Merge pull request 'fix(gitea): admins could override the gate' (#10) from fix/gitea-admins-could-override-the-gate into main
gate / gate (push) Successful in 1m34s
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Reviewed-on: #10
Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]>
This commit was merged in pull request #10.
This commit is contained in:
jakman85 committed 2026-09-29 07:43:52 +00:00
commit e8e6b9c681
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@@ -4924,3 +4924,43 @@ being unable to recur.
4. `required_approvals: 1` means a PR you open as `jakman85` needs `gitea-admin` to approve.
If that friction bites, either open agent work as `gitea-admin` and review as `jakman85`, or
drop back to relying on the status check alone.
## 2026-09-29 (later still) — the enforcement we "turned on" was overridable by the account that merges
`enable_status_check: true` and `required_approvals: 1` were set earlier today and recorded as
done. **They did not bite.** `block_admin_merge_override` was `false`, and Gitea lets repository
admins override merge requirements without it. `jakman85` holds `owner`, so both requirements
were bypassable by exactly the account that performs every merge.
**The evidence was already on the record and nobody read it:** PRs #5, #6, #7, #8 and #9 all
merged while `required_approvals: 1` was in force, with **zero approvals recorded on any of
them**. A one-line check (`/pulls/{n}/reviews`) would have shown it at any point.
Two process failures, both mine, both the same shape as the original defect:
1. **I verified with the wrong view.** `/branches/main` reports `protected`,
`enable_status_check` and `required_approvals` but NOT `block_admin_merge_override`. It
showed everything green while the rule was overridable. The authoritative object is
`/branch_protections/main` — read it and enumerate its keys.
2. **I probed for a field name I assumed existed.** This Gitea (1.24.3) has no
`apply_to_admins`. Asking `jq` for it returns `null`, which reads exactly like "set to
false" but means "key absent" — so a PATCH that silently did nothing looked like a real
before/after. **`jq` returning null is not a value; it may be an absence.** Enumerate with
`to_entries`.
Now `block_admin_merge_override: true`, applied and read back. `infra/gitea/require-gate.sh`
sets it, and `infra/gitea/block-admin-override.sh` fixes it in isolation.
**This is still only a setting.** It is proven when a green PR is REFUSED a merge until
approved — and that has not been observed yet. This PR is the test: if it merges without an
approval, the fix did not work and the finding stands.
### The governance question this exposes
There are two accounts: `jakman85` (owner, the human) and `gitea-admin` (the agent). With
approvals now genuinely required, an agent-authored PR is approved by the human — which is the
intent. But a PR authored by `jakman85` needs `gitea-admin` to approve it, i.e. the automation
account rubber-stamping the human. That is ceremony, not review. Options: keep it and accept
the ceremony; drop `required_approvals` to 0 and rely on the status check, which is the gate
that actually verifies something; or add a second human account. **This is a decision for the
operator, not a default to be chosen silently.**
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@@ -55,8 +55,27 @@ All four steps are complete and each was verified, not assumed:
| 4. Collaborator + approvals | ✅ `jakman85` is owner; `required_approvals: 1` |
Direct push to `main` was **provoked and rejected** (`pre-receive hook declined`) as
`gitea-admin`, a site admin — so protection is not merely declared, it holds for the account
agents authenticate as.
`gitea-admin`, a site admin — so push protection is not merely declared, it holds for the
account agents authenticate as.
### 5. Block the admin override — the step the first pass MISSED
`enable_status_check` and `required_approvals` were set on 2026-09-29 and **still did not
bite**, because `block_admin_merge_override` was `false`. Gitea lets repo admins override
merge requirements without it, and `jakman85` holds `owner` — so the two settings that looked
like the gate were overridable by precisely the account that merges.
**The evidence was sitting in plain sight:** PRs #5 through #9 all merged with
`required_approvals: 1` in force and **zero approvals recorded on any of them**. Checking the
*branch* view (`/branches/main`) hid this — it does not expose the field. Read the rule object
(`/branch_protections/main`) and enumerate its keys.
> **Do not probe for field names you assume exist.** This Gitea (1.24.3) has no
> `apply_to_admins`; asking `jq` for it returns `null`, which reads like "set to false" but
> means "key absent". Enumerate with `to_entries` and act on what is really there.
Now `block_admin_merge_override: true`. **That is still only a setting, not evidence** — it is
proven when a green PR is REFUSED a merge until approved, and not before.
### `require-gate.sh` / `verify-then-enforce.sh`
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stop repository admins from overriding the merge requirements on `main`.
#
# WHY. Gitea lets repo admins override branch-protection merge requirements unless
# `block_admin_merge_override` is set. It was FALSE, and jakman85 holds `owner` -- so
# required_approvals and the required status check were both overridable by the one account
# that actually merges. Evidence: PRs #5-#9 all merged with ZERO approvals recorded against
# `required_approvals: 1`.
#
# NOTE ON FIELD NAMES: this Gitea (1.24.3) has NO `apply_to_admins` field. Querying it with jq
# returns null, which reads like "set to false" but actually means "key absent". Enumerate the
# real keys (`to_entries`) rather than probing names you assume exist.
#
# Recoverable: an owner can PATCH this back to false if it gets in the way.
set -euo pipefail
HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev; OWNER=Home-Network; REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"; P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
api() { curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") "$@"; }
B="https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/branch_protections/main"
echo "==> before: block_admin_merge_override = $(api "$B" | jq -r .block_admin_merge_override)"
api -X PATCH -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"block_admin_merge_override": true}' "$B" >/dev/null
AFTER=$(api "$B" | jq -r .block_admin_merge_override)
echo "==> after: block_admin_merge_override = $AFTER"
[ "$AFTER" = true ] || { echo "PATCH did not take -- do not record this as enforced." >&2; exit 1; }
api "$B" | jq -r '{enable_push,enable_status_check,status_check_contexts,required_approvals,block_admin_merge_override}'
cat <<'NOTE'
NOW PROVE IT -- the setting is not the evidence. On the next PR:
* let the gate go green, then try to merge WITHOUT approving it.
* Gitea must REFUSE. If it merges, this still is not doing its job.
Do not record approvals as enforced until you have seen a merge refused.
NOTE
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@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
# * NOT `gate / conformance (*)` -- that job is `if: false`, and a skipped Gitea job reports
# SUCCESS ("Has been skipped"). Requiring it would pass VACUOUSLY forever while nothing
# ran, which under HARD RULE 4 is worse than a deadlock: a deadlock is loud.
# block_admin_merge_override: true is LOAD-BEARING and was missing on the first pass. Gitea
# lets repo admins override merge requirements without it, so required_approvals and the
# required status check are both bypassable by exactly the account that does the merging.
# Measured: PRs #5-#9 merged with ZERO approvals recorded against required_approvals: 1.
#
# FIELD NAMES: this Gitea (1.24.3) has NO `apply_to_admins`. Asking jq for it returns null,
# which reads like "false" but means "key absent" -- enumerate real keys with `to_entries`
# instead of probing names you assume exist. That mistake cost a wasted PATCH.
#
# * NOT the `(push)` variant -- after PR #6 there are no per-branch push runs at all, so a
# PR would never produce that context.
set -euo pipefail
@@ -28,7 +37,8 @@ jq -n '{
required_approvals: 1,
block_on_rejected_reviews: true,
dismiss_stale_approvals: true,
block_on_outdated_branch: false
block_on_outdated_branch: false,
block_admin_merge_override: true
}' | api -X PATCH -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data @- \
"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/branch_protections/main" >/dev/null