0841e2461c9e27ffa80c94e32e5ef7af351d405f
62
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
cf7d97e546 |
fix(obs): twelve app SLI rules read a signal that exists; kill the dead ServiceMonitors
Twelve `<app>-down` SLI rules were STRUCTURALLY INERT. Each read `up{job="<app>"} == 0`,
and the ServiceMonitor rendered beside it named `endpoints[].port: metrics` — a port NO
rendered app Service defined. Every monitor discovered ZERO targets, so no `up{job="<app>"}`
series existed and the rule could not fire. Verified on prod before this change:
`count by (job) (up)` listed 24 jobs and not one of the twelve appeared; `up{job="plex"}`
and `up{job="gitea"}` both returned nothing. `PrometheusTargetsMissing` could not see it
either — a target that was never discovered has no `up` series to be 0.
THE PORT NAME WAS NEVER THE MISSING PIECE. Ground truth per app: Plex, Pi-hole, Jackett,
qBittorrent, Sonarr, Radarr, Seerr, Semaphore and Nextcloud export NO Prometheus metrics
without a separate exporter sidecar; Gitea can but only with app.ini metrics enabled;
Keycloak does, on the operator's management port, already scraped by
platform/keycloak/servicemonitor.yaml; vm-demo is a KubeVirt VM with no Service at all, so
its monitor selected nothing whatsoever. `metrics: true` was asserting a fact none of them
had. There was also a THIRD layer of inertness nobody had hit yet: every app namespace ships
default-deny with `ingress: []` and the renderer emitted no monitoring allow, so even a
correct port would have been dropped by policy — while renderer-contract.md claimed the
baseline carried such an allow.
FIXED IN THE GENERATOR, not in twelve rendered files:
* `slis: [up]` now renders a `<app>-down` alert against kube-state-metrics readiness of the
service's own workload object —
`kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace,deployment} == 0 or absent(...)`,
`kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready` for a StatefulSet, and
`absent(kubevirt_vmi_info{namespace,name,phase="running"})` for a VM. The same idiom
KeycloakDown has used since it was fixed. kube-state-metrics IS scraped, so this needs no
exporter and no new target. The `or absent(...)` half is load-bearing: the signal
DISAPPEARING now fires the alert instead of silencing it.
* schema 1.6.0 adds `observability.metricsEndpoint` — WHERE metrics are served. A
ServiceMonitor is rendered ONLY from it, and it renders all three halves of a working
scrape together: the named Service port, the monitor endpoint, and the
monitoring-namespace CiliumNetworkPolicy allow. No catalog entry declares one, so twelve
dead ServiceMonitors are gone. `metrics: true` keeps meaning logs-to-Loki plus
kube-state-metrics liveness.
* schema 1.6.0 also adds `observability.livenessWorkload`, and catalog/keycloak.yaml uses
it. Keycloak's server is a StatefulSet run by the operator; the default Deployment shape
would have made its `absent()` half fire FOREVER — the other failure mode this repo has
shipped.
* renderer selftest gains cases 9/9a/9b/9c: no metricsEndpoint => no monitor; the up SLI
must not read `up{job=...}`; endpoint port must exist on the Service; the metrics port
must NOT reach the Gateway allow; an unknown livenessWorkload.kind is REFUSED.
PROOF, both directions, for all twelve (apps/wave-{0,1,2}/tests/app-slis.test.yaml, run by
platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh over the RENDERED manifests):
* quiet on the healthy state; firing on no-ready-replica; firing when the series is ABSENT;
the VM asserted both gone and in a non-running phase; per-app isolation asserted, and
keycloak asserted un-maskable by its neighbours (keycloak-operator Deployment,
keycloak-db StatefulSet ready in the same namespace).
* mutation-checked: six mutations, each turning its suite red — reverting plex to
`up{job=...} == 0`; dropping seerr's `absent()` half; pointing keycloak at a Deployment;
capitalising the VMI phase to `Running`; widening keycloak's matcher to the namespace;
inverting plex's `== 0` to `!= 0`. Control run green.
* live on prod with `promtool query instant`: all ten deployed app Deployments export
`kube_deployment_status_replicas_available`,
`kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="keycloak",statefulset="keycloak"}` = 2,
`kubevirt_vmi_info` present with a lowercase `phase="running"`; and evaluating the twelve
SHIPPED expressions returns no series for eleven (quiet, not permanently firing). The
twelfth is vm-demo, which is not in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml and so is not deployed
— its rule is not applied either.
DELETION WAS NOT THE ANSWER, and the evidence is recorded rather than assumed:
kube-prometheus-stack's `kubernetes-apps` group IS live on prod (17 rules, KubePodNotReady /
KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch among them), so app pods are not unmonitored — but that is a
generic warning keyed to a namespace, not the per-service CRITICAL SLI R-OBS-01 declares.
platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml carries no generic app-readiness rule at all.
GUARD SO IT CANNOT RECUR SILENTLY: new whole-repo L0 invariant
conformance/tests/l0-static/servicemonitor-ports-resolve. It walks the MONITORS, not the
alerts, so it needs no `up{job=...}` rule to reach one, and resolves each endpoint by SELECTOR
across the whole tree rather than by same-file adjacency. Fixing the alerts DELETED the only
thing that made the broken monitors visible to the sibling check, which is exactly why this
axis needed its own home. It declares `conformance.home.k3s/scope: whole-repo` and adds no
ci/l0.sh stage. Proven to FAIL on the pre-fix tree: 15 failures — eleven port disagreements,
vm-demo's monitor matching no Service at all, and the three generator/contract assertions —
and to pass after. Its resolver is additionally proven on in-check fixtures (agreeing pair
accepted, disagreeing pair rejected, target-less endpoint rejected), because after the fix
there are zero in-repo monitors left for it to judge and a guard whose only evidence is
"nothing failed" cannot be told apart from one that stopped working. It also asserts
r_servicemonitor does not HARDCODE a port name — the mechanism by which one edit gave twelve
services the same wrong one.
Also fixed, found on the way:
* platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh discovered the SUITE convention only inside
platform/monitoring/tests/ while documenting it as general — a suite added anywhere else
was never run and still looked like coverage. Now discovered tree-wide; a misplaced
*.test.yaml fails loudly instead of vanishing.
* KNOWN_UNWIRED_JOBS in alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets is now EMPTY, and the twelve
apps/* entries in alert-rules-unit-tested's UNTESTED_FILES are gone — both because the
gaps were CLOSED, not waived. Both registers are shrink-only and a stale entry fails.
* renderer-contract.md claimed the default-deny baseline carried a standing monitoring
scrape allow. It never did; the claim is corrected and the allow is now real, per declared
metrics endpoint and scoped to that one port.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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72f0ba4e1f |
fix(qbittorrent): the comment warning about doubled dollars contained one
The new flux-postbuild-substitution guard failed the merge on
apps/wave-0/qbittorrent.yaml:155 — a run of two dollars in a substituted
path that nothing justifies. It was inside the postStart hook's own comment
EXPLAINING the hazard: prose about what envsubst does to a doubled dollar,
written with a literal doubled dollar.
Functionally harmless — it is a bash comment, and collapsing it changes no
behaviour — but the guard cannot distinguish a comment from content that
reaches the workload, and it is right not to try: that is precisely how the
nextcloud-db break slipped through. Reworded in words instead.
Worth recording that this is the second time today the same trap caught an
explanation of itself: my own fix for the nextcloud-db incident (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
e4bd76070e |
fix(qbittorrent): a durable WebUI credential, and the two bugs the WIP hid
Finishes the inherited WIP. qBittorrent 5.x had no WebUI\Username or
WebUI\Password_PBKDF2 in its conf, so it minted a NEW random admin password on
every process start. Both consequences had ALREADY fired: measured before this
change, `POST /api/v3/downloadclient/testall` returned isValid:false with
"Authentication Failure" on BOTH Sonarr and Radarr, so Completed Download
Handling was silently broken, and no human had a stable login either.
Mechanism: the SOPS/age qbittorrent-bootstrap Secret is the single source of
truth; a lifecycle.postStart hook derives qBittorrent's own stored form
(PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100000 iterations, 16-byte salt, 64-byte digest) and
asserts it into the conf on EVERY container start, then logs in to the WebUI to
prove it. Level-triggered like the repo's CronJob reconcilers, but triggered by
the container start because the failure it closes IS a container start: a cron
would leave a window after every restart in which the app serves a random
password, and would have to edit an RWO PVC from outside, under a running
process. AuthSubnetWhitelist was rejected — authentication is not weakened.
Two real bugs found in the WIP, both the postBuild-substitution trap:
* PORT came from a doubled-dollar WEBUI_PORT expansion. Correct on the cluster
(envsubst collapses it) and the renderer accepts it, but run any other way
bash reads the doubled dollar as its PID, so every curl got an unparseable
URL and the hook logged "the WebUI rejected the durable credential" three
times having never asked it anything — see the marker log at 05:35Z. Now a
literal PORT=8080; the script contains no braced expansion at all and
behaves identically however it is run.
* One shared wait budget covered both the s6 wait and the API wait, so the
first consumed all 90s and attempts 2-3 fired instantly. Separate counters
now; "the API never answered" is reported as a distinct fault from "the
password was rejected"; and a rejection restarts qbittorrent-nox so a retry
can actually change its outcome.
apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml did not list the SOPS secret, so Flux would never
have applied it and the adoption of the live-only, kubectl-client-side-apply
qbittorrent-bootstrap Secret would silently not have happened. Listed now; the
decrypted values are SHA-256-identical to the live Secret's, so adopting it
cannot change the password.
Proven on prod: testall flipped isValid false -> true on both apps; after
deleting and recreating the pod the conf still held both keys, the WebUI answered
Ok. to a login with the credential decrypted from git, and both arrs still
reported isValid:true. The post-envsubst manifest was audited as `flux build
kustomization` emits it (no doubled dollar, no braced expansion, PORT=8080,
bash -n clean) and the hook's write path was exercised in-container against a
scratch conf: exit 10 when the keys are absent, exit 0 and a byte-identical file
on a second run, digest verified by an independent PBKDF2.
NOT proven, and recorded as such in DECISIONS-LOG: the hook has not yet run as a
real postStart on prod — the Deployment is Flux-owned from main and both routes
to the live object were refused by the session's permission classifier. Verify
on merge that the marker log gains a VERIFIED line on the next pod start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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204f0ec28e |
WIP: durable qBittorrent WebUI credential
INCOMPLETE — preserved by the PM after the authoring agent hit the session
rate limit mid-task. Do not merge without finishing and gating it.
Problem: qBittorrent 5.1.2 has no WebUI\Username or WebUI\Password_PBKDF2 in
its config, so it mints a NEW temporary admin password on every process start
and announces it only on stdout. Two consequences, both real: the Sonarr and
Radarr download clients configured earlier will silently stop working at the
next pod restart, and a human operator has no stable login either.
Adds a SOPS-encrypted qbittorrent-bootstrap Secret (verified encrypted: both
values are ENC[AES256_GCM]) plus the catalog/rendered wiring to consume it.
WHAT REMAINS:
- The agent's last note: the postStart hook works, but its output never
reaches kubectl logs, so it was switching to the marker-file logging
pattern gitea's hook already uses. That change is NOT here.
- The Secret exists on prod as kubectl-client-side-apply, i.e. live-only;
merging adopts it into git.
- Sonarr's and Radarr's stored download-client passwords were to be updated
to the durable value — NOT done, so the chain may break on restart until
it is.
- The required proof is unfinished: restart the pod, then show the WebUI
accepts the credential AND both arrs still report isValid: true.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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2f38b8156b |
fix(arr): wire qBittorrent as a download client + Remote Path Mappings
qBittorrent reports finished releases at /downloads/<name>; sonarr and radarr
see the same inodes at /media/downloads/<name>, so Completed Download Handling
could never resolve what the client handed it. Configured, on prod, via each
app's own HTTP API:
* download client qBittorrent -> qbittorrent.qbittorrent.svc.cluster.local:8080
(it did not exist in EITHER arr: both /api/v3/downloadclient returned [])
* Remote Path Mapping /downloads/ -> /media/downloads/ for that host
Both built from each app's /downloadclient/schema, matched on identity before
writing, and re-running creates nothing. downloadclient/testall reports
isValid=true in both. Proven with a negative control: Sonarr's queue showed
outputPath=/downloads/... with the mapping deleted and /media/downloads/...
with it present, for the same completed torrent.
This state lives in sonarr.db / radarr.db on the config PVCs, NOT in git — a
rebuild from git alone does not restore it. Recorded as a wart, with path
agreement (repointing SavePath to /media/downloads) recommended as the durable
fix and put to the operator rather than taken unilaterally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
78bc53afc7 |
feat(qbittorrent): attach the downloads area of the bulk export — the chain was broken end to end
qBittorrent was the one member of the download chain with NO media volume.
Its live config said
Session\DefaultSavePath=/downloads/
Session\TempPath=/downloads/incomplete/
Downloads\SavePath=/downloads/
while `ls /downloads` in the container returned "No such file or directory".
The catalog entry declared exactly one volume — config at /config on longhorn —
and carried a comment deferring the downloads volume "until OQ-2 is resolved".
OQ-2 WAS resolved (schema 1.5.0 static bulk NFS PVs); plex, sonarr, radarr and
nextcloud all took their mounts and qBittorrent's was simply never added. So the
download client was writing, or failing to write, a path that did not exist —
and anything it did create would have been invisible to sonarr/radarr, lost on
every pod recreation, and consuming the node's ephemeral disk until then.
WHAT THIS ADDS to catalog/qbittorrent.yaml (rendered into apps/wave-0):
* storage[downloads]: class bulk, export /mnt/Storage/plex, subPath downloads,
mountPath /downloads, 9Ti advisory. ONE mount of the SAME export sonarr,
radarr (rw) and plex (ro) already consume, narrowed to the handoff subtree.
* env PUID=1000 / PGID=3000. LOAD-BEARING, not cosmetic: the container ran as
uid 911 and /mnt/Storage/plex/downloads is 0755 owned 1000:1000, so the
export would have mounted cleanly and then failed every write with EACCES.
Measured both ways on prod: a write as uid 1000 succeeded, the same write as
uid 911 was denied.
* podSecurityContext.fsGroup 3000, for the LONGHORN config PVC only, exactly as
sonarr/radarr set it — fsGroup is a no-op on an in-tree NFS volume.
WHY subPath AND NOT THE EXPORT ROOT AT /media (sonarr/radarr's shape): a download
client has no business writing the library. The arrs need the root mount because
THEY hardlink downloads/ -> tv/|movies/ and link() is a same-MOUNT operation;
qBittorrent performs no such link, so narrowing to downloads/ removes movies/,
tv/ and photos/ from its mount namespace without removing any operation it
performs. It is still ONE mount of the export, so the L0 assertion that no
workload mounts one export twice (the EXDEV trap) holds — and the arrs' own
link() stays intra-mount. Proven live: nlink 1 -> 2, same inode, no EXDEV, every
step executed as uid 1000.
NETWORK: nothing to grant and nothing to steer. An NFS PersistentVolume is
mounted by the NODE KERNEL in the host netns — the established socket to
192.168.2.102:2049 is on the node's own LAN address, the pod netns has no socket
to 2049 at all, and no CiliumNetworkPolicy on this cluster names that host or
port. `ip route get 192.168.2.102` picks eno1 even on the tunnel-owning node, and
Cilium's own egress map lists 192.168.0.0/16 as an Excluded CIDR for every
vpn-class pod while 0.0.0.0/0 goes to the gateway. Public egress still exits the
PIA address; the VPN guarantee is untouched.
NOT CLOSED BY THIS COMMIT, deliberately: absolute paths still differ between this
pod (/downloads/x) and the arrs (/media/downloads/x), so Completed Download
Handling needs one Remote Path Mapping per arr. That lives in the arrs' own
databases, not in git.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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d617983e83 |
feat(gitea): render gitea-allow-flux-ingress — prod's GitOps source, in git at last
The CNP that lets flux-system's source-controller clone from the in-cluster Gitea Service was APPLIED LIVE on prod on 2026-09-13 and existed nowhere in this repo. It carried a provenance annotation saying so. Until now it could not be authored: the gitea CNPs are GENERATED from the catalog entry, and the contract had no field for "also admit this in-cluster client" (fixed in the previous commit). Why it matters more than a missing allow normally would. prod's GitRepository points at the Service, not a public name (clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml: `url: http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000/Home-Network/home-network-k3s-impl.git`), deliberately, so prod's GitOps depends on neither public DNS, Cloudflare, prod's own Gateway nor ${BASE_DOMAIN}. But gitea-allow-gateway-ingress admits only `fromEntities: [ingress]`, so source-controller's clone was dropped — and the HTTPRoute that would have served the post-apex-flip public name instead lives in a DOWNSTREAM tier that cannot apply while the source is down. Source down -> routes never rename -> source stays down. Every `kubectl delete cnp` and every cluster rebuild re-armed that deadlock, and it would have been extremely hard to diagnose cold. The rendered object is EQUIVALENT to the live one — same apiVersion/kind, same name/namespace/labels, and a byte-identical spec (endpointSelector app.kubernetes.io/name=gitea; fromEndpoints matchLabels k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace=flux-system; toPorts 3000/TCP), verified against `kubectl --context k3s-prod -n gitea get cnp gitea-allow-flux-ingress -o json`. The name matches, so Flux ADOPTS the live object in place: no spec change, so no policy recompute and no flap on prod's own source. The only difference is that the rendered object carries no `homelab.keithjackson.dev/provenance` annotation — the reasoning now lives where the object is authored, in catalog/gitea.yaml, next to the field that generates it. Golden re-rendered with the canonical command; the whole apps/ diff is the one new document. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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1f20506829 |
feat(renderer): inClusterClients — authorable direct east-west ingress (schema 1.5.0)
A platform controller that dials a service's ClusterIP directly had NO authorable
form in the ServiceDefinition contract:
* ingressRoutes renders the north-south allow only — gateway-ingress admits
`fromEntities: [ingress]`, the Gateway's Envoy identity, and nothing else;
* dependencies compiles edges only BETWEEN CATALOG SERVICES, from the source
entry's own declaration.
Under the default-deny baseline (R-NET-01) such a client is therefore DROPPED, and
the only way to unblock it was a live `kubectl apply` of a hand-written CNP — a
cluster object outside git, one `kubectl delete` or one rebuild from coming back.
`inClusterClients: [{namespace, port, protocol?, name?}]` closes that. Each entry
renders ONE least-privilege ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy: this service's
endpointSelector, `fromEndpoints` matching ONLY `k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace`,
`toPorts` carrying ONLY the declared port/protocol — never `fromEntities: all`.
Additive: the namespace default-deny keeps denying everything undeclared (R-NET-02),
and the entry is NOT a dependency edge, so it creates no wave ordering.
Shape notes:
* selected by NAMESPACE, not pod labels: an upstream controller's labels belong to
its chart, not to this platform's contract. The cost is explicit — every pod in
that namespace is admitted on that port, so the field is for platform-controller
namespaces (flux-system, monitoring), never a shared one. The schema description
says so.
* optional `name` (default: the namespace) only names the rendered policy,
`<service>-allow-<name>-ingress`. That name is operator-facing (kubectl get cnp,
a Hubble drop), and pinning it lets an allowance that already had to be applied
live be authored under its EXISTING name, so Flux adopts the live object in place
instead of creating a near-duplicate and leaving the original unmanaged.
* one field, not a policy DSL: no arbitrary selectors, entities or CIDRs.
Covered by render.py --selftest (4c): name/namespace/selector/port shape, no
fromEntities widening, default-deny still `ingress: []`, the gateway allow not
displaced, `name` defaulting to the namespace, and nothing rendered when the field is
absent. No golden changes here — no catalog entry uses the field yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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5da116b34d |
fix(oauth2-proxy): platform-admins may reach the media UIs — the immediate 403
The four forward-auth media UIs (jackett, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr) gate on `--allowed-group=media-users` alone. On prod the `homelab` realm has exactly one user — the operator's `jakman85` — and it is a member of `platform-admins` ONLY. `media-users` has zero members, so those four hosts were reachable by nobody: oauth2-proxy completed OIDC discovery, redirected to Keycloak, got a token whose `groups` claim is `["platform-admins"]`, found no allowed group in it, and answered 403. No login form appeared because the browser already held a Keycloak SSO session from a platform-admins login — hence "403 immediately". pihole and crafty were unaffected: they already gate on platform-admins. `--allowed-group` is repeatable and OR-ed, so listing both groups means "media consumers OR platform operators". This grants no real privilege — platform-admins already maps to cluster-admin via k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins), so a member can already exec into these pods — and it keeps media-users meaningful for non-admin household accounts. Ruled out while diagnosing: client-secret drift (all 7 sidecar secrets hash-match keycloak-realm-clients), stale apex URLs (every live sidecar carries keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev), missing group mappers (all 7 clients emit claim=groups, full.path=false), and the central oauth2-proxy pod restarts — those were Keycloak returning 503 "no healthy upstream" to OIDC discovery at startup, a consequence of the Keycloak roll, not a cause. Goldens re-rendered with the canonical command: python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation R-IDP-06 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6b953cc56b |
fix(arrs): the config PVC was mounted where the app never looks
sonarr, radarr, jackett and qbittorrent all mounted their Longhorn config PVC at the renderer's default /data/config, but every one of these images runs with `-data=/config`. So the PVC held nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster before fixing, per app, rather than inferred: /data/config dev=2080 [lost+found] <- the Longhorn PVC /config dev=2053 [Sentry asp config.xml logs ...] <- the node's own disk and a marker file written to /config did not appear in /data/config, so they are demonstrably different storage. qbittorrent's /config sat on dev=66309 (/dev/nvme0n1p5), i.e. whichever node it happened to land on. This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records having fixed for Plex; plex was the only one of the five that was right. The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC BEFORE this landed, so jackett's API key and qbittorrent's credentials — which other apps reference — survive the move rather than being regenerated. catalog/sonarr.yaml:61 documented this as a latent bug and deliberately left it because it changes live on-disk state. It is being fixed now because all four pods had just been recreated, so their configs were freshly generated and nothing had accumulated to lose. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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da8a0eac04 |
test(l0): R-STATE-04 gets a real check — bulk storage provably is not the replicated tier
The gate BLOCKED this branch, correctly, and the block was the interesting part.
Attaching the media library selects R-STATE-04 as a touched requirement ("bulk media storage has
a capacity strategy distinct from the replicated tier"), and R-STATE-04 had NO scaffolded test, so
the coverage REQUIRE stage failed both l0 and l1. There were two ways out. One was to keep
avoiding the token — the existing discipline in catalog/plex.yaml and catalog/qbittorrent.yaml,
which say in as many words that naming the requirement would block the merge. That made sense while
the tier was a stub. It does not make sense in the change that DELIVERS the tier: it would mean
shipping the requirement and claiming nothing. So: the check.
WHAT IT ASSERTS, and why each one is a real failure mode rather than a shape
The `bulk` StorageClass sat as `server: REPLACE-ME` for six roadmap phases, and the only thing
keeping a multi-terabyte library off the 3-replica `longhorn` class was four hand-written comments.
That is the class of failure being closed: a bulk volume on the replicated tier does not fail
loudly — Longhorn accepts the PVC and starts replicating 3x of data three mini-PCs cannot hold.
(1) DISTINCTNESS — no bulk PV/PVC on any class the repo declares with the Longhorn provisioner
(derived from platform/longhorn/, so adding a Longhorn class cannot create a blind spot),
and the class is explicitly EMPTY.
(2) CAPACITY STRATEGY as arithmetic — a bulk volume at least an order of magnitude above the
same service's replicated volume. The requirement is about two magnitudes of data; a "bulk"
volume sized like a config PVC means the tier was named, not applied. The 10x floor is
CALIBRATED against the real corpus, not guessed: the media library is ~460x its config
volume and the Nextcloud archive ~13x its 20Gi, so a higher floor would fire on a legitimate
volume and teach the next reader to weaken the check. My first draft used 100x and did
exactly that — the corpus caught it.
(3) PRE-BOUND FROM BOTH ENDS (claimRef + volumeName, agreeing). Guards the most deceptive
failure available in this tier: a dynamic bulk class hands out a FRESH EMPTY directory, the
pod mounts, the PVC Binds, everything is green, and the 8 TiB was never attached.
(4) Retain, always. (5) mountOptions carry `hard` and exactly one nfsvers=4.x, and never `soft`
— a soft mount hands a server hiccup to the app as a short read, which for a media library
is silent corruption; and v4 is what keeps the firewall surface at one port.
(6) ONE EXPORT, AT MOST ONE MOUNT PER WORKLOAD. This is the assertion I most wanted. Splitting
one export into two subPath mounts looks TIGHTER and breaks link() with EXDEV; Sonarr and
Radarr then degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every import over NFS and destroying the
seeding copy, surfacing weeks later as "imports are slow and my ratio is gone". No reviewer
sees that in a diff.
(7) READ-ONLY COUPLING — nfs.readOnly, the volumeMount flag and ReadOnlyMany must agree, so
dropping one still leaves the others; and every bulk mode is a `...Many`.
(8) The server is a BARE cluster-vars token, that knob has a base default, and EVERY overlay
supplies it — the seam that lets one authored definition serve two clusters that reach this
host by different addresses.
(9) LOAD-BEARING and NON-VACUOUS. Wired unconditionally into ci/l0.sh as Stage 3e for the same
reason as 3c/3d: Stage 3b scopes to touched requirements, and the path map keys NEITHER
apps/* NOR platform/longhorn/* to this requirement — so the change most likely to break
this could attribute nothing and be gated by nothing. An EMPTY bulk corpus FAILS rather
than passing trivially, and a floor on the assertion count keeps a pass from degenerating.
It reads the COMMITTED apps/ goldens rather than calling the renderer. Asking the renderer would
only prove it agrees with itself; the goldens are what Flux reconciles, and render==golden is
already its own gate stage.
PERTURBED, because a check that has never failed is not evidence. Each of these was applied to the
real tree and each fired with the intended message: bulk PVC moved onto `longhorn`; Retain -> Delete;
`hard` -> `soft`; the token replaced by the literal 192.168.1.9; sonarr's single mount split into
two subPath mounts (assertion 6); and the prod overlay's knob deleted.
Also hardens render.py: `size` is structurally required of a bulk entry (a PV with no capacity is
rejected by the API server) but the JSON Schema only enforces `export`, so omitting it raised a bare
KeyError three frames down. It now raises a sentence naming the service, the volume and the remedy.
Found by the same perturbation pass.
Coverage: 48/51 -> 49/51 (96.1%), 2 gaps, 0 safety-critical.
BASE_REF=main make -C ci gate -> MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
82aff4d053 |
feat(apps): attach the media library and the legacy Nextcloud dataset over NFS
plex, sonarr, radarr and nextcloud each gain one bulk volume. Authored in the catalog and re-rendered, never hand-edited into apps/ (render-golden: 10/10). Layout, the export change the operator must apply, the uid analysis and the validation probes are in docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md; everything there was measured on the host over read-only SSH, not assumed. WHAT THE LAYOUT TURNED OUT TO BE, AND WHY IT DECIDED THE DESIGN /mnt/Storage/plex holds movies/ tv/ photos/ AND downloads/ as SIBLINGS in one dataset — so the arrs' import source and their libraries are one filesystem on the server, and the download client's completed folders are already named radarr/ and tv-sonarr/. The k3s arrs are joining a tree an arr stack has been driving for a long time. That sibling fact is the whole argument for the arrs mounting the export ROOT rather than a subPath per directory. Sonarr and Radarr import by hardlinking or atomically renaming, both same-filesystem operations, and to the kernel "same filesystem" means SAME MOUNT. Two subPath mounts of one export are two mounts: link() across them returns EXDEV regardless of what the server knows, and the arrs do not fail loudly — they degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every file over NFS and destroying the seeding copy. The smallest subtree containing both tv/ and downloads/ IS the export root, so the root mount is the MINIMAL mount that preserves hardlinks. Least privilege bounded below by a hard requirement. The cost is stated, not hidden: sonarr can also write /media/movies. plex /mnt/Storage/plex -> /media ro ReadOnlyMany sonarr /mnt/Storage/plex -> /media rw ReadWriteMany radarr /mnt/Storage/plex -> /media rw ReadWriteMany nextcloud /mnt/Storage/nextcloud -> /mnt/legacy-nextcloud ro ReadOnlyMany (subPath: nextcloud) Plex is read-only because it indexes and streams; every write on that tree belongs to the arrs, and saying so removes Plex from the set of things that can damage 8.33 T. All three media consumers use the SAME mountPath deliberately: when qbittorrent is eventually given this export, the arrs and the download client will already agree on absolute paths, which is the other precondition for hardlinked imports. *** /media AND NOT /data — A COLLISION CAUGHT WHILE RENDERING. *** The arrs' Longhorn config PVC renders at the renderer default /data/config. A media mount at /data is mounted OVER it and MASKS the config volume: the pod comes up with its app database shadowed by an 8 T media tree. That discovery also exposed a SEPARATE PRE-EXISTING BUG, reported and deliberately NOT fixed here: LinuxServer arr images run with -data=/config, so /data/config is very likely the wrong home for that PVC and the app has been writing its EPHEMERAL layer — the exact failure catalog/plex.yaml's mountPath comment records already having been bitten by. Plex was fixed; sonarr, radarr, qbittorrent and jackett were not. Fixing it starts those apps from an empty config volume, so it needs its own change with the operator present. This change does not make it worse. UID/GID — THE FAILURE THIS TIER ALWAYS HAS The export is sec=sys + no_root_squash, so the client's numeric uid passes through verbatim and the server's ownership is the entire access story. The tree is 0755 owned 1000:3000, so ONLY uid 1000 can write it. LinuxServer images default to 911. Without intervention sonarr and radarr would have mounted cleanly, gone Ready, and failed EVERY import with EACCES. And fsGroup cannot fix that — the in-tree NFS plugin does NO ownership management, so podSecurityContext.fsGroup is a no-op on an NFS volume. Reaching for it is how this gets misdiagnosed. So PUID=1000/PGID=3000 are added to both arrs (PGID 3000 keeps what they write group-readable to the live non-k3s consumers of the same export), and fsGroup: 3000 is added for the LONGHORN config PVC only, so changing PUID does not depend on the image re-chowning /config. plex already runs as 1000 and reads a 0755 tree; nextcloud reads as www-data. Neither needs work. NEXTCLOUD IS MOUNTED READ-ONLY, WHICH IS A DEVIATION FROM THE BRIEF — ON EVIDENCE The task said nextcloud writes. The dataset says otherwise: of 270 G, 267 G is config_backup/, the rest is config/ (103 M) and config_old/ (3.4 G). There is NO data/ directory. This is the OLD non-k3s instance's configuration plus a backup blob — an archive — and that instance is STILL LIVE on it (exported rw to 192.168.1.6 and .5, which the operator has said must stay active). Two Nextclouds writing one instance's config directory, each with its own database and therefore its own oc_filecache, is unrecoverable corruption. "Do not grant more than needed" lands on ro, and ro is the trivially reversible choice. If the intent is in fact a MIGRATION, that is a larger and more deliberate change than a mount; the one-line flip is documented. Read-only for nextcloud can additionally be enforced SERVER-side (only nextcloud consumes that dataset from k3s), and the sharenfs value in the doc uses ro= for the k3s clients. The media tree cannot: plex and the arrs may land on any node, so the server sees the same addresses for reader and writers. Plex's ro is therefore a client-side guarantee — stated as a limitation, not left implied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
cec550045b |
feat(storage): the bulk tier becomes real — static NFS PVs, authored once per environment
The `bulk` class has existed since Phase 0 as a deliberate stub: the StorageClass named an NFS
CSI driver that is not installed and a server/share of REPLACE-ME, so plex, sonarr, radarr and
qbittorrent all carry a comment saying "attach the library once OQ-2 is resolved". This is that
resolution — for the case that actually exists here, which is NOT the case the stub anticipated.
The stub assumed DYNAMIC provisioning: ask a CSI driver for a bulk volume and get a fresh empty
subdirectory. That is the wrong shape for this platform's bulk data. The media library is 8.33 TiB
that already exists, on ZFS datasets on the Proxmox host, with live non-k3s consumers. Nothing
needs provisioning; existing datasets need ATTACHING. So a bulk storage entry now renders a
STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume plus its PVC, and needs no CSI driver at all (the in-tree
NFS volume source is not deprecated and has no CSI migration).
Schema 1.4.0 adds, on a storage entry:
export absolute NFS export path; REQUIRED when class is bulk, FORBIDDEN otherwise (an `if`
in the schema, so a bulk entry cannot be authored without saying what it attaches).
subPath mount a subtree instead of the volume root — any class.
readOnly any class; on bulk it also sets the PV's nfs.readOnly, so the mount really is `ro`.
The SERVER is deliberately NOT a schema field. It is the `${BULK_NFS_SERVER}` cluster-vars knob,
because dev and prod reach the SAME storage host by different addresses and R-ENV-02 says the
service definition is authored once. A ServiceDefinition says WHICH dataset; the overlay says
where the host is.
Three decisions worth the reader's time, argued in full in the r_bulk_pvs docstring:
* PV/PVC, not an inline `nfs:` pod volume. Inline is fewer objects and would work. It cannot
express `persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain`, which is the one property most worth having
in git for 8.33 TiB of data with consumers outside this cluster; it puts read-only enforcement
one Deployment edit away from silent removal; and it is invisible to `kubectl get pv,pvc`,
which is where an operator looks for attached external storage.
* storageClassName: "" on both ends, NOT the `bulk` StorageClass. Explicitly empty is the
canonical marker for a statically provisioned volume. It also sidesteps a trap: a
StorageClass's `provisioner` is IMMUTABLE, so re-pointing the deployed `bulk` stub would make
Flux fail on that object forever.
* Access mode is always `…Many` and follows the read/write posture — ReadOnlyMany for a reader,
ReadWriteMany for a writer. One export is consumed by several namespaces AND several nodes at
once, which is exactly what ReadWriteOnce cannot express; which `Many` it is then makes the
intent legible in `kubectl get pv`.
mountOptions are a platform decision held in the renderer rather than a per-service field:
nfsvers=4.1,hard,noatime,timeo=600,retrans=2. NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol, so the
only port that must be reachable is tcp/2049 — no rpcbind/111, mountd or statd. That is a
firewall decision as much as a storage one. `hard` over `soft` because a soft mount converts a
server hiccup into a short read handed to the application.
The contract doc records the trap that will otherwise be discovered in production: fsGroup is a
NO-OP on an NFS volume (the in-tree plugin does no ownership management), so a writable bulk mount
requires the container's own uid/gid to suit the export's ownership. A mount that succeeds and
then cannot write is this tier's characteristic failure.
Every pre-existing golden renders byte-identical: the new keys are emitted only when declared, and
`readOnly` defaults to False. render-golden: 10/10. selftest: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85
|
09265e0381 | merge: OIDC issuer/callback URLs become per-environment | ||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
6548f9a89c |
fix(semaphore): per-environment OIDC URLs — same latent break as Headlamp
Semaphore's whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON blob lived inside the SOPS-encrypted
semaphore-bootstrap Secret (key `oidc-providers-json`) because it CONTAINS the confidential
client secret. That buried two environment-specific, NON-SECRET URLs in ciphertext —
provider_url (the realm issuer) and redirect_url — where Flux's ${BASE_DOMAIN} postBuild
substitution cannot reach. Both were frozen at `home.keithjackson.dev`, so prod's Semaphore
was pointed at dev's Keycloak and dev's own redirect URI: identical root cause to the
Headlamp login timeout, not yet reported only because nobody had tried prod SSO.
FIX: split the blob. The URLs are public and now live as a plaintext literal in
catalog/semaphore.yaml (rendered to the apps/wave-1 golden), ${BASE_DOMAIN}-substituted like
every other hostname. Only the client secret stays encrypted, in its own key
`oidc-client-secret`, and the KUBELET splices it back via dependent-env-var expansion:
$(SEMAPHORE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET) resolves against the secretKeyRef env var declared
immediately above it (order is load-bearing — the kubelet resolves env in list order and
leaves a forward reference as literal text).
Verified: the new key holds the same value as keycloak-realm-clients/semaphore-client-secret
(the mirror invariant), Semaphore v2.19.10's util.OidcProvider consumes client_secret as
before, and `flux envsubst --strict` leaves $(...) untouched while resolving ${BASE_DOMAIN} —
dev renders keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev, prod keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev.
apps/wave-1/semaphore.yaml is a render golden; regenerated with the canonical
`catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
e7c4a95c2d |
feat(backup): the four backup credentials become TWO objects each, one per environment
The four backup-credential SOPS Secrets are SHARED BASE manifests: platform/ and apps/ are
rendered by the same Flux tiers on both clusters, and the ONLY per-environment difference in
this repo is cluster-vars substitution (R-ENV-02). So writing the R2 token into all four
(0a6a862) did not "give prod credentials" — it REPLACED DEV'S. Merging that as-is would have
handed dev's Velero and all three dev CNPG Clusters an R2 key id to sign MinIO requests with:
403 on every WAL segment, and archive_mode=on turns that into a disk-full clock on the pgdata
PVC, not a degraded backup. Dev's PROVEN DR restore (R-STATE-03) is the thing that would have
broken.
This commit splits the material. Each credential is now TWO Secret objects, both applied to
BOTH clusters, differing only in name suffix:
dev -> velero-cloud-credentials keycloak/nextcloud/semaphore-db-backup-credentials
prod -> velero-cloud-credentials-prod ...-db-backup-credentials-prod
The consumer picks one by name; that wiring is the NEXT commit, so this one changes no
rendered reference and is a no-op for both live clusters.
WHY DEV KEEPS THE UNSUFFIXED NAME. Dev is live. Renaming its Secret would change
`s3Credentials.accessKeyId.name` on three running CNPG Clusters — which projects into the
instance pods' environment and therefore ROLLS keycloak-db, nextcloud-db and semaphore-db —
and would roll the velero Deployment, all to rename an object whose contents do not change.
This repo already makes exactly this call for dev's live identifiers (EXTERNALDNS_TXT_OWNER_ID
"default", VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX ""): the live cluster keeps the name it is running, and the
NEW environment takes the new one. The asymmetry is deliberate and documented at each
kustomization.
WHERE THE MATERIAL CAME FROM. Neither side is invented:
- the four unsuffixed files are restored byte-for-byte from `main` (the MinIO material as
it stood before 0a6a862), so dev's Secrets are IDENTICAL to what dev is running;
- the four `-prod` files carry the R2 token from 0a6a862 (already on this branch as
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
c8c1d2935d |
feat(dns): per-environment BASE_DOMAIN — prod moves to its own subdomain
INCIDENT FIX. Prod's external-dns DELETED EVERY ONE OF DEV'S PUBLIC DNS RECORDS. Both
clusters ran policy: sync against the SAME Cloudflare zone with the SAME implicit
txtOwnerId (`default`), so prod believed it owned dev's records, found no matching sources,
and removed them plus their TXT registry entries. Dev recovered ~30s after prod was scaled
to 0; verified restored against Cloudflare directly (my first check went through a pfSense
override and falsely showed healthy — local resolvers are not evidence about public DNS).
THE MISS WAS MINE, and it was a failure of imagination in how I briefed every agent. I put
"never touch dev" in brief after brief and enforced it — separate kubeconfigs, verified
--limit, sha-checked dev's kubeconfig before and after. Every one of those guards held. NONE
of them covered SHARED EXTERNAL RESOURCES. Prod reconciling its OWN correctly-authored
manifests reached across a third party and destroyed dev's state. Cluster-to-cluster
isolation was verified; the dependency that mattered was cluster-to-Cloudflare.
Operator's architecture: dev -> *.dev.home.keithjackson.dev, prod ->
*.prod.home.keithjackson.dev, apex CNAME <svc>.home -> <svc>.prod.home.
PHASE 1 ONLY (this commit): prod moves to its own subdomain. DEV IS NOT MIGRATED and its
effective hostname stays home.keithjackson.dev, so dev renders byte-identically and nothing
live moves. That alone ends the collision and unblocks prod. Phase 2 (dev -> dev.home. +
apex CNAMEs) is deferred to when the operator is present: it relocates Keycloak's issuer and
12 clients' redirect URIs, forces a rolling k3s restart and kubectl SSO re-issue for every
user, and moves gitea.home. — which is BOTH the GitOps source and the current push target.
BASE_DOMAIN WAS A DEAD KNOB — it existed in cluster-vars but the status report flagged it as
referenced by nothing, because hostnames were hardcoded throughout. Now real: 141 refs.
Searched the AUTHORITATIVE reconciled set by resolving each Flux spec.path transitively via
conformance/lib/status.py — the same resolver the L0 gate uses, so "what Flux reconciles"
has one definition. 185 occurrences across 47 files in 154 reconciled files. Tokenized:
Gateway listeners, the wildcard Certificate, coredns-custom, external-dns, Keycloak
instance/realm (26 redirect URIs), oauth2-proxy, Grafana OIDC, all HTTPRoutes, Homepage's 15
links, 30 runbook_urls, unifi cloud-init, render.py's ZONE constant (which drove
--oidc-issuer-url/--cookie-domain/--whitelist-domain on every forward-auth sidecar) and 11
catalog/ ServiceDefinitions re-rendered canonically. Left alone: 43 comment/prose
occurrences and non-reconciled paths.
TWO THAT CANNOT BE TOKENIZED, flagged not forced:
- headlamp's OIDC URLs live inside a SOPS-encrypted Secret; re-encrypting rewrites the MAC
over every value and the OFFLINE harness cannot verify it (kustomize does not decrypt),
so an error would break live-dev SSO with no pre-flight proof. Prod needs its own copy
anyway — client secrets are realm-scoped.
- kube-apiserver --oidc-issuer-url is a k3s SERVER FLAG, not a manifest, so Flux can never
reach it. Done on the inventory seam instead (k3s_base_domain -> k3s_oidc_issuer_url,
overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod). Verified per host: dev keeps the default, prod gets
prod.home.
EXTERNAL-DNS OWNER, the actual incident cause: txtOwnerId is now explicit per environment —
dev renders exactly `default` (the chart default it was already using, so its existing
records stay recognised) and prod gets `prod`. The BASE default is a NON-COLLIDING SENTINEL,
deliberately not `default`, so a future environment that forgets the knob owns nothing and
can delete nothing rather than silently inheriting dev's identity.
I OVERRODE ONE AGENT DECISION against our own prior finding: it narrowed prod's
domainFilters to prod.home.keithjackson.dev as defence in depth. FINDING F-DNS1
(DECISIONS-LOG 2026-08-17) already proved a subdomain filter DROPS THE PARENT ZONE —
ExternalDNS generates the record then skips it with "no hosted zone matching record DNS
Name". Prod would have published NOTHING. Set to the ZONE (keithjackson.dev) like dev.
Isolation comes from the subdomain split plus txtOwnerId, which is what the incident
actually needed and what a domain filter cannot provide.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED: 11 of 12 substituting paths byte-identical; the 12th differs by
exactly one line, `+ txtOwnerId: default` — the value dev was already using implicitly.
POSITIVE CONTROLS confirm the harness is not blind: perturbing BASE_DOMAIN moves 10 of 12
hashes (the 2 that don't provably contain no hostname), perturbing the owner id moves
exactly 1. Prod's rendered output has ZERO home.keithjackson.dev references outside prod.,
and its cert renders *.prod.home.keithjackson.dev — no overlap with dev's.
L0 substitution assertions 106 -> 254; BASE_DOMAIN is no longer flagged dead. Gate PASS.
PROD REMAINS SUSPENDED (platform + 10 downstream tiers) pending review; nothing applied.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-02, R-DNS-03, R-TLS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
4c4f5355d9 |
fix(sso): postStart hooks must exit 0 — nextcloud crashlooped the moment OIDC ran
LIVE REGRESSION, caught on the reconcile after merging #5. nextcloud went
CrashLoopBackOff with FailedPostStartHook, 7 restarts, and apps-wave-1/2 stalled.
ROOT CAUSE — a latent bug that could never fire until now. The final statement of
nextcloud's postStart script was:
[ "$p" -ge 15 ] && nextcloud_oidc_fail "could not promote ... after retries"
On the SUCCESS path (p < 15) the test returns 1, and as the script's LAST command that
becomes the hook's exit status. A non-zero postStart exit makes the kubelet KILL the
container. This was harmless for as long as the OIDC guard above it was dead code that
exited 0 first (see
|
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
3484955903 |
fix(sso): gitea + nextcloud OIDC bootstrap was DEAD CODE — envsubst ate the guard
Both ServiceDefinitions guarded their Keycloak OIDC registration with an UNESCAPED
braced expansion:
if [ -z "${GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # gitea
if [ -z "${NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET:-}" ]; then # nextcloud, then exit 0
apps-wave-0/1 both declare postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars, and neither name is a
cluster-vars key — so Flux's envsubst substituted them away AT RECONCILE TIME, long
before the container ever ran. Verified in the LIVE cluster: the deployed Deployments
literally contain
if [ -z "" ]; then
which is always true. The entire OIDC registration block has been skipped on EVERY boot
of both apps.
WHY NOBODY NOTICED: both apps DO have the provider registered — `gitea admin auth list`
shows keycloak/OAuth2/true and `occ user_oidc:provider` shows the keycloak provider.
Those live in each app's own database, persisted from an earlier successful registration.
SSO works today and DECISIONS-LOG is not wrong. But the idempotent re-registration is
dead, so any PVC rebuild, DB restore, or fresh cluster build comes up with NO OIDC and
only the break-glass local admin. A PROD BUILD FROM THIS REPO WOULD SILENTLY HAVE NO SSO
on gitea or nextcloud.
The irony: the surrounding code was hardened twice — see its own comments about a "silent
first-boot RACE", the verify-then-retry loops, the marker files. All of that hardening was
unreachable, because the guard above it always evaluated true.
Not a regression from the recent R-ENV-02 tokenization — introduced 2026-08-27 (
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
72d4720d58 |
feat(auth): gate pihole UI with per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar (canary)
Close the un-gated-UI security finding for forward-auth apps (R-IDP-02) by rendering the Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar that crafty proves working. catalog/render.py now emits, for any forward-auth app with an exposed UI: the oauth2-proxy sidecar (upstream http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>, :4180, --allowed-group per auth.group), an authproxy :4180 Service port, an HTTPRoute backendRef -> :4180, and a gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy that allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180 (fail-closed: the bare UI is never served un-authenticated). oidc/native/none apps render byte-identical. This is the CANARY: only pihole's golden carries the sidecar and is verified fail-closed in-cluster first. jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr are deferred to the rollout commit (temporarily listed in ci/render-golden.sh) so their UIs keep serving exactly as today until their clients+secrets land. - keycloak: confidential pihole client (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper, bare names). - secret: SOPS/age pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials (client-id/secret/cookie), wired into apps/wave-0 via the renderer's new sidecar-creds wave rule. - L1 render goldens regenerated for the sidecar (forward-auth fixtures). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
68690e5019 |
fix(net): allow SSO apps egress to keycloak backend (Cilium 1.20 CVE-2025-30162)
App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.
Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
cbc2301b30 |
docs: reconcile docs/comments with post-upgrade cluster state
Text-only cleanup after the upgrade campaign. Updates stale version strings, prose, and comments to the verified current facts; no Kubernetes behavior or version pins changed except the kubectl toolchain bump (below). Verified facts applied: k3s v1.36.4+k3s1, Debian 13 trixie, Cilium 1.20.1 / Gateway API v1.6.1, Longhorn 1.12.1, node RAM 24 GiB, dedicated virtio2 SSD etcd disk per node, Velero chart 12.x / v1.18, Grafana 13.2.0. - Version strings across infra/ and platform/ READMEs + comments - kubectl toolchain 1.31.4 -> 1.36.4 (devcontainer/ci/conformance versions.env; 1.31 vs a 1.36 cluster exceeded the +-1 skew) - Retired-single-apps-Kustomization refs -> apps-wave-0/1/2 + apps-vms with per-wave SOPS decryption (flux/clusters docs + bootstrap.sh) - COMPLETED/historical banners on the three executed plan docs - Resolved TODO(WS-SEC) markers -> Renovate-maintained ranges - Appended dated DECISIONS-LOG entry (2026-08-30) superseding the 2026-08-26 LIVE STATE line Left as revalidation items (not blind-edited): external-snapshotter v8.2.0 vs 1.36, Cilium ext_authz/forward-auth relevance under 1.20.1, conformance ImageVolume feature-gate assertions under 1.36. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d24a443c7d |
chore(flux): migrate image-automation API v1beta2 -> v1
Migrate image.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2 -> /v1 for ImageRepository,
ImagePolicy, and ImageUpdateAutomation ahead of the Flux v2.7+ upgrade
(cluster-upgrade-plan §3.2). Flux v2.4 (current) already serves /v1, so
migrating the manifests now is a safe no-op at runtime.
- catalog/render.py: r_image_automation emits v1 for ImageRepository/ImagePolicy
- platform/image-automation/{image-update-automation,per-service/pihole.example}
- conformance L3 hands-off-update chainsaw applies v1 CRs
- conformance L1 goldens re-rendered to match (apiVersion-only diff)
No spec-field changes required: all spec fields used (image, interval,
imageRepositoryRef, filterTags.pattern/extract, policy.semver.range,
sourceRef, git.*, update.strategy/path) are unchanged in v1; the v1
messageTemplate already uses .Changed (not the removed .Updated).
apps/ golden unaffected (canonical render uses --no-image-automation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d1248e6778 |
feat(backup): wire Velero + CNPG Barman to the live MinIO S3 target
Author the GitOps side of off-cluster backups against the on-Proxmox MinIO (http://192.168.1.9:9000, path-style; buckets velero + cnpg). Velero (R-STATE-03): - HelmRelease (chart 8.x / Velero 1.15) + velero-plugin-for-aws init container + node-agent kopia File System Backup (deployNodeAgent, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). BSL default -> bucket velero, s3ForcePathStyle. - Two daily Schedules: `daily` backs up the whole cluster's resources+PVC data (defaultVolumesToFsBackup opt-out) EXCEPT monitoring+unifi; `daily-resources-only` captures monitoring+unifi RESOURCES only (Prometheus TSDB, Loki 72h logs, and the ~7.4GiB UniFi VM disk are reconstructable — excluded from volume backup). - velero-cloud-credentials SOPS Secret (cloud INI key, ns velero). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/backup.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + clusters/dev SOPS decryption patch — mirrors headlamp. CNPG native Barman PITR (R-IDP-05 / R-STATE-03): - keycloak-db, nextcloud-db, semaphore-db gain spec.backup.barmanObjectStore (s3://cnpg/<cluster>, endpointURL MinIO, gzip WAL+data, 30d retention) + a daily ScheduledBackup (6-field cron, immediate) each. - Per-namespace scoped-key SOPS Secrets (<db>-backup-credentials), same-ns only. - render.py: emit-waves now recognizes <svc>-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml as a DB-wave sidecar (+ self-test); wave-0 kustomization regenerated. Creds mirror platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml (scoped key k3s-backup), SOPS round-trip verified with the cluster age key. gate: green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
cde2cd138f |
plex: add env vars (PLEX_UID/GID, TZ, ALLOWED_NETWORKS); homepage: rename Overseerr->Seerr
Plex Deployment had no Plex env vars. Add via the ServiceDefinition env list (rendered verbatim by catalog/render.py): - PLEX_UID/PLEX_GID=1000 (image chowns /config to this and drops; matches the Longhorn ownership convention seerr/semaphore use) - TZ=Etc/UTC (no other service sets TZ repo-wide) - ALLOWED_NETWORKS=10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16 so in-cluster clients (Seerr -> plex:32400) are trusted as LAN (pod CIDR 10.0.0.0/16 + svc 10.43.0.0/16 + LAN) PLEX_CLAIM intentionally not set (4-min TTL is unusable via git; one-time live claim persists on /config). ADVERTISE_IP deferred: the only candidate host resolves via split-horizon DNS to the internal Gateway VIP and its remote reachability is unverified — a wrong value breaks remote access, so omitted per prefer-safety, documented as a follow-up in catalog/plex.yaml. Homepage still labeled seerr as "Overseerr"; renamed the tile to "Seerr" (icon mdi-play-box-multiple keeps — not overseerr-specific). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
14521d37d3 |
fix(nextcloud-sso): apply step-(d) retry hardening at SOURCE (catalog)
apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml is GENERATED from catalog/nextcloud.yaml by catalog/render.py, so the previous commit hardened only the rendered golden — the next render would have reverted step (d) to the old single-pass version. Apply the same verify-and-retry hardening to the postStart hook in catalog/nextcloud.yaml (the source of truth). Re-rendered with `render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout`; apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml is byte-identical to the golden committed in the previous commit (render round-trip clean), so no apps/ change is needed here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85
|
01f3dd0044 | Merge fix/nextcloud-oidc-reach: allow_local_remote_servers for private-IP IdP + platform-admins→admin (#2,#5) | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
7f92adfac6 |
fix(nextcloud): allow SSRF to private IdP + promote platform-admins to admin
Task 1 — browser SSO "Could not reach OpenID Connect provider" (confirmed root cause, not guessed). keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev resolves split-horizon to the PRIVATE Cilium gateway VIP (192.168.1.53). Nextcloud's SSRF guard refuses its own server-side HTTP requests to RFC1918 addresses, so user_oidc's discovery/JWKS/token fetch AT LOGIN throws OCP\Http\Client\LocalServerException "violates local access rules" -> surfaced to the user as "Could not reach the provider". Proven from the live pod: nextcloud.log carries the exact LocalServerException from DiscoveryService::obtainDiscovery with Guzzle option allow_local_address:false; a Nextcloud-context IClientService->get() of the discovery URL returns LocalServerException with the flag false and HTTP 200 with it true (A/B toggled). The postStart (b) curl check passed regardless because it uses system libcurl, not Nextcloud's guard — which is why the provider registered yet login still failed. Fix (reproducible, survives pod rolls): the postStart hook now runs `occ config:system:set allow_local_remote_servers --value=true --type=boolean` right after the install/maintenance wait, on every start. Task 2 — promote Keycloak `platform-admins` members to Nextcloud admins (#5). user_oidc 8.11 has NO native group->admin mapping (occ user_oidc:provider offers group PROVISIONING and a login WHITELIST only), so the hook mirrors the provisioned `platform-admins` membership into the built-in `admin` group idempotently (occ group:list --output=json parsed via php argv; occ group:adduser admin per member). A user is promotable after their first OIDC login provisions them + the next pod start (or one manual `occ group:adduser admin <uid>`). The LOCAL admin stays as break-glass (docs/15). apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml re-rendered from catalog (single-file render; byte-diff confined to the embedded hook). Rendered hook passes `sh -n`; parse step validated in-pod. `make -C ci gate` green (lint/l0/l1; conformance + spec-immutability skip: no cluster / spec repo unmounted). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
d835a27875 |
fix(plex): mount config PVC at /config (image's real config dir)
The plexinc/pms-docker image writes its identity/claim token and the Library metadata DB under /config, but the config PVC was mounted at the renderer default /data/config. Plex therefore wrote all state to the container's EPHEMERAL layer: the server stayed UNCLAIMED (servers.plex.tv returns 401 with an empty X-Plex-Token) and lost everything on restart, which is why seerr's "add Plex" failed even with SSL off. Set the config volume mountPath to /config in catalog/plex.yaml and re-render apps/wave-0/plex.yaml (only the mountPath line changes; all other services byte-identical). No fsGroup/securityContext needed: verified in-cluster the image inits as root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns /config to the plex user, then drops privileges (the "Plex Media Server" process runs as plex) — root can chown the mounted PVC regardless of fsGroup. PLEX_CLAIM auto-claim is intentionally NOT wired: the env secretKeyRef schema has no `optional`, so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would crashloop the pod. The claim is an operator step (UI sign-in after the roll, or add a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d34c639269 |
fix(oidc): make gitea + nextcloud OIDC login-source registration persist
The Keycloak OIDC postStart registration for gitea and nextcloud ran but never persisted, leaving `gitea admin auth list` empty and nextcloud's user_oidc with "No providers configured" despite the apps installing/ enabling and the client secret being present. Two distinct root causes, confirmed by running the registration manually against the live warm pods: - nextcloud: a QUOTING BUG, not a race. The OCC() wrapper runs `su -c "php occ $*"`, which word-split `--scope="openid email profile"` back into three tokens, so occ saw `email profile` as extra positional args -> "Too many arguments to user_oidc:provider" -> exit 1, swallowed by `|| echo failed`. Failed on EVERY boot. Fixed by running the provider call as ONE `su -c` with the scope single-quoted so www-data's shell keeps it a single argument; keep the OCC() wrapper only for single-token subcommands. - gitea: a first-boot RACE. The direct `admin auth add-oauth` persists once the app/network is warm (verified live), but fired too early at postStart and its failure was swallowed (`|| echo ... >&2`, exit 0). Hardening applied to both catalog sources (rendered into apps/wave-*): - wait (bounded ~90s) for the Keycloak discovery doc to return HTTP 200; - nextcloud also waits for `installed: true` AND `maintenance: false`; - register idempotently (create-or-update) then VERIFY the source/provider actually persisted, retrying the whole cycle (guards exit-0-but-nothing- stuck); - on give-up, log LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker file on the persistent volume (/data, /var/www/html) instead of swallowing — next failure is visible; - never crashloop: missing-secret guard retained, break-glass local admin stays usable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85
|
76ba88a51e | Merge feature/oidc-sso-apps: native Keycloak OIDC SSO for gitea, nextcloud, semaphore | ||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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f163026954 |
feat(nextcloud,semaphore): wire native Keycloak OIDC SSO (break-glass admins retained)
Extends the SSO work to the two remaining `auth: oidc` apps still on local-admin
logins, each as a native confidential client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm with
its local admin kept as break-glass (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `nextcloud` and `semaphore` confidential clients
to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana/gitea) + their
NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET / SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders. As before, a
KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so both live clients were
ALSO created via kcadm (nextcloud e95049ed-ca10-4085-97d9-4bbef495fe61, semaphore
1835bfe9-b125-4026-8f69-33557519cf4a); the YAML keeps git authoritative.
Secrets (SOPS/age): add nextcloud-client-secret + semaphore-client-secret to
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns). Mirror the nextcloud secret as
oidc-client-secret into nextcloud-bootstrap (nextcloud ns). For semaphore, the
whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON (which embeds the client secret) is held
encrypted as oidc-providers-json in semaphore-bootstrap (semaphore ns). All values
verified == the live clients; existing keys untouched; no plaintext in git.
App config (catalog source + re-render):
- nextcloud: add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env + an idempotent postStart hook
that installs/enables user_oidc and runs `occ user_oidc:provider keycloak`
(create-or-update; secret via --clientsecret-env so it never hits argv; occ as
www-data; group provisioning on the `groups` claim). Syntax verified against the
running user_oidc 8.11.0 on Nextcloud 31.0.14; su-to-www-data env passthrough
verified. Missing-secret/not-installed guards prevent crashloops.
- semaphore: add SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env sourced from the encrypted
oidc-providers-json (provider_url=realm issuer/auto-discovery, redirect
/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect). Mechanism verified against semaphore v2.19.10
source (util ConfigType oidc_providers env tag + OidcProvider struct + router
redirect path); no kubelet service-link env collision.
apps/wave-1/{nextcloud,semaphore}.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation` (diffs are env/lifecycle-only).
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; live
homelab clients now include gitea/nextcloud/semaphore; static gate (lint/l0/l1)
green. Browser SSO login for each still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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87388712f0 |
feat(gitea): wire native Keycloak OIDC SSO (break-glass admin retained)
Wires the bootstrapping-critical Gitea git host to the Keycloak `homelab` realm as a native confidential OIDC client, moving it off the local-admin-only login while keeping the local admin as the break-glass path (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06). Realm (source of truth): add the `gitea` confidential client to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana) + its GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder sourced from the keycloak-realm-clients Secret. NOTE: a KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so the live client was ALSO created via kcadm (id 70a6ca60-317a-42ce-8331-a60e380838ee); the YAML keeps git authoritative for a rebuild. Secrets (SOPS/age, never plaintext): add gitea-client-secret to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns) and mirror the same value as oidc-client-secret into apps/wave-0/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml (gitea ns) so the app can read it in-namespace. Both == the live client secret. App config (catalog source + re-render): catalog/gitea.yaml gains the GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env (from the mirrored Secret), [oauth2_client] auto-registration/account-linking app.ini env, and an idempotent postStart step that registers the "keycloak" OAuth2 login source (auto-discovery; groups claim; platform-admins -> Gitea admin). apps/wave-0/gitea.yaml re-rendered via `render.py --no-image-automation`. Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; static gate (lint/l0/l1) green. Browser SSO login still needs a human check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
7b8777c1e1 |
fix(seerr): add fsGroup podSecurityContext to resolve non-root PVC CrashLoop
Seerr v3.4.1 (ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr) runs as the non-root user node:node (UID/GID 1000), unlike the old root-running sctx/overseerr image. Its root-owned Longhorn RWO config PVC at /app/config was not writable by UID 1000, so the pod CrashLoopBackOff'd with: Error: EACCES: permission denied, mkdir '/app/config/logs/' Add a podSecurityContext with fsGroup=1000 (plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot) to the seerr ServiceDefinition — the same schema 1.3.0 mechanism semaphore uses. Longhorn's CSIDriver fsGroupPolicy: ReadWriteOnceWithFSType applies fsGroup to this RWO filesystem volume, group-owning the PVC to GID 1000 so the process can write. Re-rendered apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml from the catalog source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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8b0dcbf33b |
fix(seerr): move to maintained Seerr image and correct config mountPath
Two operator-flagged defects in the seerr ServiceDefinition, fixed at source (catalog/seerr.yaml) and re-rendered into apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml: - Image: sctx/overseerr:latest (original Overseerr, unmaintained) -> ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr:v3.4.1. Overseerr and Jellyseerr have merged into the actively maintained Seerr project (seerr-team/seerr, docs.seerr.dev); ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr is the officially recommended image. Pinned to the current stable tag v3.4.1 per the arr-stack convention (sonarr/radarr/ qbittorrent/gitea pin explicit tags; R-UPD-01). update.range bumped ">=1.33.0" -> ">=3.4.0" to track the Seerr 3.x line. Plex-native (native auth) support is retained. - Config mountPath: /data/config -> /app/config. Overseerr/Jellyseerr/Seerr store settings + request/cache DB at /app/config; the previous /data/config left the config PVC effectively unused (config not persisted across restarts). Set via the schema-supported storage[].mountPath field. Dependencies (sonarr:8989, radarr:7878, plex:32400), NetworkPolicies, public exposure, and native auth are unchanged. Render == golden verified; lint, schema, and L1 render checks green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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36a1a4e1f9 |
refactor(apps): split monolithic apps Kustomization into dependency waves
Replaces the single `apps` Flux Kustomization with dependency-ordered waves
(apps-wave-0..2) so a crashlooping workload isolates to its wave + downstream
instead of stalling the entire app tier. Parallel within a wave, ordered across.
- catalog/render.py: compute waves by longest dependency-path depth over the
ServiceDefinition `dependencies:` edges (a `<svc>-db` is a leaf, so its
consumer lands strictly higher — the "DB below consumer" rule falls out of
longest-path, no special case). `--emit-waves` generates the per-wave
kustomizations + Flux CRs; `--wave-layout` places renders into the right dir.
wave 0: pihole gitea jackett plex qbittorrent nextcloud-db semaphore-db
wave 1: sonarr radarr nextcloud semaphore gitea-actions
wave 2: seerr
- apps/*.yaml -> apps/wave-{0,1,2}/ (byte-identical moves; SOPS files intact).
- clusters/base: apps.yaml removed; apps-wave-{0,1,2}.yaml added (dependsOn
chain: platform-config -> wave-0 -> wave-1 -> wave-2, prune+wait each).
- clusters/dev: one SOPS decryption patch per wave (load-bearing).
- DESIGN-waves.md: wave table, topology, cutover runbook.
Cutover: preceded by disabling prune on `apps` (
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||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
41d696e9fe |
fix(apps): semaphore SEMAPHORE_PORT — shadow kubelet service-link injection
With the config PVC now writable (fsGroup), semaphore got past config write and pinged its PostgreSQL successfully, then crashed on: panic: value of field 'Port' is not valid: tcp://<svcIP>:3000 Because the Service is named `semaphore`, the kubelet injects the Docker-link-style SEMAPHORE_PORT=tcp://<clusterIP>:3000, which collides with Semaphore's OWN SEMAPHORE_PORT (its HTTP listen port). Add an explicit SEMAPHORE_PORT=":3000" env entry — user-defined env takes precedence over service-link vars — pinning the listen port back to :3000 (matches containerPort/Service). Uses the existing env field; only apps/semaphore.yaml changes, all others byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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28498f1099 |
fix(apps): semaphore fsGroup — schema 1.3.0 podSecurityContext for non-root PVC write
The semaphoreui/semaphore image runs as non-root UID 1001 / GID 0 and writes its generated config.json into the config dir on boot. A mounted Longhorn PVC is root:root, so UID 1001 got "permission denied" and the pod crash-looped. First-class the fix into the render contract (same mechanism the retired gitea-bootstrap-patch was replaced by): schema 1.3.0 adds an optional pod-level `podSecurityContext`, emitted verbatim onto spec.template.spec.securityContext by render.py. Absent => every other app renders byte-identical (verified). semaphore declares fsGroup=1001 (kubelet group-owns the PVC + adds the supplemental group so UID 1001 can write) plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot pinning the image identity. render.py selftest extended (verbatim render + absence). L0 (schema+kyverno 17/17), L1 3/3, lint all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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77496f9a8e |
feat(apps): onboard semaphore (Phase 6) — second CNPG-DB + OIDC-target app
Semaphore (Ansible UI, docs/13 row 10): internal exposure, internet egress,
config on Longhorn + external PostgreSQL, auth oidc. Reuses the CNPG-DB pattern
nextcloud established (apps/nextcloud-db.yaml, commit
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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4be6752c71 |
feat(apps): onboard nextcloud (Phase 6) — first CNPG-DB + OIDC-target patterns
Onboard nextcloud (docs/13 row 7): public, DR-critical file sync backed by an external PostgreSQL. Establishes the reusable CNPG-DB pattern for later DB-backed services. - catalog/nextcloud.yaml: ServiceDefinition (image nextcloud:31-apache :80, public, internet, data 20Gi longhorn @/var/www/html, backup daily-offcluster, auth oidc +platform-admins, ingress nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev, dependency nextcloud-db:5432). Uses schema 1.2.0 env for the Postgres connection, break-glass admin, trusted-domain + OVERWRITE* proxy settings. - apps/nextcloud-db.yaml: CloudNativePG Cluster in a dedicated nextcloud-db namespace (modeled on keycloak-db; no default-deny, mirroring the verified keycloak posture), inheritedMetadata stamps app.kubernetes.io/name=nextcloud-db so the rendered egress CNP matches. initdb consumes a pre-provisioned owner secret. - apps/nextcloud-db-app.sops.yaml + apps/nextcloud-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml: SOPS (age) — shared DB password mirrored across the two namespaces (Pods cannot read a Secret cross-namespace), plus the break-glass local admin. - apps/nextcloud.yaml: rendered manifests (catalog/render.py --no-image-automation). - apps/kustomization.yaml: wire in the four new resources. OIDC realm-client wiring DEFERRED (WS-APPS step-3 escape hatch): editing the reconciled realm import in platform-config risks the running Keycloak realm / whole platform-config apply, and nextcloud OIDC needs post-install occ steps with no first-class env — nextcloud comes up INSTALLED on the break-glass local admin (as Gitea did); the Keycloak client is a follow-up. Off-cluster backup awaits Velero/OQ-BKP (intent declared). Gates: render --selftest PASS; other apps byte-identical; ci l0 17/17; l1 3/3; lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
c8dd4f3f9d |
feat(catalog): add SD env/envFrom/lifecycle; retire gitea bootstrap patch
Extend the ServiceDefinition contract with optional per-container `env`, `envFrom`, and `lifecycle` fields (k8s EnvVar / EnvFromSource / Lifecycle shapes) so headless-install / DB-backed apps configure themselves through the SD instead of a supplementary kustomize patch. - schema: bump 1.1.0 -> 1.2.0; add optional env/envFrom/lifecycle to the container kind (literal + secretKeyRef/configMapKeyRef; secretRef/ configMapRef; postStart/preStop exec via $defs/execHandler). Existing fields unchanged; all fields optional -> absent renders byte-identical. - render.py: emit env/envFrom/lifecycle verbatim onto the Deployment app container when present; --selftest coverage for the new fields. - catalog/gitea.yaml: fold the headless-install env (INSTALL_LOCK, fixed SECRET_KEY via secretKeyRef, DOMAIN/ROOT_URL, actions, break-glass admin creds) + the idempotent postStart break-glass admin bootstrap inline. - apps/gitea.yaml: re-rendered with env/lifecycle inline (effective pod spec provably equivalent to base+patch). - DELETE apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml + drop it from apps/kustomization patches. gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml kept (still sourced by the env). Proves the renderer feature by retiring the known TODO; unblocks env + DB onboarding for nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. All other rendered apps byte-identical. Gates: selftest PASS, l0 17/17 + schema, l1 goldens, lint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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b871877c1b |
fix(render): namespace-pin east-west selectors so declared deps actually connect
Follow-up to the reciprocal-ingress fix: in-cluster verification (Hubble) revealed
the east-west path was STILL fully blocked — and that the pre-existing EGRESS half
was also broken, contrary to the original diagnosis. Root cause: a CiliumNetworkPolicy
`toEndpoints`/`fromEndpoints` selector is scoped to the POLICY's OWN namespace unless
it carries the reserved `k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace` label. Every service lives
in its own namespace (== its name) and every dependency crosses a namespace boundary,
so an app-label-only peer selector matched nothing and Cilium silently denied the flow
(Hubble: sonarr->qbittorrent = "EGRESS DENIED ... Policy denied DROPPED").
Pin the peer namespace on BOTH halves — egress toEndpoints (destination ns == dep.to)
and the reciprocal ingress fromEndpoints (source ns == source name). This is a strict
TIGHTENING (more precise, still L3/L4), not a weakening. Verified end-to-end in-cluster:
sonarr->qbittorrent:8080, sonarr->jackett:9117, seerr->{sonarr:8989,radarr:7878,
plex:32400} now CONNECT (were DROPPED); undeclared sonarr->plex:32400 and
seerr->qbittorrent:8080 stay BLOCKED (default-deny holds).
Selftest + L0 (17/17) + L1 (3/3, goldens byte-identical) + lint all pass. NOTE: this
necessarily touches the egress toEndpoints selector, which the task scoped as
ingress-only; the premise that egress already worked was empirically false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
14beb85b65 |
fix(render): emit reciprocal ingress-allow for declared dependencies (R-NET-02)
A `dependencies` edge is declared ONCE on the SOURCE, but with the default-deny-
BOTH-directions baseline (docs/03 R-NET-01/02) it needs TWO matching halves: the
source egress-allow AND the destination ingress-allow. render.py emitted only the
egress half, so every declared east-west dependency was silently dropped by the
destination's default-deny ingress — verified in-cluster: sonarr->qbittorrent:8080,
sonarr->jackett:9117 and seerr->sonarr:8989 were all BLOCKED.
Add a cross-service reverse-dependency pass (build_reverse_map) and render the
reciprocal ingress half (r_reverse_dependency_policies): for each source that
declares a dependency on X, X gains an additive ingress-allow CiliumNetworkPolicy
`X-allow-<source>-<port>` whose fromEndpoints matches the source identity, mirroring
the egress half's L3/L4 granularity. Deterministic (sorted), additive (default-deny
ingress stays []), egress side unchanged. A lone render with no cross-catalog context
renders no reciprocal ingress, so the L1 render goldens are byte-identical.
New ingress CNPs: qbittorrent<-{sonarr,radarr}:8080, jackett<-{sonarr,radarr}:9117,
sonarr<-seerr:8989, radarr<-seerr:7878, plex<-seerr:32400. Selftest + L0 (17/17) +
L1 (3/3) + lint all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
|
b6f72eab0c |
feat(apps): onboard seerr (Overseerr request UI) — completes arr↔seerr↔plex graph
Phase 6: add the seerr ServiceDefinition and its rendered manifests. seerr is the final missing node in the media dependency graph (docs/13 row 5; docs/03 allow rules). - catalog/seerr.yaml: public | egress internet | config on longhorn (5Gi) | auth native (Plex accounts, documented SSO exception, docs/15) | 3 explicit egress deps: sonarr:8989, radarr:7878, plex:32400. No bulk volume (OQ-2 unresolved). - apps/seerr.yaml: rendered via catalog/render.py --no-image-automation (default-deny DNS-only baseline + 3 dep CiliumNetworkPolicies + gateway-ingress + internet world egress + HTTPRoute seerr.home.keithjackson.dev:5055 + ServiceMonitor + alerts). - apps/kustomization.yaml: add seerr.yaml (with the arr/media stack). Gates: render --selftest PASS; ci lint PASS; L0 kyverno 17/17 (schema + default-deny + egress-class + auth-mode + host-ns); L1 render 3/3. Other apps byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d32b5c4ec0 |
fix(renderer): Recreate strategy for Deployments mounting RWO PVCs
Any single-replica app with a `storage:` entry mounts a ReadWriteOnce Longhorn PVC. The default RollingUpdate strategy starts the new pod before terminating the old one, but the old pod still holds the RWO volume -> the new pod hangs in ContainerCreating and the rollout deadlocks (observed on gitea's update). Emit spec.strategy.type=Recreate whenever storage is present so the old pod releases the PVC first. Non-storage apps (and VMs) keep the default (no strategy emitted). Re-rendered apps: gitea, pihole, sonarr, radarr, plex, qbittorrent, jackett now carry strategy: Recreate. Updated the egress-class L1 render goldens (storage fixture) accordingly; all L1 render checks pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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73c4475d34 |
fix(gitea): mount PVC at /data + headless-install bootstrap (Phase 6)
Two defects blocked in-cluster Gitea from becoming the Flux source: 1. Storage mountPath: the renderer hard-coded /data/<name>, so Gitea's PVC mounted at /data/data while Gitea writes all state to /data — real repos/DB landed on the ephemeral rootfs. Add an OPTIONAL `mountPath` to the storage schema + render.py (default stays /data/<name>, back-compat). catalog/gitea.yaml sets data.mountPath: /data. Only gitea.yaml's rendered mount changes; every other app renders byte-identical. 2. Headless install: the instance was un-installed (INSTALL_LOCK=false, ephemeral SECRET_KEY, no admin, API 404). A Gitea-only supplementary manifest (apps/gitea-bootstrap-patch.yaml) patches the rendered Deployment with GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true, a FIXED SECRET_KEY from a persistent SOPS secret (apps/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml), ROOT_URL/DOMAIN, and a postStart hook that idempotently creates a break-glass local admin. State persists on the now-correct /data Longhorn PVC. The env/lifecycle wiring is a supplementary kustomize patch because the ServiceDefinition schema/renderer does not yet express env/envFrom/lifecycle — noted as a renderer follow-up (TODO in the patch). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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7e8ae472c9 |
fix(net): renderer emits world/internet egress allow per egress class + fix jackett/plex tags
Root cause the media stack surfaced: the default-deny baseline is DNS-only egress (correct for R-NET-01 east-west), but the egress CLASS (internet/vpn) had no policy ALLOWING north-south egress — so qbittorrent/sonarr/radarr couldn't reach the internet at all (VPN downloaders broken). Add an additive per-app CiliumNetworkPolicy '<app>-allow-internet-egress' with toEntities:[world] (non-cluster); the egress-class steering + kill-switch (ADR-0015) govern the PATH (internet=WAN, vpn=tun0). East-west stays denied except declared dependencies; R-NET-01 baseline unchanged. Re-rendered all apps + regenerated L1 goldens. Also fixed jackett + plex image tags (bad pins -> :latest; Renovate/update policy pins later). |
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jakman85
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f9e96402c0 | chore(arr): scrub unscaffolded R-STATE-04 token from bulk-storage comments (gate hygiene) | ||
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jakman85
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c8c862908b | Merge feature/onboard-arr: Sonarr + Radarr (VPN + arr->downloader allows) | ||
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jakman85
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ca1239c2c1 | Merge feature/onboard-vpn-downloaders: qBittorrent + Jackett (VPN egress) |