPHASE="$(kubectl -n "$VNS" get restores.velero.io "$RS" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "poll $i: restore phase=${RPHASE:-<pending>}"
case "${RPHASE:-}" in
Completed|Failed|PartiallyFailed|FailedValidation) break ;;
esac
sleep 10
done
if [ "${RPHASE:-}" != "Completed" ]; then
echo "FAIL: restore did not complete (phase=${RPHASE:-<timeout>})" >&2
kubectl -n "$VNS" get restores.velero.io "$RS" -o yaml >&2 || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumerestores.velero.io -l velero.io/restore-name="$RS" -o wide >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
echo "restore $RS Completed into $DST"
# ============================= THEN ==============================
# The service returns WITH ITS DATA. With kopia FSB the restored pod carries a
# `restore-wait` init container that blocks until the node-agent has written the
# volume contents back, so Ready here already implies the data landed.
if ! kubectl -n "$DST" wait --for=condition=Ready pod/dr-workload --timeout=600s; then
echo "FAIL: restored workload never became Ready in the clean namespace $DST" >&2
kubectl -n "$DST" describe pod dr-workload >&2 || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" get podvolumerestores.velero.io -l velero.io/restore-name="$RS" -o wide >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
NEW_PV="$(kubectl -n "$DST" get pvc dr-data -o jsonpath='{.spec.volumeName}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "restored PVC bound to PersistentVolume: ${NEW_PV:-<none>}"
[ -n "$NEW_PV" ] || { echo "FAIL: restored PVC did not bind a PV" >&2; exit 1; }
if [ "$NEW_PV" = "$ORIG_PV" ]; then
echo "FAIL: the restored PVC rebound the ORIGINAL PersistentVolume ($ORIG_PV)." >&2
echo " That is an in-cluster survival, not an off-cluster restore." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "restored onto a NEW volume ($NEW_PV != $ORIG_PV) -- the data came from outside the cluster"
GOT="$(kubectl -n "$DST" exec dr-workload -- cat /data/canary)"
echo "recovered='$GOT' expected='$CANARY'"
if [ "$GOT" != "$CANARY" ]; then
echo "FAIL: restored data does not match what was backed up -- DR restore lost/corrupted data" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK
check:
# green on either a clean precondition skip or a proven off-cluster restore.
(contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORED_FROM_OFF_CLUSTER_BACKUP_OK') || contains($stdout, 'DR_RESTORE_SKIPPED_OK')): true
finally:
# ALWAYS RUNS -- on pass, fail, timeout or panic. This test creates namespaces
# and Velero objects OUTSIDE its Chainsaw namespace, so Chainsaw's own namespace
# teardown cannot reclaim them; everything below is keyed to names/labels derived
# from THIS test's namespace, so it can never touch anything it did not create.
- script:
content: |
set -u
NS="$NAMESPACE"
SRC="${NS}-dr-src"; DST="${NS}-dr-dst"; BK="${NS}-dr-backup"; RS="${NS}-dr-restore"
VNS="$(kubectl get backupstoragelocations.velero.io -A -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.namespace}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
# Velero objects first: a DeleteBackupRequest makes Velero remove the backup
# DATA from the off-cluster bucket, not just the CR (self-cleaning contract).
if [ -n "$VNS" ]; then
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete restores.velero.io "$RS" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
if kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF || true
apiVersion: velero.io/v1
kind: DeleteBackupRequest
metadata:
name: ${BK}-delete
namespace: ${VNS}
labels:
conformance.home.k3s/created-by: ${NS}
spec:
backupName: ${BK}
EOF
for i in $(seq 1 18); do
kubectl -n "$VNS" get backups.velero.io "$BK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
sleep 10
done
# Backstop if Velero could not process the request (the 2h ttl also GCs it).
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete backups.velero.io "$BK" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
kubectl -n "$VNS" delete deletebackuprequests.velero.io "${BK}-delete" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
fi
echo "velero objects for $NS cleaned up (ns $VNS)"
fi
# Scratch namespaces (both, in case the run aborted at any point).
for n in "$DST" "$SRC"; do
kubectl delete namespace "$n" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
done
# Anything left labelled as ours (defensive; the two names above are the only
# namespaces this test ever creates).
kubectl delete namespace -l "conformance.home.k3s/created-by=${NS}" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
# Released PVs from either namespace's PVCs would otherwise leak storage.
for pv in $(kubectl get pv -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{" "}{.spec.claimRef.namespace}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null | grep -E " (${SRC}|${DST})$" | cut -d' ' -f1 || true); do
kubectl delete pv "$pv" --ignore-not-found --wait=false || true
echo "released leftover PersistentVolume: $pv"
done
echo "dr-restore teardown complete (best-effort; every object was created by this test)"
infra/PHASE1-STATUS.md
+6
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@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ reconnects to it and re-establishes the toolchain.
> `DECISIONS-LOG.md` entry (2026-08-31)** — it is the current-state + gotchas + prioritized **Next
> Steps** handoff — and the plans under `docs/plans/`. Start at Next Steps.
> **Phase 7 (prod) is OPEN as of 2026-08-31 — prep only.** The first prod node
> (`k3s-prod-1`, `192.168.2.10`) is on the bench. This document covers the **dev** cluster;
> for prod see [`PROD-PROVISIONING.md`](PROD-PROVISIONING.md) (T-7.1 checklist) and the
> Phase-7 entry in `DECISIONS-LOG.md`. Nothing is installed on prod hardware until the
> R-ENV-02 tokenization blockers close and the gate is green.
> **History note.** The cluster was originally 3 libvirt/KVM VMs on the workstation
> (`10.73.0.0/24` NAT). That was **retired** after the workstation ran out of RAM/disk; the cluster
> now lives on **Proxmox VE**. Anything mentioning `virsh`, `qemu:///system`, `tofu`+`dmacvicar/libvirt`,
infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md
+336
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@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
# Prod bare-metal provisioning checklist (T-7.1)
**Task:** T-7.1 · **Workstream:** WS-INFRA · **Serves:** R-ENV-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03, R-PLAT-01/03
**Status:** Phase 7 **opened by the operator 2026-08-31** — *prep only*. Nothing is installed on prod
hardware until the blockers in §7 are closed and `make -C ci gate` is green.
> **Entry-gate note (recorded, not waived).** `roadmap/phases.md` gates Phase 7 on *"Phases 1–6
> proven in dev/test; operator declares prod hardware ready."* The operator has declared hardware
> ready. The first condition is **not** met: conformance is 37/51, and the uncovered set includes
> **R-ENV-01/02/03** — the very requirements this document serves. We proceed with prep work
> knowingly; see `DECISIONS-LOG.md` (2026-08-31 Phase-7 entry).
Prod is **3× mini-PC bare metal** ([spec docs/02](../../home-network-k3s/docs/02-environments-and-provisioning.md)).
The dev path (OpenTofu → Proxmox VM → cloud-init) **does not apply**: there is no hypervisor API to
call. Stage 1 "Create" is a human imaging a box. Stages 2–4 (baseline, cluster-join, manage) reuse
the *same* Ansible roles and the *same* Flux base as dev — that reuse is the R-ENV-02 obligation.
---
## 0. Node inventory
Fill a row per node as it lands. Node 1 is as-found on 2026-08-31.
| | node 1 | node 2 | node 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hostname | `k3s-prod-1` | `k3s-prod-2` | `k3s-prod-3` |
| LAN IP | `192.168.2.10` | `192.168.2.11` | `192.168.2.12` |
| Model | HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Desktop Mini | | |
| CPU | i7-9700T, 8c/8t, VT-x | | |
| RAM | 31 GiB | | |
| Disks | 1× 477 GB SATA SSD (`C400-MTFDDAC512M`) | | |
| OS | Debian 13 (trixie), kernel 6.12 | | |
| Firmware | HP R21 Ver. 02.26.00 | | |
| `/dev/kvm` | present | | |
Dev nodes for comparison: 8 vCPU / 24 GiB / Debian 13, **two** dedicated data disks (Longhorn + etcd).
---
## 1. Firmware / BIOS (per node, before OS install)
- [ ] **Virtualization enabled** — VT-x *and* VT-d. Required for KubeVirt (R-PLAT-03); verify after
boot with `/dev/kvm` present and `grep -cE 'vmx|svm' /proc/cpuinfo` non-zero.
- [ ] **AC power recovery = Power On.** A homelab node must return after a power cut without a
human pressing the button. (`docs/02` calls out wake/boot behaviour explicitly.)
- [ ] **Wake-on-LAN enabled** on the onboard NIC (remote recovery when the box is off).
- [ ] **Boot order** — internal disk first; USB above it only while imaging. Disable network boot
unless PXE is adopted.
- [ ] **Secure Boot** — record the setting. k3s itself is fine either way; note it so all three
nodes match.
- [ ] **Firmware version recorded** in §0 and consistent across all three nodes.
## 2. Disk layout — **OPEN DECISION, blocks the build**
`docs/02` requires the OS-vs-Longhorn device split to be **documented before prod build**. Dev went
further and added a *third* device for etcd after HDD contention starved etcd WAL fsync
(`docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md`).
Node 1 as-found is a **single** 477 GB SATA SSD carrying everything:
```
sda 477G C400-MTFDDAC512M (SSD, ~2011-era Micron/Crucial)
├─sda1 976M /boot/efi
├─sda2 30G /
├─sda3 12G /var
├─sda4 977M swap
└─sda5 433G /srv <- the only large free space
```
Consequences to settle before imaging nodes 2 and 3:
- [x] **Drive health MEASURED 2026-09-01** (`smartctl -a /dev/sda`, via the baseline package
floor — see §5). Raw attributes, so the numbers are auditable:
| | |
|---|---|
| Model | Crucial/Micron RealSSD m4/C400/P400 (`C400-MTFDDAC512MAM`, fw `070H`) |
| SMART self-assessment | **PASSED** — no attribute in `WHEN_FAILED` |
| Power-on hours | 6,814 (~284 days) · 147 power cycles |
| **Rated life used** | **31%** (`202`), i.e. 69% remaining (`173` VALUE 069) |
| **Grown failing blocks** | **15** (`170`), reallocation events **15** (`196`) |
| **Erase failures** | **187** (`172`) |
| **Unexpected power losses** | **32** (`174`) |
| Pending / offline-uncorrectable / reported-uncorrectable | **0 / 0 / 0** (`197`/`198`/`187`) |
| UDMA CRC errors | 0 (`199`) — cabling is clean |
**Read attribute `5` carefully.** Its raw value is `61440`, which is NOT a bad-sector
count: `61440 = 15 x 4096`, and both `170` and `196` independently read **15**. Its
normalised VALUE is 100 against a THRESH of 10. So the drive has **15 grown bad blocks**,
not sixty-one thousand bad sectors. The first `node_health` run FAILED on that raw value;
the check now judges on normalised VALUE/THRESH, `WHEN_FAILED`, and the vendor-independent
uncorrectable counters instead.
**Verdict: usable, but not for production state.** Nothing says imminent failure — no
pending or uncorrectable sectors, SMART self-assessment passes. But this is a ~2011
consumer MLC drive that has already consumed **31% of its rated life**, grown **15** bad
blocks, logged **187** erase failures, and taken **32** unclean power losses **with no
power-loss protection**, in a single failure domain. etcd is the worst possible tenant for
it: etcd fsyncs constantly, and an unclean power loss on a drive without PLP is exactly how
a member corrupts — this drive has already logged 32 of them.
(Non-ECC RAM is a separate, **accepted** risk — operator decision 2026-09-01, see
`DECISIONS-LOG.md`. It is not part of this verdict.)
- [ ] **Decide the layout.**- [ ] **Decide the layout.** `roles/node_baseline` expects *block devices*
(`node_baseline_longhorn_device`, `node_baseline_etcd_device`) and makes a filesystem on them.
Its defaults `/dev/vdb` and `/dev/vdc` are **virtio names that do not exist on bare metal** —
prod must override them in `group_vars`. On a single-disk node there is no second device at
all, so one of:
- **Add a second drive** (M.2 NVMe if the chassis has a free slot; verify physically — only a
SATA controller is populated today). Cleanest: matches dev's isolation, gives etcd its own
spindle.
- **Use `/dev/sda5`** (the 433 GB `/srv` partition) as the Longhorn device, etcd stays on `/`.
Buildable today, zero spend, but re-creates the shared-spindle contention dev was burned by.
- **Repartition** into dedicated OS / etcd / Longhorn partitions. Better isolation, still one
physical failure domain.
- [ ] **All three nodes get the identical layout.** Longhorn replica placement assumes symmetry.
- [ ] Record the chosen device paths here and set them in
`infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` (they are deliberately
`/dev/BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision-…` placeholders today — do **not** guess). A full
`node-baseline` run against a node still carrying those placeholders now stops on an explicit
assert naming this section, instead of failing obscurely at `mkfs` time.
- [x] **The SMART-vs-smartmontools circular dependency is broken** (2026-08-31). `roles/node_baseline`
is tagged `packages` / `system` / `disks`, so the package floor can land **without** the disk
tasks this decision blocks — see §5's drive-health box for the exact command.
## 3. OS install (per node)
- [ ] **Debian 13 (trixie)**, matching dev exactly — same kernel series, same package baseline.
- [ ] Hostname `k3s-prod-N`.
- [ ] Partition per the §2 decision.
- [ ] **No cloud-init needed.** Dev's first-boot work was deliberately moved into
`roles/node_baseline` when provisioning became API-only (`infra/cloud-init/` is a README now),
so the same role covers bare metal. Nothing to port.
## 4. Network (per node)
- [ ] **Static IP** on the prod LAN, recorded in §0. Node 1 is `192.168.2.10/24`, gateway
`192.168.2.1`.
- [x] **Prod address plan — DECIDED (operator, 2026-08-31).**
| Role | Address | Owned by |
|---|---|---|
| `k3s-prod-1` / `-2` / `-3` | `192.168.2.10` / `.11` / `.12` | Ansible inventory |
| **kube-vip control-plane VIP** | `192.168.2.9` | Ansible (`group_vars/k3s_prod`) |
| **Ingress Gateway VIP** (`GATEWAY_VIP`) | `192.168.2.20` | Flux (`clusters/prod`) |
| **Cilium L2 announcement pool** | `192.168.2.20` – `.30` | Flux (`platform-config/cilium`) |
Two deliberate properties, both mirroring dev:
- The **control-plane VIP sits outside the LB pool** (`.9`, below the nodes), so kube-vip and
Cilium LB-IPAM can never contend for the same address. Dev achieves this the other way
round (`.49` control-plane, pool `.53-.60`).
- **`GATEWAY_VIP` is the FIRST address of the pool.** Cilium LB-IPAM can only allocate from a
defined pool block, so a Gateway VIP outside every pool would not be allocatable — the pool
was widened from `.21-.30` to `.20-.30` for exactly this reason. Dev has the same shape
(`GATEWAY_VIP` `.53` = first of `.53-.60`).
- [ ] **Reserve all of `192.168.2.9` and `.20-.30` outside any DHCP range** on the prod LAN before
the build, and confirm nothing else on the network already answers on them.
- [ ] **Resolver: SECOND UPSTREAM IS AN OPEN DECISION — blocks `node-baseline.yml --tags dns`.**
Node 1 has a single IPv4 nameserver, `192.168.2.1`, which is also the LAN gateway. A single
upstream is a known SPOF that has already bitten this project — it broke containerd image
pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev.
The MECHANISM is now in the repo and needs no further work: the `dns`-tagged block in
`roles/node_baseline` detects whether a node uses systemd-resolved (dev: writes
`/etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/99-k3s-dns.conf`, restarts resolved) or a directly-managed
`/etc/resolv.conf` (prod's shape: writes the file, refusing if resolvconf/NetworkManager
owns it), and configures the ordered upstream list either way. The earlier
`fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream` branch was **dropped, not merged** — it wrote a netplan
drop-in and ran `netplan apply`, and netplan is not installed on these Debian 13 trixie
nodes, so it would have broken `node-baseline.yml` on every host.
What is still MISSING is the VALUE. `group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` sets
`node_baseline_dns_servers` to `192.168.2.1` followed by the deliberately invalid
`BLOCKED-pending-second-upstream-decision-see-PROD-PROVISIONING-md-4`, and the role's assert
stops the play on it before writing anything. Choosing the second upstream is a **network
decision, not a default the role may take**: a public resolver (`8.8.8.8`, `1.1.1.1`) would
resolve reliably but would also bypass any local zone and any filtering the gateway applies.
Decide between — and record the choice HERE, in the same change that edits the group_vars:
- a second on-LAN resolver on `192.168.2.x`;
- the dev-side PiHole `192.168.1.18`, **if** prod can actually route to it (unverified —
prod sits on the workstation side of the pfSense boundary);
- an explicit, written-down acceptance of a public resolver as fallback-only.
Also decide whether node 1's current IPv6 nameservers (`2001:4860:4860::8888` / `::8844`)
are kept: the direct-file write path replaces `/etc/resolv.conf` with exactly the listed
servers, so keeping them means listing them explicitly.
`node_baseline_dns_search` is `[]` (no search domain, node 1's behaviour today) until prod's
local domain is decided.
- [ ] Confirm the prod LAN's relationship to the dev LAN (`192.168.1.x`) and to the pfSense NAT —
prod on `192.168.2.x` sits on the *workstation* side of the boundary dev lives behind.
## 5. Access (per node) — **blocks all Ansible**
- [ ] **`k3s` user with the `home_network` SSH key.** Working on node 1.
- [ ] **Password-protected sudo, driven by Ansible `become` + a vaulted password.**
**Prod does NOT use NOPASSWD sudo** (operator decision, 2026-08-31). Dev nodes do; prod
deliberately keeps the sudo password in place and supplies it to Ansible as an
**ansible-vault-encrypted** var, exactly like the existing `hypervisor` and `proxmox_hosts`
groups:
```
inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/
README.md how to (re)create the vault — committed
vault.yml ansible_become_password: "..." — committed, ENCRYPTED
```
The passphrase that decrypts it lives **outside the repo** at
`~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass` (`ansible.cfg :: vault_password_file`), so plays still
run unattended without a plaintext secret ever touching git.
```bash
ansible-vault create inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml # ansible_become_password: ...
```
Prod nodes must therefore set `ansible_become: true` in their group_vars and must **not**
inherit any passwordless-sudo assumption from `group_vars/all.yml`.
- [ ] **Drive health baseline** (§2). **Do not hand-install the tooling** — package installation is
the `node_baseline` role's job, never a manual `apt-get` on a node (operator ruling,
2026-08-31; same click-ops-never principle as the rest of the repo). `smartmontools` is part
of `node_baseline_packages`, so it arrives with the baseline play — but a *full* baseline
would hit the disk tasks §2 has not decided yet. Run the **packages-only** baseline instead
(the `disks`-tagged tasks, including the BLOCKED-device assert, are not selected at all, so
the placeholder device paths are never even templated):
```bash
cd infra/ansible
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml \
-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages --limit k3s-prod-1
```
(Needs `group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml` to exist first — the become password above.) Reading
the drive is then:
```bash
sudo smartctl -a /dev/sda # Power_On_Hours, Percent_Lifetime_Remaining, reallocated sectors
```
Record the result in §2 and close the layout decision in the same change that replaces the
two `node_baseline_*_device` placeholders.
## 6. Ansible baseline & cluster join
Reuses the dev roles **unchanged** — that reuse **is** R-ENV-02. Only inventory and group_vars
differ, plus a target-group override on the command line.
### How prod is targeted (done, 2026-08-31)
Every node-host play used to hardcode the literal dev groups `k3s_servers` / `k3s_primary` /
`k3s_secondary`, so nothing here could select prod at all. Two knobs now close that, deliberately
kept separate because Ansible resolves them at different times:
| Layer | Knob | Set via |
|---|---|---|
| Which hosts a play **runs on** | `k3s_hosts`, `k3s_primary_hosts`, `k3s_secondary_hosts` (each defaults to the dev group) | `-e` **extra vars only** — a play's `hosts:` is templated before any host exists, so `group_vars` is not readable there |
| Which group a **role** means by "my primary" / "my servers" | `k3s_primary_group`, `k3s_servers_group`, `cluster_kubeconfig_name` | `group_vars` — dev in `all.yml`, prod in `k3s_prod/vars.yml`; **no per-run flag** |
So `roles/k3s_server` finds the prod `--cluster-init` founder, builds the prod join target and
tls-san list, and `roles/cilium` fetches the prod kubeconfig, with **no role fork**. Running with
no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had (verified by a before/after
`--list-hosts` diff on every playbook). Full detail: `infra/ansible/README.md` → **Targeting prod**.
- [x] Add a `k3s_prod` inventory group (`k3s_prod_primary` / `k3s_prod_secondary`). Prod is reached
**directly** on the LAN — no NAT port-forward hop, unlike dev's `192.168.2.102:225x` mapping.
(Nodes 2/3 stay commented out until they are physically on the bench.)
- [x] `inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml`: `kube_vip_address` (`192.168.2.9`),
`cluster_controller_api_server`, `k3s_api_host`, the group-name overrides above — **and** the
§2 device overrides for `node_baseline_longhorn_device` / `node_baseline_etcd_device`, which
are still BLOCKED placeholders.
- [ ] `inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml` — the vaulted `ansible_become_password` (§5). Until
it exists **no** prod play can escalate, and `--check` against prod cannot work either.
- [ ] Run the **packages-only** baseline first, to unblock the §2 drive-health read:
```bash
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages
```
- [ ] Run the **full** `playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → packages, kernel
modules, sysctls, iscsid, data-disk filesystems + mounts. **Blocked until §2 is decided**: it
asserts on the placeholder device paths and stops. (`qemu-guest-agent` is a no-op on bare
metal — the role already only *starts* it when the virtio channel exists, so it degrades
cleanly.)
- [ ] Run `playbooks/k3s.yml -e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary`
→ HA embedded etcd, flannel/kube-proxy/Traefik/servicelb disabled. **Only once all three
nodes are present** — see §8.
- [ ] Run `playbooks/kube-vip.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → control-plane VIP (`192.168.2.9`) on the
prod LAN.
- [ ] Run `playbooks/cilium.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` → CNI at bootstrap; Flux's HelmRelease adopts
it afterwards. The bootstrap values and the HelmRelease **must stay in parity**
(`kubeProxyReplacement`, `k8sServiceHost`/`Port`) or the two layers fight over CNI config
(`docs/02`). Note the prod kubeconfig is fetched to `.cache/prod.kubeconfig`, never over the
dev one the dev container exports as `$KUBECONFIG`.
- [ ] Run `playbooks/verify.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod`.
- [ ] `playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` **retargets but is not yet correct**:
`roles/flux_bootstrap` shells out to `bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh`, which bootstraps
`--path=clusters/dev`. Prod needs `--path=clusters/prod` — a `bootstrap/` change, not a
target-group change. Tracked with the other repo blockers in §7.
- [ ] Decide whether prod runs a VPN egress gateway node (dev uses `k3s-dev-3`, ADR-0015).
`playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml` takes `-e vpn_egress_gateway_hosts=<group>`, but there is
deliberately no prod egress group in the inventory yet, and it would need its **own** vaulted
PIA credentials — the existing vault is scoped to the dev group.
## 7. Repo blockers — **prod cannot be reconciled until these land**
`clusters/prod` is design-only today and **would build wrong**. R-ENV-02 promises dev and prod differ
*only* by `cluster-vars` values; in practice dev LAN addresses are hardcoded into base manifests:
| Hardcoded value | Where | Prod needs |
|---|---|---|
| `k8sServiceHost: 192.168.1.50` | `platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml:50`, mirrored in `values.yaml:16` | prod primary node IP |
| LB pool `192.168.1.53–.60` | `platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml:15` | a prod-LAN pool |
| `192.168.1.55` (crafty) | `platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.54` (UniFi VM) | `apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml` | prod-LAN address |
| `192.168.1.9:9000` (S3 backup) | `platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml`, `apps/wave-0/{nextcloud,semaphore}-db.yaml` | reachable prod backup target |
- [ ] **Tokenize each into a `cluster-vars` knob** with a base default, then set the value in *both*
overlays. Adding a knob before referencing `${KNOB}` is the sanctioned mechanism (see the
header comment in `clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml`). `platform`, `platform-config`, the app
waves, `apps-vms` and `crafty` all already carry `postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars`, so
the seam exists.
- [ ] **`clusters/prod` must set `GATEWAY_VIP`.** It currently doesn't, so prod would inherit the
base default `10.73.0.240` — an address from the **retired libvirt network**. The base file's
own comment flags this as owed "when hardware is built."
- [ ] **Dev overlay sets every new knob to today's exact value** so rendered dev output is
byte-identical and the live cluster sees zero drift. Verify with `make -C ci render-golden`.
- [ ] Confirm prod's backup target: dev's S3 (`versitygw` on the Proxmox host, `192.168.1.9`) is on
the dev side of the network. Off-cluster backup is DR-critical (R-STATE-03).
## 8. Build sequence (operator decision, 2026-08-31: **wait for all three nodes**)
Node 1 is baselined now; the cluster is **not** initialized until nodes 2 and 3 are on the bench.
This keeps prod spec-conformant (3-node HA embedded etcd) from its first boot, avoids a
single-server-etcd window, and avoids a later member-add dance.
1. Per-node §1–§5 on each of the three boxes.
2. §7 repo work lands on `main` with the gate green.
3. `node-baseline` → `k3s` (all three) → `kube-vip` → `cilium`.
4. `flux bootstrap ... --path=clusters/prod`.
5. Conformance against prod (§9).
## 9. Exit criteria (Phase 7)
- [ ] Prod runs the same config as dev via the prod overlay, **no base edits** (R-ENV-02).
- [ ] Node destroy/rebuild from IaC + Ansible without data loss (R-ENV-01, R-STATE-01).
- [ ] Full **automated** prod DR drill (R-STATE-03) — `definition-of-done.md` requires this for prod
specifically.
- [ ] Monitoring and alerts live on prod.
- [ ] The conformance suite passes green **against the prod cluster**, not just dev (R-TEST-03).
infra/ansible/.gitignore
+10
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
# Runtime cache written by the cilium/verify/flux plays (fetched kubeconfig,
# rendered Cilium values). Never commit — the kubeconfig is a credential.
.cache/
# Generated node-health reports (roles/node_health, playbooks/node-health.yml).
# Regenerated on every run and they carry drive serial numbers — never commit. Same
# convention as conformance/_artifacts/: generated output is an artifact, not source.
_artifacts/
# Galaxy collections installed by `ansible-galaxy collection install -r
# collections/requirements.yml -p collections/`. Pinned by requirements.yml, fetched at
# setup time — vendored bytes are not source. ansible.cfg sets collections_path.
collections/ansible_collections/
infra/ansible/README.md
+88 -2
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@@ -35,9 +35,10 @@ ansible-playbook playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml # 4. hand off to bootstrap/ (SOP
> **`site.yml` is NOT everything.** It covers the core bring-up only. Two node-host
> layers live OUTSIDE `site.yml` and must be run separately:
> ```
> ansible-playbook playbooks/kube-vip.yml # control-plane VIP (192.168.1.49); targets k3s_servers
> ansible-playbook playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml # node-host OpenVPN split-tunnel + kill-switch; targets k3s-dev-3
> ansible-playbook playbooks/kube-vip.yml # control-plane VIP (192.168.1.49); defaults to k3s_servers
> ansible-playbook playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml # node-host OpenVPN split-tunnel + kill-switch; defaults to k3s-dev-3
> ```
> (Both take the same target-group override as the rest — see **Targeting prod** below.)
## Re-provisioning a node (tofu -replace / fresh OS)
A node rebuild wipes **everything on the host filesystem** — including host-level config
@@ -88,6 +89,91 @@ expose different entrypoints, override the two vars in
`roles/flux_bootstrap/defaults/main.yml`; the task graph is unchanged. Flagged
for PM reconciliation.
## Targeting prod (R-ENV-02: same playbooks, same roles, scoped overrides)
`inventory/hosts.ini` carries a `[k3s_prod_primary]` / `[k3s_prod_secondary]` /
`[k3s_prod:children]` section for the three planned bare-metal nodes (`k3s-prod-1` at
`192.168.2.10` exists and is reachable today; `k3s-prod-2`/`-3` at `.11`/`.12` are addressed but
not yet racked, so their inventory lines stay commented out), with its own `group_vars/k3s_prod/`
(vaulted `ansible_become_password` + non-secret overrides).
**Nothing here is forked for prod.** Every node-host play takes its target group from a variable
that defaults to the dev group, so the dev commands above are unchanged, and prod is the same
command plus an override. Two separate mechanisms, for two separate reasons:
| Layer | Knob | Set via | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which hosts a play **runs on** | `k3s_hosts`, `k3s_primary_hosts`, `k3s_secondary_hosts`, `vpn_egress_gateway_hosts` | `-e` **extra vars only** | Ansible templates a play's `hosts:` *before* it has any host, so it cannot see `group_vars` at all |
| Which group a **role** means by "my primary" / "my servers" | `k3s_primary_group`, `k3s_servers_group` (+ `cluster_kubeconfig_name`) | `group_vars` — dev in `all.yml`, prod in `k3s_prod/vars.yml` | Host context exists by then, so each environment answers for itself with **no per-run flag** — same mechanism `k3s_api_host` already used |
`playbooks/node-health.yml` established the first pattern (`-e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod`); it
keeps its own var name because it is a standalone diagnostic you point anywhere, not part of the
bring-up chain.
```bash
# dev — completely unchanged, no extra vars
ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml
# prod — one flag for the whole-cluster plays
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
ansible-playbook playbooks/cilium.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
ansible-playbook playbooks/kube-vip.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
ansible-playbook playbooks/verify.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
ansible-playbook playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod # see caveat below
# prod — k3s.yml needs both halves of the primary/secondary split
ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml \
-e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary
# prod — the whole chain (extra vars are global, so they reach imported playbooks)
ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml \
-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod \
-e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary \
-e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary
```
What the roles then resolve **by themselves** for a prod host, from `group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml`:
`k3s_primary_group=k3s_prod_primary` (the `--cluster-init` founder, the node-token `delegate_to`
target, and the node Cilium fetches the kubeconfig from), `k3s_servers_group=k3s_prod` (the tls-san
node-IP list), `k3s_api_host=192.168.2.10`, `kube_vip_address=192.168.2.9`, and
`cluster_kubeconfig_name=prod.kubeconfig` — so a prod run can never overwrite the
`.cache/dev.kubeconfig` that `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh` exports as `$KUBECONFIG`.
### Packages-only baseline (`--tags packages`)
`roles/node_baseline` is tagged `packages` / `system` / `disks`. An untagged run is unchanged (all
three, in order). `--tags packages` runs **only** the apt task:
```bash
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages --limit k3s-prod-1
```
This exists to break a circular dependency: prod's disk layout (`infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §2) is
blocked on a SMART read, SMART needs `smartmontools`, `smartmontools` ships in
`node_baseline_packages` — but the role's disk tasks need block devices that decision hasn't chosen
yet. With `--tags packages` no `disks`-tagged task is selected, so the deliberate
`/dev/BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision-…` placeholders in `group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` are never
even templated, let alone handed to `mkfs`. A **full** run against a node whose devices are still
placeholders stops on an explicit assert naming §2 instead of failing obscurely at mkfs time. Never
hand-install packages on a node — that is this role's job (operator ruling, 2026-08-31).
### Still not runnable end to end
- The **disk-layout** (§2) and the `node_baseline_*_device` overrides remain BLOCKED placeholders.
- `group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml` (the become password) does not exist yet, so **no** prod play can
escalate — and `--check` against prod fails for the same reason.
- `flux-bootstrap.yml` retargets, but `roles/flux_bootstrap` shells out to
`bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh`, which bootstraps `--path=clusters/dev`. Prod needs
`--path=clusters/prod`: a `bootstrap/` change, not a target-group change (§7).
- `vpn.egress.gateway.yml` is parameterised (`-e vpn_egress_gateway_hosts=…`) but prod has **no**
egress group yet — whether prod runs one at all is an open §6 decision, and it would need its own
vaulted PIA credentials.
- The operator has ruled the prod cluster stays **uninitialized** until all three nodes are present
(§8). `192.168.2.20` is prod's *ingress* Gateway VIP — a Flux/`cluster-vars` concern, not an
Ansible one; the kube-vip **control-plane** VIP is `192.168.2.9` (`kube_vip_address`).
Everything above this section describes the **dev** runbook; the values in it (`192.168.1.x`,
`.cache/dev.kubeconfig`, `clusters/dev`) are dev's, supplied by `group_vars`, not baked into the
roles.
## Static validation (PM, in dev container — NOT run here)
```
yamllint -c ../../ci/yamllint.yaml infra/ansible
infra/ansible/ansible.cfg
+4
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@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
[defaults]
inventory = inventory/hosts.ini
roles_path = roles
# Galaxy collections live in the repo (gitignored), installed from
# collections/requirements.yml. The devcontainer image does NOT ship them, so without
# this every play dies at parse time on community.general.modprobe.
collections_path = collections
host_key_checking = False
retry_files_enabled = False
# SSH key the k3s nodes authorize for the `k3s` user (see inventory ansible_user).
infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/all.yml
+24 -1
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@@ -4,12 +4,35 @@
# cloud-init created this login user (tofu var login_user); it has NOPASSWD sudo.
ansible_user: k3s
# --- environment group NAMES (R-ENV-02: one set of roles, scoped overrides) ---------
# The GROUP NAMES a role uses to answer "who is MY environment's primary / MY
# environment's servers?". Roles must never hardcode `groups['k3s_primary']`, or they
# only ever work against dev. These two are the dev values; group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml
# overrides them with k3s_prod_primary / k3s_prod, so a host in the prod group resolves
# its own primary automatically — exactly the way k3s_api_host below is overridden there.
#
# These are GROUP NAMES (keys into `groups`), NOT host patterns. The play-level target
# pattern is a separate, extra-vars-only knob (`k3s_hosts` / `k3s_primary_hosts` /
# `k3s_secondary_hosts`, see playbooks/*.yml) because Ansible templates a play's `hosts:`
# before it has any host context and so cannot see group_vars at all.
k3s_primary_group: k3s_primary
k3s_servers_group: k3s_servers
# Filename of the kubeconfig the controller-side roles (cilium, cluster_verify,
# flux_bootstrap) fetch from the primary into infra/ansible/.cache/. Scoped per
# environment so pointing those plays at prod can NEVER overwrite the dev kubeconfig
# that infra/devcontainer/dev.sh exports as $KUBECONFIG — an operator's `kubectl get
# nodes` silently answering from prod would be a genuinely dangerous mix-up.
# group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml overrides this to prod.kubeconfig. (.cache/ is gitignored;
# a kubeconfig is a credential.)
cluster_kubeconfig_name: dev.kubeconfig
# The kube-apiserver endpoint the whole stack agrees on: the primary's REAL node IP.
# NOTE: ansible_host is now the pfSense NAT SSH target (192.168.2.102:225x), NOT the node
# IP — so we read the real 192.168.1.x from k3s_node_ip instead. Used for k3s --tls-san /
# secondary --server AND for Cilium k8sServiceHost so the Ansible bootstrap and the Flux
# HelmRelease stay in PARITY (docs/02 contract).
k3s_api_host: "{{ hostvars[groups['k3s_primary'][0]]['k3s_node_ip'] }}"
k3s_api_host: "{{ hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]]['k3s_node_ip'] }}"
k3s_api_port: 6443
# Control-plane HA VIP floated by kube-vip (roles/kube_vip). A stable failover
infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/README.md
+68
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@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
# group_vars for the `k3s_prod` group (prod k3s nodes — Phase 7 PREP ONLY)
Every node-host play that touches a k3s node (`playbooks/node-baseline.yml`, `k3s.yml`,
`cilium.yml`, `kube-vip.yml`, ...) already runs with `become: true` at the play level. On **dev**
that succeeds without a password (cloud-init's `login_user` gets NOPASSWD sudo). **Prod
deliberately does NOT get that** — operator decision, 2026-08-31 (`DECISIONS-LOG.md`, "PHASE 7
OPENED", finding 3; `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §5). Supply the sudo password as an
**ansible-vault-encrypted** var here — it is encrypted, so it is safe to commit; the passphrase
that decrypts it stays out of the repo, exactly like the existing `hypervisor` and `proxmox_hosts`
groups.
## Two files (one committed-encrypted, one never committed)
1. **The vault passphrase** — a file **outside the repo**, referenced by `ansible.cfg`
(`vault_password_file = ~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass`). Skip this if you already made
one for the `hypervisor` or `proxmox_hosts` vaults — it's the SAME passphrase file, shared by
every vaulted group in this repo:
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/home-k3s
install -m600 /dev/stdin ~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass <<<'YOUR_VAULT_PASSPHRASE'
```
2. **The encrypted become password** — `vault.yml` in **this directory** (committed, encrypted).
`vault.yml.example` alongside it shows the exact shape (see it for the reasoning); copy its
content, fill in the real password, then encrypt it in place — do not commit the `.example`
content unencrypted as `vault.yml`:
```bash
cd infra/ansible
ansible-vault create inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml
# file content (single line):
# ansible_become_password: "THE k3s USER'S SUDO PASSWORD ON k3s-prod-1"
```
(`ansible-vault create` uses the passphrase file above automatically — no prompt.)
Once `vault.yml` exists, prod plays run unattended — same as dev, just with a real sudo boundary
behind them instead of NOPASSWD.
## Notes
- `vault.yml` is skipped by the yamllint gate (`ci/yamllint.yaml` ignores `**/vault.yml`) because a
vault blob is not parseable YAML. `vault.yml.example` is plain YAML and IS linted — it's a
copy-paste scaffold, not a secret (same convention as
`platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.example`).
- The k3s **dev** nodes keep passwordless sudo unchanged — this vault is scoped to the `k3s_prod`
group only.
- `ansible_become: true` for this group is set explicitly in `vars.yml` (this directory) — belt
and braces alongside the playbooks' own `become: true`, so prod's posture is self-documenting
and doesn't rely on inheriting anything from `group_vars/all.yml` by accident.
- Non-secret prod vars live in `vars.yml`, not here — this README is scoped to the vault hand-off.
`k3s_api_host` is set to a real value. `kube_vip_address`, `cluster_controller_api_server`,
`node_baseline_longhorn_device` and `node_baseline_etcd_device` are all still-BLOCKED
placeholders pending operator decisions (control-plane VIP and disk layout, respectively) — see
`vars.yml`'s comments for what IS already decided (node addresses, the separate *ingress* VIP,
which is a Flux/`cluster-vars` concern and does not live here) versus what is not.
- This is the Ansible-bootstrap-layer secret (host credential), distinct from the platform's
in-cluster **SOPS + age** secrets (ADR-0007) — different layer, different tool, same convention
as `hypervisor`/`proxmox_hosts`.
- **Targeting prod is solved** (2026-08-31): plays take `-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` (and, for `k3s.yml`,
`-e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary`), while the
roles resolve "my environment's primary/servers" from `k3s_primary_group` / `k3s_servers_group`
in `vars.yml` here — no role fork, no per-run flag for that half. See
`infra/ansible/README.md` → "Targeting prod".
- **Do not run any prod playbook yet.** Phase 7 is prep-only: the vault above just makes the plays
*able* to authenticate once the §7 repo blockers close and the disk-layout (§2) decision in
`infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` is made. The ONE exception the operator has sanctioned is the
packages-only baseline that unblocks the §2 drive-health read —
`ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages` — which
cannot touch the BLOCKED device placeholders because every disk task is `disks`-tagged and so is
not selected. It still needs `vault.yml` (above) to exist first.
infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml
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@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
---
# group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml — NON-secret prod-scoped overrides for the [k3s_prod]
# umbrella group (inventory/hosts.ini: [k3s_prod_primary]/[k3s_prod_secondary] under
# [k3s_prod:children]). Ansible auto-loads group_vars/<groupname>/*.yml for every host
# that is a (transitive) member of that group. See infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md (T-7.1)
# §5/§6 for the checklist this file implements, and DECISIONS-LOG.md "PHASE 7 OPENED"
# (2026-08-31) for the operator decisions behind it.
#
# Pairs with vault.yml in this same directory (ansible-vault-encrypted, operator-
# created — see README.md here) for the one secret prod needs: ansible_become_password.
#
# PHASE 7 IS PREP ONLY. Five vars below (kube_vip_address, cluster_controller_api_server,
# node_baseline_longhorn_device, node_baseline_etcd_device, and the SECOND entry of
# node_baseline_dns_servers) are deliberately BROKEN
# PLACEHOLDERS, not real values — see their comments. Do not "fix" them with a guess;
# follow the referenced section of PROD-PROVISIONING.md, record the decision there,
# and update this file in the same change.
# --- become posture (§5) ----------------------------------------------------------
# Prod deliberately does NOT get dev's passwordless (NOPASSWD) sudo — operator
# decision, 2026-08-31 (DECISIONS-LOG.md "PHASE 7 OPENED", finding 3). group_vars/
# all.yml carries no explicit `ansible_become` of its own (dev's passwordless sudo
# means become succeeds without a password prompt, not that become is switched off),
# and every node-host playbook already sets `become: true` at the play level
# (node-baseline.yml, k3s.yml, cilium.yml, kube-vip.yml) — for dev that silently
# succeeds because sudo needs no password there. Setting ansible_become explicitly
# here is belt-and-braces: this group's posture is self-documenting and does not rely
# on inheriting dev's assumption by accident.
ansible_become: true
# The password itself is ansible_become_password — ansible-vault-encrypted, in
# vault.yml (this directory), never here in plaintext. See README.md to create it.
# --- environment group NAMES (R-ENV-02) -------------------------------------------
# group_vars/all.yml defines these as the DEV group names (k3s_primary / k3s_servers);
# here they name PROD's groups. Roles index `groups[k3s_primary_group]` /
# `groups[k3s_servers_group]` instead of a literal, so roles/k3s_server and roles/cilium
# resolve "my environment's primary" and "my environment's servers" correctly for prod
# hosts with NO role fork and no per-run flag — the reuse R-ENV-02 promises.
#
# NOTE these are GROUP NAMES, not the play-level target pattern. Selecting which hosts a
# play RUNS against is a separate extra-vars knob (`-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod`, and for
# k3s.yml `-e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary`),
# because Ansible templates `hosts:` before any host — and therefore any group_vars —
# exists. See infra/ansible/README.md "Targeting prod".
k3s_primary_group: k3s_prod_primary
k3s_servers_group: k3s_prod
# Keep the fetched prod kubeconfig in its OWN cache file. group_vars/all.yml defaults this
# to dev.kubeconfig, which is the file infra/devcontainer/dev.sh exports as $KUBECONFIG —
# a prod play must never clobber it (a `kubectl` that silently answers from prod is worse
# than no kubeconfig at all). .cache/ is gitignored; a kubeconfig is a credential.
cluster_kubeconfig_name: prod.kubeconfig
# --- k3s API host — safe to set now, the primary's real IP is already known -------
# Dev's k3s_api_host (group_vars/all.yml) reads a separate k3s_node_ip hostvar because
# dev's ansible_host is the pfSense NAT SSH target, not the node's real address. Prod
# has NO NAT hop — ansible_host in hosts.ini IS already the node's real, routable LAN
# address (see the KEY DIFFERENCE note there) — so point straight at it instead of
# needing a k3s_node_ip split.
k3s_api_host: "{{ hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]]['ansible_host'] }}"
# cluster_controller_tls_server_name (group_vars/all.yml) derives from kube_vip_address
# by template reference, so it needs no separate override here — it picks up the real
# value set below automatically for prod hosts too.
# --- control-plane VIP + controller access — DECIDED (§4) -------------------------
# Prod addressing, all decided by the operator 2026-08-31:
# nodes k3s-prod-1/2/3 192.168.2.10 / .11 / .12 (hosts.ini)
# control-plane VIP 192.168.2.9 (THIS value — kube-vip, Ansible-side)
# ingress Gateway VIP 192.168.2.20 (Flux/cluster-vars — NOT here)
# ingress L2 pool 192.168.2.20 - .30 (Flux/cluster-vars — NOT here)
#
# The control-plane VIP sits BELOW the node addresses and deliberately OUTSIDE the
# Cilium LB pool (.20-.30), so kube-vip and Cilium LB-IPAM can never contend for the
# same address. That separation is the point: dev learned the same shape the other way
# round (control-plane .49, ingress pool .53-.60).
#
# This is the address kube-vip floats for the API and that k3s tls-san's onto its
# serving cert; secondaries use it as their --server join target. Dev's equivalent is
# kube_vip_address: 192.168.1.49 in group_vars/all.yml.
#
# HISTORY: an earlier pass here wrongly set this to 192.168.2.20 — that is the INGRESS
# VIP, not the control-plane VIP. Corrected. Keep the two distinct.
kube_vip_address: "192.168.2.9"
# Derived from kube_vip_address above (not repeated), so fixing the one line above is
# the only change needed once a real control-plane VIP is chosen. Prod has no NAT hop
# (unlike dev's cluster_controller_api_server, the dev-container's NAT path to its VIP
# — see group_vars/all.yml), so once real this collapses to a direct "https://<VIP>:6443".
cluster_controller_api_server: "https://{{ kube_vip_address }}:6443"
# --- node_baseline data-disk devices — BLOCKED, open decision (§2) ----------------
# roles/node_baseline defaults (node_baseline_longhorn_device: /dev/vdb,
# node_baseline_etcd_device: /dev/vdc) assume tofu-provisioned virtio disks that DO
# NOT EXIST on bare metal. Node 1 is a SINGLE SATA disk (/dev/sda) with no free block
# device at all today; PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2 lists three candidate fixes (add a
# second drive / repartition / reuse the /dev/sda5 "/srv" partition) that all wait on
# a SMART health read of a ~15-year-old consumer SSD (operator decision, 2026-08-31).
#
# The overrides below are deliberately present-but-broken: leaving them UNSET would
# let the role silently fall back to /dev/vdb//dev/vdc, which ALSO don't exist on this
# hardware — a confusing failure that looks like a wiring bug. This value fails just
# as hard, but says exactly why, and blocks a `find`/glob from accidentally matching
# a real device. DO NOT replace with a guess — replace only once §2 is decided, and
# record the chosen device paths in PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2 in the SAME change that
# updates these two lines. All three nodes must end up with an identical layout
# (Longhorn replica placement assumes symmetry) before any of this is used for real.
node_baseline_longhorn_device: "/dev/BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision-see-PROD-PROVISIONING-md-2"
node_baseline_etcd_device: "/dev/BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision-see-PROD-PROVISIONING-md-2"
# --- node_baseline DNS upstreams — SECOND UPSTREAM BLOCKED, open decision (§4) -----
# roles/node_baseline defaults are DEV's list (192.168.1.18 PiHole, then 192.168.1.1
# pfSense) — addresses on a network prod cannot even reach. Inherited verbatim they would
# point every prod node at a PiHole that does not answer it, so they are overridden here,
# in the same seam as kube_vip_address / k3s_api_host / cluster_kubeconfig_name above.
# (NOT clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml: that ConfigMap is consumed by Flux
# postBuild.substituteFrom for platform/ and apps/ manifests, and no Ansible code reads it.)
#
# WHAT IS DECIDED: 192.168.2.1 — node 1's current sole nameserver, and the LAN gateway.
# It stays FIRST, so whatever local zone it serves keeps working (the dev outage taught
# that ordering is policy, not preference — see the role's defaults).
#
# WHAT IS NOT: the SECOND upstream. 192.168.2.1 is presently gateway AND only IPv4
# resolver, and there is no second address on this LAN that is known to answer. Picking
# one is a NETWORK decision, not a default this role may take: a public resolver
# (8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1) would resolve reliably but would ALSO bypass any local zone and any
# network-level filtering the gateway applies — precisely the bypass the dev fix refused
# to make. Candidates the operator must choose between and record in
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4: a second on-LAN resolver, the dev-side PiHole IF prod can
# route to 192.168.1.18, or an explicit, written-down decision to accept a public resolver
# as fallback-only.
#
# Deliberately present-but-broken, exactly like node_baseline_longhorn_device above:
# leaving the list at one entry, or unset, would either configure the very SPOF this exists
# to remove or silently inherit dev's PiHole. This value can never parse as an address, and
# the `dns`-tagged assert in roles/node_baseline stops the play on the string BLOCKED
# before a single file is written. DO NOT replace it with a guess — replace it only once
# §4 is decided, and record the chosen resolver there in the SAME change.
#
# Note the two Google IPv6 servers currently in node 1's /etc/resolv.conf
# (2001:4860:4860::8888/::8844) are NOT carried over: the direct-file write path replaces
# the file with exactly this list, so if they are to be kept they must be listed here
# explicitly — as part of that same recorded decision.
node_baseline_dns_servers:
# DECIDED (operator, 2026-09-01): prod's resolvers are PUBLIC and deliberately differ
# from dev's. Dev is PiHole-first (192.168.1.18) because dev needs the local jackson.lan
# zone AND split-horizon *.home.keithjackson.dev. Prod has no local resolver on its LAN,
# so it takes two INDEPENDENT public upstreams — which resolves the single-upstream SPOF
# (a single upstream broke containerd image pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev).
- "8.8.8.8"
- "1.1.1.1"
# SCOPE — this file sets NODE resolution only: containerd image pulls, and the upstream
# CoreDNS forwards `.` to. Three different resolvers answer *.home.keithjackson.dev, and
# only ONE of them is configured here:
#
# pods (in-cluster) -> CoreDNS -> platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml, whose `template`
# plugin answers the WHOLE home.keithjackson.dev zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. Entirely
# self-contained in the cluster; PiHole is NOT in this path. Prod is already correct
# (GATEWAY_VIP = 192.168.2.20 in clusters/prod).
# LAN clients -> PiHole. Not a cluster concern.
# nodes -> THIS FILE. Public resolvers, so the zone resolves PUBLICLY.
#
# THE ONE THING THAT BREAKS: the k3s API SERVER is a node process and carries
# `oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab`
# (roles/k3s_server/tasks/main.yml). It reaches the issuer through the NODE resolver, so on
# prod it would get the PUBLIC record instead of the prod Gateway VIP — breaking kubectl
# OIDC SSO. Dev avoids this because its node resolver is PiHole, which answers the zone
# with the dev Gateway VIP.
#
# NOT blocking today (prod has no cluster and no Keycloak yet). Options, in
# PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4: a narrow Ansible-managed /etc/hosts entry pinning
# keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev -> 192.168.2.20 on prod nodes; or a local resolver on the
# prod LAN serving the zone; or run prod on the cert kubeconfig and defer OIDC.
node_baseline_dns_search: []
infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml
+7
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
33643331386138666338353162353562613737343265376639646262663931663239333735366163
3961623239313038313966326339336464383763616266310a313766653231636636393030306635
37653764656235363738363535386539613938393839623462316134383631623464343930383133
6433386532653564630a383036633266353965383565666639363733393531643162366265366537
30313265343035653961666331663534313564333939383038306338666535316639333136363036
6532313164613836663862303561646362303130316136306361
infra/ansible/inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml.example
+25
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# =============================================================================
# TEMPLATE — NOT ENCRYPTED, NOT LOADED (a plain `.example` file; Ansible only reads
# `vault.yml` in this directory, never `vault.yml.example`). Reference scaffold +
# OPERATOR HAND-OFF, same convention as platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.example.
#
# WHAT THIS IS: the sudo (become) password for the `k3s` user on prod k3s nodes.
# Prod deliberately does NOT use passwordless (NOPASSWD) sudo the way dev does —
# operator decision, 2026-08-31 (DECISIONS-LOG.md "PHASE 7 OPENED", finding 3;
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §5). Every play that becomes root on a k3s_prod host
# (node-baseline.yml, k3s.yml, cilium.yml, kube-vip.yml, ...) needs this to escalate.
#
# HAND-OFF STEPS (operator):
# (a) Create the vault passphrase file ONCE, outside the repo, if you don't already
# have one from the `hypervisor`/`proxmox_hosts` vaults (it's the same file,
# shared by every vaulted group in this repo):
# mkdir -p ~/.config/home-k3s
# install -m600 /dev/stdin ~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass <<<'YOUR_VAULT_PASSPHRASE'
# (b) Encrypt the REAL content into inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml — never
# commit this .example file's content unencrypted as vault.yml itself:
# cd infra/ansible
# ansible-vault create inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml
# # paste the single line below with the REAL password, save, exit
# (c) Verify: ansible-vault view inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml
# =============================================================================
ansible_become_password: "REPLACE-ME"
infra/ansible/inventory/hosts.ini
+54
View File
@@ -45,3 +45,57 @@ k3s-dev-3
# `hypervisor` group above (that is `localhost` for host-prereqs.yml, a different machine).
[proxmox_hosts]
proxmox ansible_host=192.168.2.102 ansible_port=22 ansible_user=root ansible_ssh_private_key_file=~/.ssh/home_network
# =============================================================================
# PROD (k3s-prod-*) — Phase 7 PREP ONLY. See infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md (T-7.1,
# especially §5/§6) and DECISIONS-LOG.md "PHASE 7 OPENED" (2026-08-31). Node 1
# (`k3s-prod-1`, HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini) is on the bench and SSH-reachable; nodes 2
# and 3 have not arrived. This section is inventory/group_vars scaffolding only —
# nothing has been run against node 1, and the operator has decided the CLUSTER stays
# uninitialized (no k3s install, no --cluster-init) until all three nodes are present
# (decision #2 in the DECISIONS-LOG entry above) — no single-server-etcd window, no
# later member-add dance.
#
# KEY DIFFERENCE FROM DEV: prod sits DIRECTLY on the 192.168.2.x LAN — no pfSense NAT
# hop in front of it. Dev's `ansible_host` above is a NAT target (192.168.2.102:225x)
# that port-forwards to the node's real 192.168.1.x address, which is why dev also
# carries a separate `k3s_node_ip` per host. Prod needs no such split: `ansible_host`
# below IS already the node's real, routable address, so `k3s_node_ip` is set to the
# SAME value (kept explicit, not omitted, only so the k3s_server role's hostvar lookup
# — see the GAP note below — has something correct to find once that gap is closed).
# `ansible_port` is the node's own real sshd (22). See group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml for
# the k3s_api_host override that reflects this directly-reachable topology.
#
# GROUP-NAME GAP: CLOSED 2026-08-31. The roles and playbooks used to hardcode the
# LITERAL dev groups (`hosts: k3s_servers` / `k3s_primary` / `k3s_secondary`, and
# `groups['k3s_primary']` inside roles/k3s_server + roles/cilium), so nothing could
# select the k3s_prod_* groups below. Both halves are now variables, deliberately kept
# separate because Ansible resolves them at different times:
# * WHICH HOSTS A PLAY RUNS ON — `k3s_hosts` (whole-cluster plays), `k3s_primary_hosts`
# / `k3s_secondary_hosts` (k3s.yml's split), each defaulting to the dev group.
# EXTRA VARS ONLY: a play's `hosts:` is templated before any host exists, so
# group_vars cannot be read there. Prod: `-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` etc.
# * WHICH GROUP A ROLE MEANS BY "MY PRIMARY"/"MY SERVERS" — `k3s_primary_group` /
# `k3s_servers_group`, set in group_vars/all.yml (dev) and group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml
# (prod), so roles resolve their own environment with NO per-run flag — the same
# mechanism k3s_api_host already used.
# Running with no extra vars is byte-for-byte the dev behaviour it always had. See
# infra/ansible/README.md "Targeting prod" and PROD-PROVISIONING.md §6.
# =============================================================================
[k3s_prod_primary]
k3s-prod-1 ansible_host=192.168.2.10 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.10
[k3s_prod_secondary]
# Addresses for nodes 2/3 ARE decided (operator, 2026-08-31 — infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md
# §0), but the nodes themselves are NOT yet racked/imaged/reachable. Left commented so
# no play can accidentally target a host that isn't there; uncomment each line only once
# that node is actually on the bench and answering SSH.
# k3s-prod-2 ansible_host=192.168.2.11 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.11
# k3s-prod-3 ansible_host=192.168.2.12 ansible_port=22 k3s_node_ip=192.168.2.12
# Umbrella group group_vars/k3s_prod/ attaches to (mirrors dev's [k3s_servers:children]
# pattern; named to match the group_vars directory so Ansible auto-loads it).
[k3s_prod:children]
k3s_prod_primary
k3s_prod_secondary
infra/ansible/playbooks/cilium.yml
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
---
# Install Cilium as the CNI (ADR-0002). The cluster is NotReady until this runs.
# Executed from the controller against a fetched kubeconfig (role handles delegation).
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
# ansible-playbook playbooks/cilium.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
# The role's "fetch the kubeconfig from the primary" delegation follows the
# k3s_primary_group group_var, so it picks the prod primary automatically.
- name: Install Cilium CNI
hosts: k3s_servers
hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
become: true
gather_facts: false
roles:
infra/ansible/playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml
+8 -1
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@
---
# FINAL step: hand off to Flux + SOPS (T-1.4). Calls into bootstrap/ (authored by
# the Security + GitOps Engineers) — this play does not author that subtree.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
# ansible-playbook playbooks/flux-bootstrap.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
# NOTE the Flux PATH is a separate concern: roles/flux_bootstrap shells out to
# bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh, which bootstraps --path=clusters/dev. Prod needs
# --path=clusters/prod, which is a bootstrap/ change, NOT a target-group change
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §7 tracks it).
- name: Flux + SOPS bootstrap hand-off
hosts: k3s_servers
hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
become: false
gather_facts: false
roles:
infra/ansible/playbooks/k3s.yml
+13 -2
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,20 @@
# Install the HA k3s control plane (embedded etcd, 3 servers) — ADR-0001.
# Primary founds the cluster (--cluster-init); secondaries join it in a second
# play so the primary's node-token fact is available to them.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): this is the one playbook that needs TWO patterns, because the
# primary/secondary split is the whole point of the file. Both default to dev:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml # dev, unchanged
# ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml \
# -e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary \
# -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary # prod
# The role's OWN "who is the primary" lookups (join token delegate_to, tls-san list)
# do NOT use these — they follow the k3s_primary_group / k3s_servers_group group_vars,
# which prod sets once in group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml. These two vars only choose which
# hosts the plays RUN on, which Ansible resolves before any group_vars exist.
- name: k3s primary (cluster-init)
hosts: k3s_primary
hosts: "{{ k3s_primary_hosts | default('k3s_primary') }}"
become: true
gather_facts: true
roles:
@@ -16,7 +27,7 @@
# an updated tls-san set) triggers the Restart k3s handler: restarting both
# secondaries at once would drop etcd below quorum. One-at-a-time keeps 2/3 up.
- name: k3s secondaries (join)
hosts: k3s_secondary
hosts: "{{ k3s_secondary_hosts | default('k3s_secondary') }}"
become: true
serial: 1
gather_facts: true
infra/ansible/playbooks/kube-vip.yml
+7 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
---
# Deploy kube-vip as the control-plane HA VIP (192.168.1.49) for the kube-API.
# Deploy kube-vip as the control-plane HA VIP (192.168.1.49 on dev) for the kube-API.
# Control-plane ONLY (svc_enable=false) — Cilium owns Service LoadBalancing.
# Writes the manifest into each server's k3s auto-deploy dir; k3s applies it.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
# ansible-playbook playbooks/kube-vip.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
# (the VIP itself comes from kube_vip_address, already scoped per environment in
# group_vars — dev 192.168.1.49, prod 192.168.2.9).
- name: Deploy kube-vip control-plane VIP
hosts: k3s_servers
hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
become: true
gather_facts: true
roles:
infra/ansible/playbooks/node-baseline.yml
+14 -1
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,21 @@
# Node baseline — first-boot floor for k3s/Cilium/Longhorn, moved from cloud-init into
# Ansible so Proxmox provisioning stays API-only (no SSH/SFTP to the hypervisor). Runs
# FIRST in site.yml, before k3s. Idempotent; safe to re-run.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
# See README.md "Targeting prod". The pattern is the one node-health.yml established.
#
# TAGS — this role is the only way `smartmontools` (and the rest of the package floor)
# reaches a node, but its data-disk tasks need block devices that prod has NOT decided
# yet (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2). Run JUST the package floor with:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages
# `--tags packages` runs the apt task ONLY; every disk task carries the `disks` tag and
# is therefore skipped, so the BLOCKED placeholder devices can never be touched. A full
# (untagged) run against a node whose device vars are still placeholders fails fast on an
# explicit assert instead of handing a bogus path to mkfs. See roles/node_baseline.
- name: Baseline the k3s nodes (packages, kernel modules, Longhorn disk, swap-off)
hosts: k3s_servers
hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
become: true
gather_facts: true
roles:
infra/ansible/playbooks/node-health.yml
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
---
# Node hardware health — READ-ONLY inspection of a node's disks, memory, CPU, thermals,
# network and pressure-stall state. Installs nothing, changes nothing, safe to run at any
# time against dev or prod (see roles/node_health for the full contract).
#
# ./dev.sh run bash -c 'cd /work/infra/ansible && \
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-health.yml -e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod'
#
# TARGET GROUP IS A VARIABLE. This play established that pattern; the rest of the node
# playbooks (node-baseline.yml, k3s.yml, cilium.yml, kube-vip.yml, verify.yml,
# flux-bootstrap.yml) now follow it and take `k3s_hosts` / `k3s_primary_hosts` /
# `k3s_secondary_hosts` instead of the literal dev groups they used to hardcode — see
# infra/ansible/README.md "Targeting prod". This one keeps its OWN var name because it is
# a standalone diagnostic you point anywhere, not a step in the bring-up chain: it must
# stay independently targetable (`-e node_health_hosts=<group>`) even while a bring-up run
# is scoped elsewhere. Run it against prod with `-e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod`, or a
# single box with `--limit`.
#
# BECOME: left at the play level exactly as the inventory sets it. The role itself pins
# `ansible_become: false` on every unprivileged task and probes escalation once before
# attempting the only root-only check (SMART), so this play behaves correctly on dev
# (NOPASSWD sudo) and on prod (vaulted become password, or none at all) without any
# per-environment flags. See roles/node_health/tasks/main.yml for why that has to be a
# variable override rather than `become: false`.
- name: Inspect node hardware health (read-only)
hosts: "{{ node_health_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
# The role's own collector supersedes ansible.builtin.setup for this purpose (setup
# exposes no thermal zones, no EDAC, no PSI, no per-disk error counters), so skip the
# fact gathering round trip entirely.
gather_facts: false
roles:
- node_health
infra/ansible/playbooks/site.yml
+12
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,18 @@
# Full dev/test cluster bring-up, in order (docs/02 sequencing; run AFTER
# `tofu apply` has created and cloud-init has baselined the VMs):
# k3s HA install -> Cilium CNI -> verify readiness -> Flux + SOPS hand-off.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): every imported play takes its host pattern from a var that
# defaults to the dev group, so `ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml` with no extra
# vars is byte-for-byte the dev run it always was. Extra vars are global and reach
# imported playbooks, so the whole chain retargets with three flags:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/site.yml \
# -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod \
# -e k3s_primary_hosts=k3s_prod_primary \
# -e k3s_secondary_hosts=k3s_prod_secondary
# DO NOT run that yet — prod is blocked on the disk-layout decision
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2) and the §7 repo blockers, and the operator has ruled
# the prod cluster stays uninitialized until all three nodes are present (§8).
- name: Import - node baseline (packages, kernel modules, Longhorn disk, swap-off)
ansible.builtin.import_playbook: node-baseline.yml
infra/ansible/playbooks/verify.yml
+4 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
---
# Verify Phase-1 exit gate #1: 3 nodes Ready, Cilium/Hubble healthy, no kube-proxy.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
# ansible-playbook playbooks/verify.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
- name: Verify cluster readiness
hosts: k3s_servers
hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
become: false
gather_facts: false
roles:
infra/ansible/playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml
+10 -2
View File
@@ -3,15 +3,23 @@
# (ADR-0015). Host infra — the split-tunnel OpenVPN service + policy routing + scoped
# nftables kill-switch. The CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy that steers vpn-class pods to this
# node's tun0 is authored separately as GitOps (platform/), against the same contract:
# * inventory group `vpn_egress_gateway` (this play's target)
# * inventory group `vpn_egress_gateway` (this play's default target)
# * k8s node label homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-gateway=true (set by the role)
# * host tunnel iface tun0 (split-tunnel; never the node default route)
#
# Secrets come from Ansible vault (inventory/group_vars/vpn_egress_gateway/vault.yml):
# vault_vpn_egress_gateway_pia_username, vault_vpn_egress_gateway_pia_password, vault_vpn_egress_gateway_pia_ovpn
# Run: ansible-playbook playbooks/vpn.egress.gateway.yml
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): the group is a var, defaulting to dev's `vpn_egress_gateway`. Prod
# has NOT decided whether it runs an egress gateway at all, nor on which node
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §6, last box) — so there is deliberately no prod egress
# group in the inventory yet. When there is, point this at it with
# -e vpn_egress_gateway_hosts=<that group>
# and it needs its OWN vaulted PIA credentials group_vars; this play's vault is scoped to
# the dev group.
- name: Configure the node-level VPN egress gateway
hosts: vpn_egress_gateway
hosts: "{{ vpn_egress_gateway_hosts | default('vpn_egress_gateway') }}"
become: true
gather_facts: true # package module + service facts need os facts
roles:
infra/ansible/roles/cilium/defaults/main.yml
+4 -2
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ gateway_api_crd_urls:
# TLSRoute (experimental) is required by Cilium's Gateway API support.
- "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes-sigs/gateway-api/{{ gateway_api_version }}/config/crd/experimental/gateway.networking.k8s.io_tlsroutes.yaml"
# Local kubeconfig fetched from the primary. *.kubeconfig is gitignored.
cilium_kubeconfig: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/dev.kubeconfig"
# Local kubeconfig fetched from the primary. *.kubeconfig is gitignored. The FILENAME
# comes from cluster_kubeconfig_name (group_vars) so a prod run cannot overwrite the dev
# kubeconfig the dev container exports as $KUBECONFIG. R-ENV-02.
cilium_kubeconfig: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/{{ cluster_kubeconfig_name | default('dev.kubeconfig') }}"
cilium_values_path: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/cilium-values.yaml"
# dev: single operator replica to save RAM (PHASE1-SCOPE RAM ceiling). NOT a
infra/ansible/roles/cilium/tasks/main.yml
+4 -1
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,14 @@
# The cluster is NotReady until this completes — expected (PHASE1-SCOPE risks).
# run_once: this whole role acts on the cluster once, not per host.
# k3s_primary_group (group_vars) names THIS environment's primary group — `k3s_primary`
# on dev, `k3s_prod_primary` on prod — so the role fetches the right cluster's kubeconfig
# without being forked per environment (R-ENV-02).
- name: Fetch the k3s kubeconfig from the primary
ansible.builtin.slurp:
src: /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml
register: k3s_kubeconfig_raw
delegate_to: "{{ groups['k3s_primary'][0] }}"
delegate_to: "{{ groups[k3s_primary_group][0] }}"
run_once: true
- name: Ensure the local cache dir exists
infra/ansible/roles/cluster_verify/defaults/main.yml
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
---
# cluster_verify role defaults.
cluster_verify_kubeconfig: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/dev.kubeconfig"
# Filename comes from cluster_kubeconfig_name (group_vars) so dev and prod never share
# one cache file — dev.kubeconfig for dev, prod.kubeconfig for prod. R-ENV-02.
cluster_verify_kubeconfig: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/{{ cluster_kubeconfig_name | default('dev.kubeconfig') }}"
cluster_verify_node_ready_timeout: "300s"
infra/ansible/roles/flux_bootstrap/defaults/main.yml
+2 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
# args below are ASSUMPTIONS the PM must reconcile with those deliverables — see
# roles/flux_bootstrap/tasks/main.yml and infra/ansible/README.md "Interface".
flux_bootstrap_kubeconfig: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/dev.kubeconfig"
# Filename from cluster_kubeconfig_name (group_vars): dev.kubeconfig / prod.kubeconfig.
flux_bootstrap_kubeconfig: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../.cache/{{ cluster_kubeconfig_name | default('dev.kubeconfig') }}"
# Repo root, relative to playbooks/ (infra/ansible/playbooks -> ../../..).
flux_bootstrap_repo_root: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../../.."
infra/ansible/roles/k3s_server/defaults/main.yml
+5 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,11 @@ k3s_server_mode: "secondary"
# the VIP), and 127.0.0.1 (local kubeconfig / health probes). k3s regenerates the
# serving cert on restart when this set changes. Deduplicated (the primary IP is
# also k3s_api_host).
#
# k3s_servers_group — NOT a literal group name — is what makes this role environment-
# agnostic (R-ENV-02): group_vars/all.yml sets it to `k3s_servers` (dev) and
# group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml to `k3s_prod`, so each environment SANs its own servers.
k3s_tls_sans: >-
{{ ([k3s_api_host, kube_vip_address, '127.0.0.1']
+ (groups['k3s_servers'] | map('extract', hostvars, 'k3s_node_ip') | list))
+ (groups[k3s_servers_group] | map('extract', hostvars, 'k3s_node_ip') | list))
| unique }}
infra/ansible/roles/k3s_server/tasks/main.yml
+7 -3
View File
@@ -121,19 +121,23 @@
# contained — delegate_to still reaches the primary even when it isn't a play
# target, so the join no longer depends on a fact an earlier play had to set.
# T-1.5 finding F2 (see DECISIONS-LOG.md).
#
# "The primary" is resolved through k3s_primary_group (group_vars: `k3s_primary` for
# dev, `k3s_prod_primary` for prod), never a literal group name — so a prod secondary
# delegates to the PROD primary using this same role, unchanged (R-ENV-02).
- name: Fetch the k3s node-token directly from the primary (secondary)
ansible.builtin.slurp:
src: /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token
delegate_to: "{{ groups['k3s_primary'][0] }}"
delegate_to: "{{ groups[k3s_primary_group][0] }}"
register: k3s_primary_token_raw
when:
- k3s_server_mode == 'secondary'
- hostvars[groups['k3s_primary'][0]].k3s_node_token is not defined
- hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]].k3s_node_token is not defined
- name: Resolve the join token (secondary)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
k3s_join_token: >-
{{ hostvars[groups['k3s_primary'][0]].k3s_node_token
{{ hostvars[groups[k3s_primary_group][0]].k3s_node_token
| default(k3s_primary_token_raw.content | b64decode | trim, true) }}
when: k3s_server_mode == 'secondary'
infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/defaults/main.yml
+48
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,22 @@
# node_baseline — first-boot floor for k3s/Cilium/Longhorn, moved out of cloud-init
# (Proxmox provisioning is API-only). Runs before k3s (site.yml). Idempotent.
node_baseline_packages:
# VM-only in practice (binds the virtio-serial channel Proxmox attaches) but harmless to install
# unconditionally: the task below only *starts* it when that channel exists, so on bare metal
# (prod) it installs and stays a dormant, disabled unit. Kept in the shared list rather than
# split per-platform so dev and prod install from the exact same package set (R-ENV-02 reuse).
- qemu-guest-agent
- open-iscsi
- nfs-common
- curl
- cryptsetup # Longhorn >=1.12 RequiredPackages check needs the cryptsetup userspace tool (dm_crypt module alone isn't enough)
# Drive health (smartctl) is a PERMANENT part of a bare-metal node's baseline, not a one-off
# manual install: prod runs on real disks that can fail/degrade (see infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md
# §2/§5 — a ~15-year-old consumer SSD on node 1), where dev's virtio disks never needed it.
# Installed here (not hand-run with apt-get) so it's declared, idempotent, and present on every
# node from first baseline — package installation is the role's job, never a manual step
# (operator ruling, 2026-08-31; same click-ops-never principle as the rest of the repo).
- smartmontools
node_baseline_kernel_modules:
- overlay
- br_netfilter
@@ -23,3 +34,40 @@ node_baseline_longhorn_fs_label: longhorn
node_baseline_etcd_device: /dev/vdc
node_baseline_etcd_mount: /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db
node_baseline_etcd_fs_label: k3s-etcd
# --- DNS resilience (R-DNS-01 / R-DNS-03) -------------------------------------------
# These are the DEV values. Prod overrides them in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml
# (the same seam kube_vip_address / k3s_api_host / cluster_kubeconfig_name use) — NOT in
# clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml, which is a Flux postBuild ConfigMap that no Ansible
# code reads.
#
# WHY: the nodes shipped with ONE upstream resolver. PiHole answers the local jackson.lan
# zone instantly but its external recursion flaps (measured 0/25 for registry-1.docker.io /
# quay.io / ghcr.io while gitea.jackson.lan resolved 5/5), and one upstream is a hard SPOF:
# it broke containerd image pulls ("lookup registry-1.docker.io: Try again") AND CoreDNS,
# which forwards to /etc/resolv.conf and flooded its log with i/o timeouts to 192.168.1.18.
#
# ORDER IS THE POLICY. This is a RESILIENCE fix, not a bypass: the first entry stays PiHole,
# so *.jackson.lan and network-wide ad-blocking keep working exactly as before, and the
# second is only ever consulted when the first fails. Both write paths preserve that order
# (systemd-resolved tries the servers of one scope in order; glibc walks `nameserver` lines
# in order). Never put a public resolver first, and never enable `rotate` — either would
# silently take the local zone and the ad-block policy out of the path.
#
# Keep in parity with infra/tofu (var.dns_server, var.network_gateway), which sets the same
# two servers via cloud-init so a freshly rebuilt dev node boots with this list already.
node_baseline_dns_servers:
- 192.168.1.18 # PiHole — local jackson.lan zone + ad-blocking. PRIMARY, keep first.
- 192.168.1.1 # pfSense gateway — reliable external recursion. FALLBACK only.
# Search domain(s). An EMPTY list means "configure no search domain" and is a legitimate
# value (prod uses it — its local domain is not a decided thing), not a missing one.
node_baseline_dns_search:
- jackson.lan
# resolv.conf `options` for the DIRECT-file mechanism only (systemd-resolved does its own
# per-server failover timing and ignores these). glibc's defaults are timeout:5 attempts:2,
# i.e. up to 20s of stalled lookups before it reaches the second server — long enough for
# containerd to give up on a pull. These shorten the failover, and deliberately do NOT
# include `rotate`, which would round-robin the servers and break PiHole-first ordering.
node_baseline_dns_options:
- timeout:2
- attempts:2
infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/handlers/main.yml
+9
View File
@@ -2,3 +2,12 @@
- name: Reload sysctl
ansible.builtin.command: sysctl --system
changed_when: true
# Restarting systemd-resolved re-reads /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/ and re-points the
# 127.0.0.53 stub at the new upstream list. It does NOT touch link addressing or routes,
# so the SSH/NAT session Ansible is running over is unaffected. Only fires when the
# `dns`-tagged drop-in above actually changed, so a re-run of the role is a no-op.
- name: Restart systemd-resolved
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: systemd-resolved
state: restarted
infra/ansible/roles/node_baseline/tasks/main.yml
+272
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,25 @@
---
# TAGS — every task here carries one of `packages`, `system`, `disks` or `dns`. An untagged
# run is unchanged (all four run, in this order). The split exists because the PACKAGE floor
# and the DATA-DISK work have different readiness: packages are safe on any node from
# first contact, while the disk tasks need block devices that a new environment may not
# have decided yet (prod: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2, whose decision is itself blocked
# on a SMART read that needs `smartmontools` — which ships in node_baseline_packages).
# `--tags packages` breaks that circle: it installs the package floor and NOTHING else.
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages
# Skipping is the guard: with `--tags packages` no `disks`-tagged task is selected, so a
# BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision device path is never even templated, let alone handed to
# mkfs. A FULL run against such a node stops at the assert below instead. `dns` (the block
# at the bottom of this file) works the same way and guards its own BLOCKED placeholder:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml --tags dns
- name: Install baseline packages (guest agent, Longhorn/iscsi/nfs prereqs)
ansible.builtin.apt:
name: "{{ node_baseline_packages }}"
state: present
update_cache: true
cache_valid_time: 3600
tags: [packages]
- name: Persist kernel modules for k3s/Cilium/Longhorn
ansible.builtin.copy:
@@ -13,12 +28,14 @@
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: "{{ node_baseline_kernel_modules | join('\n') }}\n"
tags: [system]
- name: Load kernel modules now
community.general.modprobe:
name: "{{ item }}"
state: present
loop: "{{ node_baseline_kernel_modules }}"
tags: [system]
- name: Install sysctl tuning for k3s/Cilium
ansible.builtin.copy:
@@ -34,12 +51,14 @@
fs.inotify.max_user_instances = 8192
fs.inotify.max_user_watches = 524288
notify: Reload sysctl
tags: [system]
- name: Enable and start iscsid (Longhorn prerequisite)
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: iscsid
enabled: true
state: started
tags: [system]
# qemu-guest-agent binds to the virtio-serial channel /dev/virtio-ports/org.qemu.guest_agent.0,
# which Proxmox attaches only when the VM's `agent` option is enabled. Our tofu keeps agent
@@ -51,18 +70,44 @@
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: /dev/virtio-ports/org.qemu.guest_agent.0
register: node_baseline_qga_channel
tags: [system]
- name: Enable qemu-guest-agent (start only when its virtio channel is present)
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: qemu-guest-agent
enabled: true
state: "{{ 'started' if node_baseline_qga_channel.stat.exists else 'stopped' }}"
tags: [system]
# Fail LOUD and EARLY rather than at mkfs time when an environment has not yet decided
# its data-disk layout. group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml deliberately carries
# `/dev/BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision-see-PROD-PROVISIONING-md-2` for both devices (see
# its comments): leaving them unset would fall back to dev's virtio /dev/vdb|/dev/vdc,
# which do not exist on bare metal either — a confusing failure that looks like a wiring
# bug. This assert names the real blocker instead. It is a no-op on dev (/dev/vdb,
# /dev/vdc) and is `disks`-tagged, so `--tags packages` skips it along with the disk work.
- name: Assert this environment's data-disk devices have actually been decided
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- "'BLOCKED' not in node_baseline_longhorn_device"
- "'BLOCKED' not in node_baseline_etcd_device"
fail_msg: >-
node_baseline_longhorn_device / node_baseline_etcd_device are still the BLOCKED
placeholders for this host's environment
(longhorn={{ node_baseline_longhorn_device }}, etcd={{ node_baseline_etcd_device }}).
The disk layout is an OPEN operator decision — see infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2 —
and must NOT be guessed. To install ONLY the package floor (e.g. smartmontools, so
the SMART read that decision waits on can be taken) re-run this play with
`--tags packages`, which skips every disk task including this assert.
quiet: true
tags: [disks]
- name: Create ext4 filesystem on the Longhorn data disk (data-safe; skips if present)
community.general.filesystem:
fstype: ext4
dev: "{{ node_baseline_longhorn_device }}"
opts: "-L {{ node_baseline_longhorn_fs_label }}"
tags: [disks]
- name: Mount the Longhorn data disk
ansible.posix.mount:
@@ -71,6 +116,7 @@
fstype: ext4
opts: "defaults,nofail,x-systemd.device-timeout=5s"
state: mounted
tags: [disks]
# Dedicated SSD etcd disk (docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md). Formats /dev/vdc and
# mounts it at the k3s etcd data dir BEFORE k3s starts, so a rebuilt node comes up with
@@ -84,6 +130,7 @@
fstype: ext4
dev: "{{ node_baseline_etcd_device }}"
opts: "-L {{ node_baseline_etcd_fs_label }}"
tags: [disks]
- name: Mount the dedicated etcd SSD disk at the k3s etcd data dir
ansible.posix.mount:
@@ -96,13 +143,238 @@
dump: "0"
passno: "2"
state: mounted
tags: [disks]
- name: Disable swap now
ansible.builtin.command: swapoff -a
changed_when: false
tags: [system]
- name: Neutralize swap entries in fstab (kubelet requires swap off)
ansible.builtin.replace:
path: /etc/fstab
regexp: '^([^#].*\sswap\s.*)$'
replace: '# \1 # disabled for k3s/kubelet'
tags: [system]
# =====================================================================================
# DNS RESILIENCE — tag `dns` (R-DNS-01 / R-DNS-03)
# =====================================================================================
# Root cause (verified on dev): the nodes carried a SINGLE upstream resolver. PiHole
# (192.168.1.18) answers `*.jackson.lan` instantly but its external recursion flaps —
# 0/25 for registry-1.docker.io / quay.io / ghcr.io while gitea.jackson.lan resolved 5/5.
# One upstream is a hard SPOF: containerd image pulls died with "lookup
# registry-1.docker.io: Try again", and CoreDNS (`forward . /etc/resolv.conf`) flooded its
# log with "i/o timeout" to 192.168.1.18. The fix is ADDITIVE — PiHole stays first so the
# local zone and the ad-blocking policy are untouched; a second upstream is only consulted
# when the first fails. See defaults/main.yml for the ordering rule.
#
# WHY THIS DETECTS INSTEAD OF ASSUMING. An earlier attempt (fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream,
# dropped) wrote /etc/netplan/99-k3s-dns.yaml and ran `netplan apply`. netplan is NOT
# installed on these nodes — they run the Debian 13 trixie generic cloud image
# (infra/tofu/variables.tf) and netplan is not in node_baseline_packages — so that handler
# would have failed command-not-found and broken node-baseline.yml on EVERY node. Worse,
# the two environments do not even share a resolver stack: dev's /etc/resolv.conf is the
# systemd-resolved stub (127.0.0.53) while prod's is a directly-managed file listing
# 192.168.2.1 (it has no cloud-init at all — bare metal). So the mechanism is DETECTED per
# node and the matching seam is written. Adding a third mechanism means adding a branch
# here, not rewriting the role.
#
# All of it is `dns`-tagged, so `--tags packages` (the prod package-floor escape hatch
# documented at the top of this file) still installs nothing but packages.
- name: Determine whether systemd-resolved is running on this node
ansible.builtin.command: systemctl is-active systemd-resolved
register: node_baseline_resolved_active
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
check_mode: false
tags: [dns]
- name: Determine whether NetworkManager is running (it rewrites /etc/resolv.conf)
ansible.builtin.command: systemctl is-active NetworkManager
register: node_baseline_nm_active
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
check_mode: false
tags: [dns]
# follow: false — we need to know whether /etc/resolv.conf IS a symlink and where it
# points, which is the strongest single signal of who owns the file.
- name: Inspect /etc/resolv.conf itself (symlink or real file, and its target)
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: /etc/resolv.conf
follow: false
register: node_baseline_resolv_stat
tags: [dns]
- name: Read the current /etc/resolv.conf contents
ansible.builtin.slurp:
src: /etc/resolv.conf
register: node_baseline_resolv_slurp
failed_when: false
tags: [dns]
# resolvconf/openresolv keeps the authoritative copy under here and regenerates
# /etc/resolv.conf from it, so writing /etc/resolv.conf directly would be silently undone.
- name: Detect a resolvconf/openresolv installation that would clobber /etc/resolv.conf
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: /etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d
register: node_baseline_resolvconf_dir
tags: [dns]
# THE DETECTION. Three outcomes, in priority order:
# systemd-resolved — resolved is running AND it owns /etc/resolv.conf, proven either by
# the symlink pointing into /run/systemd/resolve/ or by the file containing only
# resolved's loopback stub (127.0.0.53 / 127.0.0.54). Writing a resolved drop-in is
# then the ONLY thing that changes real behaviour; writing resolv.conf would be
# overwritten by resolved (or, worse, land in /run and vanish at reboot).
# contended — nobody's stub, but resolvconf or NetworkManager is present/running and
# would regenerate the file underneath us. We do NOT write. The role fails loudly
# below rather than leaving an operator believing a change stuck when it did not.
# resolv-conf-file — a plain, directly-managed /etc/resolv.conf (prod's shape today).
# Safe to own outright.
# resolved running but NOT owning resolv.conf correctly falls through to the file branch:
# in that state the drop-in would change nothing glibc can see.
- name: Detect which resolver mechanism this node actually uses
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_baseline_dns_mechanism: >-
{{
'systemd-resolved' if (node_baseline_resolved_running and node_baseline_resolved_owns_resolv)
else ('contended' if (node_baseline_nm_running or node_baseline_resolvconf_present)
else 'resolv-conf-file')
}}
vars:
node_baseline_resolved_running: "{{ (node_baseline_resolved_active.stdout | default('') | trim) == 'active' }}"
node_baseline_nm_running: "{{ (node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim) == 'active' }}"
node_baseline_resolvconf_present: "{{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }}"
node_baseline_resolv_text: "{{ (node_baseline_resolv_slurp.content | default('') | b64decode) }}"
node_baseline_resolv_ns: "{{ node_baseline_resolv_text | regex_findall('(?m)^\\s*nameserver\\s+(\\S+)') }}"
node_baseline_resolved_owns_resolv: >-
{{ ('/run/systemd/resolve/' in (node_baseline_resolv_stat.stat.lnk_source | default('')))
or ((node_baseline_resolv_ns | length) > 0
and (node_baseline_resolv_ns | reject('in', ['127.0.0.53', '127.0.0.54']) | list | length) == 0) }}
tags: [dns]
- name: Report the detected resolver mechanism
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: >-
resolver mechanism = {{ node_baseline_dns_mechanism }}
(systemd-resolved is-active={{ node_baseline_resolved_active.stdout | default('') | trim }},
NetworkManager is-active={{ node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim }},
/etc/resolv.conf islnk={{ node_baseline_resolv_stat.stat.islnk | default(false) }}
target={{ node_baseline_resolv_stat.stat.lnk_source | default('(not a symlink)') }},
resolvconf dir={{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }})
tags: [dns]
# Same shape, and the same reason, as the data-disk assert above: this environment's
# upstream list is an OPERATOR DECISION, and a placeholder that fails LOUDLY beats both a
# guess and a silent inheritance of dev's PiHole. group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml deliberately
# carries a BLOCKED second entry (see its comments and PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4): prod's
# 192.168.2.1 is currently gateway AND only upstream, and choosing what sits behind it is a
# network decision this role must not make. Running against prod stops HERE, before
# anything is written.
- name: Assert this environment's DNS upstream list has actually been decided
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- node_baseline_dns_servers | length >= 2
- "'BLOCKED' not in (node_baseline_dns_servers | join(' '))"
fail_msg: >-
node_baseline_dns_servers is not a decided, redundant upstream list for this host's
environment (got: {{ node_baseline_dns_servers | join(', ') }}). A single upstream is
the exact SPOF this task exists to remove — it already broke containerd image pulls
and CoreDNS forwarding on dev — so the role will not configure one, and it will NOT
guess a second server: a public resolver would bypass the local zone and the
ad-blocking policy, which is a decision, not a default. Decide the second upstream,
record it in infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4, and set node_baseline_dns_servers in
inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml in the SAME change. To install only the
package floor meanwhile, re-run with `--tags packages`, which skips every DNS task.
quiet: true
tags: [dns]
# The `contended` outcome. Not a warning: an operator who is told "changed" while another
# daemon quietly reverts the file is worse off than one who is told nothing happened.
- name: Refuse to manage /etc/resolv.conf while another resolver manager owns it
ansible.builtin.fail:
msg: >-
/etc/resolv.conf on this node is not the systemd-resolved stub, but
resolvconf/openresolv (/etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d present:
{{ node_baseline_resolvconf_dir.stat.exists | default(false) }}) or NetworkManager
(is-active: {{ node_baseline_nm_active.stdout | default('') | trim }}) is in play and
would regenerate the file underneath this role. Writing it here would look like it
worked and silently revert. Add the matching branch to roles/node_baseline (the
`dns`-tagged block) for whichever manager this node really uses — do not force it.
when: node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'contended'
tags: [dns]
# --- Mechanism A: systemd-resolved (dev's shape today) -------------------------------
# A drop-in, never an edit of /etc/systemd/resolved.conf, so a package upgrade of that file
# never conflicts. `DNS=` is one ORDERED list inside a single resolved scope: resolved uses
# the first server and only rotates to the next when it fails, which is exactly the
# PiHole-primary/fallback behaviour wanted — it is NOT a race between two servers, so a
# gateway NXDOMAIN can never beat PiHole to a jackson.lan answer while PiHole is healthy.
- name: Ensure the systemd-resolved drop-in directory exists
ansible.builtin.file:
path: /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d
state: directory
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0755"
when: node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'systemd-resolved'
tags: [dns]
- name: Configure resilient DNS upstreams via a systemd-resolved drop-in
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.d/99-k3s-dns.conf
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: |
# Managed by the Ansible node_baseline role (tags: dns) — do not edit by hand.
# Ordered upstream list: the FIRST server is the local-zone/ad-blocking resolver and
# stays authoritative; the rest exist only so external resolution (containerd image
# pulls, CoreDNS `forward . /etc/resolv.conf`) survives its recursion flapping.
[Resolve]
DNS={{ node_baseline_dns_servers | join(' ') }}
Domains={{ node_baseline_dns_search | join(' ') }}
# Reset to empty deliberately. systemd ships compiled-in public fallback resolvers
# (Cloudflare/Google) that resolved would reach for if the list above ever came up
# empty — which would silently bypass BOTH the local zone and the network's
# ad-blocking. This fix adds redundancy; it never adds a bypass.
FallbackDNS=
notify: Restart systemd-resolved
when: node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'systemd-resolved'
tags: [dns]
# --- Mechanism B: a directly-managed /etc/resolv.conf (prod's shape today) -----------
# Only reached when nothing else owns the file (the `contended` branch above already
# stopped the play otherwise). glibc walks `nameserver` lines in order and falls through
# on timeout, so ordering carries the same policy as the resolved list.
# NOTE this REPLACES the file: any nameserver currently there and NOT in
# node_baseline_dns_servers is dropped. That is the point — the list in group_vars is the
# whole declared truth — so an environment that wants its existing IPv6 upstreams kept
# must list them there too. `backup: true` leaves the pre-role copy beside it the first
# time it changes, because this file is load-bearing for reaching the node at all.
- name: Configure resilient DNS upstreams directly in /etc/resolv.conf
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: /etc/resolv.conf
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
backup: true
content: |
# Managed by the Ansible node_baseline role (tags: dns) — do not edit by hand.
# Ordered upstream list: the FIRST server is the local-zone resolver and stays
# authoritative; the rest exist only so external resolution (containerd image pulls,
# CoreDNS `forward . /etc/resolv.conf`) survives its recursion flapping.
{% if node_baseline_dns_search | length > 0 %}
search {{ node_baseline_dns_search | join(' ') }}
{% endif %}
{% for server in node_baseline_dns_servers %}
nameserver {{ server }}
{% endfor %}
{% if node_baseline_dns_options | length > 0 %}
options {{ node_baseline_dns_options | join(' ') }}
{% endif %}
when: node_baseline_dns_mechanism == 'resolv-conf-file'
tags: [dns]
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/README.md
+156
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
# `node_health` — read-only node hardware health
Sibling of `roles/cluster_verify`. `cluster_verify` answers *"is the cluster healthy"*;
`node_health` answers *"is the hardware under it healthy"*. Same posture: it **inspects and
reports, it never changes the node**.
Serves **R-ENV-01** (you cannot certify a node you have not measured), **R-ENV-03**
(bare-metal parity with dev) and **R-OBS-04** (node-level observability).
```bash
# prod (all nodes in the k3s_prod group)
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'cd /work/infra/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/node-health.yml -e node_health_hosts=k3s_prod'
# dev (default target), one node
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'cd /work/infra/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/node-health.yml --limit k3s-dev-1'
```
## Contract
- **Read-only and side-effect-free.** It reads `/sys`, `/proc`, `/etc`, runs `lsblk`/`lscpu`,
and — only when it can escalate — `smartctl`. It writes nothing to the node and
**installs nothing**. `smartmontools` is declared in `node_baseline_packages`; if it is
absent the SMART checks SKIP with that as the stated reason (operator ruling 2026-08-31:
package installation is `node_baseline`'s job, never a health check's, never a manual
`apt-get`).
- **A skip is honest; a fake green is a defect.** Every check is `PASS` / `WARN` / `FAIL` /
`SKIP` / `INFO`, and a `SKIP` always carries *why* it could not be measured. Nothing that
was not read is reported as passing. The summary ends with a dedicated
"NOT READ (and why) — these are UNKNOWNS, not passes" section.
- **Works on bare metal and VMs.** Everything absent in a guest (SMART on virtio, DMI,
EDAC, `coretemp`, CPU throttle counters) skips cleanly instead of erroring. Verified
against both `k3s-prod-1` (HP EliteDesk, bare metal) and `k3s-dev-1` (Proxmox VM).
- **Never `become`s unless it must.** Only SMART needs root.
## What it checks
| id | what |
|---|---|
| `access.privilege` | whether `become` works at all (gates the root-only checks) |
| `storage.smart.<disk>` | overall-health, normalised-vs-threshold trips, pending/uncorrectable/CRC counters, lifetime remaining, wear + endurance context, drive temperature — **root only**. See [How the SMART verdict is reached](#how-the-smart-verdict-is-reached) |
| `storage.io_errors` | kernel SCSI/ATA `ioerr_cnt` / `iotmo_cnt` per disk (no root needed) |
| `storage.capacity`, `storage.inodes` | worst mounted filesystem, space and inodes |
| `storage.layout` | physical disks, and whether any device is genuinely free for `node_baseline_longhorn_device` / `node_baseline_etcd_device` |
| `memory.available`, `memory.swap`, `memory.ecc` | headroom, kubelet's swap-off prerequisite, EDAC correctable/uncorrectable counters |
| `cpu.throttle`, `cpu.inventory`, `cpu.virtualisation` | thermal throttle events since boot, topology + frequency scaling, VT-x/AMD-V + `/dev/kvm` (KubeVirt, R-PLAT-03) |
| `thermal.max` | hottest sensor across thermal zones and hwmon chips |
| `pressure.cpu` / `.memory` / `.io` | PSI `some avg60` — dev learned to care about CPU PSI specifically |
| `network.link`, `network.errors`, `network.resolvers` | link state/speed, NIC error counters, DNS upstream redundancy per address family |
| `os.reboot_required`, `os.inventory`, `firmware.inventory` | pending reboot, OS/kernel/uptime, chassis + BIOS |
Thresholds live in `defaults/main.yml` (`node_health_thresholds`); no verdict is hardcoded
in task logic.
## Output
1. A human summary printed in the play output.
2. The same summary and a structured JSON record under
`infra/ansible/_artifacts/node-health/<host>.{txt,json}`.
`_artifacts/` is in `infra/ansible/.gitignore` — the same convention as
`conformance/_artifacts/`. Generated output is never committed (it also carries drive
serial numbers).
## The `become` subtlety (read before editing)
`ansible_become` set as an inventory/group var — which is exactly what
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml` does — is a **connection variable**, and
connection variables **outrank** the `become:` play/task keyword. Verified on
ansible-core 2.20: a task saying `become: false` still tries to sudo and, on prod, dies
with `Missing sudo password` before the module runs. So this role overrides the
**variable** (`vars: ansible_become: false`) on the unprivileged work, and probes
escalation exactly once before attempting SMART.
Equally verified: `failed_when: false` does **not** catch a missing-sudo-password error
(it is raised by the become plugin before the failure expression is evaluated);
`ignore_errors: true` does, and still populates the registered variable. That is why the
escalation probe uses `ignore_errors` — anything else turns "no vault yet" into a hard,
misleading play failure.
## How the SMART verdict is reached
**SMART raw values are vendor-defined and this role does not judge on them.** smartctl(8)
is explicit: "starting with ATA/ATAPI-4, revision 4, the meaning of these Attribute fields
has been made entirely vendor-specific."
This is not theoretical. The first real run of this role FAILED `k3s-prod-1`'s
Crucial/Micron C400 (`C400-MTFDDAC512MAM`, fw `070H`) on `reallocated=61440`, read as a
plain bad-sector count. Micron's own TN-FD-20 *SMART Attributes for the C400 SSD* defines
attribute 5 not as a sector count but as **Reallocated Block Count**, whose raw is "the
grown NAND Flash bad-block count multiplied by the Block_Sector_Count, which is 256 x 8 for
64Gb NAND ... or 256 x 16 for 128Gb NAND (256GB and 512GB)". For this 512GB drive that
multiplier is 256 x 16 = 4096, and 61440 / 4096 = **15** — corroborated on the same drive by
attribute 170 `Grown_Failing_Block_Ct` = 15 and attribute 196 `Reallocated_Event_Count` = 15.
Fifteen grown bad blocks, not sixty-one thousand bad sectors. The verdict was wrong by a
factor of 4096 because it assumed a unit the ATA spec does not guarantee.
### What the check judges on instead
Vendor-**independent** signals only, each of which means the same thing on every drive:
1. **The drive's own overall-health self-assessment** (`smart_status.passed`) — FAIL.
2. **Normalised VALUE vs the MANUFACTURER'S OWN THRESHOLD**, taken from smartctl's
`when_failed` field (`"now"` / `"past"` / `""`). Per smartctl(8), `FAILING_NOW` means the
normalised value is at or below the threshold *the manufacturer set for that attribute on
that model*; a dash means it is OK now and has never failed. This needs no per-vendor
knowledge from us — the vendor already encoded the answer. Pre-fail failing now → FAIL;
Old_age failing now, or anything that failed in the past → WARN.
3. **ATA-standard error counters** whose raw meaning is a plain event count everywhere:
197 pending, 198 offline-uncorrectable, 187 reported-uncorrectable → WARN/FAIL;
199 CRC (SATA link, not media) → WARN only.
4. **NVMe's structured health log** — `critical_warning`, `media_errors`, `percentage_used`.
5. **Wear from the NORMALISED lifetime indicator** (ATA 202/231/233 `value`, or NVMe
`percentage_used`) — a percentage by definition, and therefore portable where raw wear
counts are not.
### What is reported but never produces a FAIL
Vendor raw counts are real information and are all printed with their numbers — grown
bad-block count, reallocation events (196), erase/program failures, unexpected power losses,
and attribute 5's raw shown **beside** the normalised reading that contradicts it. They can
raise a **WARN**, never a FAIL, because their units are vendor-defined.
The endurance counters live in the vendor-specific attribute-ID range (170-174), so they are
matched by **the name smartctl's drive database resolved for that model**, not by a bare ID:
`drivedb.h` is smartmontools' own per-(model, firmware) translation, so keying off its
resolved name borrows that portability instead of hardcoding one vendor's layout. On a drive
drivedb does not recognise, the name is `Unknown_Attribute`, nothing matches, and the field
stays `null` — no claim is made either way.
### Two honesty traps this check does not fall into
- **Zero is not a clean bill of health.** Micron TN-FD-20 states attribute 197 on the C400
"will always be 0, as reallocation will be done on-the-fly". A non-zero 197 is a finding;
a zero one proves nothing. The role reports the number and does not infer health from it.
- **A quiet drive is not necessarily a good drive.** `overall-health=PASSED` with every
threshold un-tripped can still sit alongside a third of rated life consumed, grown bad
blocks, erase failures and unprotected power losses — which is exactly `k3s-prod-1`. Those
produce a WARN *with the numbers*, because a check that called that drive "fine" would be
worse than the false FAIL it replaced.
## Known limits
- Without root: **no SMART** (wear, power-on hours, error counters, drive
temperature) and no DMI serial numbers. On prod that means creating
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml` (see that directory's README) and running
`node-baseline` so `smartmontools` exists — in that order.
- EDAC reports nothing on platforms with no ECC memory controller bound. That is
"ECC status unknown", not "no errors", and the role says so.
- SMART wear and endurance context depends on smartmontools' `drivedb.h` knowing the drive.
On an unrecognised model the vendor attributes are `Unknown_Attribute`; the portable
signals (overall health, normalised-vs-threshold, 197/198/187/199, NVMe log) still apply,
but the wear/endurance context SKIPs rather than guessing.
- `ioerr_cnt` counts commands the kernel saw fail, which includes benign rejected or
unsupported commands during discovery. Attribution needs `dmesg`, which needs root.
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/defaults/main.yml
+138
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---
# node_health — READ-ONLY hardware/health inspection of a node (bare metal or VM).
#
# Sibling of roles/cluster_verify: cluster_verify answers "is the CLUSTER healthy",
# node_health answers "is the HARDWARE under it healthy". Same posture — it inspects and
# reports, it never changes the node. Deliberately NOT part of node_baseline: baseline
# installs and configures, health only looks. That separation is why this role must never
# `apt install` anything (smartmontools is declared in node_baseline_packages; if it is
# missing here the SMART checks SKIP with a reason, they do not self-heal).
#
# Serves R-ENV-01 (reproducible node provisioning — you cannot certify a node you have not
# measured), R-ENV-03 (bare-metal parity) and R-OBS-04 (node-level observability).
# --- Reporting ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# Artifacts land under infra/ansible/_artifacts/node-health/, mirroring the repo's
# conformance/_artifacts/ convention: generated output, regenerated on every run, listed
# in .gitignore, never committed (it also carries drive serial numbers).
node_health_artifact_dir: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../_artifacts/node-health"
node_health_write_artifacts: true
# Print the human summary to the play output as well as writing it to the artifact dir.
node_health_show_summary: true
# Report-only by default: a health check that aborts the play hides the other 20 findings.
# Set true (e.g. in CI or a pre-build gate) to make any FAIL check end the play non-zero.
node_health_fail_on_fail: false
# Same, one step stricter: also fail on WARN.
node_health_fail_on_warn: false
# --- Root-only checks ---------------------------------------------------------------
# Everything this role can read WITHOUT root, it reads without root. Only SMART needs
# escalation (the ATA/NVMe passthrough ioctls are root-only). The role PROBES become
# first and, if escalation is unavailable (e.g. prod's vaulted become password is not
# present — infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §5), those checks report SKIPPED with the exact
# reason. Never a hard failure, and never a fake PASS: a skip is honest.
node_health_try_privileged: true
# --nocheck=standby: never spin up a sleeping disk just to read it. Read-only hygiene.
node_health_smartctl_args: "--json=c --all --nocheck=standby"
# --- Thresholds ---------------------------------------------------------------------
# All verdicts come from here, so a site can retune without touching task logic.
node_health_thresholds:
# Filesystems
fs_used_pct_warn: 80
fs_used_pct_fail: 90
inode_used_pct_warn: 80
# Memory (percentage of MemTotal still available)
mem_available_pct_warn: 15
mem_available_pct_fail: 5
# Temperatures (deg C, any sensor)
temp_warn_c: 70
temp_fail_c: 85
# Pressure-stall: "some" avg60, percent of wall time stalled. Dev learned to care about
# CPU PSI specifically (it shows saturation long before load average makes it obvious).
psi_some_avg60_warn: 10.0
psi_some_avg60_fail: 40.0
# Network
nic_min_speed_mbps: 1000
# A single upstream resolver is a known SPOF on this project — it broke containerd
# image pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev (DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-31, finding 5).
# Counted against the node's REAL upstreams: where systemd-resolved is in use the
# collector looks behind the 127.0.0.53 stub rather than counting it as one server.
# The fix side of this is the `dns`-tagged block in roles/node_baseline.
min_nameservers: 2
# --- SMART (only evaluated when smartctl actually ran) -----------------------------
#
# WHY THESE THRESHOLDS AND NOT "reallocated sectors" ANY MORE.
# The first real run of this role FAILED k3s-prod-1's Crucial/Micron C400 on
# `reallocated=61440`, read as a plain bad-sector count. That verdict was WRONG, and it
# was wrong for a structural reason, not a tuning one: SMART *raw* values are vendor
# defined. smartctl(8) says so outright -- "starting with ATA/ATAPI-4, revision 4, the
# meaning of these Attribute fields has been made entirely vendor-specific". Micron's own
# TN-FD-20 (SMART Attributes for the C400 SSD) defines ID 5 not as a sector count but as
# "Reallocated Block Count", raw = "the grown NAND Flash bad-block count multiplied by the
# Block_Sector_Count, which is 256 x 8 for 64Gb NAND ... or 256 x 16 for 128Gb NAND (256GB
# and 512GB)". 256 x 16 = 4096, and 61440 / 4096 = 15 -- corroborated independently by
# ID 170 Grown_Failing_Block_Ct = 15 and ID 196 Reallocated_Event_Count = 15. Fifteen
# grown bad blocks, not sixty-one thousand bad sectors.
#
# So no threshold below is ever applied to attribute 5's raw value. The verdict comes from
# the signals smartctl itself defines as vendor-INDEPENDENT:
# * the drive's own overall-health self-assessment (smart_status.passed);
# * NORMALISED value vs THRESHOLD, i.e. smartctl's when_failed ("now"/"past"), which is
# the manufacturer's OWN trip point for that attribute on that drive;
# * the ATA-standard error counters whose raw meaning is a plain event count everywhere:
# 197 pending, 198 offline-uncorrectable, 187 reported-uncorrectable, 199 CRC;
# * NVMe's structured health log (critical_warning, media_errors, percentage_used).
# Vendor raw counts are still collected and printed -- they are real information -- but
# they can only ever raise a WARN with the number shown, never a FAIL on their own.
#
# Hard-error counters (197/198/187 raw, NVMe media_errors). A plain event count on every
# drive that implements them. NOTE the converse is not evidence: some drives (the C400
# among them, per TN-FD-20) hard-code 197 to 0 because reallocation happens on the fly, so
# "pending = 0" proves nothing. Nonzero is a finding; zero is not a clean bill of health.
smart_pending_warn: 1
smart_pending_fail: 10
smart_uncorrectable_warn: 1
smart_uncorrectable_fail: 10
# 199 UDMA_CRC_Error_Count -- SATA link/cable integrity, not media. WARN only: it is a
# lifetime count that never resets, so a historic cable reseat should not FAIL a node.
smart_crc_warn: 1
# Wear, from the NORMALISED lifetime indicator (ATA 202/231/233 value, or NVMe
# percentage_used) -- a percentage by definition, so portable in a way raw wear counts
# are not. ..._remaining_* are the "this drive is nearly used up" bands; ..._used_pct_warn
# is the softer "this is not a fresh drive, know that before you put etcd on it" notice
# that PROD-PROVISIONING.md Section 2 actually needs.
smart_lifetime_remaining_warn_pct: 20
smart_lifetime_remaining_fail_pct: 10
smart_life_used_pct_warn: 25
# Reallocation ACTIVITY. 196 Reallocated_Event_Count is an ATA-standard *event* count
# (one per remap operation) and is the portable stand-in for attribute 5's unportable raw.
# WARN-only by design: remapping is what a drive is supposed to do, and how many events
# are "too many" is drive-specific -- the manufacturer already encodes that answer in
# attribute 5's normalised threshold, which the when_failed check above honours.
smart_realloc_events_warn: 1
# Endurance-stress counters, matched by the NAME smartctl's drive database resolved for
# this model rather than by a bare vendor ID -- drivedb IS the portability layer. On a
# drive smartctl does not recognise these simply do not match and nothing is claimed.
smart_erase_fail_warn: 1
smart_program_fail_warn: 1
# Unexpected power loss on a consumer SSD with no power-loss protection: each one is a
# chance of a torn/lost in-flight write. Directly relevant to etcd's fsync contract.
smart_unexpected_power_loss_warn: 10
smart_temp_warn_c: 55
smart_temp_fail_c: 70
# Power-on hours past which a consumer SSD is simply old. Informational — age alone is
# not a failure, but it belongs in the operator's field of view when deciding whether a
# drive may hold production state (PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2).
smart_power_on_hours_notice: 40000
# ATA SMART attribute IDs surfaced verbatim in the report. Vendors disagree on names, so
# the report prints whatever the drive calls them and the checks key off the IDs.
# 170-174 and 189 are the Micron/Crucial (and, by convention, most SSD controllers')
# endurance and grown-bad-block counters; they are the CONTEXT that made the C400 verdict
# above provable, and leaving them out of the report is what let a single misread raw value
# stand unchallenged. 1 and 12 are included so the error-rate and power-cycle baselines are
# visible next to them.
node_health_smart_attribute_ids: [1, 5, 9, 12, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 179, 181,
182, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195, 196, 197,
198, 199, 202, 206, 231, 232, 233, 241, 242, 246]
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/files/node_health_collect.py
+736
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@@ -0,0 +1,736 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# =============================================================================
# node_health_collect.py — UNPRIVILEGED hardware/health collector for one node.
#
# Run by roles/node_health via ansible.builtin.script. Prints ONE JSON document on
# stdout and nothing else. It is strictly READ-ONLY: it opens files under /sys, /proc
# and /etc, and shells out only to read-only queries (`lsblk`, `lscpu`, and `resolvectl dns`
# — the last only when /etc/resolv.conf turns out to be the systemd-resolved stub and the
# real upstreams have to be asked of resolved). It never writes to the node, never installs
# anything, and never needs root.
#
# WHY A COLLECTOR SCRIPT AND NOT 40 ANSIBLE TASKS
# Everything here is "read a sysfs file that may or may not exist and may or may not
# be readable". Expressing that as tasks means ~40 SSH round trips plus fragile Jinja
# parsing of `cat` output. One script is a single round trip, parses in Python where
# it is legible, and — the point that matters for this repo — can express the
# difference between "value is 0" and "value could not be read" HONESTLY, per field,
# instead of collapsing both into an empty string. Anything unreadable is emitted as
# null and appended to the top-level "unreadable" list with the reason. A skip is
# honest; a fake zero is a defect.
#
# WHY NOT ANSIBLE'S OWN setup MODULE
# `setup` gives DMI/CPU/memory/mounts, but none of the things this role exists for:
# thermal zones, EDAC correctable-error counters, CPU throttle counters, PSI
# (/proc/pressure), SCSI per-disk error counters, per-NIC error/drop statistics. The
# role therefore runs with gather_facts disabled and takes everything from here, so
# there is exactly one source of truth for the report and the JSON artifact.
#
# PORTABILITY (bare metal AND VMs — the role must be reusable against the dev nodes)
# Every read is optional. A VM has no DMI product_name worth reading, no coretemp
# hwmon, no EDAC, no SCSI error counters on virtio, and no SMART. All of those come
# back null/absent rather than raising. Nothing in this file assumes an HP EliteDesk.
#
# Python 3.6+, standard library only (no pip, no ansible module deps).
# =============================================================================
import glob
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import time
SCHEMA = "node-health/1"
# Fields that could not be read, with why. Appended to by read_text()/read_int().
UNREADABLE = []
def read_text(path, optional=True):
"""Read a small sysfs/procfs file. Returns stripped str, or None when unreadable.
`optional=False` records the failure in UNREADABLE so the report can say WHY a
check was skipped (permission denied vs. not present are very different answers —
the first is "give Ansible become", the second is "this hardware has no such
sensor")."""
try:
with open(path, "r", errors="replace") as fh:
return fh.read().strip()
except FileNotFoundError:
if not optional:
UNREADABLE.append({"path": path, "reason": "not present"})
return None
except PermissionError:
# ALWAYS recorded, even when optional: permission-denied is the signal that a
# value exists but we lack root, which is exactly what the operator needs told.
UNREADABLE.append({"path": path, "reason": "permission denied (needs root)"})
return None
except OSError as exc:
UNREADABLE.append({"path": path, "reason": "read error: %s" % exc})
return None
def read_int(path, optional=True):
raw = read_text(path, optional=optional)
if raw is None:
return None
try:
return int(raw.split()[0])
except (ValueError, IndexError):
return None
def read_kv(path, sep=":"):
"""Parse a `key: value` file (/proc/meminfo, /etc/os-release) into a dict."""
raw = read_text(path)
if raw is None:
return None
out = {}
for line in raw.splitlines():
if sep not in line:
continue
key, _, value = line.partition(sep)
out[key.strip()] = value.strip().strip('"')
return out
def run(argv, timeout=20):
"""Run a read-only query command. Returns (rc, stdout, stderr); rc None if absent."""
if shutil.which(argv[0]) is None:
return None, "", "%s not installed" % argv[0]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, timeout=timeout
)
return (
proc.returncode,
proc.stdout.decode("utf-8", "replace"),
proc.stderr.decode("utf-8", "replace"),
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
return None, "", str(exc)
# --- DMI / firmware -----------------------------------------------------------------
# /sys/class/dmi/id/* is world-readable EXCEPT the identifying serials
# (product_serial, board_serial, chassis_serial, product_uuid — mode 0400 root). Those
# come back null here and are reported as "needs root", not as "absent". A VM usually
# has the directory but with hypervisor-ish values (QEMU/SeaBIOS), which is fine and
# still worth recording.
DMI_PUBLIC = [
"sys_vendor",
"product_name",
"product_version",
"product_family",
"product_sku",
"board_vendor",
"board_name",
"board_version",
"bios_vendor",
"bios_version",
"bios_date",
"bios_release",
"ec_firmware_release",
"chassis_type",
"chassis_vendor",
]
DMI_ROOT_ONLY = ["product_serial", "board_serial", "chassis_serial", "product_uuid"]
def collect_dmi():
base = "/sys/class/dmi/id"
if not os.path.isdir(base):
return {"present": False}
dmi = {"present": True}
for field in DMI_PUBLIC:
dmi[field] = read_text(os.path.join(base, field))
# Read the root-only ones deliberately so PermissionError lands in UNREADABLE and
# the operator can see exactly which fields root would add.
for field in DMI_ROOT_ONLY:
dmi[field] = read_text(os.path.join(base, field), optional=False)
return dmi
# --- CPU ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
def collect_cpu():
cpu = {}
rc, out, _ = run(["lscpu", "-J"])
lscpu = {}
if rc == 0:
try:
for entry in json.loads(out).get("lscpu", []):
lscpu[entry.get("field", "").rstrip(":")] = entry.get("data")
except ValueError:
lscpu = {}
cpu["model"] = lscpu.get("Model name")
cpu["vendor"] = lscpu.get("Vendor ID")
cpu["architecture"] = lscpu.get("Architecture")
cpu["cpus"] = lscpu.get("CPU(s)")
cpu["threads_per_core"] = lscpu.get("Thread(s) per core")
cpu["cores_per_socket"] = lscpu.get("Core(s) per socket")
cpu["sockets"] = lscpu.get("Socket(s)")
# "Virtualization: VT-x" on bare metal; "Hypervisor vendor: KVM" inside a VM. Both
# are recorded — the first tells us KubeVirt can run here (R-PLAT-03), the second
# tells us this node IS a guest and that SMART/DMI/EDAC skips are expected.
cpu["virtualization"] = lscpu.get("Virtualization")
cpu["hypervisor_vendor"] = lscpu.get("Hypervisor vendor")
cpu["virtualization_type"] = lscpu.get("Virtualization type")
cpu["is_virtual_guest"] = bool(lscpu.get("Hypervisor vendor"))
cpu["kvm_device"] = os.path.exists("/dev/kvm")
flags = (read_text("/proc/cpuinfo") or "")
cpu["hardware_virt_flag"] = bool(re.search(r"^flags\s*:.*\b(vmx|svm)\b", flags, re.M))
# cpufreq: governor/driver and the frequency window. Absent inside most VMs.
cpufreq = "/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq"
if os.path.isdir(cpufreq):
cpu["scaling"] = {
"governor": read_text(cpufreq + "/scaling_governor"),
"driver": read_text(cpufreq + "/scaling_driver"),
"base_khz": read_int(cpufreq + "/base_frequency"),
"min_khz": read_int(cpufreq + "/cpuinfo_min_freq"),
"max_khz": read_int(cpufreq + "/cpuinfo_max_freq"),
"cur_khz": read_int(cpufreq + "/scaling_cur_freq"),
}
else:
cpu["scaling"] = None
# Thermal throttling. These counters are cumulative since boot: non-zero means the
# package or a core has ACTUALLY been clamped, which on a mini-PC in a cupboard is
# the difference between "it fits" and "it cooks". Absent in VMs.
throttle_dirs = sorted(glob.glob("/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/thermal_throttle"))
if throttle_dirs:
core_total = 0
pkg_max = 0
core_time = 0
for tdir in throttle_dirs:
core_total += read_int(tdir + "/core_throttle_count") or 0
core_time += read_int(tdir + "/core_throttle_total_time_ms") or 0
pkg_max = max(pkg_max, read_int(tdir + "/package_throttle_count") or 0)
cpu["throttle"] = {
"core_throttle_count_total": core_total,
"core_throttle_total_time_ms": core_time,
"package_throttle_count": pkg_max,
"cpus_reporting": len(throttle_dirs),
}
else:
cpu["throttle"] = None
load = read_text("/proc/loadavg")
if load:
parts = load.split()
cpu["loadavg"] = [float(parts[0]), float(parts[1]), float(parts[2])]
cpu["runnable"] = parts[3] if len(parts) > 3 else None
return cpu
# --- Memory + EDAC ------------------------------------------------------------------
def collect_memory():
meminfo = read_kv("/proc/meminfo") or {}
def kb(key):
raw = meminfo.get(key)
if not raw:
return None
try:
return int(raw.split()[0])
except (ValueError, IndexError):
return None
mem = {
"mem_total_kb": kb("MemTotal"),
"mem_available_kb": kb("MemAvailable"),
"mem_free_kb": kb("MemFree"),
"swap_total_kb": kb("SwapTotal"),
"swap_free_kb": kb("SwapFree"),
"hugepages_total": kb("HugePages_Total"),
}
# EDAC = the kernel's memory-controller error reporting. Only populated when the
# platform has ECC RAM *and* a driver bound (mc0, mc1, ...). Consumer desktop
# boards and VMs have /sys/devices/system/edac/mc but NO mcN under it — that is
# "ECC not exposed", NOT "zero errors". The distinction is the whole point: we
# report present=false and the check SKIPS rather than claiming a clean bill.
controllers = sorted(glob.glob("/sys/devices/system/edac/mc/mc[0-9]*"))
edac = {
"sysfs_present": os.path.isdir("/sys/devices/system/edac/mc"),
"controllers_present": bool(controllers),
"controllers": [],
"ce_total": None,
"ue_total": None,
}
if controllers:
ce_total = 0
ue_total = 0
for mc in controllers:
ce = read_int(mc + "/ce_count")
ue = read_int(mc + "/ue_count")
edac["controllers"].append(
{
"name": os.path.basename(mc),
"mc_name": read_text(mc + "/mc_name"),
"size_mb": read_int(mc + "/size_mb"),
"ce_count": ce,
"ue_count": ue,
"ce_noinfo_count": read_int(mc + "/ce_noinfo_count"),
"ue_noinfo_count": read_int(mc + "/ue_noinfo_count"),
}
)
ce_total += ce or 0
ue_total += ue or 0
edac["ce_total"] = ce_total
edac["ue_total"] = ue_total
mem["edac"] = edac
return mem
# --- Thermals -----------------------------------------------------------------------
def collect_thermal():
zones = []
for zdir in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone*")):
milli = read_int(zdir + "/temp")
crit = None
for trip in sorted(glob.glob(zdir + "/trip_point_*_type")):
if (read_text(trip) or "") == "critical":
crit = read_int(trip.replace("_type", "_temp"))
break
zones.append(
{
"zone": os.path.basename(zdir),
"type": read_text(zdir + "/type"),
"temp_c": round(milli / 1000.0, 1) if milli is not None else None,
"critical_c": round(crit / 1000.0, 1) if crit is not None else None,
}
)
# hwmon carries the interesting per-chip sensors (coretemp package/cores, PCH, the
# HP embedded controller). Also where FAN inputs live when the platform exposes them.
chips = []
for hdir in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/class/hwmon/hwmon*")):
chip = {"path": os.path.basename(hdir), "name": read_text(hdir + "/name"),
"temps": [], "fans": []}
for tin in sorted(glob.glob(hdir + "/temp*_input")):
milli = read_int(tin)
base = tin[: -len("_input")]
chip["temps"].append(
{
"label": read_text(base + "_label") or os.path.basename(base),
"temp_c": round(milli / 1000.0, 1) if milli is not None else None,
"max_c": (lambda v: round(v / 1000.0, 1) if v is not None else None)(
read_int(base + "_max")
),
"crit_c": (lambda v: round(v / 1000.0, 1) if v is not None else None)(
read_int(base + "_crit")
),
}
)
for fin in sorted(glob.glob(hdir + "/fan*_input")):
base = fin[: -len("_input")]
chip["fans"].append(
{
"label": read_text(base + "_label") or os.path.basename(base),
"rpm": read_int(fin),
}
)
if chip["temps"] or chip["fans"]:
chips.append(chip)
return {"zones": zones, "hwmon": chips}
# --- Pressure-stall (PSI) -----------------------------------------------------------
# /proc/pressure/{cpu,memory,io}. Dev learned to care about CPU PSI (saturation shows
# up here long before load average makes it obvious), so it is first-class in this role.
# Requires CONFIG_PSI=y + psi=1 — absent on some kernels, which SKIPS honestly.
def collect_pressure():
out = {"available": os.path.isdir("/proc/pressure")}
for resource in ("cpu", "memory", "io"):
raw = read_text("/proc/pressure/" + resource)
if raw is None:
out[resource] = None
continue
parsed = {}
for line in raw.splitlines():
fields = line.split()
if not fields:
continue
kind = fields[0] # "some" | "full"
parsed[kind] = {}
for token in fields[1:]:
key, _, value = token.partition("=")
try:
parsed[kind][key] = float(value)
except ValueError:
parsed[kind][key] = value
out[resource] = parsed
return out
# --- Storage ------------------------------------------------------------------------
PSEUDO_FS = {
"proc", "sysfs", "devtmpfs", "devpts", "tmpfs", "cgroup", "cgroup2", "pstore",
"bpf", "securityfs", "debugfs", "tracefs", "configfs", "fusectl", "hugetlbfs",
"mqueue", "efivarfs", "autofs", "binfmt_misc", "ramfs", "nsfs", "squashfs",
"overlay", "fuse.portal",
}
def collect_storage():
disks = []
# lsblk is the reliable source for model/serial/transport (it reads udev, and does
# so WITHOUT root). sysfs fills in what lsblk does not expose: the SCSI-layer error
# counters and the queue tunables.
lsblk_map = {}
rc, out, _ = run(
["lsblk", "-J", "-b", "-o",
"NAME,KNAME,PATH,TYPE,SIZE,ROTA,MODEL,SERIAL,TRAN,REV,FSTYPE,MOUNTPOINTS,PARTLABEL"]
)
lsblk_tree = []
if rc == 0:
try:
lsblk_tree = json.loads(out).get("blockdevices", [])
except ValueError:
lsblk_tree = []
def walk(nodes):
for node in nodes:
lsblk_map[node.get("kname")] = node
walk(node.get("children") or [])
walk(lsblk_tree)
for bdir in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/block/*")):
kname = os.path.basename(bdir)
# Skip pseudo block devices — they carry no hardware health and would only add
# noise to the report (loop mounts, ramdisks, device-mapper stacks, CD-ROM).
if re.match(r"^(loop|ram|sr|fd|dm-|zram|md)", kname):
continue
node = lsblk_map.get(kname, {})
sectors = read_int(bdir + "/size")
dev = bdir + "/device"
disk = {
"kname": kname,
"path": node.get("path") or "/dev/" + kname,
"model": node.get("model") or read_text(dev + "/model"),
"vendor": read_text(dev + "/vendor"),
"firmware_rev": node.get("rev") or read_text(dev + "/rev"),
"serial": node.get("serial"),
"transport": node.get("tran"),
# A device can carry a filesystem DIRECTLY, with no partition table at all —
# which is exactly how roles/node_baseline formats the Longhorn and etcd data
# disks (mkfs on /dev/vdb, mounted by LABEL). Such a device has zero
# partitions but is emphatically NOT spare, so both facts are recorded and
# the "is there a free device" check keys off all three.
"fstype": node.get("fstype"),
"mountpoints": [m for m in (node.get("mountpoints") or []) if m],
"size_bytes": (sectors * 512) if sectors is not None else node.get("size"),
"rotational": (read_int(bdir + "/queue/rotational") == 1)
if read_int(bdir + "/queue/rotational") is not None
else node.get("rota"),
"scheduler": read_text(bdir + "/queue/scheduler"),
"logical_block_size": read_int(bdir + "/queue/logical_block_size"),
"physical_block_size": read_int(bdir + "/queue/physical_block_size"),
# SCSI/ATA error counters, readable WITHOUT root. Not a substitute for SMART
# (no wear, no power-on hours, no reallocated sectors) but a genuine signal:
# ioerr_cnt > 0 means the kernel saw command failures on this device.
"scsi_counters": {
"iodone_cnt": (lambda v: int(v, 16) if v else None)(
read_text(dev + "/iodone_cnt")
),
"ioerr_cnt": (lambda v: int(v, 16) if v else None)(
read_text(dev + "/ioerr_cnt")
),
"iotmo_cnt": (lambda v: int(v, 16) if v else None)(
read_text(dev + "/iotmo_cnt")
),
}
if (os.path.isdir(dev) and os.path.exists(dev + "/ioerr_cnt"))
else None,
"partitions": [],
}
for pdir in sorted(glob.glob(bdir + "/" + kname + "*")):
pname = os.path.basename(pdir)
if not os.path.exists(pdir + "/partition"):
continue
pnode = lsblk_map.get(pname, {})
psect = read_int(pdir + "/size")
disk["partitions"].append(
{
"kname": pname,
"path": pnode.get("path") or "/dev/" + pname,
"size_bytes": (psect * 512) if psect is not None else pnode.get("size"),
"fstype": pnode.get("fstype"),
"partlabel": pnode.get("partlabel"),
"mountpoints": [m for m in (pnode.get("mountpoints") or []) if m],
}
)
disks.append(disk)
# iSCSI/FC devices are ATTACHED VOLUMES, not hardware in this box: on a k3s node they
# are Longhorn replicas the node has logged into, they come and go with workloads, and
# they have no drive health of their own. Keeping them in `disks` would (a) pad the
# report with churn and (b) — far worse — let a Longhorn volume look like a "spare
# device" that node_baseline could be pointed at and reformatted. Split, never dropped.
attached = [d for d in disks if (d.get("transport") or "") in ("iscsi", "fc", "fcoe")]
disks = [d for d in disks if d not in attached]
# Mounted filesystems with real free space, from /proc/self/mounts + statvfs. No
# `df` fork, and no root needed.
mounts = []
raw_mounts = read_text("/proc/self/mounts") or ""
seen = set()
for line in raw_mounts.splitlines():
fields = line.split()
if len(fields) < 3:
continue
source, target, fstype = fields[0], fields[1].replace("\\040", " "), fields[2]
if fstype in PSEUDO_FS or not source.startswith("/dev/"):
continue
if target in seen:
continue
seen.add(target)
try:
st = os.statvfs(target)
except OSError as exc:
UNREADABLE.append({"path": target, "reason": "statvfs failed: %s" % exc})
continue
total = st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize
avail = st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize
mounts.append(
{
"source": source,
"mountpoint": target,
"fstype": fstype,
"options": fields[3] if len(fields) > 3 else None,
"size_bytes": total,
"avail_bytes": avail,
"used_pct": round((total - avail) * 100.0 / total, 1) if total else None,
"inodes_total": st.f_files,
"inodes_avail": st.f_favail,
"inodes_used_pct": round(
(st.f_files - st.f_favail) * 100.0 / st.f_files, 1
)
if st.f_files
else None,
}
)
return {"disks": disks, "attached_volumes": attached, "mounts": mounts}
# --- Network ------------------------------------------------------------------------
def collect_network():
interfaces = []
for ndir in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/class/net/*")):
name = os.path.basename(ndir)
# Only physical/primary interfaces matter for node health. Virtual plumbing
# (cilium_*, lxc*, veth, cni, flannel, docker/podman bridges, k8s tunnels) is
# noise here and churns constantly.
if re.match(r"^(lo|veth|cilium|lxc|cni|flannel|docker|podman|br-|kube|tunl|"
r"vxlan|virbr|tailscale|wg|ip6tnl|sit|dummy|bond_|nodelocal)", name):
continue
stats = {}
for sfile in sorted(glob.glob(ndir + "/statistics/*")):
stats[os.path.basename(sfile)] = read_int(sfile)
speed = read_int(ndir + "/speed") # -1 / unreadable when the link is down
driver = None
drvlink = ndir + "/device/driver"
if os.path.islink(drvlink):
driver = os.path.basename(os.path.realpath(drvlink))
interfaces.append(
{
"name": name,
"operstate": read_text(ndir + "/operstate"),
"carrier": read_int(ndir + "/carrier"),
"speed_mbps": speed if (speed is not None and speed > 0) else None,
"duplex": read_text(ndir + "/duplex"),
"mtu": read_int(ndir + "/mtu"),
"mac": read_text(ndir + "/address"),
"driver": driver,
"virtual": not os.path.exists(ndir + "/device"),
"statistics": {
k: stats.get(k)
for k in (
"rx_packets", "tx_packets", "rx_bytes", "tx_bytes",
"rx_errors", "tx_errors", "rx_dropped", "tx_dropped",
"rx_crc_errors", "rx_frame_errors", "rx_over_errors",
"tx_carrier_errors", "collisions",
)
if k in stats
},
}
)
# Resolver config is a known SPOF class on this project (a single upstream broke
# containerd pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev). Cheap to read here, so the health
# report can flag it on prod too.
resolvers = collect_resolvers()
return {
"interfaces": interfaces,
# List of REAL upstreams, or None when they could not be determined. NEVER the
# loopback stub, and never [] standing in for "unknown".
"nameservers": resolvers["nameservers"],
"resolver_source": resolvers["source"],
"resolver_stub": resolvers["stub"],
"resolver_unavailable_reason": resolvers["unavailable_reason"],
}
# systemd-resolved's loopback listeners. 127.0.0.53 is the stub (the address written into
# /etc/resolv.conf); 127.0.0.54 is the "bypass"/proxy listener. Neither is an UPSTREAM —
# seeing one in /etc/resolv.conf means the real servers live inside resolved.
RESOLVED_STUB_IPS = ("127.0.0.53", "127.0.0.54")
def _resolved_upstreams():
"""Real upstreams from systemd-resolved. Returns (servers, reason_unreadable).
`resolvectl dns` prints one line per scope ("Global:", "Link 2 (eth0): 1.2.3.4 ..."),
which is far easier to parse reliably than the wrapped columns of `resolvectl status`.
"""
rc, out, err = run(["resolvectl", "dns", "--no-pager"])
if rc is None:
return None, (
"/etc/resolv.conf holds only the systemd-resolved loopback stub, and the real "
"upstreams behind it could not be read: resolvectl is not installed on this node"
)
if rc != 0:
detail = (err.strip() or out.strip() or "no output").splitlines()[0]
return None, (
"/etc/resolv.conf holds only the systemd-resolved loopback stub, and "
"`resolvectl dns` exited %s so the real upstreams could not be read: %s"
% (rc, detail)
)
servers = []
for line in out.splitlines():
# Split on the FIRST colon only: everything after it is the server list, and IPv6
# addresses contain colons of their own.
_, sep, rest = line.partition(":")
if not sep:
continue
for token in rest.split():
if token not in servers:
servers.append(token)
if not servers:
return None, (
"/etc/resolv.conf holds only the systemd-resolved loopback stub and "
"`resolvectl dns` reported NO upstream servers on any scope — resolved is "
"running with an empty server list, so this node has no usable upstream"
)
return servers, None
def collect_resolvers():
"""The node's real DNS upstreams, plus how they were determined.
/etc/resolv.conf is NOT always the answer. Where systemd-resolved is in use (dev's
nodes today) the file contains only resolved's loopback stub, 127.0.0.53 — reading it
literally reports "1 nameserver" forever, which is a permanent FALSE single-upstream
WARN that no amount of correct configuration can clear. When the stub is detected the
real list is asked of resolved instead.
HONESTY DISCIPLINE, unchanged from the rest of this collector: if the stub is present
and the real list cannot be read, "nameservers" is None with the reason recorded — NOT
the stub address, NOT an empty list, and NOT a guess. An unknown must stay an unknown;
the assess step turns it into a SKIP, never a PASS or a WARN.
LIMIT worth knowing: only systemd-resolved's stub is special-cased. Some OTHER local
forwarder on 127.0.0.1 (dnsmasq, unbound) is reported exactly as it appears in
resolv.conf, because nothing generic can enumerate an arbitrary forwarder's upstreams.
"""
path = "/etc/resolv.conf"
# optional=False: a MISSING /etc/resolv.conf is itself a finding worth naming.
resolv = read_text(path, optional=False)
if resolv is None:
return {
"nameservers": None,
"source": None,
"stub": [],
"unavailable_reason": "/etc/resolv.conf could not be read (see the unreadable list)",
}
listed = re.findall(r"^\s*nameserver\s+(\S+)", resolv, re.M)
stub = [n for n in listed if n in RESOLVED_STUB_IPS]
# Only when EVERY listed server is a stub is the file a pure indirection. A mixed file
# (stub plus a real address) is reported as written — that is what the resolver library
# will actually use.
if listed and len(stub) == len(listed):
servers, reason = _resolved_upstreams()
if servers is None:
UNREADABLE.append({"path": "resolvectl dns", "reason": reason})
return {
"nameservers": None,
"source": None,
"stub": listed,
"unavailable_reason": reason,
}
return {
"nameservers": servers,
"source": "resolvectl dns (/etc/resolv.conf holds only the systemd-resolved "
"stub %s)" % ", ".join(listed),
"stub": listed,
"unavailable_reason": None,
}
return {"nameservers": listed, "source": path, "stub": stub, "unavailable_reason": None}
# --- OS / kernel / uptime -----------------------------------------------------------
def collect_os():
osrel = read_kv("/etc/os-release", sep="=") or {}
uptime_raw = read_text("/proc/uptime")
uptime = None
if uptime_raw:
try:
uptime = float(uptime_raw.split()[0])
except (ValueError, IndexError):
uptime = None
return {
"distribution": osrel.get("NAME"),
"version": osrel.get("VERSION"),
"version_id": osrel.get("VERSION_ID"),
"pretty_name": osrel.get("PRETTY_NAME"),
"kernel": (read_text("/proc/sys/kernel/osrelease")),
"kernel_version_full": (read_text("/proc/version")),
"hostname": (read_text("/proc/sys/kernel/hostname")),
"uptime_seconds": uptime,
"boot_time_epoch": (time.time() - uptime) if uptime else None,
# Debian drops this file after a kernel/libc upgrade needing a reboot.
"reboot_required": os.path.exists("/var/run/reboot-required")
or os.path.exists("/run/reboot-required"),
"dmesg_restricted": (read_int("/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict") == 1),
}
# --- Tooling presence ---------------------------------------------------------------
# The role must NEVER install anything (a health check is read-only and side-effect
# free — package installation is node_baseline's job, operator ruling 2026-08-31). So
# we only DETECT, and the role skips the SMART checks with an accurate reason.
def collect_tools():
tools = {}
for tool in ("smartctl", "nvme", "ethtool", "dmidecode", "lsblk", "lscpu"):
tools[tool] = shutil.which(tool) or shutil.which(tool, path="/usr/sbin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin")
return tools
def main():
doc = {
"schema": SCHEMA,
"collected_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%z"),
"collector_uid": os.geteuid(),
"os": collect_os(),
"dmi": collect_dmi(),
"cpu": collect_cpu(),
"memory": collect_memory(),
"thermal": collect_thermal(),
"pressure": collect_pressure(),
"storage": collect_storage(),
"network": collect_network(),
"tools": collect_tools(),
}
doc["unreadable"] = UNREADABLE
json.dump(doc, sys.stdout, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
sys.stdout.write("\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/assess.yml
+676
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,676 @@
---
# Turn raw facts into explicit, named checks. Every check is one of:
#
# PASS measured, and within threshold
# WARN measured, outside the warn threshold — worth a human look
# FAIL measured, outside the fail threshold — do not put production state here
# SKIP NOT measured, with the reason attached (missing root, missing tool, sensor not
# present on this hardware). A SKIP is an honest "unknown" and is NEVER rendered
# as a pass — this repo's discipline is absolute on that point.
# INFO measured, no pass/fail semantics (inventory: firmware, uptime, CPU scaling)
#
# All thresholds come from node_health_thresholds (defaults/main.yml) so retuning never
# means editing logic here.
- name: Derive intermediate values used by several checks
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
# Every temperature the box exposes, from both thermal zones and hwmon chips.
# `select('number')` drops any sensor that returned null (unreadable/absent).
node_health_temps_c: >-
{{ ((node_health_facts.thermal.zones | map(attribute='temp_c') | list)
+ (node_health_facts.thermal.hwmon | map(attribute='temps') | flatten
| map(attribute='temp_c') | list)) | select('number') | list }}
# Filesystems, worst-first by percentage used / inodes used.
node_health_mounts_by_use: >-
{{ node_health_facts.storage.mounts | selectattr('used_pct', 'number')
| sort(attribute='used_pct') | reverse | list }}
node_health_mounts_by_inode: >-
{{ node_health_facts.storage.mounts | selectattr('inodes_used_pct', 'number')
| sort(attribute='inodes_used_pct') | reverse | list }}
# Physical NICs that are actually up. Virtual plumbing was already excluded by the
# collector; `virtual` here catches bonds/VLANs the regex let through.
node_health_nics_up: >-
{{ node_health_facts.network.interfaces
| selectattr('operstate', 'equalto', 'up') | list }}
# Devices that could actually BECOME a dedicated Longhorn or etcd volume: no
# partitions, no whole-device filesystem, nothing mounted from them. All three
# conditions matter — node_baseline formats the data disks with no partition table at
# all (mkfs straight onto /dev/vdb, mounted by LABEL), so "no partitions" alone would
# nominate a node's live Longhorn disk for reformatting. iSCSI/FC volumes were already
# split out by the collector for the same reason. On a single-disk node this list is
# empty — precisely the finding that blocks PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2.
node_health_free_devices: >-
{{ node_health_facts.storage.disks
| selectattr('partitions', 'equalto', [])
| selectattr('fstype', 'none')
| selectattr('mountpoints', 'equalto', [])
| list }}
vars:
ansible_become: false
- name: Assess — privilege escalation (gates every root-only check below)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'access.privilege',
'title': 'Privilege escalation (become) for root-only checks',
'status': ('INFO' if node_health_root_available | bool else 'SKIP'),
'detail': node_health_root_skip_reason }] }}"
# --- Storage ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SMART VERDICTS — READ defaults/main.yml's SMART threshold block BEFORE EDITING THIS.
# Short version: this check judges a drive on the signals smartctl(8) itself defines as
# vendor-independent (the drive's own overall-health verdict; NORMALISED value vs the
# MANUFACTURER'S OWN threshold, via smartctl's `when_failed`; and the ATA-standard error
# counters 197/198/187/199 whose raw meaning is a plain event count everywhere, plus NVMe's
# structured health log). Vendor raw counts are reported with their numbers and can raise a
# WARN, but they can never produce a FAIL — because their units are vendor-defined and
# reading one as if it were a portable sector count is exactly the defect this replaces.
- name: Assess — SMART per physical disk
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'storage.smart.' ~ item.kname,
'title': 'SMART health — ' ~ item.path ~ ' (' ~ (item.model | default('unknown model')) ~ ')',
'status': smart_status,
'detail': smart_detail }] }}"
loop: "{{ node_health_facts.storage.disks }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.path }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
disk_smart: "{{ (node_health_smart | selectattr('path', 'equalto', item.path) | list | first) | default({}) }}"
# --- Sub-verdicts. Each is SKIP unless the number behind it was actually read; a SKIP is
# an honest "unknown" and never contributes a PASS. ------------------------------------
# 1. The drive's own overall-health self-assessment. Vendor-independent by construction.
s_health: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.passed is not defined or disk_smart.passed is none)
else ('PASS' if disk_smart.passed else 'FAIL') }}
# 2. NVMe critical warning bitfield (spare below threshold, media in read-only, etc.).
s_nvme_crit: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.nvme_critical_warning is not defined or disk_smart.nvme_critical_warning is not number)
else ('PASS' if disk_smart.nvme_critical_warning | int == 0 else 'FAIL') }}
# 3. THE portable per-attribute failure signal: normalised value at or below the
# threshold the MANUFACTURER set for that attribute on that model. Pre-fail failing
# now = FAIL. Old_age failing now, or anything that failed in the past, = WARN.
s_thresh: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if not (disk_smart.thresholds_present | default(false))
else ('FAIL' if (disk_smart.failing_now_prefail | default([]) | length) > 0
else ('WARN' if ((disk_smart.failing_now | default([]) | length) > 0
or (disk_smart.failed_past | default([]) | length) > 0)
else 'PASS')) }}
# 4. ATA-standard hard-error counters. 197 pending; 198/187 + NVMe media_errors are
# uncorrectable reads — data the drive could NOT return. Same meaning on every drive.
s_pending: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.pending_sectors is not defined or disk_smart.pending_sectors is not number)
else ('FAIL' if disk_smart.pending_sectors | int >= th.smart_pending_fail
else ('WARN' if disk_smart.pending_sectors | int >= th.smart_pending_warn else 'PASS')) }}
uncorr_values: >-
{{ [disk_smart.offline_uncorrectable | default(none),
disk_smart.reported_uncorrect | default(none),
disk_smart.nvme_media_errors | default(none)] | select('number') | list }}
s_uncorr: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (uncorr_values | length) == 0
else ('FAIL' if (uncorr_values | max) >= th.smart_uncorrectable_fail
else ('WARN' if (uncorr_values | max) >= th.smart_uncorrectable_warn else 'PASS')) }}
# 5. 199 CRC — SATA link integrity (cable/backplane), not media. WARN only: the counter
# never resets, so one historic bad seating must not condemn the node forever.
s_crc: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.crc_errors is not defined or disk_smart.crc_errors is not number)
else ('WARN' if disk_smart.crc_errors | int >= th.smart_crc_warn else 'PASS') }}
# 6. Wear, from the NORMALISED lifetime indicator — a percentage by definition.
life_rem: "{{ disk_smart.lifetime_remaining_pct | default(none) }}"
life_used: "{{ (100 - (life_rem | int)) if (life_rem is number) else none }}"
s_life: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (life_rem is not number)
else ('FAIL' if life_rem | int <= th.smart_lifetime_remaining_fail_pct
else ('WARN' if (life_rem | int <= th.smart_lifetime_remaining_warn_pct
or life_used | int >= th.smart_life_used_pct_warn)
else 'PASS')) }}
# 7. Reallocation ACTIVITY. Portable evidence first (196 event count, and the grown
# bad-block counter smartctl's drivedb named for this model). Only if neither exists
# do we fall back to attribute 5's raw — and then ONLY to say "nonzero, so something
# was remapped", which is portable, never to interpret its magnitude, which is not.
remap_evidence: >-
{{ [disk_smart.realloc_events | default(none),
disk_smart.grown_bad_blocks | default(none)] | select('number') | list }}
realloc_raw: "{{ (disk_smart.realloc_attr | default({}, true)).get('raw', {}).get('value', none) }}"
s_remap: >-
{{ ('WARN' if (remap_evidence | max) >= th.smart_realloc_events_warn else 'PASS')
if (remap_evidence | length) > 0
else (('WARN' if realloc_raw | int > 0 else 'PASS') if realloc_raw is number else 'SKIP') }}
# 8. Endurance stress — erase/program failures are NAND wearing out under the FTL.
s_erase: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.erase_fail_count is not defined or disk_smart.erase_fail_count is not number)
else ('WARN' if disk_smart.erase_fail_count | int >= th.smart_erase_fail_warn else 'PASS') }}
s_program: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.program_fail_count is not defined or disk_smart.program_fail_count is not number)
else ('WARN' if disk_smart.program_fail_count | int >= th.smart_program_fail_warn else 'PASS') }}
# 9. Unexpected power loss. On a consumer SSD with no power-loss protection each one is
# an opportunity for a torn or lost in-flight write — which is precisely the guarantee
# etcd's fsync contract depends on. Directly relevant to PROD-PROVISIONING.md Section 2.
s_ploss: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.unexpected_power_loss is not defined or disk_smart.unexpected_power_loss is not number)
else ('WARN' if disk_smart.unexpected_power_loss | int >= th.smart_unexpected_power_loss_warn else 'PASS') }}
s_temp: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (disk_smart.temperature_c is not defined or disk_smart.temperature_c is not number)
else ('FAIL' if disk_smart.temperature_c | int >= th.smart_temp_fail_c
else ('WARN' if disk_smart.temperature_c | int >= th.smart_temp_warn_c else 'PASS')) }}
# Worst sub-verdict wins. `select('in', ...)` preserves the order of the left-hand
# list, so the LAST survivor is the most severe present.
smart_status: >-
{{ (['PASS', 'WARN', 'FAIL'] | select('in', [s_health, s_nvme_crit, s_thresh, s_pending,
s_uncorr, s_crc, s_life, s_remap, s_erase, s_program, s_ploss, s_temp]) | list | last)
| default('SKIP', true) }}
# --- Detail. Every WARN/FAIL must arrive WITH the number that caused it; a verdict the
# operator cannot check is not much better than a wrong one. -------------------------
smart_findings: >-
{%- set n = namespace(l=[]) -%}
{%- if s_health == 'FAIL' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('the drive reports its OWN overall-health self-assessment as FAILED') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_nvme_crit == 'FAIL' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('NVMe critical_warning=' ~ disk_smart.nvme_critical_warning ~ ' (non-zero)') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- for a in (disk_smart.failing_now_prefail | default([])) -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('Pre-fail attribute ' ~ a.id ~ ' ' ~ a.name ~ ' is AT OR BELOW its manufacturer threshold NOW (value='
~ a.value ~ ', thresh=' ~ a.thresh ~ ')') -%}
{%- endfor -%}
{%- for a in (disk_smart.failed_past | default([])) -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('attribute ' ~ a.id ~ ' ' ~ a.name ~ ' crossed its manufacturer threshold IN THE PAST (worst='
~ a.worst ~ ', thresh=' ~ a.thresh ~ ')') -%}
{%- endfor -%}
{%- if s_pending in ['WARN', 'FAIL'] -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('current pending sectors (197)=' ~ disk_smart.pending_sectors) -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_uncorr in ['WARN', 'FAIL'] -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('UNCORRECTABLE read errors — offline(198)=' ~ (disk_smart.offline_uncorrectable if disk_smart.offline_uncorrectable is number else 'n/a')
~ ', reported(187)=' ~ (disk_smart.reported_uncorrect if disk_smart.reported_uncorrect is number else 'n/a')
~ ', nvme media_errors=' ~ (disk_smart.nvme_media_errors if disk_smart.nvme_media_errors is number else 'n/a')) -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_crc == 'WARN' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('SATA link CRC errors (199)=' ~ disk_smart.crc_errors ~ ' — cable/backplane, not media') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_life in ['WARN', 'FAIL'] -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append(life_used ~ '% of rated life CONSUMED (' ~ life_rem
~ '% remaining, from the normalised wear indicator)') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_remap == 'WARN' and (remap_evidence | length) > 0 -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append((remap_evidence | max) ~ ' grown bad block(s)/reallocation event(s)'
~ (' [196 events=' ~ disk_smart.realloc_events ~ ']' if disk_smart.realloc_events is number else '')
~ (' [grown failing blocks=' ~ disk_smart.grown_bad_blocks ~ ']' if disk_smart.grown_bad_blocks is number else '')) -%}
{%- elif s_remap == 'WARN' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('the drive reports a non-zero reallocation attribute (5 raw=' ~ realloc_raw
~ '); its UNIT is vendor-defined, so the count is not interpreted here') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_erase == 'WARN' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('NAND erase failures=' ~ disk_smart.erase_fail_count) -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_program == 'WARN' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('NAND program failures=' ~ disk_smart.program_fail_count) -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_ploss == 'WARN' -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('unexpected power losses=' ~ disk_smart.unexpected_power_loss
~ ' — a consumer SSD has no power-loss protection, so each one risks a torn or lost in-flight write') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- if s_temp in ['WARN', 'FAIL'] -%}
{%- set _ = n.l.append('temperature=' ~ disk_smart.temperature_c ~ 'C') -%}
{%- endif -%}
{{ n.l | join('; ') }}
# The raw value that started this. Shown ALWAYS when it is non-zero and contradicts the
# normalised reading, explicitly labelled as vendor-encoded and explicitly excluded from
# the verdict — so the next operator to see 61440 sees why it is not 61440 bad sectors.
realloc_raw_note: >-
{%- if realloc_raw is number and realloc_raw | int > 0 -%}
{%- set a = disk_smart.realloc_attr -%}
attribute 5 ({{ a.name }}) raw={{ realloc_raw }} normalised value={{ a.value }} vs thresh={{ a.thresh }}
{%- if (remap_evidence | length) > 0 and (remap_evidence | max) > 0
and realloc_raw | int != (remap_evidence | max) | int
and realloc_raw | int % (remap_evidence | max) | int == 0 -%}
{{ ' (= ' ~ (remap_evidence | max) ~ ' x ' ~ (realloc_raw | int // (remap_evidence | max) | int) ~ ')' }}
{%- endif -%}
. SMART raw values are VENDOR-DEFINED (smartctl(8): "entirely vendor-specific") and this
one is NOT a portable bad-sector count — it is reported as context and is NOT used for
the verdict. The normalised value/threshold pair beside it is the manufacturer's own
trip point and IS.
{%- endif -%}
smart_detail: >-
{{ ('not read — ' ~ node_health_root_skip_reason)
if not (node_health_root_available | bool)
else ('not read — smartmontools is not installed on this node; it ships with
roles/node_baseline (node_baseline_packages), which has not been run here.
This role never installs packages.')
if not (node_health_facts.tools.smartctl is truthy)
else ('smartctl ran but this device exposes no SMART data ('
~ (disk_smart.messages | default([]) | join('; ')) ~ ') — normal for virtio/VM disks')
if not (disk_smart.available | default(false))
else ('overall-health=' ~ ('PASSED' if disk_smart.passed else 'FAILED')
~ ', power_on_hours=' ~ (disk_smart.power_on_hours | default('?'))
~ ', power_cycles=' ~ (disk_smart.power_cycles | default('?'))
~ ', life_remaining=' ~ ((life_rem | string ~ '%') if life_rem is number else 'not reported')
~ ', pending(197)=' ~ (disk_smart.pending_sectors if disk_smart.pending_sectors is number else 'n/a')
~ ', offline_uncorrectable(198)=' ~ (disk_smart.offline_uncorrectable if disk_smart.offline_uncorrectable is number else 'n/a')
~ ', reported_uncorrect(187)=' ~ (disk_smart.reported_uncorrect if disk_smart.reported_uncorrect is number else 'n/a')
~ ', crc(199)=' ~ (disk_smart.crc_errors if disk_smart.crc_errors is number else 'n/a')
~ (('. NO attribute is at or below its manufacturer threshold; closest is '
~ disk_smart.prefail_closest.id ~ ' ' ~ disk_smart.prefail_closest.name
~ ' value=' ~ disk_smart.prefail_closest.value
~ ' vs thresh=' ~ disk_smart.prefail_closest.thresh)
if (s_thresh == 'PASS' and (disk_smart.prefail_closest | default(none)) is mapping) else '')
~ (('. FINDINGS: ' ~ smart_findings) if smart_findings | trim else '')
~ (('. CONTEXT: ' ~ realloc_raw_note) if realloc_raw_note | trim else '')) }}
- name: Assess — kernel-visible I/O errors per disk (no root needed)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'storage.io_errors',
'title': 'Kernel I/O error counters on physical disks (SCSI/ATA layer)',
'status': io_status,
'detail': io_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
# ioerr_cnt/iotmo_cnt are readable WITHOUT root. They are not a substitute for SMART
# (no wear, no power-on hours, no reallocated sectors) but they are a real signal: a
# non-zero count means the kernel actually saw failed or timed-out commands on that
# device since boot.
counted: "{{ node_health_facts.storage.disks | selectattr('scsi_counters', 'mapping') | list }}"
err_total: >-
{{ (counted | map(attribute='scsi_counters.ioerr_cnt') | select('number') | list | sum)
+ (counted | map(attribute='scsi_counters.iotmo_cnt') | select('number') | list | sum) }}
io_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (counted | length) == 0
else ('PASS' if err_total | int == 0 else 'WARN') }}
io_sum_done: "{{ counted | map(attribute='scsi_counters.iodone_cnt') | select('number') | list | sum }}"
io_sum_err: "{{ counted | map(attribute='scsi_counters.ioerr_cnt') | select('number') | list | sum }}"
io_sum_tmo: "{{ counted | map(attribute='scsi_counters.iotmo_cnt') | select('number') | list | sum }}"
# Aggregate here; the STORAGE section of the summary prints the per-disk counters.
io_detail: >-
{{ 'no disk exposes SCSI/ATA error counters (virtio or NVMe-only node)'
if (counted | length) == 0
else ((counted | map(attribute='kname') | join(', ')) ~ ': completed='
~ io_sum_done | string ~ ', errors=' ~ io_sum_err | string
~ ', timeouts=' ~ io_sum_tmo | string
~ ('. Non-zero errors are commands the kernel saw fail on that device
since boot. They are NOT proof of media failure (a rejected or
unsupported command during discovery counts too) and they cannot be
attributed without dmesg, which needs root.'
if err_total | int > 0 else '')) }}
- name: Assess — filesystem free space
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'storage.capacity',
'title': 'Filesystem free space (worst mount)',
'status': fs_status,
'detail': fs_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
worst: "{{ (node_health_mounts_by_use | first) | default({}) }}"
fs_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (node_health_mounts_by_use | length) == 0
else ('FAIL' if worst.used_pct >= th.fs_used_pct_fail
else ('WARN' if worst.used_pct >= th.fs_used_pct_warn else 'PASS')) }}
fs_detail: >-
{{ 'no block-backed filesystem found' if (node_health_mounts_by_use | length) == 0
else (worst.mountpoint ~ ' ' ~ worst.used_pct | string ~ '% used ('
~ (worst.avail_bytes | int / 1073741824) | round(1) | string ~ ' GiB free of '
~ (worst.size_bytes | int / 1073741824) | round(1) | string ~ ' GiB)') }}
- name: Assess — filesystem inode headroom
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'storage.inodes',
'title': 'Filesystem inode headroom (worst mount)',
'status': in_status,
'detail': in_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
worst: "{{ (node_health_mounts_by_inode | first) | default({}) }}"
in_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if (node_health_mounts_by_inode | length) == 0
else ('WARN' if worst.inodes_used_pct >= th.inode_used_pct_warn else 'PASS') }}
in_detail: >-
{{ 'no filesystem reported inode usage' if (node_health_mounts_by_inode | length) == 0
else (worst.mountpoint ~ ' ' ~ worst.inodes_used_pct | string ~ '% of inodes used') }}
- name: Assess — data-disk layout (feeds PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'storage.layout',
'title': 'Physical disks and spare block devices for Longhorn/etcd',
'status': 'INFO',
'detail': layout_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
disks: "{{ node_health_facts.storage.disks }}"
attached: "{{ node_health_facts.storage.attached_volumes | default([]) }}"
layout_detail: >-
{{ (disks | length) | string ~ ' physical disk(s): '
~ (disks | map(attribute='kname') | join(', ')) ~ '. '
~ ((attached | length) | string ~ ' attached iSCSI/FC volume(s) excluded ('
~ (attached | map(attribute='kname') | join(', ')) ~ '). '
if (attached | length) > 0 else '')
~ ((node_health_free_devices | length) | string ~ ' device(s) with no partitions ('
~ (node_health_free_devices | map(attribute='kname') | join(', ')) ~ ')'
if (node_health_free_devices | length) > 0
else 'NO unpartitioned spare device — node_baseline_longhorn_device /
node_baseline_etcd_device have nothing to claim without repartitioning
or adding a drive') }}
# --- Memory -------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: Assess — memory headroom
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'memory.available',
'title': 'Available memory',
'status': mem_status,
'detail': mem_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
m: "{{ node_health_facts.memory }}"
avail_pct: >-
{{ ((m.mem_available_kb | int) * 100.0 / (m.mem_total_kb | int)) | round(1)
if (m.mem_total_kb is number and m.mem_available_kb is number and m.mem_total_kb | int > 0)
else none }}
mem_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if avail_pct is not number
else ('FAIL' if avail_pct | float <= th.mem_available_pct_fail
else ('WARN' if avail_pct | float <= th.mem_available_pct_warn else 'PASS')) }}
mem_detail: >-
{{ '/proc/meminfo unreadable' if avail_pct is not number
else ((m.mem_total_kb | int / 1048576) | round(1) | string ~ ' GiB total, '
~ (m.mem_available_kb | int / 1048576) | round(1) | string ~ ' GiB available ('
~ avail_pct | string ~ '%)') }}
- name: Assess — swap (kubelet requires it off)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'memory.swap',
'title': 'Swap disabled (kubelet prerequisite)',
'status': swap_status,
'detail': swap_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
m: "{{ node_health_facts.memory }}"
swap_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if m.swap_total_kb is not number
else ('PASS' if m.swap_total_kb | int == 0 else 'WARN') }}
swap_detail: >-
{{ 'swap state unreadable' if m.swap_total_kb is not number
else ('no swap active' if m.swap_total_kb | int == 0
else ((m.swap_total_kb | int / 1048576) | round(2) | string
~ ' GiB swap active — roles/node_baseline runs swapoff and neutralises
the fstab entry; this node has not been baselined yet')) }}
- name: Assess — ECC / EDAC correctable errors
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'memory.ecc',
'title': 'ECC memory errors (EDAC correctable/uncorrectable counters)',
'status': ecc_status,
'detail': ecc_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
e: "{{ node_health_facts.memory.edac }}"
ecc_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if not (e.controllers_present | bool)
else ('FAIL' if (e.ue_total | int) > 0
else ('WARN' if (e.ce_total | int) > 0 else 'PASS')) }}
ecc_detail: >-
{{ ('no EDAC memory controller is bound (' ~ ('/sys/devices/system/edac/mc exists but is empty'
if e.sysfs_present | bool else 'no EDAC sysfs at all')
~ ') — this platform does not report ECC status. Non-ECC consumer RAM or a VM;
"no errors" CANNOT be confirmed on this hardware.')
if not (e.controllers_present | bool)
else ((e.controllers | length) | string ~ ' controller(s), correctable='
~ e.ce_total | string ~ ', uncorrectable=' ~ e.ue_total | string) }}
# --- CPU ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: Assess — CPU thermal throttling
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'cpu.throttle',
'title': 'CPU thermal throttling since boot',
'status': thr_status,
'detail': thr_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
t: "{{ node_health_facts.cpu.throttle }}"
thr_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if t is none
else ('PASS' if ((t.core_throttle_count_total | int) + (t.package_throttle_count | int)) == 0
else 'WARN') }}
thr_detail: >-
{{ 'no thermal_throttle counters (VM guest or unsupported CPU)' if t is none
else ('core throttle events=' ~ t.core_throttle_count_total | string
~ ' (' ~ t.core_throttle_total_time_ms | string ~ ' ms), package events='
~ t.package_throttle_count | string) }}
- name: Assess — CPU inventory and frequency scaling
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'cpu.inventory',
'title': 'CPU model, topology and frequency scaling',
'status': 'INFO',
'detail': cpu_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
c: "{{ node_health_facts.cpu }}"
cpu_detail: >-
{{ (c.model | default('unknown')) ~ ' — ' ~ (c.cpus | default('?')) ~ ' logical CPU(s), '
~ (c.sockets | default('?')) ~ ' socket(s) x ' ~ (c.cores_per_socket | default('?'))
~ ' core(s) x ' ~ (c.threads_per_core | default('?')) ~ ' thread(s); load '
~ (c.loadavg | default([]) | join(' ')) ~ '; '
~ ('governor=' ~ c.scaling.governor ~ ' driver=' ~ c.scaling.driver
~ ' cur=' ~ ((c.scaling.cur_khz | int) / 1000) | round | int | string ~ 'MHz'
~ ' max=' ~ ((c.scaling.max_khz | int) / 1000) | round | int | string ~ 'MHz'
if c.scaling is mapping else 'no cpufreq scaling exposed') }}
- name: Assess — hardware virtualisation (KubeVirt prerequisite, R-PLAT-03)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'cpu.virtualisation',
'title': 'Hardware virtualisation available (VT-x/AMD-V + /dev/kvm)',
'status': virt_status,
'detail': virt_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
c: "{{ node_health_facts.cpu }}"
virt_status: >-
{{ 'PASS' if (c.hardware_virt_flag | bool and c.kvm_device | bool) else 'WARN' }}
virt_detail: >-
{{ 'vmx/svm flag=' ~ c.hardware_virt_flag | string ~ ', /dev/kvm='
~ c.kvm_device | string
~ (', lscpu Virtualization=' ~ c.virtualization if c.virtualization else '')
~ (', running as a guest of ' ~ c.hypervisor_vendor if c.is_virtual_guest | bool else '') }}
# --- Thermals -----------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: Assess — temperatures
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'thermal.max',
'title': 'Hottest reported sensor',
'status': temp_status,
'detail': temp_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
hottest: "{{ (node_health_temps_c | max) if (node_health_temps_c | length) > 0 else none }}"
temp_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if hottest is not number
else ('FAIL' if hottest | float >= th.temp_fail_c
else ('WARN' if hottest | float >= th.temp_warn_c else 'PASS')) }}
temp_detail: >-
{{ 'no thermal sensor exposed (typical in a VM)' if hottest is not number
else (hottest | string ~ 'C hottest of ' ~ (node_health_temps_c | length) | string
~ ' sensors; zones: '
~ (node_health_facts.thermal.zones
| map(attribute='type') | join(', ')) ) }}
# --- Pressure-stall (PSI) -----------------------------------------------------------
- name: Assess — pressure stall (CPU, memory, I/O)
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'pressure.' ~ item,
'title': 'PSI ' ~ item ~ ' — some avg60 (% of wall time stalled)',
'status': psi_status,
'detail': psi_detail }] }}"
loop: [cpu, memory, io]
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
psi: "{{ node_health_facts.pressure[item] | default(none) }}"
avg60: "{{ psi.some.avg60 | default(none) if psi is mapping else none }}"
psi_status: >-
{{ 'SKIP' if avg60 is not number
else ('FAIL' if avg60 | float >= th.psi_some_avg60_fail
else ('WARN' if avg60 | float >= th.psi_some_avg60_warn else 'PASS')) }}
psi_detail: >-
{{ '/proc/pressure/' ~ item ~ ' unavailable (kernel without CONFIG_PSI, or psi=0)'
if avg60 is not number
else ('some avg10=' ~ psi.some.avg10 | string ~ ' avg60=' ~ psi.some.avg60 | string
~ ' avg300=' ~ psi.some.avg300 | string
~ (' | full avg60=' ~ psi.full.avg60 | string if psi.full is defined else '')) }}
# --- Network ------------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: Assess — link state and speed
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'network.link',
'title': 'Physical NIC link state and negotiated speed',
'status': link_status,
'detail': link_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
th: "{{ node_health_thresholds }}"
up: "{{ node_health_nics_up }}"
slow: >-
{{ up | selectattr('speed_mbps', 'number')
| selectattr('speed_mbps', 'lt', th.nic_min_speed_mbps | int) | list }}
link_status: >-
{{ 'FAIL' if (up | length) == 0
else ('WARN' if (slow | length) > 0 else 'PASS') }}
link_detail: >-
{{ 'no physical interface is up' if (up | length) == 0
else (up | map(attribute='name') | zip(up | map(attribute='speed_mbps'))
| map('join', '=') | join('Mb/s, ') ~ 'Mb/s'
~ ' (driver ' ~ (up | map(attribute='driver') | join(', ')) ~ ')') }}
- name: Assess — link error counters
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'network.errors',
'title': 'NIC error counters since boot (rx/tx errors, CRC, carrier)',
'status': ('PASS' if err_total | int == 0 else 'WARN'),
'detail': err_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
up: "{{ node_health_nics_up }}"
err_keys: [rx_errors, tx_errors, rx_crc_errors, rx_frame_errors, rx_over_errors, tx_carrier_errors]
err_total: >-
{{ up | map(attribute='statistics') | map('dict2items') | flatten
| selectattr('key', 'in', err_keys) | map(attribute='value')
| select('number') | list | sum }}
drop_total: >-
{{ up | map(attribute='statistics') | map('dict2items') | flatten
| selectattr('key', 'in', ['rx_dropped', 'tx_dropped']) | map(attribute='value')
| select('number') | list | sum }}
err_detail: >-
{{ err_total | string ~ ' error(s), ' ~ drop_total | string ~ ' drop(s) across '
~ (up | map(attribute='name') | join(', ')) }}
# The collector reports the node's REAL upstreams: where /etc/resolv.conf holds only
# systemd-resolved's 127.0.0.53 stub (dev's shape) it asks resolved for the servers behind
# it, because counting the stub would be a permanent FALSE single-upstream WARN that no
# correct configuration could ever clear. When that lookup fails it reports null WITH a
# reason rather than a number — so the check SKIPs. A skip is honest; a WARN derived from
# an unknown is a fabricated verdict, and a PASS would be worse.
- name: Assess — DNS resolver redundancy
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'network.resolvers',
'title': 'Configured DNS upstreams (single upstream is a known SPOF here)',
'status': ('SKIP' if node_health_facts.network.nameservers is none
else ('PASS' if (ns4 | length) >= (node_health_thresholds.min_nameservers | int)
else 'WARN')),
'detail': ns_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
# `| default([], true)` only ever fires on the null (unreadable) path, where the
# counts below are unused because the status is already SKIP.
ns: "{{ node_health_facts.network.nameservers | default([], true) }}"
# Counted PER FAMILY on purpose. The outage this check exists for was a single IPv4
# upstream; IPv6 upstreams do not cover for it unless the node actually has working
# IPv6 egress, which this role cannot prove from sysfs alone. So the verdict keys off
# the IPv4 count and the detail shows the full picture.
ns4: "{{ ns | select('search', '^[0-9.]+$') | list }}"
ns6: "{{ ns | reject('search', '^[0-9.]+$') | list }}"
# Where the numbers came from — resolv.conf directly, or resolved behind the stub.
ns_src: "{{ node_health_facts.network.resolver_source | default('', true) }}"
ns_detail: >-
{{ ('not read — ' ~ (node_health_facts.network.resolver_unavailable_reason
| default('the collector recorded no reason', true))
~ '. The upstream count is UNKNOWN here — not zero, and not one.')
if node_health_facts.network.nameservers is none
else ((ns | length) | string ~ ' nameserver(s) — IPv4: '
~ (ns4 | join(', ') | default('none', true))
~ '; IPv6: ' ~ (ns6 | join(', ') | default('none', true))
~ (' (read via ' ~ ns_src ~ ')' if ns_src else '')
~ ('. Only ' ~ (ns4 | length) | string ~ ' IPv4 upstream: a single IPv4 upstream
already broke containerd image pulls and CoreDNS forwarding on dev. The fix
is the `dns`-tagged block in roles/node_baseline — set this environment
node_baseline_dns_servers (role defaults for dev, group_vars/k3s_prod for
prod) and re-run node-baseline.yml --tags dns. IPv6 upstreams only compensate
if the node has working IPv6 egress, which this check cannot verify.'
if (ns4 | length) < (node_health_thresholds.min_nameservers | int) else '')) }}
# --- OS / firmware ------------------------------------------------------------------
- name: Assess — pending reboot
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'os.reboot_required',
'title': 'Pending reboot flag',
'status': ('WARN' if node_health_facts.os.reboot_required | bool else 'PASS'),
'detail': ('/run/reboot-required present — a package upgrade needs a restart'
if node_health_facts.os.reboot_required | bool
else 'no reboot flagged') }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
- name: Assess — OS, kernel and uptime
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'os.inventory',
'title': 'OS, kernel and uptime',
'status': 'INFO',
'detail': os_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
o: "{{ node_health_facts.os }}"
os_detail: >-
{{ (o.pretty_name | default('unknown OS')) ~ ', kernel ' ~ (o.kernel | default('?'))
~ ', up ' ~ ((o.uptime_seconds | float / 86400) | round(2) | string) ~ ' day(s)' }}
- name: Assess — firmware / DMI inventory
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: "{{ node_health_checks + [{
'id': 'firmware.inventory',
'title': 'Chassis, board and BIOS firmware',
'status': ('INFO' if node_health_facts.dmi.present | bool else 'SKIP'),
'detail': dmi_detail }] }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
d: "{{ node_health_facts.dmi }}"
dmi_detail: >-
{{ 'no DMI table exposed (typical for some VMs/containers)' if not (d.present | bool)
else ((d.sys_vendor | default('?')) ~ ' ' ~ (d.product_name | default('?'))
~ ' / board ' ~ (d.board_name | default('?'))
~ ' / BIOS ' ~ (d.bios_vendor | default('?')) ~ ' '
~ (d.bios_version | default('?')) ~ ' (' ~ (d.bios_date | default('?')) ~ ')'
~ (' — serial numbers not read (root-only DMI fields)'
if d.product_serial is none else '')) }}
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/collect_smart.yml
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---
# SMART — the ONLY part of this role that needs root, and the highest-value part.
#
# Reached only when probe_privilege.yml proved escalation works AND the collector found a
# smartctl binary. Both conditions are checked by the caller (main.yml); if either is
# false the SMART checks SKIP with the precise reason rather than silently passing.
#
# smartmontools is NOT installed from here. Package installation is node_baseline's job
# (node_baseline_packages carries smartmontools) — operator ruling 2026-08-31, the same
# click-ops-never principle as the rest of the repo. A health check must be read-only and
# side-effect-free, so this role only ever DETECTS the tool.
#
# `--nocheck=standby` (defaults/main.yml) means a sleeping disk is never spun up just to
# be measured. smartctl's exit status is a BITMASK (bit 0 = usage error, bit 1 = open
# failed, bit 3 = disk failing, ...), not a simple success/failure, so `failed_when: false`
# is correct here: a non-zero exit still carries a useful JSON payload, and bit 3 in
# particular is a finding, not an error to abort on.
- name: Read SMART data for each physical disk
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: "{{ node_health_facts.tools.smartctl }} {{ node_health_smartctl_args }} {{ item.path }}"
become: true
vars:
ansible_become: true
loop: "{{ node_health_facts.storage.disks }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.path }}"
register: node_health_smart_raw
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
- name: Parse SMART payloads into per-disk facts
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_smart: "{{ node_health_smart + [smart_disk] }}"
loop: "{{ node_health_smart_raw.results | default([]) }}"
loop_control:
loop_var: smart_result
label: "{{ smart_result.item.path }}"
vars:
ansible_become: false
# An unopenable device (virtio in a VM, a USB bridge without passthrough) yields no
# stdout at all — default to an empty object so parsing never explodes on a VM.
smart_json: "{{ (smart_result.stdout | default('') | trim) | default('{}', true) | from_json }}"
smart_attrs: "{{ smart_json.ata_smart_attributes.table | default([]) }}"
smart_nvme: "{{ smart_json.nvme_smart_health_information_log | default({}) }}"
# --- VENDOR-INDEPENDENT FAILURE SIGNAL: normalised value vs the drive's own threshold.
# smartctl computes this for us and emits it as `when_failed`, per smartctl(8): "If the
# Attribute's current Normalized value is less than or equal to the threshold value, then
# the WHEN_FAILED column will display FAILING_NOW. If not, but the worst recorded value is
# less than or equal to the threshold value, then this column will display In_the_past. If
# the WHEN_FAILED column has no entry ... then this Attribute is OK now (not failing) and
# has also never failed in the past." In JSON those become "now" / "past" / "". We match
# case-insensitively on 'past' rather than on an exact token so the same code reads either
# the JSON spelling or the plain-text one if a future smartctl changes it.
#
# This is the ONLY comparison in this role that can condemn a drive on an attribute the
# role does not itself understand, and that is the point: the manufacturer picked the
# threshold, for that attribute, on that model. It needs no per-vendor knowledge from us.
smart_failed_attrs: >-
{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('when_failed', 'defined')
| rejectattr('when_failed', 'equalto', '') | list }}
smart_failed_past: "{{ smart_failed_attrs | selectattr('when_failed', 'search', '(?i)past') | list }}"
smart_failing_now: "{{ smart_failed_attrs | rejectattr('when_failed', 'search', '(?i)past') | list }}"
# Of the failing ones, which are Pre-fail (imminent failure) vs Old_age (design life
# exceeded)? smartctl decodes that flag from the drive too, so this stays vendor-neutral.
smart_failing_now_prefail: "{{ smart_failing_now | selectattr('flags.prefailure', 'defined') | selectattr('flags.prefailure') | list }}"
# How close is the drive to ANY of its own trip points? The smallest (value - thresh)
# across all Pre-fail attributes that actually carry a threshold (thresh 0 = "cannot
# trip", per ATA, so it is excluded rather than counted as a margin of `value`).
# Reported as context; a shrinking margin is the early warning the raw values cannot give.
smart_prefail_margin_json: >-
{%- set ns = namespace(best=none) -%}
{%- for a in smart_attrs -%}
{%- if (a.flags.prefailure | default(false)) and ((a.thresh | default(0)) | int) > 0 -%}
{%- set m = ((a.value | default(0)) | int) - ((a.thresh) | int) -%}
{%- if ns.best is none or m < ns.best.margin -%}
{%- set ns.best = {'id': a.id, 'name': a.name, 'value': (a.value | int),
'worst': ((a.worst | default(a.value)) | int),
'thresh': (a.thresh | int), 'margin': m} -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- endif -%}
{%- endfor -%}
{{ ns.best | to_json }}
# --- Normalised ("value") wear indicators, in vendor-preference order. Micron/Crucial use
# 202 Perc_Rated_Life_Used; many others use 231 SSD_Life_Left or 233. All three express
# the SAME thing in the normalised field — a percentage of rated life REMAINING — which is
# exactly why the normalised field is usable across vendors where their raws are not.
smart_life_202: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 202) | map(attribute='value') | first | default(none) }}"
smart_life_231: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 231) | map(attribute='value') | first | default(none) }}"
smart_life_233: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 233) | map(attribute='value') | first | default(none) }}"
# --- VENDOR CONTEXT. Everything below is collected and printed but NEVER produces a FAIL.
# Attribute 5 is kept in full — id, drive's own name, normalised value/worst/thresh AND
# raw — precisely so the report can show the raw next to the normalised reading that
# contradicts it, instead of silently dropping the number that started this.
smart_attr5: "{{ (smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 5) | list | first) | default(none) }}"
# 196 Reallocated_Event_Count — an ATA-standard *event* count (one tick per remap
# operation), the portable stand-in for attribute 5's unportable raw.
smart_realloc_events: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 196) | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
# Endurance counters matched by the NAME smartctl's drive database resolved for this
# model, not by a bare vendor attribute ID. IDs 170-174 are in the vendor-specific range
# and mean different things on different controllers; drivedb is smartmontools' own
# per-(model, firmware) translation of them, so matching its resolved name borrows that
# knowledge instead of hardcoding one vendor's. On a drive drivedb does not recognise the
# name is "Unknown_Attribute", nothing matches, and these stay null — no claim is made.
smart_grown_blocks: >-
{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('name', 'search', '(?i)(grown|runtime)[_ -]?(failing|bad)?[_ -]?block')
| map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}
smart_erase_fail: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('name', 'search', '(?i)erase[_ -]?fail') | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
smart_program_fail: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('name', 'search', '(?i)program[_ -]?fail|prog[_ -]?fail') | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
# '(?i)power[_ -]?loss[_ -]?(ct|cnt|count)' deliberately does NOT match Intel's
# Power_Loss_Cap_Test (a capacitor self-test result, not a count of power losses).
smart_power_loss: >-
{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('name', 'search', '(?i)(unexpect\w*|unsafe)[_ -]?(power|shutdown)|power[_ -]?loss[_ -]?(ct|cnt|count)')
| map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}
smart_disk:
path: "{{ smart_result.item.path }}"
# smartctl ran, but did it understand the device?
available: "{{ (smart_json.smart_status is defined) or (smart_nvme | length > 0) }}"
exit_status: "{{ smart_json.smartctl.exit_status | default(smart_result.rc) }}"
messages: "{{ smart_json.smartctl.messages | default([]) | map(attribute='string') | list }}"
protocol: "{{ smart_json.device.protocol | default(none) }}"
model: "{{ smart_json.model_name | default(none) }}"
serial: "{{ smart_json.serial_number | default(none) }}"
firmware: "{{ smart_json.firmware_version | default(none) }}"
# The headline: the drive's own overall self-assessment.
passed: "{{ smart_json.smart_status.passed | default(none) }}"
power_on_hours: "{{ smart_json.power_on_time.hours | default(none) }}"
power_cycles: "{{ smart_json.power_cycle_count | default(none) }}"
temperature_c: "{{ smart_json.temperature.current | default(none) }}"
# Normalised-vs-threshold verdict inputs (see the long note above).
failing_now: "{{ smart_failing_now }}"
failing_now_prefail: "{{ smart_failing_now_prefail }}"
failed_past: "{{ smart_failed_past }}"
thresholds_present: "{{ (smart_attrs | selectattr('thresh', 'defined') | rejectattr('thresh', 'equalto', 0) | list | length) > 0 }}"
prefail_closest: "{{ smart_prefail_margin_json | from_json }}"
# ATA-standard error counters — same meaning on every drive that implements them.
pending_sectors: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 197) | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
offline_uncorrectable: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 198) | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
reported_uncorrect: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 187) | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
crc_errors: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 199) | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
host_writes_raw: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'equalto', 241) | map(attribute='raw.value') | first | default(none) }}"
# NVMe reports wear directly as "percentage_used"; ATA SSDs report a countdown.
lifetime_remaining_pct: >-
{{ (100 - smart_nvme.percentage_used) if (smart_nvme.percentage_used is defined)
else (smart_life_202 if smart_life_202 is not none
else (smart_life_231 if smart_life_231 is not none else smart_life_233)) }}
nvme_media_errors: "{{ smart_nvme.media_errors | default(none) }}"
nvme_critical_warning: "{{ smart_nvme.critical_warning | default(none) }}"
nvme_unsafe_shutdowns: "{{ smart_nvme.unsafe_shutdowns | default(none) }}"
# --- Vendor context. Never a verdict on its own; always printed with its own numbers.
realloc_events: "{{ smart_realloc_events }}"
grown_bad_blocks: "{{ smart_grown_blocks }}"
erase_fail_count: "{{ smart_erase_fail }}"
program_fail_count: "{{ smart_program_fail }}"
unexpected_power_loss: "{{ smart_power_loss if smart_power_loss is not none else (smart_nvme.unsafe_shutdowns | default(none)) }}"
# Attribute 5, whole and labelled, so the raw is visible BESIDE the normalised reading
# rather than standing in for it. `reallocated_sectors` is deliberately gone: that name
# asserted a unit the ATA spec does not guarantee, and asserting it is what produced the
# false FAIL on k3s-prod-1 (see defaults/main.yml).
realloc_attr: "{{ smart_attr5 }}"
# Every attribute the operator asked to see, verbatim, names and all — vendors
# disagree on naming, so the checks key off IDs and the report shows the drive's
# own labels.
attributes: "{{ smart_attrs | selectattr('id', 'in', node_health_smart_attribute_ids) | list }}"
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/collect_unprivileged.yml
+30
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---
# Everything obtainable without root, in ONE round trip. See
# files/node_health_collect.py for the full field-by-field rationale — including why the
# collector is a script rather than 40 sysfs `cat` tasks, and why unreadable fields come
# back as null + a recorded reason instead of an empty string.
#
# NOTE: the role runs with gather_facts irrelevant — the collector supersedes
# ansible.builtin.setup for this purpose (setup exposes no thermal zones, no EDAC, no CPU
# throttle counters, no PSI, no per-disk SCSI error counters, no per-NIC error stats), so
# there is exactly one source of truth behind both the summary and the JSON artifact.
- name: Run the unprivileged node health collector
ansible.builtin.script:
cmd: node_health_collect.py
executable: /usr/bin/python3
register: node_health_collect_raw
changed_when: false # strictly read-only; it can never change the node
- name: Parse the collector payload
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_facts: "{{ node_health_collect_raw.stdout | from_json }}"
- name: Assert the collector schema is the one this role understands
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- node_health_facts.schema == 'node-health/1'
fail_msg: >-
Collector returned schema {{ node_health_facts.schema | default('<none>') }};
this role understands node-health/1. Role and collector are out of step.
quiet: true
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/main.yml
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---
# node_health — read-only hardware health inspection. See defaults/main.yml for the why.
#
# ORDER OF OPERATIONS
# 1. Collect everything readable WITHOUT root (one script, one round trip).
# 2. Probe whether privilege escalation actually works on this host.
# 3. Only if it does AND smartmontools is installed: read SMART.
# 4. Turn facts into a list of explicit PASS/WARN/FAIL/SKIP checks.
# 5. Render the human summary + write the JSON artifact.
#
# BECOME HANDLING — the subtle bit, read before editing.
# `ansible_become` set as an inventory/group var (which is exactly what
# inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml does for prod) is a CONNECTION VARIABLE, and
# connection variables OUTRANK the `become:` play/task keyword. Verified on this repo's
# ansible-core 2.20: a play or task saying `become: false` still tries to sudo, and on
# prod (no NOPASSWD, vaulted password) dies with "Missing sudo password" before the
# module ever runs. So the unprivileged tasks here must override the VARIABLE, not the
# keyword — hence `vars: ansible_become: false` on the include below. That makes the role
# self-contained: it behaves identically whatever the calling play sets.
#
# Equally verified: `failed_when: false` does NOT catch a missing-sudo-password error
# (it is raised by the become plugin before the task's failure expression is evaluated).
# `ignore_errors: true` DOES, and still populates the registered variable. That is why
# the escalation probe below uses ignore_errors — anything else turns "no vault yet" into
# a hard, misleading play failure.
- name: Initialise the health record
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_checks: []
node_health_smart: []
node_health_root_available: false
node_health_root_skip_reason: "privileged checks not attempted (node_health_try_privileged=false)"
vars:
ansible_become: false
- name: Collect unprivileged hardware facts
ansible.builtin.include_tasks: collect_unprivileged.yml
# Applies to every task in the included file (dynamic includes pass their vars down).
vars:
ansible_become: false
- name: Probe privilege escalation
ansible.builtin.include_tasks: probe_privilege.yml
when: node_health_try_privileged | bool
- name: Read SMART data (privileged)
ansible.builtin.include_tasks: collect_smart.yml
when:
- node_health_root_available | bool
- node_health_facts.tools.smartctl is truthy
- name: Assess collected facts into explicit checks
ansible.builtin.include_tasks: assess.yml
vars:
ansible_become: false
- name: Report (human summary + JSON artifact)
ansible.builtin.include_tasks: report.yml
vars:
ansible_become: false
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/probe_privilege.yml
+35
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---
# Does `become` actually work on this host, right now?
#
# We must know BEFORE attempting SMART, because a failed escalation is a hard task error
# (see the become note in main.yml): `failed_when: false` cannot swallow it, only
# `ignore_errors` can. Probing once with a trivial, side-effect-free command means the
# rest of the role can branch on a boolean instead of littering ignore_errors everywhere —
# and lets the report state the exact reason a check was skipped.
#
# On prod today this probe is EXPECTED to fail: prod deliberately has no NOPASSWD sudo and
# its ansible_become_password lives in an ansible-vault file that does not exist yet
# (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §5, DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-31 finding 3). That is a SKIP, not
# a defect, and the summary says so in those words.
- name: Probe whether privilege escalation is available
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: id -u
become: true
vars:
ansible_become: true
register: node_health_root_probe
changed_when: false
ignore_errors: true
- name: Record the escalation result
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_root_available: "{{ (node_health_root_probe.stdout | default('') | trim) == '0' }}"
node_health_root_skip_reason: >-
{{ 'privilege escalation OK'
if (node_health_root_probe.stdout | default('') | trim) == '0'
else 'become unavailable: ' ~ (node_health_root_probe.msg | default('unknown error'))
~ ' (prod uses a vaulted ansible_become_password —'
~ ' see infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §5)' }}
vars:
ansible_become: false
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/tasks/report.yml
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---
# Two outputs, deliberately:
#
# 1. A human summary the operator can read at a glance (printed in the play output AND
# written next to the JSON, so it survives the terminal scrollback).
# 2. A structured JSON artifact — the machine-readable record, and the thing a future
# R-OBS-04 exporter or a prod-readiness gate can consume without re-parsing prose.
#
# Artifacts follow the repo's existing convention (conformance/_artifacts/): generated
# output under a `_artifacts/` directory that .gitignore excludes. Never committed — they
# are regenerated on every run and they carry drive serial numbers.
- name: Count check outcomes
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_counts:
FAIL: "{{ node_health_checks | selectattr('status', 'equalto', 'FAIL') | list | length }}"
WARN: "{{ node_health_checks | selectattr('status', 'equalto', 'WARN') | list | length }}"
PASS: "{{ node_health_checks | selectattr('status', 'equalto', 'PASS') | list | length }}"
SKIP: "{{ node_health_checks | selectattr('status', 'equalto', 'SKIP') | list | length }}"
INFO: "{{ node_health_checks | selectattr('status', 'equalto', 'INFO') | list | length }}"
# Rendered once, then used for BOTH the on-screen report and the .txt artifact, so the
# two can never drift.
- name: Render the human summary
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
node_health_summary: "{{ lookup('ansible.builtin.template', 'summary.txt.j2') }}"
- name: Show the summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "{{ node_health_summary.split('\n') }}"
when: node_health_show_summary | bool
- name: Ensure the artifact directory exists (on the controller)
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ node_health_artifact_dir }}"
state: directory
mode: "0755"
delegate_to: localhost
become: false
when: node_health_write_artifacts | bool
- name: Write the structured health record (JSON)
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: "{{ node_health_artifact_dir }}/{{ inventory_hostname }}.json"
mode: "0644"
content: "{{ node_health_record | to_nice_json }}"
delegate_to: localhost
become: false
when: node_health_write_artifacts | bool
vars:
node_health_record:
schema: node-health/1
host: "{{ inventory_hostname }}"
address: "{{ ansible_host | default(inventory_hostname) }}"
collected_at: "{{ node_health_facts.collected_at }}"
privileged:
available: "{{ node_health_root_available }}"
reason: "{{ node_health_root_skip_reason }}"
counts: "{{ node_health_counts }}"
checks: "{{ node_health_checks }}"
smart: "{{ node_health_smart }}"
facts: "{{ node_health_facts }}"
- name: Write the human summary alongside it
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: "{{ node_health_artifact_dir }}/{{ inventory_hostname }}.txt"
mode: "0644"
content: "{{ node_health_summary }}"
delegate_to: localhost
become: false
when: node_health_write_artifacts | bool
# Report-only by default (see defaults/main.yml): a health check that aborts the play
# hides the other twenty findings. Opt in when using this role as a pre-build gate.
- name: Fail the play on health findings (opt-in)
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- (node_health_counts.FAIL | int) == 0
- not (node_health_fail_on_warn | bool) or (node_health_counts.WARN | int) == 0
fail_msg: >-
node_health: {{ node_health_counts.FAIL }} FAIL / {{ node_health_counts.WARN }} WARN
on {{ inventory_hostname }} — see {{ node_health_artifact_dir }}/{{ inventory_hostname }}.txt
quiet: true
when: node_health_fail_on_fail | bool
infra/ansible/roles/node_health/templates/summary.txt.j2
+167
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@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
{# ===========================================================================
node_health human summary. Rendered ONCE (tasks/report.yml) and used for both
the on-screen report and the .txt artifact, so the two can never drift.
Detail strings are normalised with regex_replace('\s+',' ') because the check
details are authored as YAML folded scalars in assess.yml and can carry stray
newlines/indentation from that folding.
=========================================================================== #}
{% macro fmt(text, width=74, pad=10) -%}
{{ text | regex_replace('\s+', ' ') | trim | wordwrap(width) | indent(pad, first=True) }}
{%- endmacro %}
{% macro gib(n) -%}
{{ (n | int / 1073741824) | round(1) }} GiB
{%- endmacro %}
================================================================================
NODE HEALTH — {{ inventory_hostname }} ({{ ansible_host | default('n/a') }})
collected {{ node_health_facts.collected_at }} as uid {{ node_health_facts.collector_uid }}
================================================================================
VERDICT {{ node_health_counts.FAIL }} FAIL · {{ node_health_counts.WARN }} WARN · {{ node_health_counts.PASS }} PASS · {{ node_health_counts.SKIP }} SKIP · {{ node_health_counts.INFO }} INFO
{{ 'privileged checks RAN' if node_health_root_available | bool else 'privileged checks SKIPPED — root not available' }}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHECKS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{% for c in node_health_checks %}
[{{ '%-4s' | format(c.status) }}] {{ c.id }} — {{ c.title }}
{{ fmt(c.detail) }}
{% endfor %}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MACHINE — {{ node_health_facts.dmi.sys_vendor | default('?') }} {{ node_health_facts.dmi.product_name | default('?') }}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OS {{ node_health_facts.os.pretty_name | default('?') }}
Kernel {{ node_health_facts.os.kernel | default('?') }}
Uptime {{ (node_health_facts.os.uptime_seconds | float / 86400) | round(2) }} days
BIOS {{ node_health_facts.dmi.bios_vendor | default('?') }} {{ node_health_facts.dmi.bios_version | default('?') }} ({{ node_health_facts.dmi.bios_date | default('?') }}){% if node_health_facts.dmi.ec_firmware_release %}, EC {{ node_health_facts.dmi.ec_firmware_release }}{% endif %}
Board {{ node_health_facts.dmi.board_vendor | default('?') }} {{ node_health_facts.dmi.board_name | default('?') }}
CPU {{ node_health_facts.cpu.model | default('?') }}
{{ node_health_facts.cpu.cpus | default('?') }} logical / {{ node_health_facts.cpu.sockets | default('?') }} socket(s) x {{ node_health_facts.cpu.cores_per_socket | default('?') }} core(s) x {{ node_health_facts.cpu.threads_per_core | default('?') }} thread(s)
virtualisation: {{ node_health_facts.cpu.virtualization | default('none reported') }}, /dev/kvm={{ node_health_facts.cpu.kvm_device }}
{% if node_health_facts.cpu.scaling %}
scaling: {{ node_health_facts.cpu.scaling.driver }}/{{ node_health_facts.cpu.scaling.governor }}, {{ (node_health_facts.cpu.scaling.min_khz | int / 1000) | round | int }}–{{ (node_health_facts.cpu.scaling.max_khz | int / 1000) | round | int }} MHz (now {{ (node_health_facts.cpu.scaling.cur_khz | int / 1000) | round | int }} MHz)
{% endif %}
Memory {{ (node_health_facts.memory.mem_total_kb | int / 1048576) | round(1) }} GiB total, {{ (node_health_facts.memory.mem_available_kb | int / 1048576) | round(1) }} GiB available, swap {{ (node_health_facts.memory.swap_total_kb | int / 1048576) | round(2) }} GiB
ECC/EDAC {{ 'controllers: ' ~ (node_health_facts.memory.edac.controllers | map(attribute='name') | join(', ')) ~ ' CE=' ~ node_health_facts.memory.edac.ce_total | string ~ ' UE=' ~ node_health_facts.memory.edac.ue_total | string if node_health_facts.memory.edac.controllers_present else 'not exposed (no EDAC controller bound — ECC status UNKNOWN on this platform)' }}
Load {{ node_health_facts.cpu.loadavg | default([]) | join(' ') }}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STORAGE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{% for d in node_health_facts.storage.disks %}
{{ d.path }} {{ gib(d.size_bytes) }} {{ 'rotational' if d.rotational else 'non-rotating' }} {{ d.transport | default('?', true) }}{% if d.fstype %} whole-device {{ d.fstype }}{% endif %}{% if d.mountpoints %} mounted at {{ d.mountpoints | join(',') }}{% endif %}
model {{ d.model | default('(none reported)', true) }}{% if d.firmware_rev %} fw {{ d.firmware_rev }}{% endif %}{% if d.serial %} s/n {{ d.serial }}{% endif %}
{% if d.scsi_counters %}
kernel I/O completed={{ d.scsi_counters.iodone_cnt }} errors={{ d.scsi_counters.ioerr_cnt }} timeouts={{ d.scsi_counters.iotmo_cnt }}
{% endif %}
{% set sm = (node_health_smart | selectattr('path', 'equalto', d.path) | list | first) | default(none) %}
{% if sm and sm.available %}
SMART overall-health={{ 'PASSED' if sm.passed else 'FAILED' }} power_on_hours={{ sm.power_on_hours | default('?') }} power_cycles={{ sm.power_cycles | default('?') }}
lifetime_remaining={{ (sm.lifetime_remaining_pct | string ~ '%') if sm.lifetime_remaining_pct is not none else 'not reported' }} temp={{ (sm.temperature_c | string ~ 'C') if sm.temperature_c is not none else 'not reported by this drive' }}
pending(197)={{ sm.pending_sectors | default('?') }} offline_uncorrectable(198)={{ sm.offline_uncorrectable | default('?') }} reported_uncorrect(187)={{ sm.reported_uncorrect | default('?') }} crc(199)={{ sm.crc_errors | default('?') }}
{% if sm.failing_now or sm.failed_past %}
THRESHOLD TRIPS{% for a in sm.failing_now %} [{{ a.id }} {{ a.name }} FAILING_NOW value={{ a.value }}<=thresh={{ a.thresh }}{{ ' Pre-fail' if a.flags.prefailure | default(false) else ' Old_age' }}]{% endfor %}{% for a in sm.failed_past %} [{{ a.id }} {{ a.name }} In_the_past worst={{ a.worst }}<=thresh={{ a.thresh }}]{% endfor %}
{% elif sm.thresholds_present %}
no attribute at/below its manufacturer threshold{% if sm.prefail_closest %}; closest Pre-fail margin: {{ sm.prefail_closest.id }} {{ sm.prefail_closest.name }} value={{ sm.prefail_closest.value }} vs thresh={{ sm.prefail_closest.thresh }}{% endif %}
{% endif %}
vendor context (NOT used for the verdict — raw units are vendor-defined):
reallocation events(196)={{ sm.realloc_events if sm.realloc_events is not none else 'n/a' }} grown bad blocks={{ sm.grown_bad_blocks if sm.grown_bad_blocks is not none else 'n/a' }} erase fails={{ sm.erase_fail_count if sm.erase_fail_count is not none else 'n/a' }} program fails={{ sm.program_fail_count if sm.program_fail_count is not none else 'n/a' }} unexpected power loss={{ sm.unexpected_power_loss if sm.unexpected_power_loss is not none else 'n/a' }}
{% if sm.realloc_attr %}
attr 5 {{ sm.realloc_attr.name }} raw={{ sm.realloc_attr.raw.string | default(sm.realloc_attr.raw.value) }} (vendor-encoded) vs normalised value={{ sm.realloc_attr.value }} thresh={{ sm.realloc_attr.thresh }} (the signal that is judged)
{% endif %}
{% for a in sm.attributes | default([]) %}
[{{ '%3d' | format(a.id) }}] {{ '%-26s' | format(a.name) }} value={{ a.value }} worst={{ a.worst }} thresh={{ a.thresh }} raw={{ a.raw.string | default(a.raw.value) }}{% if a.when_failed | default('') %} <<< when_failed={{ a.when_failed }}{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% else %}
SMART NOT READ — {{ (node_health_root_skip_reason if not node_health_root_available else ('smartmontools not installed on this node (ships with roles/node_baseline; this role never installs packages)' if not node_health_facts.tools.smartctl else 'device exposes no SMART data')) | regex_replace('\s+', ' ') | trim }}
{% endif %}
{% for p in d.partitions %}
{{ '%-12s' | format(p.kname) }} {{ '%9s' | format(gib(p.size_bytes)) }} {{ '%-6s' | format(p.fstype | default('-', true)) }} {{ (p.mountpoints[:2] | join(', ') ~ (' (+%d more)' | format(p.mountpoints | length - 2) if (p.mountpoints | length) > 2 else '')) if p.mountpoints else '(unmounted)' }}
{% endfor %}
{% endfor %}
{% if node_health_facts.storage.attached_volumes | default([]) %}
ATTACHED VOLUMES (iSCSI/FC — Longhorn replicas etc., not hardware in this box)
{% for a in node_health_facts.storage.attached_volumes %}
{{ '%-10s' | format(a.path) }} {{ '%9s' | format(gib(a.size_bytes)) }} {{ a.transport }} {{ a.model | default('-', true) }}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
MOUNTED FILESYSTEMS
{% for m in node_health_facts.storage.mounts | sort(attribute='mountpoint') %}
{{ '%-14s' | format(m.mountpoint) }} {{ '%-6s' | format(m.fstype) }} {{ '%9s' | format(gib(m.size_bytes)) }} total, {{ '%9s' | format(gib(m.avail_bytes)) }} free ({{ m.used_pct }}% used, inodes {{ (m.inodes_used_pct | string ~ '%') if m.inodes_used_pct is not none else 'n/a' }})
{% endfor %}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THERMAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{% for z in node_health_facts.thermal.zones %}
zone {{ '%-18s' | format(z.type | default(z.zone)) }} {{ (z.temp_c | string ~ 'C') if z.temp_c is not none else 'unreadable (sensor returned no data)' }}{% if z.critical_c %} (critical {{ z.critical_c }}C){% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% for chip in node_health_facts.thermal.hwmon %}
{% for t in chip.temps %}
{{ '%-16s' | format(chip.name | default('hwmon')) }} {{ '%-22s' | format(t.label) }} {{ (t.temp_c | string ~ 'C') if t.temp_c is not none else 'unreadable (sensor returned no data)' }}{% if t.crit_c %} (crit {{ t.crit_c }}C){% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% for f in chip.fans %}
{{ '%-16s' | format(chip.name | default('hwmon')) }} {{ '%-22s' | format(f.label) }} {{ f.rpm }} rpm
{% endfor %}
{% endfor %}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRESSURE STALL (/proc/pressure — % of wall time stalled)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{% for res in ['cpu', 'memory', 'io'] %}
{% set p = node_health_facts.pressure[res] %}
{% if p %}
{{ '%-7s' | format(res) }} some avg10={{ p.some.avg10 }} avg60={{ p.some.avg60 }} avg300={{ p.some.avg300 }}{% if p.full is defined %} | full avg60={{ p.full.avg60 }}{% endif %}
{% else %}
{{ '%-7s' | format(res) }} unavailable
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NETWORK
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{% for n in node_health_facts.network.interfaces %}
{{ '%-10s' | format(n.name) }} {{ '%-6s' | format(n.operstate) }} {{ '%-8s' | format((n.speed_mbps | string ~ 'Mb/s') if n.speed_mbps else 'no-link') }} {{ '%-9s' | format(n.duplex | default('-')) }} mtu {{ n.mtu }} driver {{ n.driver | default('-') }}
rx {{ n.statistics.rx_packets | default('?') }} pkts / errors {{ n.statistics.rx_errors | default('?') }} / dropped {{ n.statistics.rx_dropped | default('?') }}
tx {{ n.statistics.tx_packets | default('?') }} pkts / errors {{ n.statistics.tx_errors | default('?') }} / dropped {{ n.statistics.tx_dropped | default('?') }}
{% endfor %}
{% if node_health_facts.network.nameservers is none %}
nameservers NOT READ — {{ node_health_facts.network.resolver_unavailable_reason | default('the collector recorded no reason', true) | regex_replace('\s+', ' ') | trim | wordwrap(66) | indent(13) }}
{% else %}
nameservers {{ node_health_facts.network.nameservers | join(', ') | default('none configured', true) }}
{% if node_health_facts.network.resolver_stub | default([], true) | length > 0 %}
(/etc/resolv.conf holds only the systemd-resolved stub {{ node_health_facts.network.resolver_stub | join(', ') }}; the servers above are the real upstreams behind it)
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOT READ (and why) — these are UNKNOWNS, not passes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{% for c in node_health_checks if c.status == 'SKIP' %}
- {{ c.id }}: {{ c.detail | regex_replace('\s+', ' ') | trim | wordwrap(70) | indent(3) }}
{% else %}
(nothing skipped)
{% endfor %}
{% if node_health_facts.unreadable %}
Unreadable paths reported by the collector:
{% for u in node_health_facts.unreadable %}
- {{ u.path }} — {{ u.reason }}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
tools present: {% for t, p in node_health_facts.tools.items() %}{{ t }}={{ p | default('MISSING', true) }}{{ ', ' if not loop.last }}{% endfor %}
================================================================================
infra/tofu/main.tf
+10 -1
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@@ -159,8 +159,17 @@ resource "proxmox_virtual_environment_vm" "node" {
}
}
# DNS resilience (dev only — tofu provisions the dev VMs; prod is bare metal with no
# cloud-init). A SINGLE upstream was a hard SPOF: PiHole (var.dns_server) answers the
# local jackson.lan zone but its external recursion flaps, which broke containerd image
# pulls and CoreDNS forwarding. PiHole stays FIRST — the local zone and network
# ad-blocking are unchanged — and the pfSense gateway (var.network_gateway) is added
# purely as a fallback for external recursion. Order is the policy, not a preference.
# This keeps a freshly built node's cloud-init in parity with what the Ansible
# node_baseline role's `dns`-tagged block configures on an already-running node
# (node_baseline_dns_servers), so a rebuild does not regress to one resolver.
dns {
servers = [var.dns_server]
servers = [var.dns_server, var.network_gateway]
}
user_account {
platform-config/cilium/l2-announcement-policy.yaml
+4 -2
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@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
# CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy — ARP-announce LoadBalancer VIPs on the node LAN so hosts on
# 192.168.1.0/24 can reach Gateway listeners at the pool IP (l2announcements.enabled=true in the
# CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy — ARP-announce LoadBalancer VIPs on the node LAN so LAN hosts (dev
# 192.168.1.0/24, prod 192.168.2.0/24) can reach Gateway listeners at the pool IP. The RANGE itself
# is env-scoped in l2-ip-pool.yaml via CILIUM_LB_POOL_START/STOP; this policy is env-agnostic and
# needs no cluster-vars knob (l2announcements.enabled=true in the
# Cilium HelmRelease turns on the controller; this policy scopes WHAT/WHERE it announces).
# Announces on the primary ethernet interface. On Proxmox VMs the NIC is typically ens18/eth0;
# `^e(n|th)` matches ens*/enp*/eth* so the exact name need not be pinned. VERIFY-AT-BRINGUP: if
platform-config/cilium/l2-ip-pool.yaml
+24 -7
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,33 @@
---
# CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool — reserved VIP range for LoadBalancer Services. Gateway API listeners
# (gatewayClassName: cilium) get their address from here. Range matches the tofu reservation
# (cilium_l2_vip_range 192.168.1.53-.60) on the Proxmox LAN 192.168.1.0/24. These addresses sit
# OUTSIDE the node IPs (.50/.51/.52) and any DHCP scope, so nothing else claims them.
# (gatewayClassName: cilium) get their address from here. The range must match the environment's tofu
# reservation (cilium_l2_vip_range) and sit OUTSIDE the node IPs and any DHCP scope, so nothing else
# claims them.
#
# NOTE (dev): the range is hardcoded to the dev LAN reservation. A prod overlay must supply the
# prod LAN range (parameterize via cluster-vars when prod hardware is built). See DECISIONS-LOG.
# R-ENV-02: the range was HARDCODED to the dev LAN (192.168.1.53-.60 on the Proxmox LAN 192.168.1.0/24,
# nodes .50/.51/.52) until 2026-08-31; it is now ${CILIUM_LB_POOL_START}..${CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP} from
# cluster-vars, substituted by the `platform-config` Flux Kustomization.
#
# CONTAINMENT INVARIANT — ${GATEWAY_VIP} MUST be inside this block, and in practice EQUAL to
# ${CILIUM_LB_POOL_START}. The `shared` Gateway (platform/gateway/gateway.yaml) pins NOTHING: it has
# no `lbipam.cilium.io/ips` annotation and no spec.addresses (unlike platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml
# and apps/vms/unifi/50-service-l4.yaml, which DO pin). Cilium's Gateway controller creates a
# `cilium-gateway-shared` LoadBalancer Service and LB-IPAM assigns it the FIRST FREE address of a
# matching pool block — so the Gateway lands on POOL_START, and dev's GATEWAY_VIP (.53) IS dev's
# POOL_START (.53-.60). A GATEWAY_VIP outside every pool is NOT allocatable: the Gateway would come
# up on POOL_START anyway while split-horizon coredns-custom keeps answering *.home.keithjackson.dev
# with the unannounced GATEWAY_VIP, blackholing in-cluster hairpin traffic while looking healthy.
#
# RESOLVED (operator, 2026-08-31): the invariant holds in BOTH environments. An earlier prod
# proposal put GATEWAY_VIP .20 outside a .21-.30 pool; the operator widened the prod pool to
# 192.168.2.20-.30 so GATEWAY_VIP (.20) IS prod's POOL_START, exactly as dev's .53 is dev's.
# Prod's kube-vip CONTROL-PLANE VIP (192.168.2.9) sits deliberately BELOW the pool so kube-vip
# and LB-IPAM can never contend for an address.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2alpha1
kind: CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool
metadata:
name: default-pool
spec:
blocks:
- start: "192.168.1.53"
stop: "192.168.1.60"
- start: "${CILIUM_LB_POOL_START}"
stop: "${CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP}"
platform/cilium/helmrelease.yaml
+5 -2
View File
@@ -45,9 +45,12 @@ spec:
# [parity] MUST equal Ansible: kubeProxyReplacement: true
kubeProxyReplacement: true
# [parity] MUST equal Ansible: k8sServiceHost/k8sServicePort = the k3s API endpoint
# (k3s_api_host/k3s_api_port). This is the primary control-plane node IP (192.168.1.50).
# (k3s_api_host/k3s_api_port). This is the primary control-plane node IP.
# Setting these wrong breaks Cilium's connection to the API server on adopt.
k8sServiceHost: "192.168.1.50"
# ${K3S_API_HOST} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02): dev 192.168.1.50 | prod set in clusters/prod.
# The `platform` Flux Kustomization substitutes it; the Ansible side is already parameterized
# from inventory (k3s_api_host), so the parity contract holds per-environment, not per-literal.
k8sServiceHost: "${K3S_API_HOST}"
k8sServicePort: 6443
# --- Gateway API (ingress; replaces Traefik) — docs/09, ADR-0002 ---
# [parity] MUST equal Ansible: gatewayAPI.enabled: true
platform/cilium/values.yaml
+4 -2
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@
# [parity] k3s kube-proxy disabled → Cilium replaces it (ADR-0001/0002)
kubeProxyReplacement: true
# [parity] = the k3s API endpoint (primary control-plane node IP) + port
k8sServiceHost: "192.168.1.50"
# [parity] = the k3s API endpoint (primary control-plane node IP) + port.
# Mirrors the HelmRelease's ${K3S_API_HOST} cluster-vars token (R-ENV-02). This file is NOT a
# kustomize resource, so nothing substitutes it — the token is shown with its dev value beside it.
k8sServiceHost: "${K3S_API_HOST}" # dev: 192.168.1.50
k8sServicePort: 6443
# [parity] ingress via Gateway API, no Traefik (docs/09)
gatewayAPI:
platform/crafty/service-l4.yaml
+8 -6
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
# the crafty pod's network namespace. The Gateway API `shared` Gateway is an L7 HTTPS terminator and
# CANNOT express raw TCP on arbitrary ports or UDP at all. So the game ports are exposed as
# type=LoadBalancer Services whose VIP is pulled from the CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool `default-pool`
# (192.168.1.53-.60) and ARP-announced on the flat LAN by the existing CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy
# (dev 192.168.1.53-.60; see CILIUM_LB_POOL_* in cluster-vars) and ARP-announced on the flat LAN by
# the existing CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy
# `default-l2` (platform-config/cilium/*) — the SAME machinery the Gateway VIP and unifi already use.
# No new Cilium config is needed; these Services just consume the pool.
#
@@ -15,8 +16,9 @@
# control plane) is Keycloak-gated (via the oauth2-proxy sidecar); the game ports carry player traffic
# and must reach the server subprocesses directly.
#
# VIP: 192.168.1.55 — the next free address in default-pool (.53 = shared Gateway, .54 = unifi;
# verified free live 2026-08-28). PINNED via lbipam.cilium.io/ips so players have a stable target.
# VIP: CRAFTY_L4_VIP (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev 192.168.1.55) — the next free address in
# default-pool (dev: .53 = shared Gateway, .54 = unifi; verified free live 2026-08-28). PINNED via
# lbipam.cilium.io/ips so players have a stable target. The `crafty` Flux Kustomization substitutes it.
# ONE VIP, TWO SERVICES: a LoadBalancer Service is single-protocol-friendly, so TCP and UDP split into
# two Services sharing the IP via lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key (same pattern as unifi).
#
@@ -38,8 +40,8 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: crafty
annotations:
lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: "crafty"
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "192.168.1.55"
# external-dns publishes A crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev -> 192.168.1.55 (the Java server target).
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}"
# external-dns publishes A crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev -> the pinned VIP (Java server target).
external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/hostname: "crafty-mc.home.keithjackson.dev"
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: crafty
annotations:
lbipam.cilium.io/sharing-key: "crafty" # same key + same IP => shares the VIP with -tcp
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "192.168.1.55"
lbipam.cilium.io/ips: "${CRAFTY_L4_VIP}"
spec:
type: LoadBalancer
externalTrafficPolicy: Local
platform/keycloak/postgres-cluster.yaml
+3 -1
View File
@@ -40,11 +40,13 @@ spec:
# to the Cluster name), so objects land under s3://cnpg/keycloak-db/. Path-style HTTP MinIO endpoint.
# Credentials: the scoped key from the in-namespace SOPS Secret keycloak-db-backup-credentials
# (a Pod only reads same-ns Secrets), kept in sync with platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml.
# endpointURL is ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars, R-ENV-02; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000) — prod
# MUST point at its own off-cluster target. Substituted by the `platform-config` Kustomization.
backup:
retentionPolicy: "30d" # keep 30 days of base backups + WAL (PITR window); prunes older
barmanObjectStore:
destinationPath: s3://cnpg
endpointURL: http://192.168.1.9:9000
endpointURL: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT}
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: keycloak-db-backup-credentials
platform/velero/helmrelease.yaml
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
---
# Velero — off-cluster backup/DR of cluster resources + PVC data (ADR-0003, R-STATE-03). LIVE.
#
# TARGET: the on-Proxmox MinIO S3 endpoint http://192.168.1.9:9000 (plain HTTP, path-style), bucket
# TARGET: the MinIO S3 endpoint ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (cluster-vars; dev http://192.168.1.9:9000 on
# Proxmox — plain HTTP, path-style), bucket
# `velero`. region us-east-1 is a placeholder MinIO ignores (S3 clients still require one).
#
# WHY THIS SHAPE:
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ spec:
default: true
config:
region: us-east-1 # placeholder; MinIO ignores it (S3 clients require one)
s3Url: http://192.168.1.9:9000 # on-Proxmox MinIO, plain HTTP
s3Url: ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} # on-Proxmox MinIO, plain HTTP (cluster-vars)
s3ForcePathStyle: "true" # MinIO is path-style
credentials:
existingSecret: velero-cloud-credentials # SOPS Secret carrying the `cloud` INI key (ns velero)
platform/velero/values.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# doc pointer, kept for parity with the other components' layout).
#
# LIVE wiring (see helmrelease.yaml):
# - provider aws + velero-plugin-for-aws (init container) → MinIO S3 http://192.168.1.9:9000
# - provider aws + velero-plugin-for-aws (init container) → MinIO S3 ${S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT} (dev: http://192.168.1.9:9000)
# (path-style, bucket `velero`, region us-east-1 placeholder).
# - deployNodeAgent:true + uploaderType:kopia → File System Backup of PVC data (no CSI data-mover).
# - snapshotsEnabled:false → no VolumeSnapshotLocation.