Add the offline_access optional client scope to the `kubernetes`
kubelogin client so the operator's kubectl can request long-lived
OFFLINE refresh tokens (--oidc-extra-scope=offline_access) instead of
being forced to re-auth on the realm's ONLINE session timeouts
(ssoSessionIdleTimeout 30m / ssoSessionMaxLifespan 10h). Offline tokens
honour offlineSessionIdleTimeout 30d with no hard max lifespan.
- keycloak-realm-import.yaml: add optionalClientScopes: [offline_access]
to the kubernetes client so a fresh realm import reproduces it.
- k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml: document the kubeconfig exec-arg
(--oidc-extra-scope=offline_access) + clear-cache/re-login steps.
Realm session timeouts unchanged; scope is optional (opt-in) and
client-only. Applied live via kcadm (reversible).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Homepage v2.1.2 treats proxmox.yaml as a required config file (present in
the image skeleton dir /app/src/skeleton alongside services/settings/
bookmarks/widgets/docker/kubernetes/custom.*). On startup it copies a
default skeleton into /app/config for any required file that is missing.
The ConfigMap provided every skeleton file except proxmox.yaml, so the pod
tried to copyfile the proxmox skeleton into the read-only subPath-mounted
/app/config and crashed with EACCES -> CrashLoopBackOff -> Gateway "no
healthy upstream".
Provide an empty proxmox.yaml in the ConfigMap and mount it via subPath
like the other config files, so Homepage finds all required files and
never writes at runtime. Verified the full required set against the running
image's skeleton dir (9 files); proxmox.yaml was the only missing one.
Bumped checksum/config annotation to re-roll the pod.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Deploy Homepage (gethomepage) as the apex landing dashboard aggregating
links to cluster services, in its OWN non-gating post-platform Flux
Kustomization (clusters/base/homepage.yaml, dependsOn platform-config,
wait:false) — mirrors headlamp/oauth2-proxy so a leaf UI can never gate
the platform chain.
- platform/homepage/: plain manifests (ns, config ConfigMap, Deployment,
Service, default-deny+Cilium ingress NP, apex HTTPRoute). Non-root pod,
HOMEPAGE_ALLOWED_HOSTS, bundled mdi-* icons (DNS-only egress).
- gateway.yaml: add https-apex + http-apex-redirect listeners for the bare
apex (the *.home wildcard listener does NOT match it). Apex is already a
SAN on the wildcard cert — no new Certificate.
- Forward-auth annotated (auth-mode=forward-auth) but NOT enforced: the
Gateway ext-authz mechanism is an unbuilt Phase-6 WS-NET TODO (same status
as all other forward-auth apps). Flagged as PM follow-up.
Gate: lint/l0/render-golden(10/10)/l1 green; conformance skipped (no cluster).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Headlamp's HelmRelease sat in the wait:true `platform` Flux tier. Its pod
crashlooped (`flag provided but not defined: -session-ttl` — chart 0.40.1
renders a container arg the appVersion v0.40.1 backend lacks; upstream
kubernetes-sigs/headlamp#4883), and because it gated `platform`, the whole
chain stalled: platform Ready=Unknown -> platform-config, oauth2-proxy,
apps-wave-0/1/2 and apps-vms all Ready=False "dependency not ready".
Part A (unblock + durable lesson): a leaf UI must never gate the chain. Move
all Headlamp resources into a new non-gating Flux Kustomization
clusters/base/headlamp.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false, SOPS
decryption patched per-env in clusters/dev) — mirroring oauth2-proxy exactly.
The new Kustomization owns the whole platform/headlamp component; its HTTPRoute
moves from platform-config into platform/headlamp/kustomization.yaml. Removed
headlamp from platform/kustomization.yaml and its httproute from
platform-config/kustomization.yaml. Now a crashlooping Headlamp can never stall
platform/platform-config/apps.
Part B (make it start): pin the chart to 0.41.0 (`>=0.41.0 <0.42.0`). The
backend added `f.Int("session-ttl", …)` in v0.41.0 and chart 0.41.0 pins that
same image (appVersion == chart version), so chart+image realign; every arg the
chart renders for our values is supported. OIDC config + per-user RBAC
(clusterRoleBinding.create:false) unchanged.
Gate: `make -C ci gate` PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Add Headlamp (kubernetes-sigs/headlamp Helm chart) at
headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev with native Keycloak OIDC login and PER-USER
RBAC: Headlamp forwards each user's id_token to the k3s apiserver, so the
existing oidc:* group bindings (platform-admins->cluster-admin, viewers->view)
apply per user. The ServiceAccount is deliberately NOT bound to cluster-admin
(clusterRoleBinding.create=false), since user requests ride the forwarded token.
Key integration nuance: the apiserver is configured oidc-client-id=kubernetes,
so it only accepts tokens whose aud contains `kubernetes`. The new `headlamp`
Keycloak client carries an oidc-audience-mapper (included.client.audience=
kubernetes) so tokens carry aud=[headlamp, kubernetes] -- accepted by both
Headlamp's own verifier and the apiserver, leaving the apiserver config
untouched. A groups mapper emits the `groups` claim the apiserver maps to RBAC.
- platform/headlamp: namespace, HelmRepository/HelmRelease, SOPS OIDC secret
(externalSecret envFrom), default-deny NetworkPolicy + Cilium ingress
(gateway)/egress (apiserver+Keycloak) policies, README. Wired into
platform/kustomization.yaml (platform tier).
- platform/headlamp/httproute.yaml wired into platform-config (Gateway API CR,
dependsOn platform), modeled on grafana-httproute.
- keycloak-realm-import: add `headlamp` confidential client + groups/audience
mappers + HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder. Client also created LIVE via
kcadm (realm import no-ops on the existing realm).
- keycloak-realm-clients.sops: add headlamp-client-secret (mirrored into
headlamp-oidc-credentials clientSecret). Both encrypted to the repo age key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
bpg/proxmox deprecates proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file ("Use
proxmox_download_file instead. This resource will be removed in v1.0."),
the short-name rename from ADR-007. Both are the same dual-registered
Framework resource, so rename the resource type + import_from reference
and add a `moved` block. OpenTofu 1.9 drives the provider's MoveState
(migration.PrefixMoveState) to transfer state in place: same id, no
re-download of the Debian image, no change to the VMs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The committed apps/ goldens were a MIX of two render flag sets: 8 services
were rendered with `--no-image-automation` (no image CRs) while gitea and
nextcloud carried stale ImageRepository/ImagePolicy CRs from a render WITHOUT
the flag. Neither single command reproduced all goldens, and the gate did not
catch it.
Part A — canonical render:
python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation
`--no-image-automation` is canonical: image automation is authored-but-DISABLED
(DECISIONS-LOG; image-reflector/-automation controllers not installed), and
every app was onboarded via this flag. Re-render drops the ImageRepository +
ImagePolicy objects from gitea + nextcloud only (52 line deletions, purely the
trailing image-automation blocks). No functional content changed — the
nextcloud postStart hardening and gitea OIDC hook are untouched.
Part B — enforcement:
ci/render-golden.sh renders every onboarded catalog service with the canonical
command into a temp dir and FAILS on ANY diff vs committed apps/ (missing
golden or content drift), across all 10 services (not just the 3 L1 spot-checks).
Not-onboarded catalog entries (keycloak, vm-demo) are excluded per DESIGN-waves.
Wired as a required no-cluster stage in ci/gate.sh, ci/Makefile, and both the
live (.gitea/workflows/gate.yml) and dormant (merge-gate.yaml) pipelines.
Proof: tampering a golden makes the stage exit 1 (blocks merge); reverting
restores exit 0. `make -C ci gate` green in the devcontainer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml is GENERATED from catalog/nextcloud.yaml by
catalog/render.py, so the previous commit hardened only the rendered golden —
the next render would have reverted step (d) to the old single-pass version.
Apply the same verify-and-retry hardening to the postStart hook in
catalog/nextcloud.yaml (the source of truth). Re-rendered with
`render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout`; apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml is
byte-identical to the golden committed in the previous commit (render round-trip
clean), so no apps/ change is needed here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two SSO follow-ups the operator hit after Nextcloud OIDC login worked.
1. Sign-out "redirect failed". On logout user_oidc redirects the browser to
Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud
base '/'> and client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider
sendIdTokenHint=0). Keycloak then validates that redirect against the
client's post.logout.redirect.uris attribute, which was empty -> "Invalid
redirect uri" -> the operator's "redirect failed". Register
https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/* on the nextcloud client
(attributes.post.logout.redirect.uris). Applied live via kcadm and captured
here so git stays authoritative (a RealmImport no-ops on the existing realm).
2. postStart step (d) mirrors platform-admins -> built-in admin group, but the
previous single best-effort pass ran occ group:adduser once with output
swallowed and no retry. At early boot (container Started ~9s after create)
that call can transiently fail (DB / maintenance race), silently dropping the
promotion until the next restart. Harden step (d) with a verify-and-retry
loop (like step (c)): re-read group:list and re-add any platform-admins
member still missing from admin until verified (bounded ~30s), no-op for
existing members.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Replace the gitignored plaintext infra/tofu/.r2.env and backend.hcl with a
single committed, SOPS/age-encrypted dotenv (secrets.sops.env) plus a thin
wrapper (tf.sh), so tofu runs with no manual secret entry and secrets live
encrypted in git like the repo's other secrets.
- .sops.yaml: creation rule encrypting infra/tofu/secrets.sops.env (all values)
to the existing age recipient.
- secrets.sops.env: encrypted, PLACEHOLDER values only. Holds R2 S3 keys, the
state-encryption passphrase (TF_STATE_PASSPHRASE scalar), and the Proxmox API
token/endpoint. Operator fills real values via `sops`.
- tf.sh: sops exec-env decrypts the dotenv, exports PROXMOX_VE_*/AWS_*, builds
the multi-line TF_ENCRYPTION HCL from TF_STATE_PASSPHRASE, and runs tofu
(injecting -backend-config=backend.r2.hcl on init). Proxmox token stays env-only,
never a tofu variable/state.
- backend.r2.hcl: committed non-secret R2 bucket/key/endpoint (account id is not
a credential), passed to `tofu init`.
- Retire .r2.env/backend.hcl(.example): drop the committed templates; keep the
gitignore lines as a safety net for leftover local plaintext.
- Update backend.tf/README/REMOTE-STATE for the new day-2 flow and DR story
(repo + age key is sufficient).
Verified: placeholder file round-trips sops -e/-d with the repo age key; tf.sh
exports the expected VAR NAMES and builds valid TF_ENCRYPTION HCL (stub tofu, no
real plan/secrets).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Task 1 — browser SSO "Could not reach OpenID Connect provider" (confirmed root
cause, not guessed). keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev resolves split-horizon to the
PRIVATE Cilium gateway VIP (192.168.1.53). Nextcloud's SSRF guard refuses its own
server-side HTTP requests to RFC1918 addresses, so user_oidc's discovery/JWKS/token
fetch AT LOGIN throws OCP\Http\Client\LocalServerException "violates local access
rules" -> surfaced to the user as "Could not reach the provider". Proven from the
live pod: nextcloud.log carries the exact LocalServerException from
DiscoveryService::obtainDiscovery with Guzzle option allow_local_address:false; a
Nextcloud-context IClientService->get() of the discovery URL returns
LocalServerException with the flag false and HTTP 200 with it true (A/B toggled).
The postStart (b) curl check passed regardless because it uses system libcurl, not
Nextcloud's guard — which is why the provider registered yet login still failed.
Fix (reproducible, survives pod rolls): the postStart hook now runs
`occ config:system:set allow_local_remote_servers --value=true --type=boolean`
right after the install/maintenance wait, on every start.
Task 2 — promote Keycloak `platform-admins` members to Nextcloud admins (#5).
user_oidc 8.11 has NO native group->admin mapping (occ user_oidc:provider offers
group PROVISIONING and a login WHITELIST only), so the hook mirrors the provisioned
`platform-admins` membership into the built-in `admin` group idempotently (occ
group:list --output=json parsed via php argv; occ group:adduser admin per member).
A user is promotable after their first OIDC login provisions them + the next pod
start (or one manual `occ group:adduser admin <uid>`). The LOCAL admin stays as
break-glass (docs/15).
apps/wave-1/nextcloud.yaml re-rendered from catalog (single-file render; byte-diff
confined to the embedded hook). Rendered hook passes `sh -n`; parse step validated
in-pod. `make -C ci gate` green (lint/l0/l1; conformance + spec-immutability skip:
no cluster / spec repo unmounted).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The plexinc/pms-docker image writes its identity/claim token and the
Library metadata DB under /config, but the config PVC was mounted at the
renderer default /data/config. Plex therefore wrote all state to the
container's EPHEMERAL layer: the server stayed UNCLAIMED (servers.plex.tv
returns 401 with an empty X-Plex-Token) and lost everything on restart,
which is why seerr's "add Plex" failed even with SSL off.
Set the config volume mountPath to /config in catalog/plex.yaml and
re-render apps/wave-0/plex.yaml (only the mountPath line changes; all
other services byte-identical). No fsGroup/securityContext needed:
verified in-cluster the image inits as root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns
/config to the plex user, then drops privileges (the "Plex Media Server"
process runs as plex) — root can chown the mounted PVC regardless of
fsGroup.
PLEX_CLAIM auto-claim is intentionally NOT wired: the env secretKeyRef
schema has no `optional`, so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would
crashloop the pod. The claim is an operator step (UI sign-in after the
roll, or add a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
oauth2-proxy is a leaf forward-auth service that depends on Keycloak +
trusted wildcard TLS + split-horizon DNS. It lived in the gating `platform`
Flux Kustomization (wait:true), so on a cold start it Failed until those
dependencies existed, keeping the whole `platform` tier not-Ready. That in
turn blocked `platform-config` — which brings up the very Keycloak instance,
wildcard Certificate and L2 VIP oauth2-proxy needs (and previously carried
oauth2-proxy's own httproute/servicemonitor) — from ever reconciling. A
self-gating cold-start deadlock, twice-proven (DECISIONS-LOG sessions 7 & 9).
Break the cycle by moving the whole oauth2-proxy component out of the
`platform` tier into its own non-gating post-platform Flux Kustomization:
- clusters/base/oauth2-proxy.yaml: new Kustomization -> ./platform/oauth2-proxy,
dependsOn platform-config, wait:false, substituteFrom cluster-vars.
- clusters/base/kustomization.yaml: reference the new Kustomization.
- platform/kustomization.yaml: drop the oauth2-proxy component (no longer in
the gating tier).
- platform/oauth2-proxy/kustomization.yaml: pull in httproute + servicemonitor
so the full component travels together.
- platform-config/kustomization.yaml: drop the in-place oauth2-proxy
httproute/servicemonitor refs (moved with the controller).
- clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml: add the SOPS decryption patch for the new
oauth2-proxy Kustomization (it now owns the encrypted credentials Secret that
the `platform` Kustomization used to decrypt).
Now `platform` reaches Ready without oauth2-proxy; platform-config brings up
Keycloak/TLS/DNS; then oauth2-proxy reconciles against dependencies that
already exist. wait:false guarantees its health can never gate anything above
it. No config of oauth2-proxy itself changed — only its reconciliation tier.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
R-STATE-02 was the last safety-critical requirement with no verifying test,
exempted via DOCUMENTED_GAPS. Author the L3 fault-injection test that proves the
guarantee and remove the exemption.
tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss/chainsaw-test.yaml:
GIVEN a 3-replica Longhorn volume with written data attached on node N,
WHEN N is removed from service (cordon + evict the attached workload, forcing
the volume to detach from N),
THEN a fresh workload on a SURVIVING node re-attaches the same volume and reads
the canary intact — volume stays available, cluster reconverges.
Safe-by-construction for the 3-node embedded-etcd dev cluster:
- Disruption scoped to EXACTLY ONE node, at the scheduling layer only (cordon +
evict our own pod). kubelet/etcd stay up — etcd quorum is never touched.
- Never `kubectl drain`; only our own writer pod is deleted, so no unrelated or
system pod is disturbed.
- Victim node labelled conformance.home.k3s/cordoned-by=<test-ns>; `finally`
ALWAYS uncordons every node with THAT label and removes it — restored even on
failure/timeout, and never touches an operator-cordoned node.
- Self-skips green until a longhorn StorageClass AND >= 3 Ready nodes exist.
Bookkeeping:
- run.sh: remove R-STATE-02 from DOCUMENTED_GAPS; add node-loss to CONF_HEAVY_TESTS
(serial pass, matches the other Longhorn/KubeVirt L3 tests).
- incluster/rbac.yaml: enable the scoped nodes get/list/patch rule the test needs
(cordon/uncordon/label); no eviction rights (no drain).
- README.md / coverage.py docstring: refresh the documented-gap example.
Coverage: 36/51 -> 37/51 (70.6% -> 72.5%); safety-critical gaps 1 -> 0. Only
R-STATE-02 changed ([] -> node-loss); no other requirement or golden touched.
NOTE: LIVE execution is DEFERRED to an operator-chosen maintenance window. This
change AUTHORS + statically validates the test (renders, chainsaw-lints, harness
selects it, coverage updates). The static gate runs L2/L3 as SKIP without a
cluster (expected). The node-disruption test was NOT run live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The Keycloak OIDC postStart registration for gitea and nextcloud ran but
never persisted, leaving `gitea admin auth list` empty and nextcloud's
user_oidc with "No providers configured" despite the apps installing/
enabling and the client secret being present.
Two distinct root causes, confirmed by running the registration manually
against the live warm pods:
- nextcloud: a QUOTING BUG, not a race. The OCC() wrapper runs
`su -c "php occ $*"`, which word-split `--scope="openid email profile"`
back into three tokens, so occ saw `email profile` as extra positional
args -> "Too many arguments to user_oidc:provider" -> exit 1, swallowed
by `|| echo failed`. Failed on EVERY boot. Fixed by running the provider
call as ONE `su -c` with the scope single-quoted so www-data's shell
keeps it a single argument; keep the OCC() wrapper only for single-token
subcommands.
- gitea: a first-boot RACE. The direct `admin auth add-oauth` persists once
the app/network is warm (verified live), but fired too early at postStart
and its failure was swallowed (`|| echo ... >&2`, exit 0).
Hardening applied to both catalog sources (rendered into apps/wave-*):
- wait (bounded ~90s) for the Keycloak discovery doc to return HTTP 200;
- nextcloud also waits for `installed: true` AND `maintenance: false`;
- register idempotently (create-or-update) then VERIFY the source/provider
actually persisted, retrying the whole cycle (guards exit-0-but-nothing-
stuck);
- on give-up, log LOUDLY to stderr AND a marker file on the persistent
volume (/data, /var/www/html) instead of swallowing — next failure is
visible;
- never crashloop: missing-secret guard retained, break-glass local admin
stays usable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Extends the SSO work to the two remaining `auth: oidc` apps still on local-admin
logins, each as a native confidential client of the Keycloak `homelab` realm with
its local admin kept as break-glass (docs/15 availability caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `nextcloud` and `semaphore` confidential clients
to platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana/gitea) + their
NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET / SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders. As before, a
KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so both live clients were
ALSO created via kcadm (nextcloud e95049ed-ca10-4085-97d9-4bbef495fe61, semaphore
1835bfe9-b125-4026-8f69-33557519cf4a); the YAML keeps git authoritative.
Secrets (SOPS/age): add nextcloud-client-secret + semaphore-client-secret to
keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns). Mirror the nextcloud secret as
oidc-client-secret into nextcloud-bootstrap (nextcloud ns). For semaphore, the
whole SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS JSON (which embeds the client secret) is held
encrypted as oidc-providers-json in semaphore-bootstrap (semaphore ns). All values
verified == the live clients; existing keys untouched; no plaintext in git.
App config (catalog source + re-render):
- nextcloud: add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env + an idempotent postStart hook
that installs/enables user_oidc and runs `occ user_oidc:provider keycloak`
(create-or-update; secret via --clientsecret-env so it never hits argv; occ as
www-data; group provisioning on the `groups` claim). Syntax verified against the
running user_oidc 8.11.0 on Nextcloud 31.0.14; su-to-www-data env passthrough
verified. Missing-secret/not-installed guards prevent crashloops.
- semaphore: add SEMAPHORE_OIDC_PROVIDERS env sourced from the encrypted
oidc-providers-json (provider_url=realm issuer/auto-discovery, redirect
/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect). Mechanism verified against semaphore v2.19.10
source (util ConfigType oidc_providers env tag + OidcProvider struct + router
redirect path); no kubelet service-link env collision.
apps/wave-1/{nextcloud,semaphore}.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation` (diffs are env/lifecycle-only).
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run; live
homelab clients now include gitea/nextcloud/semaphore; static gate (lint/l0/l1)
green. Browser SSO login for each still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Wires the bootstrapping-critical Gitea git host to the Keycloak `homelab` realm
as a native confidential OIDC client, moving it off the local-admin-only login
while keeping the local admin as the break-glass path (docs/15 availability
caveat; R-IDP-02/06).
Realm (source of truth): add the `gitea` confidential client to
platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-import.yaml (modeled on grafana) + its
GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder sourced from the keycloak-realm-clients Secret.
NOTE: a KeycloakRealmImport no-ops on an already-existing realm, so the live
client was ALSO created via kcadm (id 70a6ca60-317a-42ce-8331-a60e380838ee);
the YAML keeps git authoritative for a rebuild.
Secrets (SOPS/age, never plaintext): add gitea-client-secret to
platform/keycloak/keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml (keycloak ns) and mirror the
same value as oidc-client-secret into apps/wave-0/gitea-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml
(gitea ns) so the app can read it in-namespace. Both == the live client secret.
App config (catalog source + re-render): catalog/gitea.yaml gains the
GITEA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET env (from the mirrored Secret), [oauth2_client]
auto-registration/account-linking app.ini env, and an idempotent postStart step
that registers the "keycloak" OAuth2 login source (auto-discovery; groups claim;
platform-admins -> Gitea admin). apps/wave-0/gitea.yaml re-rendered via
`render.py --no-image-automation`.
Verified: realm import Done=True/HasErrors=False and platform-config
Ready=True/Healthy=True (unchanged); edited realm YAML passes server dry-run;
static gate (lint/l0/l1) green. Browser SSO login still needs a human check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Seerr v3.4.1 (ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr) runs as the non-root user node:node
(UID/GID 1000), unlike the old root-running sctx/overseerr image. Its root-owned
Longhorn RWO config PVC at /app/config was not writable by UID 1000, so the pod
CrashLoopBackOff'd with:
Error: EACCES: permission denied, mkdir '/app/config/logs/'
Add a podSecurityContext with fsGroup=1000 (plus runAsUser/runAsGroup/runAsNonRoot)
to the seerr ServiceDefinition — the same schema 1.3.0 mechanism semaphore uses.
Longhorn's CSIDriver fsGroupPolicy: ReadWriteOnceWithFSType applies fsGroup to this
RWO filesystem volume, group-owning the PVC to GID 1000 so the process can write.
Re-rendered apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml from the catalog source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
backend.tf began with a stray YAML `---` doc separator (invalid HCL) that broke
`tofu` parsing. Remove it. Also document the one-time `unencrypted` fallback method
needed to adopt encryption on pre-existing plaintext state (add for the migrate,
remove after), so the record is complete. State migration to R2 verified: 4/4
resources read back through the encrypt-only method (proves ciphertext at rest).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two operator-flagged defects in the seerr ServiceDefinition, fixed at source
(catalog/seerr.yaml) and re-rendered into apps/wave-2/seerr.yaml:
- Image: sctx/overseerr:latest (original Overseerr, unmaintained) ->
ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr:v3.4.1. Overseerr and Jellyseerr have merged into
the actively maintained Seerr project (seerr-team/seerr, docs.seerr.dev);
ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr is the officially recommended image. Pinned to the
current stable tag v3.4.1 per the arr-stack convention (sonarr/radarr/
qbittorrent/gitea pin explicit tags; R-UPD-01). update.range bumped
">=1.33.0" -> ">=3.4.0" to track the Seerr 3.x line. Plex-native (native
auth) support is retained.
- Config mountPath: /data/config -> /app/config. Overseerr/Jellyseerr/Seerr
store settings + request/cache DB at /app/config; the previous /data/config
left the config PVC effectively unused (config not persisted across
restarts). Set via the schema-supported storage[].mountPath field.
Dependencies (sonarr:8989, radarr:7878, plex:32400), NetworkPolicies,
public exposure, and native auth are unchanged. Render == golden verified;
lint, schema, and L1 render checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Local-only tfstate meant losing the workstation would strand a rebuild (apply
would try to recreate the 3 live nodes). Move state to Cloudflare R2, which sits
OUTSIDE the Proxmox->VM->cluster->Gitea chain, so a full cluster rebuild can still
read it; encrypted at rest via OpenTofu native AES-GCM.
Adds a partial s3 backend (R2 skip-flags), gitignored backend.hcl/.r2.env for the
account-specific + secret bits, their .example templates, and a migration+DR runbook.
Locking (use_lockfile) deferred to an OpenTofu >=1.10 bump (1.9.0 lacks it).
Migration (tofu init -migrate-state) runs once the operator provisions the R2 bucket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Reconciles the documentation with the deployed platform (the root README still
claimed Phase 0 / no cluster; the infra docs described a retired libvirt cluster;
DECISIONS-LOG.md had gone ~85 commits stale), and fixes the two independent
defects that had left the merge gate BLOCKED on main:
- yamllint commas errors in the hand-authored apps/vms/unifi manifests
(whitespace only; kustomize output byte-identical);
- ci/touched-requirements.sh scanning whole file contents instead of the diff,
which mis-attributed requirements to changes that never touched them and made
appending to the decision log fail CI.
Gate verified in the devcontainer: spec-immutability / lint / l0 / l1 green,
MERGE GATE: PASS.
The content-scan half of the 'stop keying on doc-header tokens' follow-up is done
(ci/touched-requirements.sh). The path-map half remains: clusters/* and ci/* are
still keyed wholesale to R-ENV-02 + R-GITOPS-01, which is why those two stay in
DOCUMENTED_GAPS. Notes the accepted consequence for header-declared manifests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
`ci/touched-requirements.sh` documents its detection as "R-* tokens literally
present in the diff of changed files". It did not do that — it grepped the ENTIRE
CONTENT of every changed file. So a change inherited every requirement those files
had ever mentioned in prose, and `--require-all` then blocked the merge on
requirements the author never went near.
On this branch that meant editing the decision log and the tofu docs dragged in
five unrelated requirements, all on untouched lines, all legitimately uncovered:
[coverage] REQUIRE: FAILED — required requirement(s) uncovered: [5 IDs]
The practical effect was that the PM could not append to the decision log without
failing CI — which is a fair part of why the log went stale in the first place.
This is the defect already logged as "FOLLOW-UP (WS-TEST): fix the matcher so real
requirements need not be exempted".
Two scoping rules, both learned from the gate blocking merges it should not have:
1. Scan the ADDED/REMOVED lines of the diff, as the header always claimed.
Removed lines count too — deleting a test's requirement tag, or a policy's
self-declared ID, touches that requirement just as much as adding one.
2. Skip `*.md`. An ID in prose is a REFERENCE, not a declaration: explaining a
requirement is not changing behaviour against it. Rule 1 alone is not enough —
a commit that documents a mis-attribution names the IDs involved and thereby
re-triggers the very mis-attribution it fixes, and the decision log can never
record which requirements a change concerned.
This TIGHTENS attribution rather than weakening the gate:
- no requirement is exempted, and DOCUMENTED_GAPS is untouched;
- authoritative declarations (`conformance.home.k3s/R-*` tags, Kyverno policies,
ServiceDefinitions) all live in YAML, on lines a real change must touch;
- the coarse path->requirement fallback is unchanged and file-type agnostic, so
the doc subtrees that matter (conformance/, schemas/, catalog/, clusters/, ci/)
stay covered either way.
Alternatives rejected: adding the five IDs to DOCUMENTED_GAPS genuinely weakens the
gate; scrubbing requirement IDs out of prose (precedent f9e9640) would mean editing
the decision log's own history to appease a matcher.
Gate semantics change — flagged in DECISIONS-LOG.md for review.
Also drops three R-TEST-06 mentions this branch had added to prose and refreshes
the now-stale "gate is RED" notes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The docs had drifted badly behind ~85 commits of delivery. The root README still
said "Phase 0 — Foundations. No cluster exists yet"; the infra docs still
described a libvirt/KVM cluster that has been retired for two days; and
DECISIONS-LOG.md — the PM's authoritative record — stopped at 2026-08-25 AM.
Anyone following these docs would have been working from a false map.
Verified against the live cluster (3/3 nodes, 7/7 Flux Kustomizations Ready,
10/10 HelmReleases Ready) rather than inferred from commit messages.
README.md
- Phase 0 -> a per-phase status table: 0-6 delivered and deployed, 7 not open.
- Layout now shows the wave split, platform-config, apps/vms, infra, bootstrap.
- Real conformance number (36/51, 70.6%) and how to regenerate it.
- Devcontainer workflow; note that the gate was red and why.
infra/PHASE1-STATUS.md — rewritten. Was a `virsh`/libvirt resume guide for a
cluster that no longer exists. Now: the Proxmox substrate, the pfSense NAT
paths, both kubectl access paths (Keycloak OIDC normal / cert break-glass),
the toolchain, off-repo state that must not be lost, and the fact that Flux's
git source is an app inside the cluster (`git push origin main` IS the deploy).
infra/PHASE1-SCOPE.md — historical banner. The exit criteria and sizing
rationale are still worth keeping; the libvirt execution steps are not.
infra/README.md — Proxmox, plus a map of the subtree and where the cluster
actually lives (it is not on this workstation).
infra/devcontainer/README.md — the "run tofu and ansible on the HOST" limitation
is OBSOLETE: it was a dmacvicar/libvirt polkit/PID problem, and bpg/proxmox
talks to an HTTP API. Everything runs in the container now. Documents the full
CI-gate toolchain and what each bind mount is load-bearing for (the age keyring
and the read-only spec repo especially — without the latter, spec-immutability
silently skips instead of verifying).
infra/tofu/README.md — was "Authoring only — nothing here has been applied". It
is applied and live. Disk sizes corrected 40/100 -> 64/128 GiB (confirmed
against the running nodes), pfSense NAT marked done, and a warning that
terraform.tfstate is absent on a fresh workstation — an apply with empty state
would try to recreate the three live nodes.
infra/tofu/variables.tf — section comment disagreed with its own defaults.
infra/cluster.sh — retired-with-instructions header. It silently drives libvirt
domains that do not exist; behaviour unchanged, but it no longer lies.
apps/vms/unifi/README.md — was "NOT WIRED IN", 60Gi, and listed a file that has
since been dropped. Now: live status, 40Gi, resolved open questions marked
resolved, and the two constraints the next person will otherwise rediscover —
KubeVirt's 2048B inline userData cap, and that apps-vms must never carry
postBuild.substituteFrom (envsubst corrupts the cloud-init).
DECISIONS-LOG.md — backfilled the gap as one structured entry: the Proxmox
migration, NAT + kube-vip, the twice-proven oauth2-proxy cold-start deadlock,
the Flux source cutover, CI going live in-cluster, ten app onboardings and the
renderer bugs they exposed, the wave split (verified: DBs adopted, not
recreated — original ages intact, prune restored), KubeVirt storage, the UniFi
VM, and kubectl SSO. Plus verified live state and the carried-forward open list.
Two corrections to the record while verifying:
- kubectl OIDC is LIVE (`kubectl auth whoami` -> oidc:<user>,
[oidc:platform-admins]), so the rolling restart 3472f1d deferred has
happened.
- UniFi OS Server is NOT installed in the guest. The VM is healthy (Ubuntu
24.04.4, guest agent connected, live-migratable) but :11443 answers nothing,
and the CNP explicitly permits cluster -> :11443, so it is genuinely not
listening rather than a policy artifact.
Docs and comments only; no manifest semantics change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The hand-authored UniFi VM manifests used column-aligned inline flow mappings
(`{ name: inform, port: 8080, protocol: TCP }`), which yamllint's `commas`
rule rejects as "too many spaces after comma". That made `make -C ci lint` FAIL,
so the merge gate has been BLOCKED on `main` since the UniFi commits landed —
every other static stage was green.
Collapse each run of spaces after a comma to one, and re-align the trailing
comments so the port tables stay readable. Whitespace only:
`kubectl kustomize apps/vms` renders byte-for-byte identically before and after.
The lint config is left untouched — relaxing the rule to make failing files pass
is moving the goalposts, not fixing the code.
Also refresh these files' stale `STAGING / DRAFT` headers: the tree is live,
reconciled by the non-gating `apps-vms` Flux Kustomization.
Gate after this change: spec-immutability / lint / l0 / l1 all green,
MERGE GATE: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Lets users kubectl into the cluster via Keycloak SSO, mapping realm groups to
cluster RBAC. The cert-based admin kubeconfig is untouched and remains a fully
independent break-glass path (works even if Keycloak/OIDC is down).
- keycloak-realm-import.yaml: new `kubernetes` PUBLIC client + PKCE (S256) — no
client secret in any kubeconfig; kubelogin runs auth-code+PKCE to localhost.
groups mapper + email/profile/roles scopes.
- k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (NEW, platform-config): ClusterRoleBindings
oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view.
- k3s_server role: kube-apiserver-arg OIDC flags (issuer=homelab realm,
client-id=kubernetes, username-claim=email + oidc: prefix, groups-claim=groups
+ oidc: prefix). No oidc-ca-file (nodes reach the issuer via the gateway VIP
and trust the public LE cert). Applied via the rolling Restart k3s handler.
Keycloak/RBAC land via Flux now; the API-server flags take effect on the next
`ansible-playbook playbooks/k3s.yml` rolling restart (deferred until cluster load
from the VM-import incident settles).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
760084e only committed the unifi-cloudinit.yaml deletion — the `git add` errored
on that already-staged pathspec and skipped the other two files, leaving the
kustomization still referencing the deleted file (broken build). Commit the
intended changes: 30-virtualmachine.yaml inline userData + kustomization.yaml
without the secretGenerator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
userDataSecretRef tripped a Flux server-side-apply schema quirk on the KubeVirt
VirtualMachine CRD ("field not declared in schema"). Go back to inline userData,
trimmed to 1112 bytes (< the 2048 limit) by dropping the break-glass SSH key —
no longer needed for debugging now that the postBuild cloud-init corruption is
fixed. Keeps qemu-guest-agent (AgentConnected proves cloud-init ran) and the
public-API UOS resolver + non-interactive install. Removes the secretGenerator +
unifi-cloudinit.yaml. (Add SSH back via userDataSecretRef only if the SSA quirk is
worked around and guest access is needed.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Adding the SSH key pushed the inline cloudInitNoCloud.userData over KubeVirt's
2048-byte limit ("userdata exceeds 2048 byte limit. Should use UserDataSecretRef").
Move the cloud-init into apps/vms/unifi/unifi-cloudinit.yaml and wrap it as the
`unifi-cloudinit` Secret via a Kustomize secretGenerator (disableNameSuffixHash
so the VM can reference it by fixed name); VM now uses userDataSecretRef. Content
is non-sensitive (public key + public installer script), so not SOPS-encrypted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Flux's postBuild.substituteFrom runs envsubst over the WHOLE manifest, including
the VM cloud-init userData. It was substituting every shell `${...}` in the UOS
install script (${UOS_URL}, the API-resolver ${...}) to empty — which is why the
first UOS install silently did nothing — and ${PIPESTATUS[0]} then broke the
build entirely ("missing closing brace"), blocking apps-vms reconcile.
VM manifests use no cluster-vars, so substitution is unneeded. Removed it; the
cloud-init shell now reaches the guest intact. (A future VM needing a cluster-var
must escape its shell `${...}` as `$${...}`.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The first UOS bring-up left no way into the guest (cloud-init set no
credentials), so the in-guest UOS install couldn't be observed. Add:
- ssh_authorized_keys (public key, safe to commit) on the default ubuntu user
- qemu-guest-agent (KubeVirt AgentConnected + virtctl guest access)
- tee the install-uos output to the serial console + /var/log/uos-install.log,
and record the installer exit code, so the install is observable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The UniFi Block import got past the device-permission fix but then failed
ReplicaSchedulingFailure / "insufficient storage": CDI sizes scratch ~= the disk
virtual size and, on the default 3-replica `longhorn` class, the ~60Gi scratch x3
(189G) on top of the disk's x3 (180G) overflowed the Longhorn tier (~125G/node).
- platform/longhorn/storageclasses.yaml: NEW `longhorn-scratch` StorageClass
(numberOfReplicas: 1) — CDI scratch is ephemeral/throwaway, replicating it 3x is
waste; if a node dies mid-import CDI just retries.
- platform/kubevirt/cdi-cr.yaml: spec.config.scratchSpaceStorageClass ->
longhorn-scratch.
- apps/vms/unifi/20-datavolume.yaml: boot disk 60Gi -> 40Gi (UOS min is 25Gi;
40Gi is comfortable for a home site and lighter on the replicated tier).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The k3s nodes authorize ~/.ssh/home_network for the `k3s` user, but ansible.cfg
set no private_key_file and there's no ssh_config entry for the SSH-NAT host, so
node-config plays (e.g. the rolling k3s config.yaml + Restart handler) failed
with Permission denied (publickey). Pin the key so those plays connect without a
per-run --private-key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The UniFi VM boot-disk DataVolume (RWX + Block on longhorn-vm) failed to import:
CDI's non-root importer (UID 107, cap-drop ALL) hit
`blockdev: cannot open /dev/cdi-block-volume: Permission denied`.
Kubernetes only applies fsGroup ownership to *filesystem* volumes — it never
chowns a raw block device — and Longhorn's CSIDriver (fsGroupPolicy:
ReadWriteOnceWithFSType) skips fsGroup on RWX/Block volumes regardless, so the
device stays root:root. The CDI-documented fix is the container-runtime setting
`device_ownership_from_security_context`, exposed on k3s (>= v1.31.3+k3s1, this
cluster is v1.31.5) as `nonroot-devices: true`. It makes containerd set the
in-container device node's owner from the pod's securityContext.
Added to the Ansible-managed /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml alongside tls-san;
applied via the existing rolling `Restart k3s` handler (serial:1, kube-vip keeps
the API up, etcd holds 2/3). Node-scoped, security-neutral (pods stay non-root),
and preserves the longhorn-vm RWX/Block/migratable contract unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8